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Fischer Black (1986) points out, that as a result of noise we are forced to act largely in the dark. 
In this book, I have collected three research papers based on the common premise that an 
encounter between theory and practice can contrast noise with information, in the research area 
of managerial compensation. Based on my experience as a remuneration committee advisor, 
combined with the use of academic insights, it is the objective to contribute to the literature in 
three ways: i) Open the black box of the executive remuneration decision; ii) Capture the 
executive remuneration structure in a single quantifiable yardstick; iii) Work with a new and 
potentially unique dataset on profit centre head remuneration. I will further elaborate on this in 
section 1.3, in which the outline of the book and the research questions are discussed. The 
upcoming section 1.2 provides three anchor points for the sake of readability.   
 
1.2 Anchor points 
1.2.1 Managerial compensation contracting: society is watching 
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of large corporations are among the best paid individuals in 
our society. In terms of the Dutch environment, CEOs of AEX-listed companies earn multiples 
of the salary of the Prime Minister of the Netherlands and typically more than pilots, college 
professors, lawyers, surgeons, etc.
1 It is no wonder, therefore, that CEO remuneration contracts 
are the object of considerable attention and scrutiny. The topic of executive compensation and 
CEO compensation in particular, is discussed, among other places, on social networks, in the 
popular press, at shareholder meetings, in the political arena and, last but not least, in the 
academic world. These discussions concern the total level of compensation, the increase in 
compensation over time (in absolute or relative sense), the determinants of CEO pay, the 
(in)sensitivity to firm performance, international pay differences, etc.  
 
Given the emotions that sometimes accompany the topic of executive compensation, it is the 
task of academia to bring facts into the equation.  This can only be achieved if there is a bridge 
                                                      
1 For example, refer to the article ‘Wie verdient wat?’, Elsevier, 24 June 2010, which reflects salary levels 
of 257 jobs in the Netherlands.  
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of communication between academics and practitioners. Given my dual background of working 
as a remuneration committee advisor, on the one hand, and an academic researcher, on the 
other, I have taken this into account as an anchor point. 
 
1.2.2 Corporate finance theory and beyond 
Corporate finance theory is my starting point for studying managerial compensation issues 
within firms. Financing these enterprises implies raising and investing capital to create unique 
combinations of physical and human capital. There is a difference between financing physical 
capital, on the one hand, and human capital, on the other. Physical assets, such as a machine that 
produces product ‘X’, can be financed by multiple financial instruments, typically using some 
form of longer-term debt or equity. The method of finance can change the cost of capital (and 
consequently the company’s value) but not the return of the machine directly. With regard to 
financing (managerial) human capital, there is an added dimension: the way it is financed can 
also result in a varying return. Under the assumption that financial incentives drive people’s 
behaviour, providing a CEO with share-based payments provides an incentive to take NPV > 0 
actions and could result in a higher return for the company. So the need for outside debt and 
equity in the ‘modern (industrial) corporation’, on the one hand, creates an agency problem that, 
on the other, can also be resolved in part by the way the company and, specifically, human 
capital are financed. The three main areas in corporate finance, reflected in table 1.1, provide 
context for analysing the assumed conflict between shareholders and management and are 
implicit anchor points throughout this paper. 
 
Table 1.1: Corporate finance building blocks in relation to executive remuneration 
Element Comments 
Capital structure  In light of the agency problem, the optimal capital structure strikes a balance 
between debt and equity to limit perk consumption (disciplinary role of debt), 
and financial distress/taking excessive risks, in order to minimise overall 
agency costs. It is widely accepted that agency problems can often be reduced 
more efficiently by introduction of an (optimal) incentive scheme. This implies 
a shift away from using the entire company’s financial structure towards 
contract theory. 
Corporate governance  There are several ways to define corporate governance. In a broad sense, it 
deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations ensure 
obtaining a return on their investment. Good governance is needed as the 
market does not allocate all resources efficiently without intervention from 
above. The market has its costs and firms alleviate these costs by replacing the 
price mechanism with the exercise of authority. At listed companies, 
management does not own the company but largely controls it. Corporate 
governance studies how authority is allocated and exercised; how do suppliers 
of finance control managers? 
Valuation  The value of a firm equals the discounted sum of payoffs generated by the firm 
minus the opportunity cost of the inputs used, minus rents paid out to 
production factors (such as labour/human capital). Rents in this respect refer to 




tend to be paid above their opportunity cost. Some researchers argue that top-
executives also derive rents from the company (for example as a result of a 
lack of corporate governance). The valuation of the firm is furthermore 
important since creating (shareholder) value is the primary goal of a company 
in neo-classical finance theory. An optimal incentive contract should take this 
objective (goal alignment) into account. 
 
While corporate finance theory is my point of departure, the executive compensation literature 
is interdisciplinary by nature, and fertile ground for study.
2 I will use an eclectic approach to 
marry theoretical insights and practical experience.  
 
1.2.3 Remuneration level and structure (ex ante versus ex post compensation) 
This book divides managerial compensation into its ‘level’ and ‘structure’. The level primarily 
relates to the ex-ante price level of human capital (also referred to as ‘expected’ or ‘on target’ 
compensation). The structure relates to the design of the pay contract which, in combination 
with the achieved performance level, results in ex-post or realised compensation. Table 1.2 
provides an example.  
 
Table 1.2: Illustration of ex-ante versus ex-post compensation of a CEO 
This table shows the direct compensation elements of a CEO remuneration contract. The variables are: i) 
‘Base salary’ which equals fixed compensation/non-contingent pay, including items such as 13th-month 
salary, vacation allowance plus other non-performance-related allowances; ii) ‘Short-term incentive’ 
which equals the annual bonus; iii) ‘Long-term incentive’ which equals the annualised expected value of 
long-term incentive awards such as stock options, share grants and other long-term rewards; iv) ‘Total 
direct compensation’ which equals the sum of these three elements. The ex ante or expected total direct 
compensation level equals € 3,000,000. Based on different states of the world (here: bad company results 
and  good company results), the ex post or actual remuneration ranges between € 1,750,000 and € 
4,250,000. 
  Ex post value of 
compensation – 
bad company results 
Ex ante value of 
compensation 
Ex post value of 
compensation –  
good company results 
Base salary   € 1,000,000  € 1,000,000  € 1,000,000 
Short-term incentive   € 250,000  € 500,000  € 750,000 
Long-term incentive  € 500,000  € 1,500,000  € 2,500,000 
      
Total direct compensation   € 1,750,000  € 3,000,000  € 4,250,000 
 
                                                      
2 For example, managerial compensation contracting has received ample attention in the legal and 
accounting literature. Another example is the work of Nobel Prize laureate Daniel Kahneman. From a 
psychologist’s perspective, he analyses ways in which economics has traditionally misunderstood human 
behaviour. For example, these maps of bounded rationality explore the heuristics that people use, decision 
making under risk, and framing effects with their implications for rational-agent models (Kahneman, 
2003). Acknowledging that economic agents, including the contracting parties (e.g. CEO and 
remuneration committee), are only bounded rationally is essential to understanding the executive 
remuneration decision and the existing remuneration landscape.   
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The division between ex ante and ex post remuneration is my final anchor point. It suggests that 
remuneration contracts can differ in terms of: i) the level of the ex ante compensation; ii) the 
remuneration structure, which determines the actual payment in different states of the world.  
 
1.3 Chapter overview   
As mentioned in the first section of this introduction, the objective of this thesis is to add to the 
managerial compensation contracting literature in three ways: i) Open the black box of the 
executive remuneration decision; ii) Capture the executive remuneration structure in a single 
quantifiable yardstick; iii) Work with a new and potentially unique dataset on profit centre head 
remuneration. The chapters of research are based on these three approaches, as set forth. 
1.3.1 Chapter 2: The Executive Remuneration Decision  
Drafting a remuneration policy, i.e. setting remuneration levels and designing a remuneration 
structure, in large corporations, is essentially performed by the remuneration committee.
3 Given 
that bounded rationality, labour market imperfections, and the importance of process are 
acknowledged, questions regarding the role of the remuneration committee and its decision-
making methodology become relevant. There is a vast body of literature that looks from the 
outside in, which transforms the executive remuneration decision process into a black box. 
Collecting data and testing hypotheses based on different theoretical models, has resulted in a 
debate among various traditions that claim to explain remuneration practices. Because there is 
no theoretical model that really applies, some scholars argue that this has fragmented the debate. 
Therefore, in chapter 2 my objective is to comment on some of the existing theoretical anchor 
points from a practical view, focusing on the role of the remuneration committee and its 
decisions. An eclectic perspective is taken, resulting in four lenses that summarise the practical 
comments. The combination of these lenses can be used to enhance the setting up and 
interpretation of future empirical research. Furthermore, it provides company stakeholders with 
ways to analyse the executive compensation process, as well as the resulting decisions on level 
and structure.  
 
The following research questions form the basis of the chapter outline: 1) What does the top 
executive remuneration landscape look like (level and structure)?; 2) What is the role of the 
remuneration committee in the executive remuneration level decision?; 3) What is the role of 
the remuneration committee in the executive remuneration structure decision?; 4) How are real-
life executive remuneration decisions made? 
                                                      
3 In this thesis I will use the term remuneration committee and compensation committee interchangeably. 
I will assume that it represents the full (supervisory) board in its decisions.   
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1.3.2 Chapter 3: Executive Remuneration Structure and the CompRisk Index  
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) conclude their survey of corporate governance with the following 
question, among others, for further research: ‘Given the large impact of executives’ actions on 
values of firms, why aren’t very high powered incentive contracts used more often in the United 
States and the rest of the world?’ Meanwhile, this question has been answered. Too much of a 
good incentive results in counterproductive behaviour. Incidence of backdating stock options, 
misstatements, fraud, overvalued equity and financial distress have been linked to measures of 
incentive strength, such as the exposure to stock option gains and losses, Denis et al. (2006), 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), Cullinan et al. (2006), Jensen (2005), Efendi et al. (2004), 
Tian (2004).  
 
Incentives can be classified into portfolio- and performance-incentives. The first category refers 
to the structure of the CEO’s portfolio of stock options and shares which are (assumed to be) 
part of his wealth. The sensitivity of CEO wealth to share price movements (delta) and to share 
return volatility (vega) has been widely researched both analytically and empirically, among 
others Hemmer et al. (1999), Guay (1999) and Coles et al. (2006).
4 The second category refers 
to the structure of unvested rights, including the short-term incentive and the long-term 
incentive plans. In comparison to the first category, there is a fundamental difference. Shares 
and option portfolios in the first category can be directly linked to share price movements and 
return volatility. In contrast, the assessment of performance-incentives follows a two-staged 
approach. The underlying option and/ or share vehicle needs be taken into account, but even 
more important is the performance condition. It determines whether or not there will be an 
addition to the portfolio or not.
5 For the research in chapter 3, I will focus on the second 
category from an ex ante perspective.
6  
                                                      
4 Note that a related stream of research focuses on the implications of the magnitude of the portfolio on 
the value of compensation, from the perspective of the executive. It concludes that if a risk-averse 
manager has a significant part of his wealth tied to his firm’s stock price, the certainty equivalent value of 
that compensation contract can be substantially less than its cost as perceived by shareholders, e.g. 
Lambert et al. (1991), Hall and Murphy (2002). Valuation of the executive compensation contract from 
the perspective of the executive is not my objective. This would involve making assumptions on the risk 
preferences of the CEO. In contrast, the goal is, based on the perspective of the company and based on the 
valuation tools that are used in practice for IFRS 2 accounting, to establish a consistent measure that can 
capture the variability of future remuneration policy payments. 
5 Such a performance condition can become quite elaborate. For example, within a relative total 
shareholder return plan, not only the price path of the company should be simulated, but also the price 
paths of the companies in the reference group (sometimes over 100 companies). The analyses of possible 
future payouts furthermore needs to take into account the payout curve, which determines the payment in 
each possible state of the world. 
6 Note that the pay-for-performance literature has focused on the ex post perspective. At the moment the 
package is realised the executive is no longer at risk and therefore this moment is not suited for a risk 
analysis in the second category (performance incentives). Only if payout is in shares or options and these 
vehicles remain part of the wealth of the CEO, a risk exposure analysis can be executed. However, this 
would fall in category one (portfolio incentives).    
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A typical measure of ‘compensation at risk’ in this stream of research is the pay mix, i.e. 
variable compensation divided by total compensation. It is my objective in chapter 3, to 
improve this proxy by taking into account underlying contract details. The compensation risk 
index (or CompRisk index) that I put forward, is based on the coefficient of variation and 
measures the variability of each unit of expected reward. In this light it is closely related to the 
inverse of the Sharpe ratio (1966, 1994), but free from the noise that would be introduced by the 
need for a relevant risk free human capital benchmark. The CompRisk index can be used by 
researchers to capture the remuneration structure in a single quantifiable yardstick. This enables 
research on the determinants of observed remuneration structures.
7 Remuneration committees 
can use the tool to balance risk and reward in executive compensation contracts. The CompRisk 
index has the potential to reinforce the bridge between theory and practice, because the 
underlying techniques are based on the international financial reporting standard 2, which is 
followed by companies in light of the valuation of share-based payments for the accounting 
statements. 
 
Besides developing the CompRisk index and presenting the observed landscape of CEO 
compensation risk in the Netherlands and the UK, I explore the use of the measure and research 
its determinants. The research is based on a dataset of handpicked CEO-contract information of 
the largest listed Dutch and UK firms over the 2001-2008 period.
8 The data cover all industries.  
 
The following research questions form the basis of the chapter outline: 1) How to define a 
single quantifiable metric that can capture the structure, risk or incentive strength of yearly 
compensation contracts?; 2) What is the level of risk in real-life compensation contracts in the 
Netherlands and the UK?; 3) How can the CompRisk index be used?; 4) What are the 
determinants of compensation risk, as measured by the CompRisk index? 
 
1.3.3 Chapter 4: Determinants of Profit Centre Head Remuneration  
In the quest for survival, businesses try to obtain a strategic advantage. This can be achieved by 
means of optimally financing the business, developing a superior strategy and executing this 
strategy. It goes without saying that human capital is indispensable in this equation; i.e. 
attracting the best people to the organisation, retaining them and motivating them to deploy their 
abilities at the benefit of the company.  It can be safely assumed that the success of the business 
                                                      
7 It can also be used as a proxy for CEO risk acceptance or as a right-hand-side variable in research on 
managerial risk taking. 
8 The dataset focuses on the largest listed companies (scope figures for the companies in the dataset are 
presented in section 3.3). This may imply that the research is not representative for small and / or non-
listed companies. This is a limitation.  
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is a positive function of the amount of talent in the organisation. Human capital becomes 
additionally important when one moves up the corporate ladder. This is because decisions 
geometrically affect the organisation; positively or negatively. The CEO has final decisive 
power. However, an important part of his power is cascaded to managers, so called  profit centre 
heads (PCH), that report directly or indirectly to him. These individuals have profit & loss 
responsibility for a part of the business and / or are jointly responsible for the total company. In 
light of the aforementioned topics of attraction, retention and motivation, as well as the general 
topic of optimally financing the business, this topic is of interest to the academic world 
(Bushman, Indjejikian & Smith, 1995). 
 
However, research on executive remuneration typically focuses on the CEO and/or executive 
board, whereas the level below the board remains invisible. This is the case, because detailed 
profit centre head (PCH) information for the layer below the top of the corporate hierarchy is 
scarce for the U.S. (Fisher and Govindarajan, 1992). It is even scarcer for European firms. 
Because it is considered private information, empirical research on this subject is difficult to 
execute. We therefore provide such research in chapter 4, based on a unique dataset of 645 
European firms covering 16,415 CEO/PCH observations over the 2000-2008 time span, made 
available by Towers Perrin.
9 The objectives are to execute a broad research on the (time variant 
and invariant) determinants of PCH remuneration, the pay gap with the CEO and to use a PCH 
performance proxy to establish a measure for CEO excess remuneration. We follow a new 
approach for this line of research that strictly separates between ex ante (expected) 
compensation at t=0, and ex post compensation at the moment of realisation. This allows for 
more detailed conclusions.  
 
The following research questions form the basis of the chapter outline: 1) What are the 
determinants of profit centre head remuneration?; 2) What are the determinants of the CEO-
PCH remuneration gap?; 3) Do CEOs have more power to influence their actual bonus than 
PCHs? 
 
1.3.4 Outline of the book  
Each of the research chapters 2, 3, and 4 can be read independently from the other chapters. 
Chapters start with an introduction in which the objective and the research questions are 
                                                      
9 The dataset focuses on large companies (scope figures for the companies in the dataset are presented in 




described, and end with a summary and conclusion, followed by an overview of references, 
summary of research variables (chapter 3 and 4) and other appendices.  
 
Table 1.3 Outline of the book  
This table shows the structure of the remainder of this book. Besides the introductory chapter, the book 
consists of three research chapters. For each chapter, a brief description, the underlying sources, 
geographical focus of the data, and position focus are shown.  
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The Executive Remuneration Decision 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The objective of this book, is to add to the managerial compensation contracting literature in 
three ways: i) Open the black box of the executive remuneration decision; ii) Capture the 
executive remuneration structure in a single quantifiable yardstick; iii) Work with a new and 
potentially unique dataset on profit centre head remuneration. In this research chapter, I focus 
on the first approach mentioned. Drafting the remuneration policy, i.e. setting remuneration 
levels and designing a remuneration structure, with performance measures, payment vehicle, 
payment zone, etc., in large corporations is effectively performed by the remuneration 
committee. What exactly is its role and how are decisions reached? 
  
There is a vast body of literature that looks from the outside in, which transforms the executive 
remuneration decision process into a black box. Collecting data and testing hypotheses based on 
different theoretical models, has resulted in a debate among various traditions that claim to 
explain remuneration practices. Because there is no theoretical model that really applies, some 
scholars argue that this has fragmented the debate. In this research chapter the objective, 
therefore, is to comment on some of the existing theoretical anchor points from a practical view, 
focusing on the role of the remuneration committee. An eclectic perspective is taken, resulting 
in four lenses that summarise the practical comments. The combination of these lenses can be 
used to enhance the setting up and interpretation of future empirical research. Furthermore, it 
provides company stakeholders with a tool to analyse the executive compensation process and 
the resulting decisions on level and structure.
 10  
 
I will combine data of the European executive remuneration landscape, based on our research 
for the Dutch Corporate Governance Code Monitoring Committee (2007), with theoretical 
literature research
11 as well as practical experience in the field, working as a remuneration 
committee advisor.  
                                                      
10 In the Netherlands, since the introduction of the ‘Tabaksblat Code’ in 2004, shareholders adopt the 
remuneration policy of the Board of Management and approve the long-term incentive plan. Furthermore, 
the staff council has an advisory voice to the AGM regarding Board of Management compensation 
(change of article 2:135 BW as per July 1, 2010;  www.justitie.nl).  
11 Theoretical insight is obtained by studying academic papers and books. Over 250 references are 
incorporated in this chapter.  
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2.1.1 Research questions  
The objective is to comment on some of the existing theoretical anchor points from a practical 
view, focusing on the role of the remuneration committee and its decisions. An eclectic 
perspective will be taken, resulting in four lenses that summarise the practical comments. In 
section 2.2 to 2.5, I will follow the process of answering four underlying research questions as 
shown in table 2.1.  
 
Table 2.1: Research questions 
This table provides an overview of the research questions of this chapter, the objectives, and the reference 
to the relevant section.  
Research questions  Objectives  Section 
1) What does the top executive 
remuneration landscape look 
like (level and structure)? 
The objective is to provide an overview of market 
practice for the largest listed companies in the 
Netherlands, relative to 6 other European countries as 
well as the U.S. 
2.2 
2) What is the role of the 
remuneration committee in the 
executive remuneration level 
decision? 
The objective is to provide an overview of the 
fundamental characteristics of the pricing mechanism 
in the CEO labour market segment. Practical comments 
are based on the role of the remuneration committee. 
2.3 
3) What is the role of the 
remuneration committee in the 
executive remuneration 
structure decision? 
The objective is to provide an overview of the 
advances that have been made in the contract literature. 
Practical comments are based on the role of the 
remuneration committee. 
2.4 
4) How are real-life executive 
remuneration decisions made? 
The objective is to summarise the practical comments, 
into an eclectic perspective. The combined four lenses 




2.1.2 Research structure  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: section 2.2 starts with an overview of the 
European executive remuneration landscape, focusing especially on the remuneration policy for 
the CEO position. The policy determines how the remuneration level is established and what the 
remuneration structure looks like. Differences per company and/or country are described and 
require a further analysis of the theoretical anchor points of remuneration policies within the 
practical context of the role of the remuneration committee. With regard to the remuneration 
level, section 2.3 provides the fundamentals of the CEO labour market segment, and describes 
the role of the remuneration committee (see section 2.3.4). With regard to the remuneration 
structure, section 2.4 describes the fundamentals of incentive contracts and the role of the 
remuneration committee (see section 2.4.4). Section 2.5 summarises the practical comments into 
an eclectic perspective to provide insight in the executive remuneration decision. Section 2.6 
ends this chapter, with a summary and conclusion.  
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2.2 The executive remuneration landscape 
This section provides an overview of the Dutch executive remuneration landscape in a European 
and U.S. context. The objective is to obtain an overview of remuneration policy market practice 
among the largest listed companies in Europe, based on public as well as proprietary data. For 
this purpose, in 2007, a questionnaire (see appendix 2.1) was drafted and sent out to seven 
Towers Perrin offices in Europe (the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Belgium, 
Italy and Sweden), as part of our research for the Dutch Monitoring Committee Corporate 
Governance Code. For each country, it was decided to focus on the constituents of the most 
important stock market index. In order to provide additional context, we also sent the 
questionnaire to the New York office of Towers Perrin to obtain a U.S. view as well.  The data 
is therefore representative for the largest listed companies in each of the markets. Because these 
companies are typically early adopters, the results may represent a broader market trend as well. 
Table 2.2 provides an overview of the country and company focus:
12 
 
Table 2.2: Country and company focus of research 
This table provides an overview of the researched countries and companies.  
Country Company  focus 
The Netherlands  AEX 25 
United Kingdom  FTSE 30 
Germany DAX  30 
France CAC  40 
Belgium BEL  20 
Italy MIB  30 
Sweden OMXS  30 
United States  Fortune 500 
 
Our special interest focuses on the way compensation packages are set up and in what type of 
structures they are operated: short-term versus longer-term focus, how targets are determined, 
what type of vehicles and performance measures are used, etc. In this light, we will first provide 
the country specific corporate governance context in which these decisions are made (see 
section 2.2.1) Subsequently, the results of the survey are reflected in terms of compensation 
level (see section 2.2.2), and compensation structure (see section 2.2.3). 
                                                      
12 The questionnaires have been developed by the research committee of the Monitoring Committee 
Dutch Corporate Governance Code (2007), based on typical survey questions of Towers Perrin. All 
questionnaires have been filled out by local consultants in the relevant countries. I have processed these 
questionnaires into a view of each market. Some information will be presented at a higher-level than other 
information, to ensure that Towers Perrin is not in breach of contract with their clients, given the 
proprietary nature of some of the data.  
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2.2.1 Corporate governance context in which remuneration decisions are made 
Executive remuneration contracts are part of a broader set of governance mechanisms that 
together form the corporate governance system. According to Renneboog (2005), these 
mechanisms ensure or should ensure that management, referred to as the agent, runs the firm for 
the benefit of one or more stakeholders, referred to as the principals. This is a broad view of 
corporate governance. In the Anglo-American literature, corporate governance is often defined 
more narrowly. Shleifer and Vishny (1997), for example, state that corporate governance deals 
with “the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a 
return on their investment”. They state that product market competition, one of the most 
powerful forces towards economic efficiency in the world, cannot solve this problem 
satisfactorily. This is because markets are not perfect and, once capital is sunk, managers can 
expropriate the return. Thus, corporate governance mechanisms should ensure that investors are 
assured they get a return on this capital. Table 2.3 shows the main characteristics of the 
transatlantic corporate governance players (McCahery and Khachaturyan, 2006). 
 
Table 2.3: Main characteristics of transatlantic corporate governance players  
Country United  States  UK  Germany  France  Italy 
Employees  - Flexible labour 
-Low 
unionisation      




- Staff councils 
- Co-
determination 
- High skills 
- Non-flexible 
labour market 



























Government -  Liberal  policies 
- Arm’s length 




























- High activism 
- High 
percentage of 
outsiders due to 
investor pressure 









as a significant 
minority 
- Medium size 
- Moderate 
activism 
- Minority of 
outsiders 
- Medium size 
- Low activism 
- Large % of 
insiders 
- Medium size 
                                                      
13 The impact of country differences also holds for the related topic of capital structure. De Jong, Nguyen 
and Kabir (2008) show that country specific factors matter. In a better legal environment and more stable 
and healthier conditions (creditor right protection, GDP growth, etc.), firms are likely to take more debt.  
14 Board structures can be grouped into three main types: i) The two tier-system, e.g. Germany and the 
Netherlands; ii) The fully unitary system, e.g. the UK, U.S. and Italy: this is where there is a single Board 
made up of executive management and non-executive directors; iii) A system of two Boards, one 
executive and one non-executive, e.g. Belgium and majority of French and Swedish companies: some 
executives, particularly the CEO, will also sit on the non-executive Board. In some countries, multiple 
board structures are observed, e.g. Italy, the Netherlands, and France. The vast majority of companies  
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- Few foreign-
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The Netherlands and Sweden can be categorised in the column of Germany, and Belgium in the 
column of France. Differences in corporate ownership create different challenges in the various 
countries (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Schleifer, 1999). To illuminate such differences, we 
will focus on an example of failing corporate governance in polar cases: widely held firms 
versus family controlled firms.  
 
Widely held firms: corporate governance in widely held firms is about alleviating the conflict of 
interest between dispersed small shareowners and powerful controlling managers (Berle and 
Means, 1932, Jensen and Meckling 1976). In cases such as Enron, Worldcom, Vivendi, Royal 
Ahold etc., corporate managers engage in earnings manipulation, accounting irregularities to 
inflate share price and gain from their equity and option holdings.  
 
Family controlled firms:
15 in terms of corporate governance, issues can arise with the 
controlling shareholder. Self-dealing, for example, via value transfer as described by Schleifer 
and Vishny (1997) and Johnson et al. (2000),
16 is observed. The ‘Parmalat case’, expropriation 
by the Italian Tanzi family of about USD 3 billion, hiding losses, overstating assets, 
understating debt, forging bank documents and diverting cash to the family, can be seen as an 
extreme example. In this case, the controlling shareholder expropriated investors of corporate 
resources via self-dealing. Agency problems can thus arise not only between shareholder and 
management but also between controlling and minority shareholders. I will address this issue in 
more detail in section 2.4. 
 
As mentioned previously, differences in corporate governance create different challenges in the 
various countries, leading to different regulatory responses and different interactions between 
                                                                                                                                                            
operate a separate remuneration committee to deal with matters related to remuneration of the top-
executives within the company. 
15 These firms are typically better managed than widely held ones, reflected by significantly higher 
Tobin’s Q (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
16 E.g. transactions with the dominant shareholder at other than arm’s-length terms, biased allocation of 
intangible assets and liabilities, excessive director compensation. Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes 
and Schleifer (2008) have created an anti-self-dealing index that is a measure of legal protection of 
minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders.  
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governance mechanisms. Gillan (2006) presents a broad corporate governance framework and 
indicates that corporate governance mechanisms indeed interact with one another; as such, 
executive compensation is indirectly  affected by the broader governance framework, i.e. 
external devices such as the capital markets, governance ratings,
17 the market for corporate 
control,
18 the labour market,
19 product markets, private sources of external overview,
20 the 
accounting, legal/tax environment,
21 as well as internal devices, such as the board of directors,
22 
the capital structure,
23 by-laws and charter provisions,
24 and the internal control systems.
25 
 
Besides being indirectly affected by the broader corporate governance framework, executive 
compensation is directly affected by national and industry corporate governance codes. In the 
Netherlands, the Dutch Corporate Governance Code was published in 2003 and amended in 
2008. Based on an ‘apply or explain’ principle, listed companies are affected by the principles 
and best practice provisions that prescribe certain design criteria.
26 Table 2.4 provides an 
                                                      
17 Capital market information and analysis via corporate governance rating agencies, voting 
recommendations and securities analysts’ reports can reduce agency costs by monitoring corporate 
management. Increased monitoring ceteris paribus reduces the need for variable compensation (a/o Chung 
and Jo, 1996, Bethel and Gillan, 2002). 
18 The market for corporate control ceteris paribus reduces the need for managerial incentives. As 
managers compete in the product market, assets (companies) go to the highest value use and thus 
inefficient managers are disciplined. However, it can also provide a means by which inefficient managers 
may indulge in empire building (Bittlingmayer, 2000). Weston et al. (2004) provides a general overview 
on takeovers, restructuring and corporate governance.  
19 Labour markets, in conjunction with reputation/career concerns of managers ceteris paribus, reduce the 
need for managerial incentives via executive compensation. 
20 The media is a real corporate governance device. It puts pressure on corporate managers to behave in a 
‘socially acceptable manner’ (Dyck and Zingales, 2002). From a different perspective, CEOs who win 
media awards are compensated more after receiving awards (Malmendier and Tate, 2009). 
21 Laws influence the structure of executive compensation. The ‘million dollar cap’ (tax law) in the U.S., 
for example, has resulted in a greater rate of variable to non-variable compensation, since non-variable 
compensation is only tax deductible up to USD 1,000,000. 
22 An interesting example is provided by Brick et al. (2006). Excess compensation paid to directors seems 
to be associated with excess CEO compensation. This excess compensation is furthermore associated 
with firm underperformance. Evidence is consistent with ‘mutual back scratching’ or cronyism. In 
general, the trade-off between monitoring and incentives is interesting. Decreased monitoring can be 
compensated by increased incentives, as observed in practice (Ryan and Wiggens, 2001, Bryan et al. 
2006). However, when supervision becomes inadequate this results in a lower pay-for-performance 
sensitivity, as incentives would provide an incentive to inflate performance given the low detection 
possibility. Goldman and Slezak (2006) show that incentive compensation works as a ‘double-edged 
sword’. 
23 Capital structure can discipline management and ceteris paribus reduce the need for incentive pay. Debt 
financing, for example, mitigates the potential agency costs of free cash flow (Grossman and Hart 1982, 
Jensen 1986, 1993). 
24 This refers to those governance mechanisms that serve as potential barriers for corporate control. These 
elements might increase the need for incentive compensation as the market for corporate control works 
less effectively and therefore can only discipline managers who significantly under-perform. 
25 Internal control systems and codes of ethics can discipline managers and could result in a reduced need 
for incentive compensation. 
26 For example, regarding long-term incentive programmes, the Code (2003) has the following best 
practice provisions:   
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overview of corporate governance codes in the European countries researched. The United 
States is not reflected, as it can be characterised as more rules based, in view of the Sarbanes-
Oxley act
27 (2002), for example, and listing requirements such as the NYSE Corporate 
Governance Rules (2003) approved by the SEC. Institutional investors in some cases publish 
their own policy on corporate governance standards affecting their investment choices, such as 
the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-
CREF) for the fifth time in 2007. 
 
Table 2.4: Overview of the main corporate governance codes per country 









Published in 2003 (Tabaksblat Code) replacing 
‘Corporate Governance in the Netherlands; the Forty 
Recommendations’ (1997) of the Peters Committee. 
After three monitoring reports (2005, 2006, 2007), the 








Published in 1998, overseen by the Financial 
Reporting Council. Consolidation of Cadbury (1992) 
Greenbury (1995) and Hampel (1998). Amended in 







Published in 2002 (Cromme Code). Amended in 
2003, 2005, 2006, and 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010.  7 
                                                                                                                                                            
II.2.1  Options to acquire shares are a conditional remuneration component, and become unconditional 
only when the management board members have fulfilled predetermined performance criteria after a 
period of at least three years from the grant date. 
II.2.2  If the company, notwithstanding best practice provision II.2.1, grants unconditional options to 
the management board members, it shall apply performance criteria when doing so and the options 
should, in any event, not be exercised in the first three years after they have been granted.   
II.2.3  Shares granted to management board members without financial consideration shall be retained 
for a period of at least five years or at least until the end of the employment, if this period is shorter. The 
number of shares to be granted shall be dependent on the achievement of clearly quantifiable and 
challenging targets specified beforehand.  
II.2.4  The option exercise price shall not be fixed at a lower level than a verifiable price or a verifiable 
price average in accordance with the official listing on one or more predetermined days during a period of 
not more than five trading days prior to and including the day on which the option is granted. 
II.2.5  Neither the exercise price nor the other conditions regarding the granted options shall be 
modified during the term of the options, except in so far as prompted by structural changes relating to the 
shares or the company in accordance with established market practice. 
27 The Sarbanes-Oxley act is a U.S. federal law, enacted on July 30 2002, in response to a number of 
major corporate and accounting scandals including those affecting Enron, Tyco International, Adelphia, 
Peregrine Systems and WorldCom. Named after sponsors Senator Paul Sarbanes (D-MD) and 
Representative Michael G. Oxley (R-OH), the Act was approved by the House by a vote of 423-3 and by 
the Senate 99-0. The legislation established new or enhanced standards for all U.S. public company 
boards, management, and public accounting firms. It does not apply to privately held companies. The Act 
contains eleven titles, or sections, ranging from additional Corporate Board responsibilities to criminal 
penalties, and requires the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to implement rulings on 
requirements to comply with the new law (www.sarbanes-oxley.com).  
28 Country rating based on Heidrick & Struggles (2009).  
29 In November 2006, the Companies Act was enacted, the result of an eight-year preparation to revise the 
Companies Act of 1985. An important and related change is that executives need to act in line with 
shareholders’ interests, but also take the longer term into account, as well as interests of employees, 
suppliers, buyers, and the environment.   
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Published in 2003 (replacing the complementary 1995 
Vienot I, 1999 Vienot II and 2002 Bouton). 
Consolidation of these AFEP
30 and MEDEF’s
31 








Published in 2004 (Lippens Code) replacing the ‘Dual 
Code’ of 1998 which formed a consolidation of the 
code issued by the Belgian Banking and Finance 
Commission and the code issued by the Brussels 






Published in 1999 (Preda Code), amended in 2002 (il 
Codice di Autodisciplina delle società quotate 








Published in 2004 (Åsbrink Code). Amended in 2010.  3 
 
The slogan ‘corporate governance; an ongoing process’ could be found in 2008 on the website 
of the Belgian corporate governance committee (www.corporategovernancecommittee.be). It 
reflects a broader European practice that corporate governance codes are introduced, after 
public consultation, and are regularly amended to reflect the updated state of thinking, after 
public consultation. Monitoring committees’ research typically provides a regular update of the 
level of appliance of the Code’s provisions. In the Netherlands, this review is performed on a 
yearly basis since the introduction of the Code.  
 
Various academic researchers focus on what types of companies are more likely to apply the 
Code, instead of explaining why they do not follow certain provisions, such as Andres and 
Theissen (2008) for the German Code. They found that a significant predictor of individual 
director remuneration disclosure was Tobin’s Q in the year after the Code was introduced. The 
overall proportion of German disclosure remained low and therefore a new law was enacted in 
2006, which mandates disclosure unless the shareholder’s meeting grants an exemption.  
 
Table 2.5 provides further information on disclosure, and shareholders' direct power on 
remuneration. The overview is based on the elements chosen by the Commission of the 
European Communities, following the 2004 recommendations on directors’ remuneration to the 
member states (Commission Recommendations - Official Journal of the European Union, 
2004/Commission Staff Working Document, 2007).  
 
                                                      
30 Association Française des Entreprises Privées 
31 Mouvement des Entreprises de France (French Business Confederation) 
32 Amended Swedish Companies Act as at 1 January 2006  
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Table 2.5: Remuneration-related corporate governance context per country (per 2007) 
Country  Disclosure on 
remuneration policy 
AGM vote on 
remuneration policy 
Disclosure of remuneration 
of individual board 
members/details 
The Netherlands  Y (apply or explain)  Y (binding vote based on 
law)  Y (law) 
United Kingdom  Y (apply or explain)  Y (advisory vote based on 
apply or explain)  Y (apply or explain) 
Germany  Y (partly apply or 
explain)  N 
Y (possibility to derogate if 
the AGM decides this with 
75% of votes) 
France Y  (law) 
Y (however vote relates to 
the annual report in 
general) 
Y (law) 
Belgium  Y (apply or explain)  N  Partly (only CEO and non-
executive directors) 
Italy N  N  Y  (law) 
Sweden  Y (law)  Y (law)  Y (law) 
United States  Y (SEC) 
Y (advisory, typically on 
Summary Compensation 
Table and narrative) 
Y (SEC) 
 
Subsequent developments until 2010 show that that all countries have moved to shareholder 
voting on remuneration (either the policy or the remuneration report). This is typically an 
advisory vote. Only the Netherlands and Sweden have a binding vote. Following the start of the 
financial crisis late 2008, additional local and European guidelines have been introduced for 
financial institutions. For an overview, please refer to Ferrarini and Ungureanu (2010). 
 
It is not our intention here to conduct another comparative corporate governance study, but 
merely to state that local regulatory and public policy issues, as well as other elements, such as 
national culture, vary from one country to the next and, furthermore, must be constantly 
reviewed in the light of changing local laws and regulations.  
 
The remuneration policies for top executives, especially the CEO, which emerge under these 
circumstances, are reflected in the next two subsections. The reference year is 2006. By 
focusing on policy levels and structure, a robust overview is obtained for approximately two to 
four years around the reference year.
33 
2.2.2 Remuneration level 
This subsection focuses specifically on the underlying anchor points of ex ante or expected 
remuneration levels. Remuneration levels of top executives within large listed companies are 
typically anchored to an external reference group, the peer group. Both the character and the 
                                                      
33 This statement is based on the notion that remuneration polices are typically altered once every two to 
four years.   
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size of this group are therefore important drivers of compensation levels. Do companies 
specifically look at organisations in the same industry or cross sector, nationally or 
internationally? A small reference group causes year-on-year fluctuations in the market 
benchmark. A large group might not be an adequate reflection of the specific labour market the 
company faces. Tables 2.6 and 2.7 provide overviews. 
 
Table 2.6: Constituents of the reference group 
This table shows the characteristics of peer groups. The typical number of companies in the reference 
group is reflected as well as the focus; cross section versus sector specific, or a combination. 
Country  Number  Cross sector  Combination  Sector specific 
The Netherlands  15 to 25  27%  27%  46% 
United Kingdom  15 to 30  70%  n/a  30% 
Germany 10  to  30  80%  n/a  20% 
France 10  to  30  85%  n/a  15% 
Belgium 15  to  25  Predominantly n/a  Rarely 
Italy  6 to 15  70%  n/a  30% 
Sweden  5 to 15  80%  n/a  20% 
United States  15 to 40  Predominantly  n/a  Rarely 
 
Table 2.7: National versus international character of the reference group 
This table shows to what extent companies choose a national versus an international comparator group. 
 
Within the smallest countries, there is a correlation between choosing a sector-specific peer 
group and focusing on international peers. A sufficient amount of sector-specific peers in the 
same country is often difficult to find. The Netherlands is an example of a country with an 
international focus. Typically, U.S. companies are left out of the peer group, given the 
significant difference in market practice. 
Country National  International 
the Netherlands  8%  92% 
United Kingdom  70%  30% 
Germany 90%  10% 
France 85%  15% 
Belgium Predominantly  Rarely 
Italy 35% 65% 
Sweden 80%  20% 
United States  Predominantly  Rarely  
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Based on the peer group, a benchmark is performed that ranks the companies from lowest to 
highest pay. In general, companies tend to focus on the median of the peer group for at target or 
ex ante compensation. In some instances, and especially for variable pay elements, companies 
deviate from this practice in order to create a more performance-driven package.
34 In particular, 
the increase in variable pay has driven executive compensation over the last decade. Table 2.8 
provides insight into the bonus and long-term incentive grant level development over the ten-
year period starting in 1996 for a typical CEO, as defined in the Worldwide Total Remuneration 
report of Towers Perrin, until 2005/2006 which is indexed at 100. 
 
Table 2.8: Variable pay grant size development – CEO position 
This table shows the development of bonus and long-term incentive (LTI) values for a typical CEO, over 
the decade 1996-2006. All figures are indexed at 2005/2006 figures.  
 
Table 2.8 shows that variable pay has increased significantly over the decade reviewed. In 
particular, long-term incentives (LTI) are a relatively new phenomenon in Europe. In 1996, LTI 
                                                      
34 Note that the so-called ‘pay-ratchet effect’ is especially fuelled by those companies that raise the 
market/peer group ceiling and other companies who compare themselves to these companies. Section 2.3 
will further elaborate on this. 
Year of survey:  1996/1997  1998/1999  2001/2002  2003/2004  2005/2006 
Target bonus       
The Netherlands  38  44  73  104  100 
United Kingdom  67  73  80  100  100 
Germany 28  30  52  100  100 
France  56 53 67 81  100 
Belgium  63 68 63 75  100 
Italy 74  86  100  100  100 
Sweden 80  80  120  100  100 
United States  76  76  110  112  100 
       
Expected LTI value        
The Netherlands  0  43  88  88  100 
United Kingdom  60  76  88  100  100 
Germany 0 0  60  100  100 
France  45 45 52 55  100 
Belgium 0  27  87  83  100 
Italy  14 22 80 70  100 
Sweden 0  0  125  140  100 
United States  39  57  94  108  100  
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grants were prevalent in half of the countries. In the U.S., grant levels grew exponentially 
during the 1990s (Jensen, Murphy and Wruck, 2004). This was followed by a downturn. Table 
2.9 provides an overview of the eventual results of this development for the research group, i.e. 
target bonus and LTI levels as a percentage of basic pay.
35 
 
Table 2.9: Variable pay as a percentage of basic pay – CEO position 
This table shows variable pay levels, for the CEO position, expressed as a percentage of fixed pay. The 
yearly policy levels of target bonus, maximum bonus, and expected value of the long-term incentive are 
reflected at the 25
th, 50
th (median) and 75
th percentile. 
    Chief Executive Officer 
   25th percentile  Median  75th percentile 
   The Netherlands 
Target bonus    57%  90%  100% 
Maximum bonus    81%  144%  159% 
Expected annualised long-term incentive value    42%  62%  126% 
   United Kingdom 
Target bonus    76%  100%  126% 
Maximum bonus    125%  180%  205% 
Expected annualised long-term incentive value    80%  132%  184% 
   Germany 
Target bonus    115%  145%  160% 
Maximum bonus    200%  280%  320% 
Expected annualised long-term incentive value    30%  70%  120% 
   France 
Target bonus    80%  100%  150% 
Maximum bonus    120%  160%  220% 
Expected annualised long-term incentive value    100%  150%  250% 
   Belgium 
Target bonus    45%  60%  100% 
Maximum bonus    80%  100%  145% 
Expected annualised long-term incentive value    25%  50%  85% 
  Italy 
Target bonus    38%  64%  88% 
Maximum bonus    60%  100%  200% 
Expected annualised long-term incentive value    35%  65%  92% 
                                                      
35 Basic salary figures are not reflected, as the constituents of the various market indices vary in terms of 
size and are therefore not directly comparable. Target bonus and long-term incentive figures have been 
provided as a percentage of basic salary to enhance comparability. Long-term incentives are valued based 
on a standard approach: binomial model for share options, performance discounts based on the 
assumption of equal probability of various states of the world.  
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    Chief Executive Officer 
   25th percentile  Median  75th percentile 
   Sweden 
Target bonus    25%  30%  38% 
Maximum bonus    50%  55%  75% 
Expected annualised long-term incentive value    0%  15%  31% 
   United States 
Target bonus    120%  138%  185% 
Maximum bonus    240%  276%  370% 
Expected annualised long-term incentive value    360%  499%  609% 
 
Table 2.10 provides an overview with similar figures, but now for a typical top-executive board 
member. In order to obtain a proxy for the extent to which countries exhibit a more collegial 
structure or a CEO-model, the numbers in table 2.10 are compared to the figures in table 2.9. 
From this perspective, German firms score highest on the collegial structure with the smallest 
deviation between CEO and direct report, and French firms score highest on the CEO-model 
with the largest deviation.  
 
Table 2.10: Variable pay as a percentage of basic pay – ‘direct report’ of the CEO  
This table shows variable pay levels, for the position reporting directly to the CEO, expressed as a 
percentage of fixed pay. The yearly policy levels of target bonus, maximum bonus, and expected value of 
the long-term incentive are reflected at the 25
th, 50
th (median) and 75
th percentile. 
      Direct report of the CEO 
     25th percentile Median  75th percentile
     The Netherlands 
Target bonus      53%  61%  80% 
Maximum bonus      77%  100%  125% 
Expected annualised long-term incentive value      47%  58%  89% 
     United Kingdom 
Target bonus      60%  75%  113% 
Maximum bonus      100%  150%  164% 
Expected annualised long-term incentive value      56%  98%  130% 
          
     Germany 
Target bonus      100%  140%  160% 
Maximum bonus      190%  270%  300% 
Expected annualised long-term incentive value      30%  70%  125% 
     France 
Target bonus      40%  50%  65%  
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      Direct report of the CEO 
     25th percentile Median  75th percentile
Maximum bonus      60%  75%  100% 
Expected annualised long-term incentive value      80%  100%  140% 
     Belgium 
Target bonus      30%  50%  70% 
Maximum bonus      60%  80%  100% 
Expected annualised long-term incentive value      20%  30%  70% 
     Italy 
Target bonus      28%  40%  50% 
Maximum bonus      35%  55%  80% 
Expected annualised long-term incentive value      26%  38%  79% 
     Sweden 
Target bonus      20%  25%  30% 
Maximum bonus      36%  50%  80% 
Expected annualised long-term incentive value      0%  10%  26% 
     United States 
Target bonus      60%  85%  100% 
Maximum bonus      120%  170%  200% 
Expected annualised long-term incentive value      180%  256%  347% 
 
In Europe, German firms are known for high bonuses, French firms are characterised by large 
long-term incentive components as reflected in table 2.9 and 2.10. Swedish bonus and LTI 
levels are the lowest. U.S. levels are characterised by the significant long-term incentive 
component, which provides an absolute anchor point at the top of the (global) market.The ratio 
of fixed (base) pay and total variable pay is reflected in figure 2.1 and 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.1: Mix of fixed versus variable pay– CEO position 












































































The figures reflect target/policy compensation levels. Whereas Sweden has the lowest variable 
pay ratio (fixed versus variable pay equals 70:30), the U.S. has the highest performance-related 
pay mix for the CEO position (13:87). In general, performance-related pay constitutes a larger 
part of total direct compensation for the CEO than for other top-executives who report to the 
CEO).  
Figure 2.2: Fixed versus variable pay mix – ‘direct report’ of the CEO  








2.2.3 Remuneration structure 
This subsection will provide some insights into the market practice on the remuneration 
structure, focusing on the variable pay components. Typically, ‘pay at risk’ is divided into a 
short-term incentive or annual bonus component and a long-term incentive component, which 
can be earned over a multi-year period, typically three years or longer. 
 
Short-term incentive (STI) 
The short-term incentive is earned over the period of one year, based on performance in relation 
to predefined performance targets. Typically, there is a threshold performance level below 
which no bonus is awarded. Most companies also define a maximum bonus payout related to a 
‘maximum performance level’. Even if a higher performance is achieved, the bonus payout is 
not increased.
36 The performance incentive zone is typically linear between the threshold and 
maximum performance level. Figure 2.3 shows this.  
 
 
                                                      






































































Figure 2.3: Typical performance incentive zone of a short-term incentive plan 
This figure shows the typical performance- and payment zone of a short-term incentive plan. At the 
threshold performance level, a minimum payment is made. Below this performance level, there is no 















The payment under the annual bonus plan is usually in cash. In Germany, this is the only 
payment vehicle observed. In the other European countries, a combination of cash and shares is 
also observed, especially in the UK, whereas, in the U.S., cash payouts are the norm. 
Approximately 5% of the companies do not pay in cash but in equity. 
 
In the majority of cases, multiple performance measures are used to determine the payout under 
the annual incentive plan. The largest part of the bonus is based on financial performance 
measures. Figure 2.4 provides an overview for the Netherlands, the aggregated European 


























Figure 2.4: Number of financial performance measures used (STI) 
This figure shows the number of financial performance measures used (1, 2, 3, 4 or more than 4), to 
measure company performance. The prevalence of use is reflected for the Netherlands, Europe (UK, 













Most companies use two or three financial measures. Table 2.11 provides the top five of most 
observed measures. To be precise, the measures reflect categories of measures that companies 
classify as such.  
 
Table 2.11: Top five of most commonly used financial performance measures (STI) 
 
Most of these measures can be classified as accounting and internal (growth) measures, as 
opposed to value creation or return measures. There are also local customs in the use of 
performance measures. In the UK as well as Germany, bottom-line profits are the most common 
criterion to measure performance of top management. However, in Germany, net profit is used 
for this purpose and in the UK net profit per share.  
 
In order to establish the bonus payment based on multiple performance criteria, the most 
commonly used method is the ‘additive method’. This implies that, for each individual 
performance measure, the bonus payout is determined and subsequently summed to obtain the 
  the Netherlands  Europe (UK, Ger, Fra, Bel, It, Swe)  United States 
1  Operational profit  Operational profit  Sales/Revenue 
2  Sales/Revenue  Sales/Revenue  Earnings per share 
3  Economic profit (EVA)  Earnings per share  Operational profit 
4  Cash flow  Return on invested capital  Net profit 






































total bonus. A small number of companies, however, use the alternative ‘multiplicative method’ 
in which bonus elements are interrelated. Example: a company with a revenue growth target can 
choose to modify the associated bonus upwards or downwards based on the outcome on a return 
measure, to ensure growth is not achieved at the detriment of returns, i.e. profitable growth.  
 
The question as to how performance targets are established is answered in table 2.12. 
 
Table 2.12: Method for establishing performance targets (STI) 
This table shows the prevalence of target setting methods for the short-term incentive plan.  
 
 
The most common method for establishing performance targets is to link these to the annual 
budget. As the budget is typically somewhat conservative, management expectations might 
deviate from the budget and therefore it is reflected as a separate category. Relative 
performance evaluation (RPE) is not often applied to the annual bonus. The ‘timeless standard’ 
is neither often used. These timeless standards can be used for return measures, e.g. using the 
cost of capital as a timeless standard.
37   
 
As mentioned previously, besides financial measures, most companies use non-financial 
measures as well when determining the total bonus amount. Examples of non-financial 
measures are: customer satisfaction, employee engagement, R&D milestones, creating team 
spirit, et cetera. Table 2.13 provides insight into how many companies use this type of 
performance measurement, as well as providing an indication of the total bonus that depends on 
it. If a single market figure would provide a skewed picture, a range is given.  
 
 
                                                      
37 The term ‘timeless’ should not be taken too literally. Periodically, the level of the standard is evaluated 




(UK, Ger, Fra, Bel, It, Swe) 
United States 
Budget 68%  63%  37% 
Year-on-year growth/delta 8%  19%  27% 
Management expectations  8%  13%  25% 
Relative (reference group)  4%  3%  1% 
Timeless standard  12%  1%  1% 
Other 0%  2%  9% 
Total 100%  100%  100%  
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Table 2.13: Prevalence of non-financial performance measures (STI) 
This table shows which proportion of the sample uses non-financial performance measures (e.g. customer 
satisfaction, employee engagement, team synergy) to establish the annual bonus payment. It also shows 
the typical percentage of the bonus that is governed by such measures.  
 
In some countries, such as Belgium and the UK, the vast majority of companies make use of 
non-financial measures that determine between 1/4 and 1/3 of the bonus amount. In Italy, non-
financial measures are less common and, if applied, typically only make up 10% of the total 
bonus amount. 
 
In summary, the short-term incentive consists of several building blocks. Typically, companies 
use multiple financial performance measures that can differ per organisation. Targets are 
typically set based on the forward-looking budget, but other methods are also observed. In 
addition to financial criteria, non-financial performance is measured, criteria varying 
considerably from company to company, typically determining between 20% and 30% of the 
total bonus amount. Since ‘performance’ is multidimensionally formulated within the short-term 
incentive, empirical research attempting to measure the correlation between pay and 
performance is faced with an almost impossible task. It is therefore questionable whether adding 
more studies on this statistical relationship will further broaden or deepen insight into this 
research area. 
 
Long-term incentive (LTI) 
The long-term incentive component can be earned over a multi-year period. The typical 
payment vehicle across the globe historically used to be share options. In the U.S. during the 
1990s, share option grants reached a high in what some academics call a ‘share option 
explosion’ (Jensen, Murphy and Wruck, 2004). The vast majority of U.S. companies still grant 
share options (approximately 75%). The restricted share has become popular over the past years 
and is granted by approximately 60% of companies in the research year. Performance plans, 
Country  Percentage of companies  Percentage of bonus 
The Netherlands  75%  20% 
United Kingdom  89%  35% 
Germany  47%  20% - 50% 
France 80%  25% 
Belgium 90%  25% 
Italy 30%  10% 
Sweden  65%  10% - 30% 
United States  59%  30% - 40%  
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typically shares or cash with a performance condition, have also emerged as a frequently used 
remuneration vehicle employed by approximately 50% of companies. For the European 
countries in the research group, figure 2.5 provides an overview of LTI vehicles.  
 
Figure 2.5: Payment vehicle (LTI)
38 
This figure shows the prevalence of LTI vehicles in each of the countries. The three observed vehicles are 













In some countries, LTI design is driven by tax considerations,
39 e.g. Belgian tax-efficient share 
option plans.
40 Performance conditions, if applicable, can be linked to the grant, i.e. 
retrospective performance measurement, or to the vesting, i.e. prospective performance 
measurement, of the LTI (see figure 2.6). 
 
Figure 2.6: Performance condition linked to grant or vesting (LTI) 
This figure shows the prevalence of the moment in time at which performance is measured within the LTI 
plan. Measurement at grant implies that the number of shares / options are determined at t=0. Typically a 
requirement of continued employment over the following three years (t=3) is the only further condition. 
Measurement at vesting, implies that a number of shares / options are granted at t=0 at the condition of 
performance testing at a future moment in time. At the moment of vesting, e.g. at t=3, the number of 
vehicles is ultimately determined. This becomes the unconditional ownership of the participant to the 
plan. 
                                                      
38 Phantom options are options with which the option holder, ‘at exercise’, receives the cash difference 
between the share price and the exercise price. Phantom shares are similar to shares but are settled in 
cash. In both cases there is no actual transfer of shares.  
39 Source: Equity incentives around the world (2005) – Towers Perrin 
40 Stock options are taxed on the 60
th day following the offer. No further tax is due on the spread at 
exercise or later on when the shares are sold. This provides for an opportunity to earn a gain that is not 






































































































































































In contrast to the short-term incentive, there are significant differences between countries 
regarding performance conditions. Even within a single country, the UK, significant differences 
are observed between options and shares. Therefore, the individual country overview is 
presented in figure 2.7 (with two bars for the UK). 
 
Figure 2.7: Number of performance conditions (LTI) 
This figure shows the number of performance measures used (1, 2, 3, 4 or more than 4), to measure 












Most companies use one performance measure linked to the LTI. When two types of LTI 
vehicles are used, two performance measures become prevalent. Table 2.14 provides an 
overview of the top two measures in each country. In France, the market practice is more 
dispersed. Various measures are used with no distinctly numbered 1 and 2 measures, as shown 







































































Table 2.14: Top two of most used performance measures (LTI) 
This table shows the top 2 of the most prevalent measures, based on which the long-term incentive 
payment vehicle becomes unconditional (vesting). The UK is reflected twice, given the clear difference in 
market practice between share plans and option plans.   
 
In the Netherlands and the UK, the vast majority of companies use at least the Relative Total 
Shareholder Return (RTSR) measure, 75% and 93% respectively. In the other countries, the 
market practice of RTSR is less dominant. RTSR is determined on the basis of relative TSR 
performance against a defined performance peer group. Earnings per share targets are typically 
growth based: achieving a certain growth percentage above the development of the consumer 
price index.  
 
Summarising, companies have increased the use of long-term incentive awards. Apart from 
plain vanilla share options, other vehicles have been introduced. In particular, the introduction 
of performance measures to govern vesting
41 of options and shares impacts the risk class of 
these plans, ceteris paribus. Example: if a company changes the grant of plain vanilla share 
options to an option plan with a performance measure, this decreases the fair value of one 
vehicle, measured at the moment of conditional grant. In order to provide the executive with the 
same initial value, at t = 0, the number of vehicles granted is increased. If and when the 
performance condition is finally achieved, more vehicles become unconditional than under a 
plain vanilla plan. This increases the ex post payment realisation in this scenario. However, the 
probability of a zero payout also increases due to the fact that if the performance hurdle is not 
achieved no options will become unconditional. This increases the payout variability and thus 
the level at which these pay components are at risk. A compensation risk index is needed to 
quantify the magnitude of the changed risk class. This topic is addressed in chapter 3. 
                                                      
41 ‘Vesting’ means becoming unconditional. In performance equity plans, share options or shares only 
become unconditional if and when the defined performance level is achieved.  
Country 1  2 
The Netherlands  Relative total shareholder return  Earnings per share (EPS) 
United Kingdom (shares)  Relative total shareholder return  Earnings per share (EPS) 
United Kingdom (options)  Earnings per share (EPS)  Relative total shareholder return 
Germany  Share price appreciation (relative 
and absolute) 
Economic and operational profit 
France  Total shareholder return (absolute and relative), revenue, operational profit, 
net profit 
Belgium  Not applicable  Not applicable  
Italy  Operational profit  Relative total shareholder return, 
earnings per share 
Sweden  Economic profit (EVA)  Earnings per share 
United States  Earnings per share  Absolute total shareholder return  
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2.2.4 Summary and conclusion 
This section has provided an overview of European market practice on remuneration policies, 
focusing on the total direct compensation elements. From a bird’s-eye view, remuneration 
policy levels and structure within Europe differ from the U.S. In particular, the remuneration 
levels and pay mix are not comparable to the U.S. practice. A closer look at the European 
environment also reveals that country practices differ from one another. Within each country, 
there are marked differences between companies.  
 
The conclusion of this section is that market practice is diverse. This is caused by differences at 
the individual, company, industry and country level, which create relatively unique human 
capital investment combinations. Insight into the (individual) ‘executive remuneration decision’ 
is therefore needed, to comprehend more clearly where these differences originate from, such 
that theoretical anchor points can be linked to the practical context in which these decisions are 
made. In the next two sections, I will focus on the CEO position and address the underlying 
dynamics of remuneration levels (see section 2.3), and the remuneration structure (see section 
2.4). Subsequently, the role of the remuneration committee is summarised by taking an eclectic 
perspective, in order to understand the real-life executive remuneration decision (see section 
2.5). The chapter ends with a summary and conclusion (see section 2.6).  
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2.3 Remuneration level: invisible and visible hands in the CEO labour market 
This section provides an overview of the fundamental characteristics of the pricing mechanism 
in the market for CEOs of large companies.
42 The starting point is the theory of human capital 
(see section 2.3.1) and the intersection between the CEO labour demand and supply curve in the 
theoretical perfectly competitive market (see section 2.3.2).
43 Significant imperfections mean 
that these curves can contribute to explaining general market results and movements, but fail to 
explain individual remuneration packages (see section 2.3.3). In reality, remuneration levels are 
determined by a bargaining process between the company, which is assumed to be represented 
by the remuneration committee, and the CEO candidate. This practical context is discussed in 
section 2.3.4 in which the role of the remuneration committee is examined.  
2.3.1 Human capital 
The value of human capital is primarily derived from how many the associated qualifications, 
expertise and skills
44 can earn in the labour market (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1997).
45 Labour is not 
a homogenous factor of production due to these differences in human capital. Consequently, 
various labour market segments exist, ultimately based on differences in scarcity, resulting in 
different compensation levels, e.g. between a factory worker and his CEO. A CEO’s ex ante 
                                                      
42 Based on Rosen (1992), the pricing mechanism in the CEO labour market should determine an efficient 
ex ante and ex post price level for different types of human capital (in the relative and absolute sense). 
43 According to Adam Smith (1776), the price system solves the economic problem efficiently without 
conscious direction: “Every individual endeavours to employ his capital so that its produce may be of 
greatest value. He generally neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is 
promoting it. He intends only his own security, only his own gain. And he is led by an invisible hand to 
promote an end which was no part of his intention. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes 
that of society more effectively than when he really intends to promote it”.  
44 There are different ways to characterise skills. Following and expanding the work of Becker (1964), 
Castanias and Helfat (1991) and Harris and Helfat (1997), a four way classification is provided by 
Castanias and Helfat (2001) and Bailey and Helfat (2003): generic skills, which can be transferred across 
all businesses and firms; related industry skills, which can be transferred outside of an industry to other 
industries that make related products or that utilise related resources and production processes; industry 
specific skills, which can only be transferred to firms that operate in the same industry; firm specific skills, 
which cannot be transferred to other firms. When the CEO possesses superior skills, which are short in 
supply, he can use them to generate rents. Ricardian rents are returns to the CEO in excess of the payment 
required to attract him to his occupation. Quasi rents are primarily produced by firm-specific skills and 
are returns in excess of the payment level that would cause the CEO to leave (i.e. value in its first best and 
next best use). 
45 These types of statements should be viewed in the context of various theories of the firm. One of these 
theories perceives the firm as ‘rent seeking’ (Williamson 1971, 1979, 1985 and Klein, Crawford and 
Alchian, 1978). The key idea here is that integration is efficient in situations in which non-integration 
leads to inefficiency. Other theories of the firm are for example ‘property rights’ theory and ‘incentive 
system’ theory. Within property rights theory, efficient bargaining causes the parties to share the surplus 
from their specific investments; a/o Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990) and Hart (1995). 
The ‘incentive system’ theory focuses on an incentive problem between a principal and agent, asset 
allocation, incentive contracting etc.; a/o Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991, 1994), Holmstrom and Tirole 
(1991) and Holmstrom (1999).  
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compensation is thus the price that is paid by the company for scarce human capital.
46 The 
eventual price that needs to be paid depends not only on past investments, education, acquired 
skills and expertise, but also on the nature of the future investment. The risk associated with the 
job will result in a risk premium being required. The higher the risk, the higher the premium that 
needs to be paid to ensure the individual is willing to invest in the relationship.
47 Inequality, 
even in perfectly competitive markets, therefore results from past investments as well as the 
magnitude and risk of the new investment.  
2.3.2 Demand and supply in the CEO labour market 
CEO labour demand  
The demand side of the market for CEOs consists of firms that seek to hire a new CEO from 
inside or outside the firm at a given moment in time. The elasticity of labour demand equals the 
responsiveness of labour demand to a change in wage rate.
48 In order to generally assess the 
elasticity of the CEO labour demand curve, table 2.15 provides two determinants supplemented 
with comments relating to the CEO labour market. It indicates that the CEO labour demand 
curve is relatively inelastic as the result of no direct substitution possibilities and a relatively 
low direct impact from the elasticity of the goods it produces.  
 
Table 2.15 Elasticity of CEO labour demand curve 
This table describes the (relative absence of the) substitution effect and the scale effect, in light of the 
CEO labour demand curve.  
Substitution effect by using 
less labour and more of 
other means of production 
The CEO is at the top of the company ‘pyramid’ and cannot directly be 
substituted by, for example, assets, such as factory workers by machines 
(to a certain extent).
49 
                                                      
46 Human capital refers to the qualifications, skills and expertise that contribute to a worker’s 
productivity. Pioneering articles in human capital theory are Schultz (1960) and Becker (1962). Mincer 
(1970) provides a survey of the early human capital studies. 
47 Some further notes on human capital investments and associated risk: CEOs of listed companies 
typically face a higher risk than CEOs of non-listed companies due to increased visibility, e.g. increased 
risk of reputation damage. CEOs of companies that face financial distress, or a high risk of it, incur 
greater risk than companies in a state of going concern/lower risk of financial distress. The frequently 
recorded pay difference between a CEO hired from within or from outside of the company can also be 
related to investment risk. The magnitude and risk of the investment for the first is lower than for the 
latter, as the ‘insider’ has already made firm-specific investments in the past and has more knowledge of 
potential returns. Generally speaking, in recent years, as a result of increased transparency and required 
accountability, e.g. Sarbanes Oxley, introduction of corporate governance codes, etc., the risk of the top 
executive position investment has increased. This is accompanied by increased remuneration levels. 
48 Hicks (1966) and Marshall (1923) provide the Hicks-Marshall laws of derived demand, which assert 
that the elasticity of demand for a category of labour is higher when the price elasticity of demand for the 
product it produces is higher, when other factors of production can easily be substituted for the category 
of labour, when the supply of other factors of production is more elastic, and when the cost of employing 
the category of labour is a large share of the total cost of production. 
49 A CEO can only be substituted by another CEO. In some cases this is a value-enhancing decision. For 
the Dutch market, Cools and Van Praag (2007) have researched the value relevance of unanticipated top 
executive departures and found that forced departures, by the Supervisory Board, are indeed value  
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Scale effect/price elasticity 
of demand for the goods 
that labour produces 
Generally speaking, as labour is a derived demand, the price elasticity of 
labour depends on the price elasticity of the goods that are produced. When 
the price of labour increases, the costs to produce the product, increases as 
well. The increase is passed on in the form of a higher product price. If the 
demand for the good is elastic, fewer quantities will be asked for and 
therefore less labour is needed. The price elasticity across industries can 
differ as a result of the different products that are produced, e.g. basic 
versus luxury items. However, in the case of the CEO position, two 
additional elements determine price elasticity: i) Total CEO labour costs 
are typically only a small fraction of the total costs (revenues) of the 
company and therefore the derived demand for CEO labour is significantly 
less elastic;
50 ii) The CEO position is a unique position and the demand in a 
single firm cannot be reduced. The demand for all CEOs in the total 
market, or a certain industry, and in the longer term, is more elastic as the 
market for corporate control can reduce the total number of CEO positions, 
as a result of mergers and acquisitions, in a certain industry or economy. 
 
Figure 2.8 reflects a drawing of the CEO demand curve for an individual company that is 
searching for a CEO. It is perfectly inelastic up to a certain ‘cut off’ point. Theoretically, this 
would be the point at which the market for corporate control takes over; i.e. where it is more 
efficient to have one CEO run a merger of two businesses.  
 
 














                                                                                                                                                            
relevant, defined in terms of positive abnormal share price returns subsequent to the announcement, 
researching the period 1991-2000. 
50 When, for example, a sample is taken from approximately the 50 largest companies in the Netherlands 
for the year 2005, total direct CEO compensation (basic salary, bonus, annualised long-term incentive) 
equals 0.07% of total sales with a standard deviation of 0.09% (source: Towers Perrin Dutch Top 




Demand for a 





Since the CEO labour demand curve for an individual company will be perfectly inelastic over a 
large range, the demand side of the market does not provide an instant cap on CEO pay. As a 
result, the labour demand curve for the whole market is also highly inelastic. It is basically 
obtained by a horizontal summation of the individual CEO labour demand curves.
51 In light of 
the above, the perception of the labour supply curve is important in achieving an efficient wage 
level in the market for CEO human capital, as the labour demand curve only provides for a very 
high natural cap. 
 
CEO labour supply  
The supply side of the market consists of CEO candidates. All internal and most external 
candidates do not hold the position of CEO in their current firm. Resulting from the specific 
skills needed, i.e. scarcity, the number of qualified CEO candidates is small. Khurana (2002a, b) 
provides case examples comparing the initial pool of candidates for a CEO position and a 
Marketing Vice President position. The initial pool of a Marketing VP was ten times the size of 
the initial pool of CEO candidates. Of course, this is related to relative scarcity. However, 
Khurana (2002a, b) also indicates that the scarcity is exacerbated, if not actually created, by the 
participants themselves. The shortage might essentially be a misperception, largely driven by 
the fact that boards employ extremely limited criteria to define the pool of eligible candidates. 
Labour supply is also small as a result of the fact that not all qualified sellers are always aware 
or made aware of the CEO vacancy. The elasticity of labour supply equals the responsiveness of 
labour supply to a change in wage rate. In order to generally assess the elasticity of the CEO 
labour supply curve, table 2.16 provides two determinants supplemented with comments 
relating to the CEO labour market. 
Table 2.16 Elasticity of CEO labour supply curve 
This table describes the effect of occupational and geographical mobility on the CEO labour supply 
curve.  
Occupational  mobility  The elasticity of the CEO labour supply curve depends partially on the 
occupational mobility, i.e. the ability and willingness to do the job, as well as 
the awareness of possible candidates that the job is available.  
Geographical mobility  To what extent CEO candidates are mobile is difficult to assess. Generally 
speaking, if the mobility is higher, the elasticity of labour supply is higher. 
When taking the international context into account, one might argue that CEO 
candidates are still relatively immobile, given the fact that large pay 




                                                      
51 Note that this is particularly true for the short term. Over the longer term, the market demand curve will 
be somewhat more elastic than a horizontal summation of long-term individual firm demand, as a result 
of the fact that the long-term curve must take into account the impact of the entry and exits of firms.   
52 Pay differences are recorded, among others, in Conyon and Murphy (2000).  
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A change in the wage rate results in an income effect and a substitution effect (Jacobsen and 
Skillman, 2004). The eventual effect of a wage increase is the result of these effects. On the one 
hand, an increase in the wage rate increases the price of leisure and therefore increases the 
number of working hours. The change in the quantity of work/effort supplied corresponding to 
this element is termed the substitution effect. It has a positive sign, as the hours of work increase 
when the wage goes up. On the other hand, the increase in real income results in more leisure 
(fewer working hours). This is called the income effect. Therefore the income effect has a 
negative sign: if income goes up, hours of work fall. If the substitution effect dominates, the 
person’s labour supply curve will be positively sloped. If the income effect is dominant, the 
person will respond to a wage increase by decreasing his or her labour supply.  
 
It is likely that elasticity is positive for a large part of the supply curve. Increase in 
compensation, results in a higher number of individuals that will invest in breaking the 
occupational barrier and, furthermore, there will be more geographical mobility towards the 
higher wage. Higher compensation could eventually also result in increased inelasticity, 
possibly even bending the curve backwards when individuals in this segment become 
financially independent relatively quickly and could exit the market. The difficulty of drawing 
the CEO labour supply curve is related to the fact that, within the CEO labour market segment, 
further segmentation would be needed from identifying similar types of jobs.
53 Having the skill 
set to be the CEO of a small privately-owned company does not imply being qualified to lead a 
large listed company. The associated pay difference of hundreds of thousands of euro 
emphasises this point.
54 It is not my further objective here to establish homogenous jobs. 
Following Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000), it is concluded that the supply of highly-skilled 
CEOs capable of running large complex corporations is relatively inelastic.
55 The supply of 
CEOs capable to run smaller businesses is relatively less inelastic, due to relatively less scarcity.  
 
General market forces underlying CEO pay increases – shifting demand and supply 
There is a consensus that CEO compensation has increased significantly over the past decade 
(Jensen et al. 2004, Bebchuk and Grinstein, 2005). Possible market-based explanations of 
changes in CEO pay levels can be found in shifting demand and supply curves. A summary is 
provided below of how these shifts can result in changed or increased compensation:  
 
                                                      
53 The imperfections in this market furthermore show that there is no ‘going rate’ where CEO 
compensation is concerned. Bargaining is an important characteristic of this market. Imperfections are 
addressed in section 2.3.3. 
54 Towers Perrin Top Executive Remuneration Survey (2008) 
55 When supply is inelastic, a larger part of the rents to be divided between company and CEO is captured 
by the CEO.  
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Shifts in the CEO labour demand curve: 
i) Within a certain industry, when the demand for the final product increases, ceteris paribus the 
price of the product will increase and will raise the marginal revenue product of labour, shifting 
the demand curve to the right, causing an increase in compensation;  
ii) When the human capital needed to do the job changes and/or when productivity of labour 
increases, the labour demand curve shifts.
56 Rosen (1992) has shown that for CEOs, marginal 
productivity
57 is important as “the activities of the CEO are magnified geometrically, because 
they affect recursively the productivity of all who work below them in the organisation”. The 
marginal product of talent and skills is thus larger at higher levels of a hierarchy, through a 
chain letter effect, i.e. a little extra talent at the top can have enormous effects on total 
output/value creation. This ‘scale of  operations’ effect accrues to the managers as rents;
58  
                                                      
56 A change in human capital needed to perform the job as an explanation for the pronounced trend of 
outside hiring and increased CEO pay levels, has been explored by Murphy and Zábojník (2007). 
Basically, their line of reasoning boils down to a change in the composition of managerial skills needed to 
manage a modern corporation. The relative importance of general skills, financial and accounting 
expertise, and ability to manage physical and human assets, has increased relative to firm-specific skills, 
knowledge, contacts, and experience only relevant within the organisation. Based on the assumption that 
transferable ability is ‘priced’ in the managerial labour market and firm-specific capital is ‘unpriced’, the 
authors explain the significant increase in executive compensation in the United States between 1970 and 
2000, as being due to the increased importance of general managerial skills in the modern organisation. 
57 For the labour market, marginal productivity theory indicates that competitive, profit-maximising firms 
hire each factor, including labour, up to the point at which the value of the marginal revenue product of 
the factor equals its price: marginal cost of labour = marginal revenue product of labour. The marginal 
cost equals the market or equilibrium wage. The marginal revenue product equals the multiplication of 
the marginal physical product of labour (MPPL), the extra output produced by the last worker, and the 
marginal revenue gained by selling one more unit of output (MR). For a CEO position, this notion is 
particularly relevant in a relative sense and is typically defined in terms of value creation. If another CEO, 
with more talent, would increase the value of the company more, based on marginal productivity theory, 
such a CEO would be paid more. 
58 This is much like the ‘superstar’ effect as described by Rosen (1981). As a result of a convexity of 
R(q), which is the net revenue as a function of talent, small differences in talent become magnified in 
larger earnings differences, with greater magnification if the earnings-talent gradient increases sharply 
near the top of the scale. In the case of ‘superstars’, every consumer wants to enjoy the goods that are 
produced by the best producer. The producer is able to supply every consumer at low cost. This enables 
talented people to command both very large markets and very large incomes. Gabaix and Landier (2008) 
use extreme value theory to study the economics of superstars. They obtain general functional forms for 
the distribution of top talents and find that the dispersion of CEO talent distribution appears to be very 
small at the top. They research 250 U.S. firms. If CEOs are ranked by talent, and the CEO number 250 is 
replaced by the CEO number one, the value of the firm will increase only by 0.016%. These very small 
differences in talent, translate into considerable compensation differentials, as they are magnified by firm 
size. Indeed, the same calibration delivers that CEO number 1 is paid over 500% more than CEO number 
250. With regard to the six-fold increase of CEO pay between 1980 and 2003, they show that a 
reasonable explanation is the six-fold increase in market capitalisation of large U.S. companies during 
that period. When stock market valuations increase by 500%, under constant returns to scale, CEO 
‘productivity’ increases by 500% and equilibrium CEO pay increases by 500%.  
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iii) The supply of other factors of production is less relevant for the CEO labour market 
segment. Substitutes are not available and supplements do not necessarily have an impact at the 
top level. 
Shifts in the CEO labour supply curve: 
i) Fundamental changes in tastes: one could argue that, as a result of the emancipation of 
women, more qualified sellers enter the market in addition to the existing male candidates, and 
the CEO labour supply curve shifts to the right. This possible effect will therefore not result in a 
higher equilibrium compensation level, but rather the opposite, as a result of a higher supply;  
ii) Changes in alternative opportunities: the supply of labour in any one labour market depends 
on the opportunities available in other labour markets. If wages are increased in other markets, 
workers will shift jobs if they are willing and able to do so. This causes the labour supply to 
decrease in the first market mentioned. Example: the supply of CEOs for the submarket of 
publicly listed companies can be affected by increased prevalence of the private-equity sector. 
The ‘Calhoun case’
59 in 2006 seemed to suggest an increase in alternative opportunities. These 
types of change can result in an upward pressure on CEO compensation levels within the 
segment of listed companies, to attract and retain the best-qualified candidates;  
iii) Cross country movements: movements of workers from region to region, or country to 
country, usually result in shifts in the labour supply curve. The CEO labour market has a clear 
international dimension. In this respect, it is interesting to note that allowing foreign candidates 
to apply for the job, widens the pool of potential candidates, but could in fact drive pay 
upwards. When, for example, a Dutch firm wants to hire a CEO from the U.S., it needs to pay a 
compensation level above the local market level, due to the pay differential between these 
countries, besides the additional transaction costs that are associated with hiring someone from 
abroad;  
iv) The non-pecuniary aspect of the job and reputation risk: an increase in reputation and other 
risks will diminish the number of candidates that are willing to do the job at a certain 
compensation level; increased legal and corporate governance regulations, increased media 
attention, public scrutiny, et cetera, result in an increase of the market equilibrium wage (see 
case study 2.1). 
                                                      
59 David Calhoun left General Electric, a large listed company, to become the CEO of a significantly 
smaller privately held Dutch based firm, VNU/The Nielsen Company (The Wall Street Journal, August 
24, 2006).  
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Case study 2.1: pay increases as a result of increased reputation and other risks 
An extension of the risk of reputation damage is the public debate on management 
compensation. At the end of the last century, Prime Minister Kok scrutinised the level of 
compensation of Management Board members in the Netherlands. Since then, there is a yearly 
public debate about it (Engesaeth, 2006). The debate typically calls for moderation. However, 
from the perspective of the CEO it increases the risk of reputation damage. This could affect the 
CEO labour supply curve; because fewer individuals are willing to apply for a CEO position at 
a given compensation level. In this light, the media play an important role as they provide 
information that is used by decision makers in modern economies and societies. Whether the 
information is independent and correct, relates to the question of “who owns the media” as 
researched by Djankov et al, (2003). Below, I provide an example of bringing inadequate 
information into the public domain, which can exacerbate the previously described situation of 
risk for executives. Het Financieele Dagblad, the Dutch equivalent of the Wall Street Journal or 
Financial Times, dated May 29
th 2006, headlined the morning paper with an article stating that 
basic salary levels of CEOs had risen strongly from the year 2004 to 2005. The CEOs of the 
AEX companies received a salary increase of more than 30%, according to the paper. These 
figures were taken from the public website www.bestuursvoorzitter.nl of the Vereniging voor 
Effectenbezitters (VEB – securities holders’ association), which represents and defends the 
interests of small investors. I have downloaded this dataset to take a closer look at it; see table 
2.17.  
 
Table 2.17: Overview of changes in fixed compensation  
This table shows an overview of fixed compensation per 2004 and 2005 of the CEOs of the AEX listed 
companies in the Netherlands. Increases from the year 2004 to 2005 are reflected in the final column. 
Source: VEB website www.bestuursvoorzitter.nl   
  CEO (company)  2005 2004  increase  % 
1 Bakker  (TNT) 900,000  900,000  0.0% 
2 Bennink  (Numico)  1,000,000  1,000,000  0.0% 
3 Cescau  (Unilever)  1,336,000*  1,109,000  20.5% 
4  Davis (Reed Elsevier)  1,507,246  1,457,836  3.4% 
5 De  Becker  (Hagemeyer) 654,355  650,000*  0.7% 
6 Elverding  (DSM) 612,000  599,760  2.0% 
7 Goddijn  (TomTom)  186,319*  127,582  46.0% 
8 Groenink  (ABN  Amro) 910,000  889,000  2.4% 
9  Hulshoff (Rodamco Europe)  397,000  371,000  7.0% 
10 Keller  (SBM  Offshore)  574,000  404,000*  42.1% 
11 Kleisterlee  (Philips) 1,020,000  1,015,000  0.5%  
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12 Koffrie  (Buhrmann)  567,000  561,000  1.1% 
13  McKinstry (Wolters Kluwer)  846,000  772,000  9.6% 
14 Meurice  (ASML)  630,000  150,000*  320.0% 
15 Miles  (Vedior)  601,000  582,000*  3.3% 
16 Moberg  (Ahold) 1,500,000  1,500,000  0.0% 
17 Ruys  (Heineken)  634,000**  543,000  16.8% 
18 Scheepbouwer  (KPN) 1,001,397  1,003,236  -0.2% 
19 Shepard  (Aegon)  803,000  804,000  -0.1% 
20 Tilmant  (ING  Groep) 1,289,000  1,250,000*  3.1% 
21  Van Boxmeer (Heineken)  472,000*  358,000  31.8% 
22  Van den Bergh (VNU)  661,725  622,594  6.3% 
23  Van der Veer (Royal Dutch Shell)  1,525,000  1,281,774  19.0% 
24 Votron  (Fortis)  750,000  187,500*  300.0% 
25 Wagenaar  (Getronics)  625,000  600,000  4.2% 
  Average     33.6% 
* Appointed CEO per the indicated year  ** Stepped down as CEO per the indicated year 
 
Table 2.17 does indeed show that the average increase of basic pay was 33.6%. However, it also 
shows that this number is heavily affected by various inaccurate comparisons. The most obvious 
examples are the increases of around 300% of Mr. Meurice (ASML) and Mr. Votron (Fortis), 
who joined their companies on 1 October 2004 and 11 October 2004 respectively. The 
calculation thus compares approximately three-month salary in 2004 with a full year’s salary in 
2005. When these figures are left out of the comparison, the average drops significantly to a 
9.8% increase, which still incorporates a number of similar flaws, such as Mr. Keller of SBM, 
who joined the company on 9 August 2004, and Mr. Goddijn of TomTom, who became CEO of 
the company on 27 May 2005. This example shows that, in the process of translating data to 
information, the media can add noise to the public domain.
60 This increases the reputation risk 
for top executives and can cause upward pressure on compensation. Another example of 
reputation risk is provided by the introduction of the Sarbanes Oxley act (2002). This act 
requires the Chief Financial Officer of the company to sign the financial statements of the 
company together with the CEO. The consequence of providing wrong information to the public 
can be imprisonment in the U.S. This caused upward pressure on the compensation of CFOs for 
Dutch companies with a listing in the United States.  
 
End of case study 2.1 
                                                      
60 The article, to some extent, also reveals what is news and what not. The flawed dataset in figure 2.18 
shows a median increase of 3.4%. One of the alternative angles that the article could have taken is the fact 




Theoretically, shifts in demand and supply curves can provide a market-driven explanation for 
changes in CEO compensation. It was concluded that the labour supply and demand curves are 
inelastic, especially for individuals who are able to manage the largest corporations in our 
society. Therefore, small shifts in these curves can cause significant changes in the ‘equilibrium 
price’. Although shifts in market demand and supply curves can explain general market 
movements to a certain extent, they fail to explain individual compensation packages. The CEO 
labour market is less competitive than is basically assumed in this section; in fact there is no 
single equilibrium price. Gomez-Meija and Wiseman (1997), for example, observe huge 
variations in the salary, bonuses and long-term incentive income received by executives of firms 
of similar size, in the same industry, and given similar performance. Significant market 
imperfections in the CEO labour market are an important cause of these differences and are 
discussed in the next section.  
 
2.3.3 Imperfections in the CEO labour market 
This section abandons the theoretical assumption of the perfectly competitive market of the 
previous section. It describes market imperfections that exist in practice, as well as possible 
ways to diminish these imperfections. 
 
CEO labour market segment benchmark 
In order to provide an additional characterisation of the ‘pricing mechanism’ within the CEO 
labour market, we discuss the market imperfections below. As it is difficult to specify the size 
of the economic imperfections of the CEO labour market in absolute terms accurately, we 
characterise it in relative terms. Hence, we compare the CEO labour market with two other 
segments of factor markets: i) Share market: the general working and efficiency of financial 
markets is well known and widely researched. Share markets, typically central exchanges, can 
be considered highly competitive; there is a broad consensus that the share market works 
relatively efficiently; ii) Labour market for manufacturing employees: part of the differences of 
comparing a financial market segment with a labour market segment is attributable to the fact 
that two different factors of production are compared; labour versus capital. As human beings 
are less homogenous and less mobile than money, labour markets generally exhibit larger 
imperfections than financial markets. In order to illustrate that, relative to other labour market 
segments, the CEO labour segment has its own dynamics, we also compare it to the market for 




Table 2.18: Relative imperfections in the CEO labour market  
This table shows the characteristics of the perfectly competitive market, and indicates to what extent the 
elements are applicable to the CEO labour market segment, the share market, and the labour market 
segment for manufacturing employees. 
Characteristics 
of the perfectly 
competitive 
market 





Not applicable  Large number of 
buyers and sellers  Relatively small number of buyers 
and sellers 
Applicable Applicable 
Not applicable  Applicable  To a certain extent 
applicable 
Everyone is a 
price taker: 
This is not the case in the CEO 
market. In reality, matching and 
negotiation costs give rise to a 
bargaining process. The CEO 
candidate may have a powerful 
position to raise initial compensation. 
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that 
the list of possible candidates is 
relatively small as a result of limited 
criteria applied by companies.
61 
Furthermore, prices/compensation 
levels are referenced to a limited 
number of peer companies (Khurana, 
2002b). 
This is more or 
less the case in the 
share market; only 
large bulk 
shareholders may 




workers as well as the 
companies offering 
factory jobs are more 
or less price takers. 
Only indirectly, via 
unions, do factory 
workers have 
bargaining power. 
Not applicable  Applicable  To a certain extent 
applicable 
Freedom of entry: 
It is difficult to enter the CEO labour 
market, especially in the short term, 
as a result of barriers relating to 
education, experience, etc. 
Transaction costs are also high: costs 
of sign-on bonuses and or exit 
arrangements. 
Large freedom of 
entry. Transaction 
costs are low. 
The labour market for 
factory workers can 
be relatively easily 
entered. Transaction 
costs are relatively 
low. 
Not applicable  Applicable  Not applicable 
There is perfect 
knowledge: 
There is imperfect knowledge. The 
market is not very transparent. There 
is no central marketplace. Information 
is costly;  
Supply side: not everyone is aware of 
the fact that a CEO position will be 
filled; process is often shrouded in 
secrecy; 
Demand side: skills, compensation, 
etc., of candidates are often not 
known and information is also noisy. 
The knowledge 
level in the market 
is high. Most 
research indicates 
that the share 
market is efficient 







There is no perfect 
knowledge. Not every 
worker is completely 
aware of all jobs 
(there is no central 
market place). 
Factors are 
homogenous  Not applicable  Applicable  To a certain extent 
applicable 
                                                      
61 According to Khurana (2002a and 2002b), this is further narrowed down when decisions are made to 
invite candidates for an interview. 
62 Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) indicate that when information is costly, a perfect competitive 
equilibrium does not exist to completely transmit the informed trader’s information to uninformed traders. 
Markets can therefore not be fully open for arbitrage when information about the arbitrage opportunity is 




of the perfectly 
competitive 
market 





In the CEO market as a whole, factors 
are not homogenous; there is a 
difference in ability, skills, charisma, 
etc. Only if this market is segmented 
further, it might be the case that 
factors are homogenous to a certain 
extent in each segment. 
Yes, factors from 
a certain risk type 
are homogenous. 
Although there will 
be some differences 
between different 
manufacturing 
employees in terms of 
skills and motivation, 
generally speaking 
the factors to a large 
degree are 
homogenous. 




results in Pareto 
optimal 
results/allocation. 
Price is not very informative as a 
result of: 
Imperfect information (characterised 
by private information and noise);
63 
Transaction costs are high; 
Labour immobility; 
The impossibility of arbitraging 









model, apart from 
a number of 












Table 2.18 shows that the CEO labour market segment is far from perfectly competitive and 
displays large discrepancies resulting from operational and informational inefficiency: i) 
Operational efficiency:
64 the CEO labour market has the lowest operational efficiency. 
Transaction costs are high, as a result of sign-on bonuses, severance arrangements, etc. The bid-
ask spread is higher than in the other markets described. To explain this statement: in a not 
perfectly competitive market there are two prices: the bid price and the ask price. The narrower 
the bid-ask spread, the more competitive the market, apart from other transaction costs, which 
also need to be low. The share market can be called highly competitive, for example, as the bid-
ask spread is very low.
65 The imperfections in the CEO labour market cause a high bid-ask 
spread. In the CEO labour market, the company determines the bid price and the CEO candidate 
the asking price. Based on contract negotiations, the eventual price for human capital is 
                                                      
63 Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) indicate: the more individuals are informed, the more informative is the 
price system. In general, the price system becomes more informative if the quality of the informed 
trader’s information increases. The greater the magnitude of noise, the less informative the price system 
is.  
64 A market is called operationally efficient if trades are made at the lowest possible cost, i.e. if 
transaction costs are minimal. Transaction costs include commission paid to brokers or intermediaries as 
well as the prevailing bid-ask spread: the difference between the price at which someone is willing to buy 
and at which someone is willing to sell (offer price). In the share market, for example, transaction costs 
are minimal as a result of active competition in the market and among brokers. 
65 What constitutes a small bid-ask spread is somewhat arbitrary; a spread of less than 1% may be 
considered small, but a spread of 5% or more certainly not (Houthakker and Williamson, 1996).  
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determined at which the transaction occurs. Whether the eventual price will be closer to the bid 
or to the ask price is primarily dependent on the bargaining power of both parties; ii) 
Informational efficiency:
66 as the operational efficiency of the CEO labour market is the lowest, 
it will also have the lowest informational efficiency. The market is characterised by a great deal 
of ‘noise’; for example, uncertainty about the quality and number of qualified CEO candidates.     
 
The significant imperfections in the CEO labour market give rise to results that are not 
necessarily competitive. Some guidance on reducing market imperfections is provided below. 
 
Reducing market imperfections      
Due to imperfections, it is unlikely that all CEOs will be paid the unbiased value of their 
marginal product. The ‘ex ante price level’ in this market will typically not be first best 
efficient. It is therefore important to direct effort towards eliminating market imperfections, as 
this can improve market results. Enhancing operational and informational efficiency of the 
market can be induced by the following four ways: i) Widening search criteria and the 
perception of the supply side of the market: in the CEO hiring process, often only a small 
number of potential candidates are considered (Khurana, 2002b). This could result in a 
perceived lower supply curve and associated perception that a higher price needs to be paid. The 
wrong perception of the market supply curve contributes to higher CEO compensation. 
Executive search firms (ESFs) have made the CEO labour market more transparent by 
intermediating between the demand and supply sides of the market. ESFs and their principals 
should ensure that all suitable candidates are considered. This could involve disclosing the CEO 
vacancy and job requirements in the national or international public domain, and setting up a 
system that allows individuals to easily apply for the job without potential reputation damage; 
ii) Improving transparency: transparency on executive compensation has improved in many 
markets over recent years. A uniform way of reporting ex ante and ex post compensation will 
make the price ranges in this market even more visible. It should be noted, however, that 
improving transparency acts like a ‘double-edged sword’, as it triggers a ‘non-economic’ force 
towards increased imperfection of the market that should be actively controlled; CEOs striving 
                                                      
66 A market is informationally efficient if all information available at that time is fully reflected in current 
prices at any time. Operational efficiency is a prerequisite for informational efficiency; if transaction costs 
are high, market parties might not find it worth their while to respond to new information. There is 
general consensus that share markets, for example, are informationally efficient, i.e. there are sufficient 
traders with negligible transaction costs. Research on financial market efficiency dates back to the 1960s, 
when the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) was formulated (Samuelson, 1965, Fama, 1965). The 
conclusion of Fama (1970) is that, with only a few exceptions, the efficient markets model stands up well 
and seems a good first approximation of reality, at least for the weak and semi-strong form of efficiency. 
Numerous studies have further examined the EMH, focusing primarily on the ‘random walk hypothesis’, 
‘variance bounds tests’, ‘overreaction and underreaction’ and ‘anomalies’. The EMH especially serves as 
a useful benchmark for measuring the relative efficiency of a market (Lo, 1997).  
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to be better paid than their peers. This informational efficiency paradox will be further discussed 
in section 2.3.4. Furthermore, the amount of noise regarding CEO abilities and skills could be 
reduced by storing information on public databases, e.g. via social media. In addition, ESFs act 
as market makers and foster networks of potential candidates; iii) Lowering transaction costs: 
sign-on bonuses as well as exit arrangements need to be modest in order to reduce transaction 
costs and decrease entry and exit barriers, thus improving efficiency in this market.
67 Direct 
transaction costs are also the fees of ESFs, for example. Due to the specific fee structure 
operated by some of these firms, indirect transaction costs can be induced as well. ESF fees are 
sometimes tied to the compensation package of the newly hired executive. The higher the CEO 
compensation, the higher the fee earned by the ESF. This could provide adverse incentives, e.g. 
selecting those candidates that are already highly paid. Indirect transaction costs constitute the 
higher compensation to be paid to the newly hired CEO induced by this fee structure. These 
ESFs therefore play a role in the continual surge of managerial remuneration. Companies should 
therefore only work with ESFs on a fixed fee basis, either based on success or not, to avoid 
adverse incentives; iv) Selection of labour market peer groups: establishing CEO compensation 
based on a peer group of other CEOs assumes homogeneity. As the combination of a specific 
CEO, in terms of skills, charisma, experience, etc., in a specific company, sector, size, scope, 
life cycle, etc., results in relatively unique investment combinations with associated risk 
premiums, it is important to regard collected market data for ‘similar positions’ as a point of 
reference only. Comparability can be increased by taking out investment combinations that do 
not resemble the company’s situation, e.g. going concern versus a company that hired its CEO 
at a moment of financial distress. A peer group should, in principle, contain a large and robust 
number of companies in order to resemble the principle of perfectly competitive markets that no 
single market actor can influence market prices.
68 Peer groups should be reviewed regularly, and 
in particular when important company changes occur. For example, when the company becomes 
less complex as a result of divestments, etc., compensation levels should be adjusted 
downwards, based on an adjusted reference market. These downwards adjustments are 
especially important as the perception exists that executive compensation has only risen and has 
                                                      
67 The Dutch Corporate Governance Code (2003, 2008) limits exit arrangements to one-year’s basic 
salary. 
68 This is not always without difficulty. Especially for the largest companies in the economy, using a large 
peer group might not provide a workable solution, as there are only a relatively small number of large 
companies in an economy. Widening the market reference would thus imply using smaller companies 
with lower compensation levels. This might not provide a solution for the largest companies, as these 
companies want to attract the most highly skilled CEOs. Therefore lowering the market reference (taking 
into account less skilled CEOs of smaller companies) might result in setting an inefficiently low 
compensation level, possibly attracting less skilled CEOs.  
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never been adjusted downwards.
69 When setting pay above the median, it should be kept in 
mind that the CEO labour market resembles a click fund. When the market median has risen it 
seems to never come down, resulting from a focus on the upper half of the market and 
identifying only this part as ‘competitive’ pay levels.  As imperfections exist to different 
degrees in different markets, it is important if and when foreign companies are selected in the 
labour market peer group, that this is done with great care. Including foreign companies implies 
importing imperfections from different markets due to different economic, legal, governance 
and cultural circumstances.
70 From an international perspective, countries outside of the U.S. 
that incorporate U.S. companies in the peer group will raise the market reference, because U.S. 
levels are generally much higher.
71 Paying more or less than, for example, the market median of 
the defined peer group does not necessarily indicate a suboptimal outcome, as further discussed 
in section 2.3.4.  
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Where markets fail, improvement could be made by legal requirements imposed directly by the 
government or indirectly by legally-anchored corporate governance codes regarding the 
elements listed above. Although eliminating all market imperfections would improve results, it 
is important to realise that imperfections will never be completely eradicated. A number of 
characteristics that are inherent to the CEO labour market are not in line with the characteristics 
of perfect factor markets. In this light, it should be noted that reducing imperfections in 
isolation, e.g. improving pay transparency, could even increase the imperfection of the market 
as a whole by importing non-economic or psychological forces. These statements should be 
viewed in light of the bargaining process in which the remuneration committee plays a pivotal 
role.  
                                                      
69 In practice this might only be possible when a new CEO is hired resulting from contractual rights of the 
CEO in place. A different thought on keeping the remuneration level of the CEO equal is based on the 
question whether the company pays for skill/talent level or the complexity of the job. In case skill level is 
priced, the remuneration level should remain equal. The company could however decide to replace the 
CEO when less skill is needed to run the new firm and lower the pay of the new CEO. When the 
complexity of the job is priced, the company could decide to lower the compensation of the CEO. In this 
case, the CEO might decide to quit the job and look for a new company in which his or her skill level is 
fully leveraged.  
70 As an example, Core et al. (2004) compare contracting costs in the U.S. and Italy. As a result of the 
different legal circumstances, the contracting environment in Italy is less perfect than in the U.S. Within 
their environment, however, Italian firms might be contracting efficiently, given the imperfections, and 
the results under the U.S. contracting environment might in fact be inefficient. Therefore, results are 
difficult to compare directly. A different example is Kaplan (1997), who compares corporate governance 
and corporate performance of Germany, Japan and the U.S. These countries have differences in boards of 
directors, ownership, capital markets, takeover/control markets, and banking systems. The countries also 
have differences in CEO compensation: Germany, Japan and the U.S. are respectively categorised as 
moderate, low, and high, in terms of executive compensation. 
71 The Towers Perrin Worldwide Total Remuneration Survey (2006) indicates that CEO total 
remuneration for a typical manufacturing company in most countries equals 50% or less of U.S. CEO 
pay, especially caused by the significant long-term incentive component of CEOs in the U.S.   
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2.3.4 The role of the remuneration committee  
The remuneration (/ nomination) committee is the spider in the executive compensation web. Its 
pivotal role originates from the imperfections in this market. Besides market forces, which are 
not necessarily competitive, the pricing mechanism in the CEO labour market boils down to pay 
negotiations between the CEO (candidate) and the company, assumed to be represented by this 
body. The invisible hand in the CEO labour market is thus supplemented by the visible hand of 
the compensation committee, which provides a perspective for policy makers. This section 
starts by indicating that the bargaining process is not only determined by economic forces, but 
also by psychological forces. Subsequently, an overview is provided of possible bargaining 
results, and the need for a different approach is identified in contrast to ‘peer grouping’ to assess 
the efficiency of market results. 
 
Bargaining and the paradox of informational efficiency  
In a bargaining situation, not only bargaining skill and power are important. According to 
Watson and Holman (1977), combining economics and psychology can provide additional 
insight. This touches upon the relatively new research area of the ‘economics of happiness’, 
which is an approach that combines the techniques used by economists with those more 
commonly used by psychologists.
72 In this light, a relevant psychological factor is based on 
Layard (2005), which refers to a study of Harvard University School of Public Health students 
to demonstrate the point that what makes people happy is their relative income, rather than their 
absolute income. As the level of transparency with regard to CEO compensation in most 
markets has become higher, CEOs are better informed about what is paid in similar jobs. In the 
bargaining process, CEO candidates will strive to be paid more than their peers, which results in 
a social comparison treadmill. In a situation where market power of CEOs has remained the 
same or has even increased, improving informational efficiency can create a paradox of 
increased informational efficiency actually resulting in a lower overall efficiency level, i.e. 
results are less efficient. Information becomes a controlling force in the bargaining process, 
resulting in an increased aspiration of the CEO candidate to maximise. This can produce pay 
increases in this market
73 regardless of shifts in demand and supply curves. 
 
The company should thus set clear boundaries, possibly even upfront in a job vacancy published 
in the public domain, as the CEO candidate cannot be blamed for his or her will to maximise.   
                                                      
72 This field of research relies on surveys of the reported well-being of individuals across countries and 
continents and on a more expansive notion of utility (Graham, 2005). 
73 In markets in which remuneration is not yet publicly disclosed this information efficiency paradox 
should be recognised. Increased informational efficiency by pay disclosure triggers non-
economic/psychological forces and could result in a decrease in overall efficiency of this market, if pay 
negotiations are not adequately performed.  
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Potential remuneration results  
As mentioned previously, the compensation committee cannot hide itself solely behind an 
invisible hand. It has significant room to manoeuvre and therefore largely determines the 
difference between optimal results
74 given market imperfections or suboptimal results. Table 
2.19 provides an overview of potential bargaining results in three categories. The table is 
subsequently discussed. 
 
Table 2.19: Bargaining result depends on the role of the remuneration committee 
Role of the remuneration committee  Optimal (given market imperfections)  Suboptimal 
Good intentions – efficient bargaining  1 (a, b)   
Good intentions – inefficient bargaining    2 
Bad intentions/collusion    3 
 
1.  Good intentions – effective bargaining: the compensation committee performs its role as 
required. Contract bargaining occurs at arm’s length. Subcategories: 
a)  Good intentions – effective bargaining – outcome is within currently observed market 
remuneration levels: as a result of imperfections, different pay levels are observed for 
the same position in similar companies and similar situations. Based mainly on 
bargaining skills and power, the eventual result will be more in line with either the 
bottom half of the market or the top half of the market. If the company eventually 
decides, for example, to pay at the 75
th percentile level, one could argue that the 
company has done less well in the contract negotiation.
75 However, from an economic 
viewpoint, the real malefactor is the degree of imperfection of this market allowing for 
a large bargaining space. 
b)  Good intentions – effective bargaining – outcome is higher than currently observed 
market remuneration levels: the result is an outlier positioned outside the observed 
market range. The situation could result from the fact that a high-risk investment is 
required of a specific individual. The higher the risk, the higher the premium that needs 
to be paid to ensure the individual is willing to invest in the relationship, e.g. a company 
in financial distress.  
2.  Good intentions – ineffective bargaining: results are suboptimal due to lack of bargaining 
skills and/or an inefficient hiring process in which the bargaining power is shifted to the 
                                                      
74 Core et al (2004) have indicated that imperfections do not necessarily imply that CEO compensation is 
not ‘optimal’ given the existence of information costs, transaction costs, etc. Optimality here refers to 
maximising the surplus on both sides of the market, given these imperfections. 
75 Note that this deviates from the Coase theorem (1960) often chosen in literature, or the efficient 
contracting perspective, in which informational problems are not present. One of the assumptions 
underlying this starting point is that the contract that the parties end up signing is independent of the 
bargaining process leading up to the signature of the contract.   
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CEO candidate. Khurana (2002 a, b) describes the process of narrowing down the number 
of CEO candidates and starting pay negotiations with the favoured candidate anxious to 
secure his or her services. Jensen et al. (2004) indicate that such a procedure is a recipe for 
paying too much for managerial talent. Although talented CEOs may be scarce, the 
described situation in fact results in a situation that resembles a bilateral monopoly.
76 When 
the compensation committee is unnecessary in the situation of a bilateral monopoly, this can 
result in a bargaining situation where ‘price does not matter’.
77 The results may be 
inefficient and have no relation to the market price, casu quo range of market prices. In 
section 2.3.2 it was shown that the demand side of the market is not typically financially 
constrained. Such results may raise the ceiling of observed market figures. These results, 
which are not second best efficient, contribute to creating ever-increasing pay levels in the 
CEO labour market, called ‘pay ratcheting’, when a peer comparison is not properly 
performed.
78  
3.  Bad intentions/collusion: results are suboptimal. In “Pay without Performance”, Bebchuk 
and Fried (2004) advocate the view that executive compensation is not driven by market 
forces and arm’s length bargaining between the remuneration committee and the CEO, but 
is the result of managerial power. Pay packages are characterised by ‘camouflage’ and only 
limited by public outrage, i.e. outrage costs. 
 
The question of which of the three categories is most common, and in which variant, is heavily 
debated among empiricists. In order to say something about the efficiency of the bargaining 
outcome, a benchmark is needed against which to compare the set remuneration. Labour market 
peer groups will generally provide an insufficient anchor point to assess optimality, because: i) 
Homogeneity of peer comparison is limited: a combination of a specific firm with a specific 
individual, within a specific context, delivers relatively unique human capital investment 
combinations; ii) The labour market reference provides a collection of market figures which in 
turn can be the result of an optimal or suboptimal bargaining process and could fall in either of 
                                                      
76 Duffhues and Jobsen (2007) indicate that contract negotiation in the CEO labour market often shows a 
clear comparison with the situation of a bilateral monopoly. 
77 There seems to be consensus amongst theorists that, in case of a bilateral monopoly, price is not 
determinate, and that buyer and seller tend to split the joint maximum profit (Watson and Holman, 1977). 
Different techniques are used to create more insight. For an econometric analysis, among others, please 
refer to Oczkowski (1999). For a simulation model including a situation of bilateral monopoly, among 
others, please refer to Duvallet, Garapin, Hollard, Llerena (2004). 
78 Companies that pay the CEO at the 75
th percentile market level are often scrutinised for contributing to 
the pay-ratchet effect. Although this may be the case, it is important to note that these companies do not 
contribute to ever-increasing pay levels. If the company changes CEO compensation to this level, while in 
the past paying at the 25
th percentile, the market median rises and this could result in upward adjustment 
of companies that reward at the median market level. However, the market ‘ceiling’ is unchanged, 
providing an eventual cap on pay increases. Companies that raise this ceiling contribute to ever-increasing 
pay levels especially if other companies, sometimes wrongfully, compare themselves with this particular 
company.   
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the three categories listed above. Without insight into the basis of the comparison, i.e. optimal 
versus suboptimal, a peer comparison to assess the optimality of a specific bargaining situation 
can result in drawing the wrong conclusion; iii) Finally, as indicated by category 1b, even when 
a bargaining outcome falls outside the peer comparison, i.e. observed market figures, it might 
still be optimal due to the specifics of the situation. 
 
Duffhues and Jobsen (2006) state that the development of a risk-return model could enhance 
insight into executive pay practices. Further detailing and researching the perspective of human 
capital investments, risk and associated premiums, in light of the CEO compensation topic, is 
therefore an important topic for future research (see chapter 3). This is especially the case since 
the lack of accountability, due to the omission of an individualised benchmarking tool to assess 
the efficiency of the bargaining process, can be a recipe for setting off outrage costs,
79 
particularly translated into reputation damage of those involved, increased prices demanded by 
suppliers, strikes of employees, etc.  
 
The role of the compensation committee is to realise that negotiations have become more 
professional,
80 are affected by psychology, and are controlled by information. It should actively 
seek to minimise imperfections, i.e. take a clear stand on what the company is willing to pay, 
possibly employing their own professional contracting agent, widening the market reference, 
and to maximise informational efficiency, i.e. provide shareholders with a standardised 
summary report on pay levels and full insight into considerations, and maximise operational 
efficiency, i.e. minimise sign-on bonuses and exit arrangements.  
 
2.3.5 Summary and conclusion 
This section has focused on the dynamics of the executive remuneration level decision. Starting 
from the theoretically limiting case of the perfectly competitive market model, differences in 
compensation are mainly explained by differences in human capital. Ability in combination 
with investments in human capital, i.e. education, acquired skills and expertise, which result in 
relative scarcity, produce higher returns. This fundamentally explains why CEOs earn more 
than, for example, manufacturing employees, which is due to relative scarcity.  
                                                      
79 Bebchuk and Fried (2004) use this term in the managerial power context. Outrage costs can be the 
result of perceived unexplainable unfairness. If the company is not able to provide insight regarding the 
‘fairness’ of the remuneration outcome, especially in the case of an increase, this could trigger outrage 
costs. 
80 Jensen et al. (2004) provide an example of professional negotiators acting on behalf of the CEO to 
extract as much as possible from the company in the form of sign-on bonuses, salaries, target bonuses, 
long-term incentive grants, pension and other benefits.     
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Focusing on the CEO labour market demand and supply curves, I established that these are 
relatively inelastic for the largest listed companies in the economy. When an individual 
company is searching for a CEO, the labour demand is even perfectly inelastic. This is the result 
of no close substitution. Furthermore, companies are not easily deterred by high compensation 
levels, since CEO labour costs are only a fraction of the total costs of the company. There is 
only a very high natural cap from the demand side; in theory this is the point where the 
company cannot survive in the long-term and in practice the point where the market for 
corporate control acts when CEO pay is far from optimal. The market demand curve, which is 
largely a horizontal summation of individual demand, is therefore also relatively inelastic. This 
notion makes the perception and reality of the supply curve even more important in this market. 
Generally speaking, as a result of inelasticity, small shifts in either the demand curve or the 
supply curve can explain large changes in market prices from this perspective.  
Further deduction rendered the view that the CEO labour market displays significant deviations 
from the perfectly competitive model. This conclusion is based on a comparison with the labour 
market segment for manufacturing employees, and with the share market, one of the financial 
markets, based on the essential characteristics of perfect factor markets. Operational and 
informational efficiency is lowest in the CEO labour market as a result of high transaction costs, 
imperfect information characterised by private information and noise, labour immobility and the 
impossibility of arbitraging. Due to these imperfections, there is no single market-equilibrium 
compensation level. The labour demand and supply curves therefore can contribute to 
explaining general market results and movements; however, these fail to explain individual 
remuneration packages. 
The pricing mechanism in this market, apart from the invisible hand, consisting of weak 
competitive market forces, boils down to pay negotiations between the CEO candidate and the 
company assumed to be represented by the compensation committee, i.e. the visible hand of the 
compensation committee. The role of the compensation committee is to attract a qualified CEO 
at the lowest possible costs to shareholders. Poor bargaining and a misperception of the supply 
side of the market can prevent such a situation from occurring. Furthermore, increased 
compensation disclosure has provided CEO candidates with a strong psychological aspiration to 
maximise, i.e. being paid at least as good as the upper half of the market. This can result in an 
upward spiral, regardless of shifts in supply and demand curves. 
Due to the fact that there is no single equilibrium price, stakeholders are unable to assess 
whether the remuneration committee members have performed their job well. Pay differences 
between CEOs in similar situations can, for example, be the result of inequalities in complexity  
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that are difficult for the outside world to determine. However, they can also be the result of an 
excellent, or poorly, conducted negotiation. A labour market peer group comparison, in 
isolation, cannot be used to assess the situation, given the highly individual character of the 
human capital investment situation, i.e. a combination of a specific firm with a specific 
individual within a specific context. In case of compensation that is perceived as too high, this 
could offset ‘outrage costs’ that damages the company and its value, especially in an untrusting 




                                                      
81 In various countries, this is already the case. In the Netherlands, the remuneration report, drafted by the 
remuneration committee, summarises and explains the remuneration policy for the Board of Management. 
This policy is tabled for adoption at the AGM. This system of a ‘binding vote’ goes beyond the practice 
in, for example, the UK, where shareholders have an ‘advisory vote’.  
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2.4 Remuneration structure: incentive contracts - a balancing act 
The previous section 2.3 explored the CEO labour market. The price level that is negotiated 
provides an expected value of the compensation of the CEO. The eventually realised or ex post 
compensation can be very different from the expected compensation, and depends on the 
specific conditions in the contractual labour agreement in combination with achieved 
performance. The structure of the variable compensation components in the contract determines 
the magnitude of this deviation and thus the associated risk for the executive.  
 
This chapter provides an overview of the contracting difficulties that give rise to and are 
associated with variable compensation and, furthermore, the groundwork, as well as important 
advances that have been made in agency theory during the past approximately 30 years. 
Practical comments are made in section 2.4.4, which discusses the role of the remuneration 
committee, and shows that there is room for alternative hypotheses. 
 
2.4.1 Classic agency problem – optimal contracting perspective 
Issues regarding incentive pay are closely related to the theory of contracts. In the 1970s, the 
‘theory of contracts’ originated from the failures of general equilibrium theory to adequately 
take into account realistic parameters, such as the possession of private information by 
contracting parties (Salanié, 1997). To analyse the problem of parties bargaining over the terms 
of a contract, involving asymmetric information, game theory was resorted to. The theory of 
contracts covers a lot of ground and many varied situations, and can be distinguished along 
several axes: i) Static or dynamic; ii) Involving complete or incomplete contracts; iii) 
Describing bilateral or multilateral relationships, etc. 
 
Principal – agent paradigm 
The study of bargaining under asymmetric information is quite complex. Therefore the 
‘principal-agent’ paradigm has been introduced as a simplifying tool. It allocates all bargaining 
power to one of the parties. This party will propose a ‘take it or leave it’ contract and therefore 
requests a ‘yes or no’ answer; the other party is not free to propose another contract. The 
principal-agent game is therefore a Stackelberg game in which the leader, who proposes the 
contract, is called the principal, and the follower, the party who just has to accept or reject the 
contract, is called the agent. In the model, the utility of one party is maximised, while the other 




According to Salanié (1997), bargaining under asymmetric information can be associated with 
who the party is; what his characteristics are, called hidden information, or what the party does, 
i.e. the decisions he takes, called hidden action.  
 
Hidden information is studied within adverse selection models as well as signalling models. 
Adverse selection models
82 entail the private knowledge of a cost or preference parameter, such 
as talent or risk-aversion. In such models, the uninformed party, principal, is imperfectly 
informed of the characteristics of the informed party, agent; the uninformed party moves first. 
Other terms that are used for these models are ‘self selection’ and ‘screening’ models. The 
objective of these models is to make the agent reveal their characteristics by offering a menu of 
contracts from which the different types of informed agents choose according to their private 
characteristics. In signalling models, the informational situation is the same as under adverse 
selection models; however the informed party moves first in these models by sending a signal 
that may reveal information relating to his or her type. The uninformed party then tries to 
decrypt these signals by using some interpretative scheme.
83 In terms of executive 
compensation, contracting under hidden information will be briefly discussed in the next section 
2.4.2.   
 
Hidden action or moral hazard models entail the private knowledge of an action of the agent, 
such as effort.
84 The uninformed party, principal, moves first and is imperfectly informed of the 
actions of the informed party, agent. Moral hazard involves the following elements: i) Agent 
                                                      
82 A seminal article on adverse selection has been written by Mirrlees (1971). Exploring optimum income 
taxation, to maximise a utilitarian social welfare function, Mirrlees defines income as the product of 
labour supply and talent. Talent in this respect is the adverse selection parameter. However, observable 
visibility of the income reduces this problem. The principal-agent model with adverse selection has also 
been useful in analysing the insurance market, in which probability of accident is the adverse selection 
parameter, for instance in Stiglitz (1977), and for the analysis of banking contracts, in which the adverse 
selection parameter is the efficiency of the borrower, for instance in Gale and Hellwig (1985).  
83 Important early contributions include: Akerlof (1970), who showed that a market may function very 
badly if the informed party has no way to signal the quality of the goods it is selling; for an example, 
please refer to the market for second-hand cars. In the model of Spence (1973), the signal that is sent by 
the informed party has a cost that depends on its type, so that higher types are more likely to send higher 
signals. This signal may then help the uninformed party to distinguish the different types. The Crawford-
Sobel (1982) model shows that even if the signal is purely extrinsic, if it has no cost for the informed 
party and thus constitutes ‘cheap talk’, both parties may still coordinate on equilibria that reveal some 
information. 
84 The problem of moral hazard was originally analysed in the medical care market by Arrow (1963). 
Arrow stated that because agents can affect, by their behaviour, medical expenses or the probability of the 
health risks they face, insurance companies cannot offer proper coverage of medical risks. Arrow also 
calls for public intervention when insurance markets do not emerge because of moral hazard. Although 
optimal risk sharing is usually prevented by moral hazard, Pauly (1968) disputes the fact that the 
government faced with the same informational constraints can do better. The first attempts to model 
moral hazard have been performed by Zeckhauser (1970), Spence and Zeckhauser (1971) and Ross 
(1973).   
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takes a decision or action that affects his or her utility and that of the principal; ii) The principal 
only observes the ‘outcome’, which is an imperfect signal of the action taken; iii) The action the 
agent would choose spontaneously is not Pareto optimal. Since the action is unobservable, the 
principal cannot force the agent to choose an action that is Pareto optimal. The principal can 
only influence the choice of action by the agent by conditioning the agent’s utility to the only 
variable that is observable: the outcome. This, in turn, can only be done by giving the agent a 
transfer that depends on the outcome. Section 2.4.3 will focus on contracting under hidden 
action. The objective is to distil out a number of predictions for the practice and reality of 
executive compensation that are rooted in the theory of optimal contracts. The primary focus 
will be on the solutions to the principal’s problem as provided by a number of seminal studies.  
2.4.2 Contracting with hidden information / adverse selection 
The contracting problem in the case of hidden information is to design a contract that effectively 
separates agents with different hidden types, so that agents from each class only select contracts 
intended for their type. The different contractual solutions will not be further specified, but 
problems that hidden information causes in the specific case of the CEO labour market will be 
briefly addressed. In a ‘normal’ hiring process of a manufacturing employee, for example, the 
job vacancy is often publicly known, e.g. by means of advertisement. The more people know 
about the vacancy the better, as this results in a possibly larger pool of applicants, which 
potentially allows for a better choice. In a standard case, a number of people will apply for the 
job. By screening, i.e. checking references, education, etc., and offering a specific type of 
contract that is intended for the type of individual the company is looking for, the right person 
for the job can be selected more or less through a self-selection process. The fact that 
characteristics being sought cannot be directly observed, therefore, does not always cause a 
problem.        
 
In the specific case of the executive and CEO labour market, the vacancy is not often publicly 
known. Khurana (2002) has indicated that this market segment is characterised by covertness 
and a high degree of risk. Executive Search Firms operate as market makers. As a result of 
hidden information and the significant adverse consequences of choosing the wrong person for 
the job, only candidates will be invited who, one way or another, have publicly shown their 
capability for doing the job.
85 This is especially the case in large publicly listed firms. As a 
result, individuals who are capable of doing the job, but are not on the ‘radar screen’ of the 
remuneration and/or appointment committee, will not be invited. As a result of the fact that the 
vacancy is not publicly known these individuals are also not able to initiate a job application. 
                                                      
85 Khurana (2002a, b) indicates that, for the hiring process within large firms, only a small number of 
candidates are considered whom most people know off the top of their heads.   
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The first situation mentioned above results in a perceived lower labour supply, and the latter in 
an increased inelasticity of the labour supply curve. CEO ex ante compensation rises as a result, 
and the characteristics sought might only be partially found.     
 
Note that the basic lesson of adverse selection theory of offering a menu of contracts still stands. 
Suppose a candidate with entrepreneurial spirit is searched for with a relatively low risk profile. 
In such a case, the contract should be designed to ensure the right candidate will ‘self-select’ 
into the job. The offered contract may contain more pay at risk, effectuated by the obligation for 
the candidate to buy a certain number of shares in the company,
86 for example. Alternatively, 
the pay-for-performance relationship can be more pronounced, more risk or leverage. In figure 
2.9, this would be contract B as opposed to contract A.
87  
Figure 2.9: Self-selection as a result of the shape of the compensation plan 
This figure shows two contracts with equal expected costs for the company. Based on the perception of 
the value of the contract for the CEO candidate, a choice is made between more security, contract A, or 





A candidate who expects to be in 
this part of the performance 
dimension will self-select into 
company B (with more pay at risk) 
A candidate who expects to be in 
this part of the performance 
dimension will self-select into 







     
 
The self-selection mechanism thus contributes to a situation in which candidates with a certain 
type of risk profile and cost of effort function will self-select into or out of the company. 
 
In the next subsection, the agency problem, characterised by hidden action and the associated 
contracting difficulties, is further explored.  
                                                      
86 Note that wealth constraints could limit the practical application of these types of contracts. On the 
other hand, these contracts might particularly attract wealthy individuals, as they are generally less risk-
averse.   
87 Based on Jensen (2003), page 402  
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2.4.3 Contracting with hidden action/moral hazard 
The principal–agent problem in a modern firm, which is characterised by the separation of 
ownership and control, was identified by Berle and Means (1932) and was formalised by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976).
88 This agency problem is specifically apparent in the relationship between 
the shareholder and the manager of a corporation. A trade-off between debt and equity finance 
was developed to minimise agency costs.
89 The disciplinary effects of debt financing reduce 
perk consumption by management. However, borrowing becomes costly when debt levels are 
large, with the possibility of financial distress. At this point the manager will have an incentive 
to engage in excessively risky projects/investments, which benefit the owner if the project 
succeeds and hurt the creditor if it does not.
90 The optimal debt/equity ratio of the firm is 
determined at the point at which the marginal benefit of keeping the manager from taking perks 
is offset by the marginal cost of causing risky behaviour. The theoretical shortcoming of Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), however, is that agency problems can generally be solved more 
efficiently by putting the agent on an incentive scheme rather than by using the financial 
structure of the company.
91 The optimal contract between a principal and an agent is the 
                                                      
88 Jensen and Meckling (1976) do not focus on how to structure the contractual relationship between the 
principal and the agent to provide appropriate incentives for the agent to make choices that will maximise 
the principal’s welfare, given that uncertainty and imperfect monitoring exists. They assume that 
individuals will solve these problems. The important aspect of their study is that they indicate that this 
cannot be done at zero costs if both the principal and the agent are utility maximisers. The real costs 
associated with the agency problem are defined as the sum of: the monitoring expenditures by the 
principal, the bonding expenditures by the agent, and the residual loss: this refers to the monetary 
equivalent of the reduction in welfare of the principal as a result of the remaining divergence between the 
agent’s decisions and those decisions, which would maximise the welfare of the principal, which cannot 
be eliminated by monitoring or bonding. 
89 Before the development of the asymmetric information paradigm, the single most important 
consideration affecting a capital structure decision was thought to be taxes. Modigliani and Miller (1958, 
1963) had drawn attention to the large tax-arbitrage gains to be made from the tax deductibility of 
corporate interest payments, generally favouring debt over equity, up to a certain point at which financial 
distress costs dominate on a marginal basis.   
90 Stulz (1990) extended the model of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and formalised the ideas expressed by 
Jensen (1986) concerning the benefits of debt as a control mechanism on wasting free cash flows by 
investing them in uneconomic projects. Stulz assumes managerial utility is increasing in the amount of 
money invested in the firm. Financing policy matters, as it reduces the agency cost of managerial 
discretion. Managerial discretion has two costs in a situation that observes neither cash flow nor 
management’s investment decisions: an overinvestment cost, which arises because management invests 
too much in some circumstances, and an underinvestment cost caused by management’s lack of 
credibility when it claims it cannot fund positive NPV projects with internal resources. In this case, it may 
be optimal for shareholders to prohibit future external financing and to impose an initial debt ratio, which 
is such that it balances the marginal cost of good investment projects foregone when the free cash flow 
turns out to be low, against the marginal benefit of bad investment projects avoided when the free cash 
flow turns out to be high. It thus provides a theory of optimal capital structure under asymmetric 
information. 
91 Hart (2001) provides an example to illustrate this point: suppose a principal hires an agent to sell 
silverware. The job is to drive around and knock on people’s doors and try to interest them in knives and 
forks. The principal may be worried that the agent will sit in the car all day and listen to rap music and not 
sell the product. One solution to this problem is to pay a fixed amount per set of silverware that is sold. 
Note that it is not necessary to make the agent a shareholder of the silverware firm to induce hard work.  
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contract that minimises total agency costs. The basic ‘agency problem’ is summarised in figure 
2.10: 
 





by the principal to 
the agent Private information:
• Hidden Action
• Hidden Information
Actions of the agent are 




The principal offers a 
contract to the agent to 
induce the agent to 




The agency problem focuses especially on the incentive problem that arises as a result of the 
agent performing tasks for the principal. The principal is concerned that the manager engages in 
tempting alternatives, instead of finding and investing in all positive net present value (NPV) 
projects open to the firm (Brealey and Meyers, 2000), such as: i) Reduced effort (under-
investment): finding and implementing investments in truly valuable projects is a high-effort, 
high-pressure activity. The manager will be attempted to slack off; ii) Perks: the manager can 
consume company assets by buying tickets to sporting events, office accommodation, plan 
meetings at luxury resorts, etc. These non-pecuniary rewards are often referred to as private 
benefits or perquisites; iii) Empire building (over-investment) and entrenching investment: 
managers usually prefer to run large businesses rather than small ones. Getting from small to 
large may not be a positive-NPV undertaking (Jensen, 1986, 1993). This issue of over-
investment is also often apparent in cases of entrenching investment, which are projects 
designed to require or reward the skills and experience of existing managers (Schleifer and 
Vishny, 1989); iv) Avoiding risk: if a manager only receives a fixed salary and cannot share in 
the upside of risky projects, then safe projects are better than risky ones from a manager’s 
viewpoint. However, risky projects can have large positive NPVs.  
  
To induce the agent to carry out the task delegated by the principal, a contract
92 is offered to the 
agent by the principal. The contract should ensure that the agent acts in the interest of the 
                                                      
92 In contracting theory, the contract offered by the principal can be explicit, implicit or both. An explicit 
contract is guaranteed by a third party, e.g. a court or a mediator. An implicit contract relies on a system 
of behavioural norms, for instance, and will need to be sustained as an equilibrium in the interaction 







principal. The difficulty of designing an efficient or optimal contract
93 lies in the previously-
mentioned characteristics of the principal-agent relationship; as the agent owns private 
information and the eventual outcome based on his actions is only indicative of his private 
information, the solution to the principal’s problem is not usually Pareto-optimal (Ross, 1973). 
 
The theoretical literature has evolved, from high level thinking on possible solutions for the 
principal’s problem, towards providing both explanations and recommendations for the 
structure of real life incentive contracts. To provide insight into the major developments, three 
building blocks are created. These blocks range from the basic moral hazard problem to the 
more advanced problem under incomplete contracts (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005). Each 
block is discussed below. 
 
Figure 2.11: Overview agency literature – panel A  








The groundwork of agency theory was laid down in the late 1970s and early 1980s, establishing 
the classic model in agency theory, such as that of Jensen and Meckling (1976), Holmstrom 
(1979 and 1982), Grossman and Hart (1983), and others. In a typical ‘hidden action’ model, the 
agent, e.g. the CEO, is assumed to take actions to produce stochastic shareholder value and in 
return receives a certain amount of compensation. The utility function is positively based on 
compensation and negatively on actions. The CEO’s utility function and the production function 
linking the CEO’s actions to output are common knowledge to both shareholders and the CEO, 
but only the CEO observes the actions taken. That is, the shareholders know precisely what 
actions they want the CEO to take, but cannot directly observe the CEO’s actions. The optimal 
                                                      
93 Note that there is a difference between a contract that can be considered optimal in the first best or 
second best sense, and a contract that is considered complete. According to Hart and Holmstrom (1987), 
the vast majority of the theoretical work has been concerned with what might be called complete 
contracts. In this context, a complete contract is one that specifies each party’s obligations in every 
conceivable eventuality, rather than a contract that is fully contingent in the Arrow-Debreu sense. 
According to this terminology, an asymmetric labour contract can be just as complete as a symmetric 
information contract. It is important to note that, in reality, it is usually impossible to lay down each 
party’s obligations completely and unambiguously in advance, so that most actual contracts are seriously 
incomplete. Incompleteness can further lead to departures from the first best solution, even when there are 






















Level of sophistication – more in line with real life circumstances 
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contract maximises the risk-neutral shareholders’ objective, firm output minus CEO 
compensation, subject to an incentive compatibility constraint, i.e. the CEO chooses actions to 
maximise his or her utility, and a participation constraint, i.e. the expected utility of the contract 
must exceed the CEO’s reservation utility. The fundamental insight emerging from the 
traditional principal-agent models is that the optimal contract mimics a statistical inference 
problem: the payouts depend on the likelihood that the desired actions were actually taken. This 
‘informativeness principle’, introduced by Holmstrom (1979), suggests that performance 
measures are chosen to the extent that they provide information on whether the CEO took the 
actions desired by shareholders.  
 
The informativeness principle leads to a number of other insights with regard to efficient 
incentive contracts: i) Besides using share-based measures in incentive contracts, the 
informativeness principle allows for a role for additional performance measures, such as 
accounting returns.
94 Non-share-based measures will be used to the extent that they provide 
information relevant in assessing whether the CEO actually took the desired action. In fact, if 
these other measures constitute a ‘sufficient statistic’ for the CEO’s actions, share-based 
measures need not be used at all;
95 ii) Based on the same principle, Holmstrom (1982a) suggests 
that optimal incentive contracts for risk-averse executives should depend on Relative 
Performance Evaluation (RPE), as this will yield similar effort incentives, compared to absolute 
performance-related contracts, but with less compensation risk for the executive, by removing 
common shocks experienced by all firms in the same industry over which the CEO has no 
control. RPE will lead to reducing moral hazard costs and a more optimal risk-sharing ratio. 
                                                      
94 Especially in accounting literature, the informativeness of performance measures has been a subject of 
research. Lambert and Larcker (1987) argue that, while market returns may be the ‘correct’ measure of 
performance from the perspective of the shareholders, such measures may not be the best indicators of 
managerial actions. Relying on Holmstrom (1979), they argue that the important characteristic of a 
performance measure is whether it provides information on managerial action. In designing management 
compensation contracts, what matters is that the performance measure has a high signal-to-noise ratio, i.e. 
that the information about managerial action captured by the performance measure can be distinguished 
from the random noise in the measure.  
95 Bushman and Smith (2001) indicate that compensation can be positively as well as negatively related to 
accounting performance: i) The direct incentive hypothesis, positive relationship: CEO effort in a given 
year can sometimes be better measured by accounting performance than by share prices, as share prices 
might have already incorporated this, thus in one sense share prices measure relative performance, i.e. 
relative to investor’s expectations; ii) Filtering hypothesis, negative relationship: is based on the 
assumption that the noise component in accounting performance is correlated with the noise component 
in share price performance. If, for example, the noise component is positively correlated with the noise in 
share price performance, the filtering hypothesis implies a negative correlation between accounting 
performance and CEO compensation. Another reason why accounting measures are used in practice 
includes the fact that instances could occur in which the objective of the principal is difficult to contract. 
The weight that should be allocated to ‘price versus non-price measures’ as Core, Guay and Verrecchia 
(2003) have called it, depends on the ‘quality’ of the measures in the specific company, as discussed in 
the section on multidimensional moral hazard problems.  
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Empirical evidence on the use of RPE is mixed
96 (Prendergast, 1999). Murphy (1999) shows 
that RPE is hardly ever used in long-term incentives. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) found 
that CEOs are rewarded for luck, defined as observable shocks to performance beyond the 
CEO’s control. The overall conclusion seems to be that RPE has been absent in most executive 
compensation contracts,
97 given the fact that there are benefits as well as costs in the use of 
RPE.
98 In long-term incentive schemes, a sharp increase of RPE was observed, in the 
Netherlands, after the introduction of the Dutch Corporate Governance Code (2003). Best 
practice provisions II.2.1 and II.2.3 require options and shares to be linked to predetermined 
performance criteria for options, and clearly quantifiable and challenging targets for shares. As 
a result, a significant number of large listed Dutch companies started to introduce relative TSR 
plans in 2004 and 2005 (Haanen, Maas and Triest, 2006);
99 iii) Also based on the 
informativeness principle, Grossman and Hart (1983) determined that the optimal sharing rate 




                                                      
96 Gibbons and Murphy (1990) report the strongest support for the RPE hypothesis based on 1974-1986 
data from 1049 U.S. firms. They found that changes in CEO pay are positively and significantly related to 
firm performance, but negatively and significantly related to industry and market performance. The 
research is not convincing to Janakiram, Lambert and Larcker (1992) and Sloan (1993), who relax the 
findings of Gibbons and Murphy (1990). 
97 The Towers Perrin 2004 European Annual Incentive Plan Survey, for example, reports on the 
prevalence of performance standards among 198 large European companies: most companies, 65%, use a 
budget approach. Only 4% use a peer group/relative performance measurement to set targets for the short-
term incentive plan. 
98 Lambert (2001) argues that there are also costs associated with RPE: i) There may be counter-
productive arguments concerning which components are controllable and which components are non-
controllable political costs with shareholder groups. When executives are paid large bonuses if their 
firm’s share price has gone down, even if the decrease is not as large as the decrease for peer firms, it can 
motivate destructive competition between agents, i.e. sabotaging their performance instead of improving 
your own. The use of RPE might lead to poor strategic decisions, e.g. picking lines of business in which 
the competition is ‘easy’ as opposed to picking the ones in which you will do best on an absolute basis, in 
which removing the impact of a variable from the agent’s performance measure reduces his incentives to 
forecast that variable and modify the firm’s strategy on the basis of this information, e.g. even if oil prices 
are exogenously given, you may still want the executive to attempt to forecast what oil prices will be and 
to design a strategy for the firm that is best, given that strategy such as inventory decisions, hedging 
positions, pricing contracts, etc. Executives can achieve some of the benefits of RPE on their own. They 
may be able to re-allocate their portfolio of wealth to remove a position of the market-related risk, as a 
result of which it is unnecessary for the firm to do this with a compensation contract.        
99 These plans grant options and/or shares conditional upon the achievement of TSR performance relative 
to a group of predefined peers/competitors. Note that, within these plans, only the allocation mechanism 
is based on RPE. The gain on the shares or options is not relative, such as is the case with indexed 
options, for example, promoted by Rappaport (1999). 
100 Although this might be theoretically true, it is questionable whether this is relevant for the practice of 
setting efficient contracts. As agents in the real world face a wider range of alternatives and principal, a 
more diffuse picture than assumed in traditional agency models, optimal rewards for CEOs are linear in 
the agent’s aggregate performance (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1987). Non-linear performance incentive 
zones in sequential action models lead to gaming. Please also refer to Gibbons (2005) and Jensen and 
Murphy (2004).   
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The traditional principal-agent model yields several important and practical insights useful in 
understanding existing contracts and, normatively, in designing better ones. In particular, the 
models highlight the trade-off between risk and incentives, as illustrated by the simple agency 
model. The optimal sharing rate is provided by Haubrich 1994, among others, as: 
 
s* = 1/(1+ηcσ²)                                   [2.1] 
 
where s* equals the optimal sharing rate, η equals the agent’s coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion, c equals the agent’s cost of effort, and σ² the variance of firm performance. 
 
Equation 2.1 explains lower pay-for-performance sensitivities by higher levels of risk aversion 
(η), cost of effort (c) and/or large uncontrollable noise in firm performance (σ²). The test of the 
classical model is therefore based on the predicted negative relationships between ‘s’, on the 
one hand, and ‘η’, ‘c’ and ‘σ²’ on the other. As risk aversion and cost of effort are difficult to 
observe, Garen (1994) and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) focus on the assumed negative 
relationship between the sharing rate and the variability of firm performance (σ²). Both studies 
indeed found this negative relationship over different periods: 1974-1988, low statistical 
significance, and 1993-1996, high statistical significance, respectively. Agents will thus have 
weaker incentives when the variance of the performance measure is larger.
101 
 
The sharing rate is often referred to as the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS). There are 
numerous empirical studies researching the level of this pay-for-performance sensitivity in real 
life compensation contracts, especially in the U.S. and the UK. Van Praag (2005) provides an 
overview of 26 studies including, among others, influential work of Jensen and Murphy (1990) 
and Hall and Liebman (1998). Jensen and Murphy (1990) researched 2,213 firms over the 
period 1974-1986 and found an average CEO PPS of 0.00325 or USD 3.25 per USD 1,000 
change in shareholder value.
102 The incentive is equal to owning 0.325% of the company’s 
share. The PPS has increased over time as shown by the study of Hall and Liebman (1998). 
They researched 478 U.S. Fortune 500 companies over the period 1980-1994 and found a PPS 
of USD 6 per USD 1,000 for the year 1994, which is an almost doubling of the PPS in relation 
                                                      
101 This supports a general principal-agent framework, but does not identify which specific agency 
problem generates the data; under-investment, as a result of private costs of additional positive NPV 
investments that require additional work, and carrying overseeing responsibilities for that investment, or 
over-investment, taking on wasteful, negative present value investment projects because private benefits 
are derived from controlling more assets. Over the period from 1993 to 2001, Aggarwal and Samwick 
(2006) found that investment is increasing in incentives and, furthermore, that firm performance is 
increasing in incentives. This is in line with models of under-investment. 
102 The PPS in this study includes basic salary, bonus payments, share options, share ownership and threat 
of dismissal. Note that the PPS for the smallest companies in the sample is higher than for the largest 
companies: USD 1.85 and USD 8.05 per USD 1,000 respectively.    
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to the study of Jensen and Murphy (1990).
103 Changes can be largely attributed to changes in 
share options and share holdings. Many other aspects of the PPS have been explored in various 
studies, including:  
 
i) PPS versus incentive strength: from a different perspective, Hall and Liebman (1998) state 
that incentives arising from the empirically observed PPSs can be significant as a result of the 
fact that even small sharing rates can cause significant absolute value swings in CEO wealth. 
This would result in adequate decision-making. Hall and Liebman (1998) provide the example 
of a CEO choosing between two projects with different expected payoffs and private benefits. 
Project A has expected returns of USD 350 million more than the expected return of project B, 
but project B yields private benefits that the CEO values at USD 1 million. In this case the CEO 
needs to be paid USD 1 million more, plus one dollar, for choosing project A. In this case, even 
if the CEO receives only USD 3.25 per USD 1,000 of added market value, the CEO will choose 
the correct project, which would result in USD 350,000 * USD 3.25 = USD 1,137,500 extra 
compensation when choosing project A;  
 
ii) PPS versus incentive strength in small and large organisations: the PPS is lower in large 
organisations than in small organisations. In line with the above, Baker and Hall (2004) show 
that the agency problem is not necessarily larger in these firms as a result of this. The crucial 
parameter is the elasticity of CEO productivity with respect to firm size. CEO marginal product 
rises significantly with firm size, following the chain letter effect of Rosen. Thus, a lower PPS, 
in large firms, should be multiplied by a larger marginal product of effort (γ) to obtain incentive 
strength. Their results show that overall incentive strengths in small and large organisations are 
generally similar. Intuitively, this can be explained by looking at the dollar stake in the 
company. A lower PPS within a large company reflects a significant absolute money stake. A 
higher PPS within a smaller company could reflect a similar money stake;  
 
iii)  International PPS differences: an example is the study of Conyon and Murphy (2000), 
which shows that the PPS based on share ownership in the UK is significantly smaller than in 
the U.S. A U.S. median PPS of USD 14.8 and a UK median PPS of USD 2.5 per USD 1,000 
was found over the year 1997. Milbourn (2001) provides the PPS of Dutch firms in relation to 
the result of Conyon and Murphy (2000). Working with the PPS of the full management board, 
he concludes that median figures are similar to the practice in the UK, but significantly and 
systematically below U.S. figures;  
                                                      
103 As companies tend to increase in size over time, and the PPS of larger companies is lower than that of 
small companies, a size-adjusted PPS would have quadrupled the Jensen and Murphy PPS instead of the 




iv) Risk profile and effort aversion: η and c are important parameters to mitigate the agency 
problem when the variability of firm performance is a given. Reducing the agency problem, 
within the classical framework, involves trading-off insurance and incentives. If it is possible to 
provide the CEO with a significant variable package, to obtain a high s*, agency costs will 
ceteris paribus be reduced. Hiring the right CEO is therefore essential. The right CEO here 
refers to an entrepreneurial agent with low risk and effort aversion, in addition to the right skills 
and capabilities. Note that providing an incentive for undertaking a risky project does not 
necessarily equal an incentive for effort, i.e. working hard to implement the chosen project. 
Hirshleifer and Suh (1992) state that the optimal curvature of the PPS, linear, concave, or 
convex, depends on the trade-off between controlling project risk and motivating effort. The 
analysis predicts greater option-based compensation, convex payoff, to counterbalance the 
agent’s risk aversion when there are desirable but risky growth opportunities, as proxied by 
Tobin’s Q or R&D expenditures, and less option compensation when there are effective 
monitoring institutions, such as large shareholder
104 and bank lenders. 
 
Although the classic agency model provides a number of fundamental insights with regard to 
the trade-off between insurance, i.e. fixed compensation, and incentives, i.e. variable 
compensation, it has proven to be too limited to fully explain real-life incentives. This is clearly 
articulated in the literature that studies the agency problem as a multidimensional issue.   
 
Figure 2.11: Overview agency literature – panel B 









The classic model of moral hazard highlights the trade-off between fixed and variable 
compensation, i.e. to what extent will pay be at risk? It reveals the importance of the 
informativeness principle, measuring the likelihood that a certain action is undertaken. As CEOs 
                                                      
104 Shleifer and Vishny (1986) describe the value of a large shareholder and analyse the role of these 
shareholders as monitors of management, developers of new strategies and facilitators of takeovers: they 
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can choose from a much richer set of actions than contemplated under the original principal-
agent framework, and over multiple periods, extensions to the classic agency model were 
developed in the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. The objective of this literature is to 
capture the practice of incentive contracts more adequately. Below, the basic model is extended 
to incorporate: multiple tasks, multiple agents (tournament theory) and multiple periods.  
Multiple tasks 
The role of the informativeness principle in compensation contracts is reduced in the more 
realistic multidimensional setting. It is questionable whether shareholders know exactly which 
CEO actions maximise firm value. The reason that shareholders entrust their money to self-
interested CEOs, is based on their beliefs that CEOs have superior skills or information to make 
positive or favourable net-present-value investment decisions. The multitask literature shows 
that CEOs can choose from a wide array of activities that affect shareholder value, including: 
defining the business strategy, choosing between debt and equity financing, making dividend 
and repurchase decisions, identifying acquisition and divestment targets, selecting industries 
and markets to enter or exit, allocating capital among business units, setting budgets for 
developing new products and businesses, hiring productive subordinates and firing unproductive 
subordinates, and designing, implementing, and maintaining the nexus of implicit and explicit 
contracts that defines the organisation.  
 
The relevance of the multitask literature, e.g. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991),
105 is that it 
provides a theoretical framework for the common understanding that the fundamental 
shareholder-manager agency problem is not getting the CEO to work harder, but rather getting 
him or her to choose actions that increase rather than decrease shareholder value. If a CEO can 
choose from an almost unlimited action set, according to Murphy (1999), he or she could also 
decide to: i) Sandbag the budget process to achieve performance targets; ii) Attenuate the 
benefits of relative performance evaluation by taking unproductive actions that lower the 
performance of the peer group; iii) Shift accounting returns across periods by accelerating or 
delaying revenues and costs; iv) Monitor year-to-date performance and adjust actions on a daily 
basis to maximise bonuses based on cumulative annual performance; v) Make accounting 
choices that artificially inflate or deflate reported earnings; vi) Make investment choices, such 
as cuts in R&D, which increase short-term profits at the expense of long-term profitability.  
 
                                                      
105 The groundwork of multitasking models can be attributed to Lazear (1989) in a tournament setting, 
Baker (1992) with regard to the choice of performance measures, and Feltham and Xie (1994) regarding 
the value of performance measures within a multitask setting.  
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Multitask models are all characterised by multidimensional actions, and are occupied first and 
foremost with the issue of distortion. The term ‘distortion’ is introduced to emphasise the 
possibility that incentives can create distortive behaviour, i.e. behaviour which is not in line 
with the company’s goal. This emphasises the benefit of tying variable pay to the principal’s 
objective, i.e. increasing shareholder value.
106 Non-share price measures will be selected to the 
extent that they provide incentives to take actions generally consistent with value maximisation, 
rather than measures that are incrementally informative of CEO actions. In terms of the quality 
of performance measures, Baker (1992) and Baker (2002) show that this is a trade-off between 
distortion and risk, in other words: between goal alignment and line of sight, i.e. influence of the 
CEO on the outcome.
107  
 
The more distorted and riskier the measure, the less valuable it will be to the organisation and 
the less it will be used in an incentive contract.
108 Which performance measure should be used 
ideally is still topic of debate. Jensen (2003) advocates economic profit or EVA™ but 
acknowledges that it still needs to be figured out how managers can be motivated to make 
value-creating decisions that generate negative economic profits in early years while returning 
large positive economic profit in later years. In this light, Duffhues (2006) advocates more 
transparency with regard to the developments of the eventual goal of the company, i.e. value 
creation. Companies should disclose a ‘segmented market-value balance sheet’ reflecting the 
usual accounting balance sheet, segment 1, and a second segment indicating the additional 
value, above the cost price of segment 1. Disclosing this segmented balance sheet and the 
resulting Tobin’s Q, the sum of segments 1 and 2 divided by segment 1, is at the heart of good 
corporate governance and also provides an important performance measure of managerial 
actions. Consequently, it deserves an important place in executive compensation contracts. 
 
In conclusion, the most important lessons of the multitask literature are (Gibbons, 1998, 2005): 
i) An increased set of CEOs’ actions leads to incentive structures that are linear, rather than 
                                                      
106 Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) show that share prices are uniquely suited for compensation purposes, 
not so much as they are accurate, but because they are an objective third party assessment, unlike the 
subjective assessment of the board of directors and/or supervisory board. 
107 Straight correlation of a certain measure with the goal of the company is not necessarily a quality 
indicator. When earnings per share (EPS), for example, are highly correlated with the share price, it does 
not necessarily imply that it is a good measure of performance. If both measures are hit by business cycle 
variations, with similar noise terms, the correlation is high, even though paying based on EPS creates a 
distorted incentive to increase the share price, because EPS ignores long-term effects. In short, a 
performance measure is valuable if it induces valuable actions, not if it is highly correlated with the share 
price. Therefore alignment is more important than influence.      
108 Core, Guay and Verrecchia (2003) summarise two key predictions of the accounting literature 
concerning performance measures: (a) the relative weight on a given performance measure is a decreasing 
function of the noise in the performance measure, and (b) the relative weight on two performance 
measures is a decreasing function of the relative noise in the performance measures.     
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convex or concave (Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987). Non-linear plans tend to reward gaming 
and/or performance volatility. When contracts are linear and constant across periods, managers 
have fewer incentives to adjust effort based on year-to-date performance or to shift earnings 
across periods to maximise current bonuses. Decisions that increase current earnings at the 
expense of future earnings will have a symmetrical consequence for future bonuses; ii) 
Objective performance measures typically cannot be used to create ideal incentives. Baker, 
Gibbons and Murphy (1994) show that subjective performance assessment can increase the 
efficiency of compensation contracts by subjectively blacking out noise, or increase alignment 
in imperfect objective performance measures;
109 iii) Efficient bonus rates are typically small, as 
there is no sense in creating strong incentives for the wrong actions; iv) It is often helpful to use 
multiple instruments to provide a balanced package of incentives, i.e. trade-off between risk and 
distortion. 
Multiple agents 
In a multiple-agent setting, incentive contracts can also take on several different forms based on 
the interaction between these agents. A special structure is the contract based on the tournament 
model, which can induce optimal incentives via the source of competition (Lazear and Rosen, 
1981). Agents striving to win the ‘corporate tournament’ will exert additional effort as long as 
the prizes are high enough (Rosen, 1986). When workers have the ability to negatively affect 
each other’s output, it is more efficient to have weak incentives instead of strong but 
dysfunctional incentives (Lazear, 1989, Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994). Tournament-like 
incentives are inherent to most organisations through promotion to different ranks in the 
organisation. Within this theory, CEO compensation that seems out of proportion ex post, 
inefficient, or not in line with the marginal product, can be efficient if it induces ex ante 
efficient incentives. 
 
Multiple periods  
It is important to note that incentive contracts are not the only source of incentives. Incentives 
can also arise from career concerns (Fama 1980, Holmstrom 1982b). Career concerns arise in 
situations in which the agent exerts effort not only to maximise current pay but also to affect the 
perception of others. Since the worker’s current performance affects the market’s belief about 
the worker’s ability, it will affect future career opportunities and thus the worker’s future 
                                                      
109 The notion of subjective performance assessment has been picked up by corporate governance 
platforms in terms of assessing reasonableness of payments to executives. The Dutch Corporate 
Governance Code (2008) states in best practice provision II.2.10: “If a variable remuneration component 
conditionally awarded in a previous financial year would, in the opinion of the supervisory board, 
produce an unfair result due to extraordinary circumstances during the period in which the predetermined 
performance criteria have been or should have been achieved, the supervisory board has the power to 




110 Gibbons and Murphy (1992) have added incentive contracts to the Fama-
Holmstrom model, optimising explicit and implicit incentives. Generally speaking, because the 
implicit incentives related to career concerns are weakest for workers close to retirement, 
explicit incentives from the optimal compensation contract should be strongest for such 
workers.
111 In case of a CEO, he or she might care about post retirement opportunities and will 
therefore not be entirely driven by these explicit contractual incentives.
112 For younger workers, 
the career concerns theory indicates that no variable pay is needed to create incentives for effort. 
Variable pay, however, can still be useful to overcome an overly risk-averse attitude.
113 When 
parties engage in a long-term contract, a repeated open-ended relationship, other elements can 
also become important:  
 
i)  Relational contracts: Informal self-enforced provisions can supplement a formal court-
enforced contract. When a credible future penalty in the event of non-compliance is in place, 
each party is induced to stick to the agreed term. An example of a relational contract is a 
promise of a bonus payment or a promotion as a reward for good performance. Most 
employment relationships have such informal provisions;
114  
                                                      
110 Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999) extend the Holmstrom (1982b) career concerns model to a 
multitask environment. The study shows that optimal contracts should take into account which 
performance variables are particularly interpreted by the market as a proxy for ‘ability’. If these are not 
taken into account, agents may exert too much effort to those tasks and too little to other important tasks 
that the market uses, to a lesser extent, to update beliefs of managerial ability. 
111 Surprisingly, the related ‘horizon problem’ has not been supported by strong empirical evidence. The 
‘horizon hypothesis’ claims that CEOs near retirement should be rewarded more with share-based 
vehicles such as share options. This would also reward him or her for decisions that generate positive net 
cash flows after his or her retirement. The theory thus predicts a positive relationship between equity-
based compensation and age. An overview based on selected empirical research papers yields only one 
study that supports this theory, Lewellen, Loderer and Martin (1987), and four that even found a negative 
relationship; Ryan and Wiggens (2001), Hwang and Lilien (2000), Yermack (1995), Eaton and Rosen 
(1983).  
112 Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) show that these opportunities are positively related to the executive’s 
performance during the final years of employment, based on a sample of 277 CEOs leaving office in the 
period from 1989 to 1993 from Fortune 500 companies. Abnormal share returns in the final two years of a 
CEO’s tenure are particularly important in explaining the CEO’s continued service on his own board. The 
likelihood of serving as an outside director on other companies’ boards is better explained by accounting 
returns over the CEO’s tenure, than by share returns. 
113 Empirical research underlines the complexity of trading off explicit and implicit incentives. Nohel and 
Todd (2005) studied the problem of compensating a manager whose career concerns affect his investment 
strategy. The change in the manager’s human capital is proportional to the change in firm value. The 
principal’s problem is to find the most cost-efficient way to overcome the manager’s excessive 
conservatism, either by insuring the manager’s human capital risk or by introducing a compensation 
contract whose payoff is convex in firm value. The optimal contract arising from this situation is a fixed 
salary, paid out in cash, supplemented by a small number of call options. The option’s convex payoff 
function helps to overcome managerial risk aversion. Options will be granted ‘at the money’, i.e. the 
intrinsic value will be low or zero if the manager shies away from risk. The greater the career concerns, 
the more options need to be granted to encourage risk-taking behaviour.  
114 Brown, Falk and Fehr (2004), for example, show that long-term relational contracts can provide 
significant gains for both parties in the relationship. Successful long-term relationships exhibit generous 
rent sharing and high effort and quality from the very beginning of the relationship. Between firms and  
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ii) Contract renegotiation: Long-term contracts can often be re-negotiated at a later stage. Ex 
post renegotiation can undermine ex ante incentives. The issue of re-pricing share options 
provides an example relating to executive compensation. The resetting of the strike price to a 
lower level after options ‘drop out of the money’ benefits the company by restoring incentives 
ex post, but the anticipation of such moves undermines ex ante incentives;
115  
 
iii) Wealth effects: In a general multi-period setting, wealth effects should be taken into account. 
Wealth can change the risk preference of an individual; generally, the more outside wealth the 
less risk averse,
116 and therefore the slope of the optimal contract will often be a non-linear 
function of the history of output. Furthermore, a general insight from long-term contracting is 
that it is in the principal’s interest to force the agent to consume more in earlier periods and 
reduce savings. By keeping the agent’s continuing wealth low, the principal can ensure that the 
agent’s marginal utility of money remains high. The principal can hereby reduce its costs by 
providing the agent with effective monetary incentives. 
 
Figure 2.11: Overview agency literature – panel C 






                                                                                                                                                            
workers, the average income of both parties is much higher than in the short-term, court-enforced 
relationships, as workers provide higher effort levels to receive higher wages. A firm can initiate a trustful 
long-term relationship by already paying relatively high wages at the beginning of the relationship, and 
the worker can signal that he or she can be trusted by providing effort that meets or exceeds the firm’s 
expectations.   
115 Papers researching the issue of re-pricing in real world cases are, for example, Brenner, Sundaram and 
Yermack (2000), Chance, Kumar and Todd (2000), Chidambaran and Prabhala (2003), and Carter and 
Lynch (2001). Re-pricing is not very frequently observed. It is seen especially in companies that face 
negative shareholder returns operating in the high-tech or services sector. A typical downward adjustment 
equals 40%, restoring the exercise price to a level that is ‘at the money’. Note that, according to Acharya, 
John and Sundaram (2000), re-pricing of share options is not always suboptimal. It can result in an 
increase in the value of the organisation when the positive incentive effect of re-pricing is stronger than 
the negative effect on the initially provided incentive, all observed from an ex ante viewpoint. 
Furthermore, Balachandran, Carter and Lynch (2004) report that companies respond to underwater 
options not only by re-pricing, but also by increasing total compensation, salary and share option grants, 
primarily in an attempt to retain executives and restore incentives.  
116 Becker (2006) studied the wealth of Swedish CEOs. Higher-wealth CEOs were found to receive higher 
incentives, consistent with the prediction of agency theory that, as a result of higher non-firm-related 
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Figure 2.11-C shows that the advanced problem of moral hazard also deals with 
multidimensional problems. However, the separation of ownership and control, as identified by 
Berle and Means (1932), and the associated pursuit of managers fulfilling their own objectives 
is only one aspect that shapes the contracting relationship. According to Bolton and Scharfstein 
(1998), standard agency theory, and its implications for optimal contracts, suffers from an 
excessively narrow view of the firm. In their paper, they advocate integrating this view of the 
firm with the question of Ronald Coase (1937): “Why are there firms?”, which is concerned 
with the question of integration. Firms emerge in response to the inefficiencies arising from 
being unable to write contracts that fully specify what should happen in future situations that are 
hard to foresee or describe. The difficulties relating to such incomplete contracts affect the 
owner-manager relationship and are discussed below.  
 
Incomplete contracts  
Theoretical research on incomplete contracts is a relatively new phenomenon when compared to 
the complete contracting framework. According to Hart (2001), economists use the term 
‘incomplete’ to refer to a contract that does not set out all the future contingencies, or which 
fails to specify the obligations and benefits of the exchange partners under each possible 
contingency. The key test of contractual incompleteness, according to Jacobsen and Skillman 
(2004), lies in the possibility of specifying the terms and conditions of exchange in such a way 
that failure to achieve them can be verified by an external enforcement agency. Contracts are 
deemed complete so long as all matters affecting the potential gains from trade that are 
observable to the trading parties can also be verified by the appropriate external enforcement 
agency, such as a court of law, and are rendered incomplete to the extent that this condition does 
not hold. Tirole (1999) states that incomplete contract models are usually associated with 
transaction costs and one or more of the following ingredients: i) Unforeseen contingencies / 
bounded rationality:
117 Parties cannot define, ex ante, the contingencies that may subsequently 
occur, or actions that may become feasible later on. So they must content themselves with 
signing a contract, such as an authority or ownership relationship, which does not explicitly 
mention those contingencies, or by not signing a contract at all; ii) Cost of writing contracts: 
Even if one could foresee all possible events, they might be so numerous that it would be too 
costly to describe them in a contract; iii) Cost of enforcing contracts: Courts must understand 
                                                      
117 Maskin and Tirole (1999) express the view that transaction costs relating to describing or even 
foreseeing future physical situations in advance need not interfere with complete contracting. Transaction 
costs need not be relevant, provided that agents can forecast their possible future pay-offs, even if other 
aspects of the physical situation cannot be forecasted. They invoke the irrelevance theorem and state that, 
if parties have trouble foreseeing the possible physical contingencies, they can write contracts that specify 
only the possible ex ante payoff contingencies; after all, it is payoff that ultimately matters. Complete 
contracting should thus not be dismissed too quickly.   
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the terms of the contract and verify the contracted contingencies and actions in order to enforce 
the contract. If this cannot be done, the contract is said to be incomplete. 
 
A key question that arises with respect to incomplete contracts is: how are future decisions 
taken? Given that an incomplete contract is silent about future eventualities, and given that 
important decisions must be taken in response to these eventualities, how will this be done? 
What decision making process will be used? Asking these questions implies a fundamental shift 
of focus. The focus of the optimal contracting paradigm was on constructing compensation 
contingent upon performance results. Focus of the incomplete contracting paradigm is on 
procedural and institutional-design issues. It does not explain the form of the contract as the 
outcome of some optimisation problem. It is the result of optimal institutional design, the design 
of decision-making rules, and the allocation of control rights.  
 
There is a different view of the firm related to this shift away from standard incentive theory. 
Where Jensen and Meckling (1976) define the owner of the firm only in terms of cash flow 
rights, shareholders are the owners as they are the “residual claimant on the firm’s cash flow”, 
Grossman and Hart (1986) define the owners as having “residual rights of control”. Grossman 
and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), explore the issue of the value of ownership and 
residual rights of control in situations in which parties write incomplete contracts. In the 
property-rights theory of the firm, the owner has the specific right to exclude others from using 
the firm’s assets. This right serves as a protection against ex post opportunism. In its simplest 
form, the theory predicts that ownership of productive assets is allocated to the party requiring 
the most protection against ex post opportunism.  
 
In reality there are wealth constraints, limiting the possibility of owning or even buying assets. 
The modern corporation is characterised by the separation of ownership and control. Aghion 
and Bolton (1992) have created a state-contingent control model in the case of a wealth-
constrained entrepreneur. It answers the question of who should own the firm, i.e. the critical 
decision rights, given a wealth-constrained entrepreneur and a financier. Potential conflicts can 
be related to the fact that the manager likes other things besides money. The investor might be 
particularly interested in short-term gains and not put value on the company as a going concern. 
The allocation of control, defined as: who gets to make the critical decision, is thus an important 
dimension of the financial contract. State-contingent control, in which the manager-entrepreneur 
controls the company when it performs well, and the investor controls the company when it 
performs poorly, appears to be an efficient system. The model of contingent control is most 
directly applicable in a venture-capital setting. Kaplan and Strömberg (2003), researching 200 
venture capital deals, indicate that cash flow rights are generally allocated separately from  
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voting or board rights. Future control rights are often contingent upon observable measures of 
firm performance. Generally, the venture-capital lead partner obtains full control if the firm 
performs poorly, whereas, if the firm performs well, the entrepreneur can increase his or her 
control rights.  
 
In large listed firms, managers often have no or very little residual control rights, and at first 
sight seem to be only a small part of the entrepreneur-investor game of Aghion and Bolton 
(1992). After all, one could argue that state-contingent control applies only among financial 
claim holders. In bad states, creditors  have control, and in good states of the world, 
shareholders  have control. Since large firms are financed by large amounts of capital, 
management in these firms can generally not obtain bargaining power via actual ownership 
rights.  
 
The related problem arising in this employment relationship is the so-called hold-up problem. 
This problem can be illustrated, based on a simple production agreement between two parties A 
and B, in which party A needs to make a relationship-specific-investment in human capital to 
raise productivity and thus the outcome of the production agreement. Suppose all payments to 
the parties are obtained from the realised value of the final output, and the investment of party A 
is not verifiable for a court, e.g. it is an intellectual investment. When parties cannot credibly 
agree not to renegotiate ex post, after the investment has been made, a hold-up problem can 
arise. Figure 2.12 provides a graphical representation of the hold-up problem.   
 
Figure 2.12: Relationship-specific investments and the hold-up problem 
In this figure the hold-up problem is reflected. Party A chooses not to make a (socially desirable) 
relationship-specific investment (is held up) as he anticipates a net gain of 40 instead of 50. As a result, 




Party A makes a 
relationship-specific 
investment of 60










Pay-out A: 100 
(net gain 40)
Pay-out B: 100 
(net gain 100)
Pay-out A: 50 
(net gain 50)





At t =1 (ex post situation) the investment of party A is sunk. Once it is sunk it creates quasi 
rents, which are amounts in excess of the return necessary to keep the invested assets in their 
current use. In figure 2.12, this amount is 100 (200 minus 100).
118 Under equal ex post 
bargaining rights, the relationship-specific investment will be given up. The social costs of 
contractual incompleteness thus depend in part on the determinants of bargaining power over 
quasi rents. In the case of companies, Holmstrom and Roberts (1998) have shown that most 
hold-up problems can be solved through integration of activities.  
 
This is not the case with the hold-up problem in the labour relationship between a CEO and the 
company owners. The previously-mentioned logic of state-of the world-contingent control can 
be a solution and is translated into certain types of incentive plans. One could, for example, 
argue that ‘performance share plans’,
119 which allocate shares to the CEO and/or Board of 
Management when the company has performed well, resemble a form of mitigated state-
contingent control. Although the allocated control rights after good performance might only be 
a small part of total control rights, management has additional bargaining power resulting from 
the undertaken relationship-specific investments. The threat of quitting, thereby reducing the 
returns of these investments for the shareholders of the company, provides additional control 
(Duffhues, 2000 and Zingales, 2000).
120  
 
In summary, the incentive problem is twofold:  
1.  The traditional agency problem, as a result of the separation of ownership and control: 
discouraging empire building and shirking, and thus providing incentives for effort and 
appropriate risk taking: making the right, sometimes risky, investments; 
2.  The human capital under-investment problem: providing incentives to undertake firm-
specific investments in human capital that benefit both the agent and the principal. This 
incentive problem, as mentioned above, could be solved in part by allocating ownership 
rights, i.e. shares,
121 to ensure the CEO will receive his or her share of future payoffs.  
 
                                                      
118 There are also pure rents, which are returns in excess of those needed to cause the investment to be 
made in the first place. In figure 2.4, this amount is 40: 200 minus 100 minus 60. 
119 Performance share plans, as well as performance option plans, are common among the larger listed 
companies in the Netherlands. This is partially the result of the introduction of the Dutch Corporate 
Governance Code (2003, 2008), which advocates that shares should only be granted after the achievement 
of clearly quantifiable and challenging targets (BPP: II.2.3).   
120 Shleifer and Vishny (1997) therefore argue that outside financiers should be protected against 
expropriation through the residual right of control. 
121 Holmstrom and Roberts (1998) stress that asset ownership is not the only source of bargaining power. 
Other incentive instruments, such as relational contracts and other substitutes for ownership, are available 
to deal with the joint problem of motivation and coordination. Duffhues (2000), for example, describes 




We have observed the paradox that the second incentive problem is partly solved by the 
existence of the first. The modern corporation is characterised by the separation of ownership 
and control. In view of the fact that shareholders are dispersed, it is mainly managers who 
control the company.
122 This fact, the ability to derive individual benefits typically referred to as 
agency costs, thus also has a positive side effect; it provides an incentive to invest in firm-
specific human capital.  
 
2.4.4 The role of the remuneration committee  
The task of the remuneration committee is to adequately trade off  fixed versus variable 
compensation, risk versus distortion, over-investment versus under-investment, objective versus 
subjective performance measures, explicit incentives versus relational-, reputation- and career-
concerns, etc. Trade-offs should be made in light of the corporate objective function: 
enlightened value maximisation creating long-term shareholder value (Jensen, 2001).  
 
The most comprehensive trade-off in designing the compensation contract is the one between 
risk and distortion. Organisations rarely have low risk as well as low distorted performance 
measures and remuneration vehicles, and therefore choose a combination from the categories 
‘low risk and high distortion’  or ‘high risk and low distortion’ from table 2.20. 
 
Table 2.20: classification of performance measures and compensation vehicles (risk and 
distortion) 
Low risk - high distortion  High risk - low distortion 
Short-term focused performance measures  Long-term focused performance measures 
Individual performance measures  Group performance measures 
Accounting/internal based performance measures  Value-based/external performance measures 
Relative performance measures  Absolute performance measures 
Multiple measures  Single measure 
Cash-based vehicles  Equity-based vehicles 
 
                                                      
122 Zingales (2000) provides an excellent example of the difference between ownership and control, 
especially in ‘new firms’, which are characterised by human-capital-intensive operations and a highly 
competitive environment. The shareholders of the advertising agency Saatchi and Saatchi thought that, as 
they owned the firm, they also controlled the firm. After voting down a generous option package for the 
chairman following bad company performance, the latter left the company, and took with him quite a few 
key executives. This resulted in significant destruction of human-capital and other value caused by 
shareholders exercising their traditional ownership rights.   
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Note that table 2.20 also provides insight into the ‘perceived value’
123 of compensation 
instruments. Perceived value could be defined as the certainty-equivalent cash amount that the 
executive would be willing to give up in exchange for the risky award. Generally, the higher the 
risk, the lower the perceived value is, assuming a risk-averse agent. Combinations of items from 
the left-hand column of table 2.20 generally have a higher perceived value than combinations 
from the right-hand column. For example, a yearly cash bonus based on an internal measure of 
individual performance has a higher perceived value than a long-term-performance option plan 
based on the achievement of an absolute Total Shareholder Return (TSR) hurdle.  
 
The real life complexity of making the previously mentioned trade-offs is not a sinecure. The 
relatively stylised world of the agency model is replaced by the setting as reflected in figure 
2.13.  
 




The following factors add complexity: i) There are multiple agency problems: between 
shareholders and management, between the compensation committee and shareholders,
124 
                                                      
123 Perceived value research has particularly focused on share options. These equity vehicles generally 
have a low perceived value relative to company costs, as a result of the fact that managers are 
undiversified, effectively risk-averse, and exposed to the firm’s total risk, but only rewarded for the 
systematic part. See Hall and Murphy (2002) and Meulbroek (2001).  
124 Bebchuk, Fried and Walker (2002) and Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2004) focus on the assumption that 
the compensation committee will not always be a perfect agent for outside shareholders. Diffuse 
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between current and future shareholders;
125 ii) There are multiple principals within the same 
‘group of principals’, focused on shareholders in this case, with different objectives residing in 
different countries, e.g. pension funds, venture capitalists, small shareholders, etc., from the 
Netherlands or abroad;
126 iii) Different contexts due to differences in corporate governance, 
legal system, tax system accounting rules, can result in different results, i.e. context is relevant; 
iv) Economic as well as social factors play a role: maximising utility includes not only 
economic, but also social elements, such as balancing compensation-related decisions with 
potential outrage costs, status, etc. Furthermore, the ‘logic of appropriateness’ in practice 
sometimes dominates relative to the ‘logic of consequence’, i.e. the underlying ‘model of man’ 
is relevant, as describe below.
127128 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
characterised by camouflaged performance insensitivity only constrained by outrage costs, which are 
economic and social costs that executives and non-executives bear as a result of designing and approving 
a pay package that is perceived as ‘outrageous’ by stakeholders of the company.  
125 A situation of conflict between current and future shareholders could arise by relaxing the assumption 
of Holmstrom and Tirole (1993), in which the share price would be an unbiased estimator of firm 
fundamentals, and allows for the possibility of overvalued equity, Jensen (2004, 2005). Bolton, 
Scheinkman and Xiong (2006) developed a model dividing the share price into a long-term fundamental 
value and a short-term speculative component. From the perspective of current shareholders, an optimal 
agency contract would be to provide the CEO with incentives to exacerbate investor’s differences of 
opinion and to bring about a higher speculative share price, possibly at the expense of collapsing the 
company in the future. 
126 A shareholder base is not homogenous. Investors do not all share the same beliefs on future cash flows 
of the company or the appropriate discount factor, nor do they all have the same objectives; compare 
hedge funds with yield investors, core growth investors, etc. Differences can also be observed when 
looking at voting behaviour in light of executive compensation plans that are put up for approval. Morgan 
and Poulsen (2001) and Morgan, Poulsen and Wolf (2006) show that not all investors vote in the same 
way, and that behaviour changes over time; comparing the latter with the first study, investors have 
become more sensitive for potentially harmful provisions.  
127 For example, if the manager-shareholder relationship can be characterised as a stewardship 
relationship instead of an agency relationship, different types of contracts would be optimal. Stewardship 
models assume behaviour characterised by pro-organisational collectivistic behaviour, e.g. Davis, 
Schoorman and Donaldson (1997a, b), McConvill (2005). Fixed compensation could be a viable 
alternative, possibly in combination with shares with long lock-up periods to rationalise relationship-
specific investments. Note that the stewardship model creates a prisoner’s dilemma. Adopting a 
stewardship contract in which the manager eventually will behave as an agent would be analogous to 
turning the hen house over to the fox. 
128 Jensen and Meckling (1994) adopt a more comprehensive model of human behaviour. According to 
their model, people are driven by tangibles, i.e. wealth, as well as intangibles, such as leisure, but also 
respect, honour, power companionship, self-actualisation and the welfare of others. They furthermore 
have a positive rate of discount for future as opposed to present goods, which can explain fraudulent 
behaviour. People will respond creatively to the opportunities the environment presents to them, and they 
will work to loosen constraints that prevent them from doing what they wish. Trade-offs can be made 
between the various human needs (to a certain extent). The model thus deviates from the psychological 
model of Maslow (1943), in which human needs are arranged in hierarchies; the appearance of one need 
usually rests on the prior satisfaction of another more compelling need. From high to low, these needs are: 
physiological, i.e. water and food, safety, love, and self-actualisation. In Maslow’s model, no amount of 
safety will be traded for any amount of food, until the latter need is satisfied.   
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Logic of appropriateness  
The ‘logic of consequence’ underlying the agency theory can limit our understanding of the 
executive compensation landscape if decision-makers actually apply a different decision-
making scheme. The latter seems plausible, since all individuals are constrained in their 
capacity to make fully rational decisions, due to the cost and sometimes unavailability of 
information, and because of their own cognitive limitations. Decisions in practice are typically 
based on factors such as norms, i.e. market practice, corporate governance best practices, and 
trust, culture,
129 recommendations, rules, history and authority. The model of decision-making 
that is in line with this is called the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (Cyert and March 1963/1992). 
The logic of appropriateness is a perspective that sees human actions, as driven by rules of 
appropriate or exemplary behaviour, organised into institutions. Instead of searching for a 
maximising situation, decisions are made because they are seen as natural, rightful, expected, 
and legitimate.  
 
Institutions constrain decision-making by defining and limiting the set of choices individual 
actors have (North, 1990). Maps of bounded rationality are provided by research of Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky. These maps of bounded rationality for example relate to the 
heuristics that people use (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974)   
decision-making under uncertainty (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 
1992; Kahneman et al. 1990, 1991; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991) and framing effects with 
their implications for rational-agent models (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981, 1986).  
 
Bounded rational behaviour, e.g. of the compensation committee, is observed in practice, for 
example, in the case where simplicity is defined as a guiding principle, not fully understanding 
the full cost and effects of certain remuneration instruments,
130 following market practice, i.e. 
what other companies do, instead of developing a tailor-made plan, etc. If the remuneration 
committee is not able to oversee all possible consequences of its remuneration decisions, a ‘dark 
side of executive compensation’ also arises. This ‘other side of the trade-off’ is not always 
adequately taken into account, given the results of various empirical studies with a common 
denominator: when there is too much at stake, this can result in counterproductive behaviour, as 
                                                      
129 This relates to national culture as well as to the culture within the organisation. Tosi and Greckhamer 
(2004), for example, show that CEO pay is characterised by power, distance, and individualism: compare 
France and U.S. versus Sweden and Japan. 
130 For example: according to Murphy (2002), the perceived costs of share options were low in the 1990s, 
partially because options were not expensed in the profit and loss account. This led to granting too many 
share options to too many people, the so-called ‘option explosion’ in the U.S. in the 1990s; also see 
Jensen, Murphy and Wruck (2004).  
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indicated by, among others: Denis et al. (2006), Cullinan et al. (2006), Goldman and Slezak 
(2006), Jensen (2004, 2005), Efendi, et al. (2004), Tian (2004).  
 
2.4.5 Summary and conclusion 
This section has focused on the dynamics of the executive remuneration structure decision. 
Based on an overview of agency (contract) theory, it has become clear that the ‘principal’s 
problem’ involves various trade-offs resulting in different optimal results within different 
organisations. The role of the remuneration committee is to strike a balance between security 
and risk, line of sight versus goal alignment, over-investment versus under-investment, 
objective versus subjective performance measures, explicit incentives versus relational, 
reputation and career concerns, etc. Furthermore, process, context and the underlying model of 
man are relevant. Additional variation can therefore be explained, by the different design of 
institutions. A contingency approach is needed to understand which elements are most 
influential in which circumstances. Section 2.5 will summarise the building blocks into an 




2.5 The executive remuneration decision  
The previous two sections have provided theoretical anchor points linked to the context of 
executive remuneration in practice. When remuneration falls apart in level and structure, section 
2.3 has provided insight into the ex ante level of compensation and the price of human capital in 
the executive labour market. A number of characteristics of the executive labour market were 
described and it was concluded that demand and supply curves intersecting in this market can 
only partially explain the ex ante price of human capital. Since the market is imperfect, relative 
to the other observed markets, i.e. the share market and the labour market for manufacturing 
employees, the remuneration committee enjoys quite some flexibility in setting a CEO’s pay 
package.
131 The structure  of a compensation package, especially variable pay, and the 
associated ex post level of compensation were discussed in section 2.4. Assumptions usually 
underlying a standard agency setting, in which a representative shareholder contracts with a 
CEO based on maximising economic utility functions, are not always fully met in practice, and 
therefore cannot completely explain the executive compensation landscape.  
 
This section further dissects the executive compensation decision in reality, and combines the 
building blocks of the previous sections into an eclectic perspective. It consists of four lenses 
and may serve as an aid to improve future empirical research and to better interpret past 
empirical research. The section is structured as follows: 
 
Remuneration level – ex ante (see section 2.5.1) which relates to the expected value of total 
direct compensation, i.e. the sum of basic salary, target bonus and the fair value of the long-term 
incentive component;  
Remuneration structure – ex post (see section 2.5.2): which relates to the way the compensation 
package is structured. The structure of pay in combination with the actually achieved 
performance results in ex post compensation; 
Constraints of the remuneration committee (see section 2.5.3): which describes the pivotal role 
of the compensation committee as the spider in the executive compensation web but also the 
constraints it faces; 
Categorisation of the remuneration committee (see section 2.5.4): The characteristics of the 
committee contribute to the explanation of the remuneration policy outcome. 
 
                                                      
131 Gomez-Meija and Wiseman (1997) observe significant variation in the salary, bonuses and long-term 
incentive income received by executives of firms of similar size, in the same industry, and performing at 
similar levels, and conclude that there is thus room to manoeuvre.   
 
82
2.5.1 Remuneration level – ex ante perspective  
Determining the policy level  
The first building block of the remuneration policy entails the total remuneration level. The 
typical total remuneration package entails the following components (Towers Perrin Worldwide 
Total Remuneration survey 2005-2006): i) Annual basic salary, including regular payments 
such as 13
th month salary and vacation allowance; ii) Variable bonus: payment related to 
(individual) performance; iii) Long-term incentive: annual expected value of long-term 
incentive awards, such as share options and share grants; iv) Benefits, including compulsory 
company contributions, such as social security expenses and voluntary company contributions, 
such as pensions and medical (insurance) contributions; v) Perquisites, including the annual 
cash value of the company car and club memberships. 
 
Below, the process of setting remuneration levels is further explained. The focus will be on the 
direct remuneration elements, i.e. the basic salary, annual bonus and long-term incentive. 
Benefits and perquisites typically comprise a smaller portion of the remuneration package of a 
CEO in a given year, with variation especially depending on the country-specific context. The 
objective is to provide insight into the steps that are taken in a typical pay-setting process in 
practice. 
 
In the typical process of setting remuneration levels for the CEO, the remuneration committee 
proceeds through the following steps: 
 
1.  Determine a labour-market peer group based on a number of selection criteria; 
2.  Collect market compensation data of these companies; 
3.  Determine which market reference will be relevant, e.g. lower quartile, median, upper 
quartile; 
4.  Discuss the external reference as well as other relevant input parameters, such as the 
internal reference, political climate, public opinion, etc., in the remuneration committee;  
5.  Set policy level and actual pay level, based on steps 1 to 4, and implement this. 
 
Step 1 – labour-market peer group 
From practical experience, all large listed companies use external compensation references to 
determine compensation levels. Some companies rely more heavily on this kind of data, while 
others use it as one of the input factors in the pay-setting process. The Dutch Corporate 
Governance Code (2003, 2008) requires listed companies to include, in its remuneration report, 
if applicable, “the composition of the group of companies (peer group) whose remuneration  
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policy determines in part the level and composition of the remuneration of the management 
board members”.  
 
When the remuneration policy is under review in a typical process, first a labour-market peer 
group is established. If possible, one labour market for the full executive board is established. 
Executives from the United States are often ring-fenced and compensation is based on the U.S. 
market.   
 
Based on a number of selection criteria, peer companies are chosen. Selection criteria can 
include for example: i) From which companies does the company hire executives and to which 
companies does it risk losing executives, based on past experience and outlook for the future?; 
ii) Same sector, or cross industry?; iii) Complexity of the business; iv) Comparable scope 
figures, e.g. revenues, market capitalisation, employees; v) National, Dutch, or also foreign 
companies?; vi) Justifiable to stakeholders. 
 
In terms of compensation levels, an important decision is whether to choose only national 
companies or to select foreign companies as well; practices in various countries have been 
reflected in section 2.2. For example, adding U.S. companies to the peer group will often 
increase the observed market level. Therefore all criteria ultimately need to be reconciled with 
the final criterion: ‘justifiable to stakeholders’. It is important to note that ‘outrage costs’ 
(Bebchuk and Fried, 2004) seem to play a role in this process. Remuneration committee 
members are reluctant to approve compensation packages that could be perceived as 
‘outrageous’, as a result of the fear for reputational damage.    
  
Step 2 – data collection 
After an appropriate labour-market peer group has been established, a benchmark is performed. 
Benchmark figures are usually obtained via compensation consultants, such as Hay Group, 
Mercer, Towers Watson, etc. These companies provide market figures for the selected group of 
companies, usually for the lower quartile, median, and upper quartile levels. Market figures 
either reflect raw data, or are regressed to reflect the size and scope of the company.  
 
 
Step 3 – relevant market reference level 
The remuneration committee sets a relevant market reference level. A market-competitive level 
is typically referenced to the median market level (50
th percentile). Companies who set their  
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reference level higher than the median market level often justify this based on the ‘desire to only 
hire the best executives in the market’.
132 
  
Step 4 – discussion    
The defined reference market and desired pay reference level are the starting points for a 
discussion in the remuneration committee. Other relevant input parameters include:  
 
i) Internal equity considerations: desired pay difference between the CEO and the other board 
members, desired pay difference between the board of management and one level down in the 
organisation, if considered appropriate, the pay-relativity between the CEO and the average or 
lowest paid employee of the company is determined;  
 
ii) Political and social climate: in the year 2004, for example, it was difficult to justify base pay 
adjustments of management-board members in the light of the ‘social agreement’ (Sociaal 
Akkoord). Outrage costs and camouflage as defined by Bebchuk and Fried (2004) can play a 
role in this respect. In this light, decisions can be made to not adjust the basic salary, because it 
is highly visible and therefore might cause public scrutiny. A possible desire to adjust pay could 
result in adapting other components such as the long-term incentive component, which is less 
visible;  
 
iii) Pay mix: ratio of fixed versus variable; within the variable part of remuneration: the ratio of 
short-term versus long-term oriented compensation. The first mentioned ‘internal equity 
consideration’ in fact represents elements of the tournament model as discussed in section 2.4. 
The price of winning the ‘corporate tournament’, i.e. becoming CEO, is only worth providing 
additional effort for as long as the price is high enough. The pay mix can be the result of 
following the market reference or a more fundamental decision, for example, based on the 
nature of the business or the strategic focus. In a going-concern situation, the company ought to 
have more focus on the longer term than on the short term. The pay mix can differ per board 
member.  
 
Step 5 – determination of policy level and implementation 
The final step is to formalise the choice for a certain compensation level in the remuneration 
policy and ask shareholders to adopt the new policy, in the Dutch situation. At a certain moment 
                                                      
132 Engesaeth (2006) indicates that setting pay above the market median could result in ‘pay ratcheting’. 
As peer groups have an absolute ceiling, this effect is limited to this ceiling and does not result in ever-
increasing pay levels. The latter effect, however, is observed when going-concern companies compare 
themselves to organisations that raise the market ceiling, a company in financial distress, for example, 
that pays an additional risk premium.   
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in time, there can be a difference between the policy ex ante compensation level and the real ex 
ante compensation level. Different companies deal differently with such an issue. If the 
compensation committee, for example, decides that the relevant pay level for the CEO is the 
median of a defined reference market, and the current compensation package of the CEO is 
situated below this level, the committee can decide to increase the level in the given year or to 
apply a growth scenario in which policy levels are met within, for example, two or three years. 
Hiring executives – bargaining process 
The process described in the previous sections is relevant for situations in which there is no 
vacancy on the board of management. Regular compensation adjustments, if applicable, can be 
based on the defined policy. However, a negotiation will take place when a new management 
board member is hired. This process has been discussed in section 2.3.4. As mentioned 
previously, due to imperfections, and potential inefficiencies, it is unlikely that all CEOs will be 
paid the unbiased value of their marginal product. Jensen, Murphy and Wruck (2004) even state 
that remuneration committees almost consistently pay too much for newly appointed CEOs, 
especially those hired from outside the firm, since the pay bargaining process starts when the 
pool of candidates is narrowed down to one, which shifts the bargaining power to the candidate. 
Gomez-Meija and Wiseman (1997) also state that the firm enjoys much flexibility in deciding 
on a particular CEO’s pay package, given the huge variance in the salary, bonuses, and long-
term incentive component received by executives of firms of similar size, in the same industry, 
and performing at similar levels. 
 
Eclectic perspective – lens 1: policy level 
The first lens summarises the way policy level is determined. The remuneration committee 
collects the necessary external and internal data to set compensation levels. The market is 
effectively translated into a reference group, on the basis of which remuneration levels are set. 
The internal reference and/or tournament objectives are taken into account. Policy levels are 
eventually set based on this information, as well as other information deemed relevant by the 
remuneration committee, i.e. tax treatment, etc.).
133 Figure 2.14 illustrates the setting of policy 
levels: 
 
                                                      
133 Note that the performance level does not directly play a role in setting the ex ante compensation level. 
After all, it reflects the value of compensation under the assumption of expected or at target performance. 
Indirectly, performance may play a role, as a compensation committee might be more willing to adjust or 
increase ex ante compensation in a given year if the performance of the company has been very good; if 
this is the case, the outrage constraint is loosened, as shareholders will be less inclined to scrutinise 
executive compensation when the performance of the company is excellent.  
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In a final discussion within the remuneration committee, decisions are made. Eventual decisions 
are based on:  
 
i) The judgement of the remuneration committee: this is based on the collected information, the 
characteristics of the person in the CEO position, the difference in terms of complexity of the 
role versus the same position in companies of the comparator or peer group, etc. This judgement 
is affected by the personal anchor points of the committee member, such as individual 
characteristics, their past or present position as management board member, the degree to which 
the compensation committee members are effectively influenced by the management of the 
company, individual belief about what is a reasonable pay package, balance of power within the 
remuneration committee, etc.;  
 
ii) The (outrage) constraints: this limits the action space of the compensation committee. For 
example, there are three compensation committee meetings in a specific year. During the first 
two meetings it was decided that a certain remuneration level would be appropriate considering 
the competitive market. In the final meeting, it is discussed whether this is also justifiable to 
various stakeholders, in view of the political and/or social climate, performance of the company, 
etc. If this is not the case, this is often taken into account. Heineken N.V. provides an example. 
Heineken withdrew their proposals for a new remuneration policy shortly before the AGM of 
2009 on the basis of stakeholder scrutiny. The remuneration committee is furthermore 
constrained by the rest of the (supervisory) board, shareholders, and all other parties that can 
legally constrain or effectively harm the company or its reputation. This will be further 
discussed in section 2.5.3.  
 
In spite of various constraints, the remuneration committee still has room to interpret market 
and other data and manoeuvre within a certain bandwidth, which could result in optimal or less 
optimal results, given bounded rationality and/or logic of appropriateness. Table 2.21 provides 








Other data / information 
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Table 2.21: Suboptimal ex ante compensation – normative check list 
Element Context 
External reference  1.  The companies chosen in the peer group could be an inadequate reflection 
of the relevant labour market for the specific company: 
a.  Type of companies: is the company competing for talent only 
within a certain industry, or can a wider market reference of 
cross-industry companies be used? 
b.  Geographical spread: is the company competing for talent within 
the country, in Europe, or even on a worldwide basis? If and 
when companies from the U.S. are included, the company would 
need to have a solid business case to prevent from being accused 
of driving up pay. 
2.  The peer group may be too small to robustly capture the relevant segment 
of the executive labour market. A peer group which has a relatively small 
number of constituents also results in: 
a.  Volatility in the market reference: year-on-year changes can be 
the result of individual peer CEOs retiring or being replaced. This 
fundamentally hurts the theoretical principle of the perfectly 
competitive market, that a single market participant cannot affect 
the market price, because the market is proxied by the peer group;
b.  Noise: the small peer group could be an imperfect proxy for the 
relevant executive labour market segment. 
3.  Market data, if regressed, might be regressed based on the wrong 
elements. Should market data be regressed based on (log) revenue, market 
capitalisation, assets, etc.? If possible, the compensation committee should 
work with un-regressed market data, based on a peer group that is of 
similar size, scope and complexity as the company, to diminish ‘noise’ as 
a result of regression. 
4.  Noise can also be a result of the fact that there are different views on how 
long-term incentive grants should be valued. IFRS 2 has provided 
guidance, but there is still room for interpretation. With regard to relative 
TSR share plans, for example, a fundamental difference is whether or not 
to take the correlation into account between the number of shares that vest 
at the end of the performance period and the share price at that moment 
(P3xQ3 or P0xQ3). Both valuation methods are observed in practice and 
approved by external auditing firms; however, a significant difference in 
the fair value between different companies is the result. 
5.  When a market reference level is chosen above the 50
th percentile, the 
median of the peer group, this contributes to the so-called pay ratchet 
effect, within the range of market figures provided by the peer group. 
Internal reference  6.  The internal reference should be carefully considered. Are all executives 
below the board of management part of the corporate tournament or not? 
The effect of importing pay differences should be carefully dealt with. 
When acquiring a U.S. company, for example, creating a situation in 
which executives below the board earn more than a board member may 
cause an upward pressure on board of management pay. In this light, it is 
also important to ask who is part of the corporate tournament and who is 
not. 
Other data and 
information 
7.  If and when an ex ante compensation level is based, or partially based, on 
other data and information, the company should carefully explain what 
this is and how it has affected the compensation levels. 
Pay mix  8.  With regard to the pay mix, the short-term incentive part should not be 
overemphasised. Multitasking models have shown that creating incentives 
for one task diverts attention away from other tasks. In a going-concern 
firm, therefore, the long-term component should have a higher weight than 




2.5.2 Remuneration structure – ex post perspective 
In section 2.4, incentive contracts were discussed. The shape of the contract, in combination 
with the eventual delivered performance, results in actual or ex post compensation. In the end, 
executives are interested in their actually earned compensation. An often-heard example in 
boardrooms, to emphasise this, is related to options. Once they are underwater, they are 
perceived as worthless, and often a disincentive. The way compensation is structured is 
therefore important, as it influences the perception of risk and thus the value of the package. The 
type of performance measures, performance targets, and payout zone in combination with the 
delivered performance eventually results in the actually earned compensation: paid out salary, 
realised bonus, and actual gains on option or share programmes.  
 
As a result of imperfections in the executive labour market, the compensation committee can 
make its own judgments within certain constraints; selecting type and number of performance 
measures, setting challenging or less challenging targets, create more risk or less, create more 
leverage or less, etc. 
 
Determining the policy structure  
When focusing on the direct compensation elements, a typical pay package consists of a basic 
salary, a short-term incentive and a long-term incentive plan. The difference between the ex ante 
and ex post value of basic salary is zero, apart from the time value of money. It is not contingent 
upon performance. Within the short and long-term incentive plan, however, this difference can 
be significant and depends on the structures of these plans. The typical process steps are 
described below for the practice of setting the remuneration structure: 
 
1.  Company strategy and data collection  
2.  Selection of performance measures 
3.  Setting targets and performance incentive zone 
4.  Determining  payment vehicle 
5.  Implementation  
 
Step 1: Company strategy and data collection   
The first phase of designing a new remuneration structure is establishing or re-establishing the 
objectives of the company. What are short-term and long-term goals? What is the definition of 
success? Objectives are often explicitly set in line with long-term value creation. To gain insight 
into the competition, a market overview can be made, which provides information on what 
types of plans and performance measures are operated by a relevant reference market. This  
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could, for example, be a national or international group of direct competitors. The remuneration 
committee could decide to adopt the same or similar measures and to follow market practice, or 
deliberately deviate. In a situation in which competitors, for example, would only operate 
growth measures, such as revenue, operating earnings, etc., as a competitive edge, the company 
could decide to particularly focus on ‘value measures’. The aim is to support the strategy of the 
company through performance-contingent compensation.    
 
Step 2: Selection of performance measures 
Based on the type of company and its objectives, performance measures are selected in line with 
these goals.
134 The trade-off between goal alignment and line of sight is typically explicitly or 
implicitly taken into account (Baker, 2002). The short-term incentive plan typically operates 
performance measures that score higher on line of sight, such as accounting-based measures, 
and goal alignment is critical for the long-term incentive, e.g. through the use of market-based 
measures, such as Total Shareholder Return and working with equity-based incentives.  
 
Furthermore, a decision needs to be made regarding the desirability of a discretionary element 
in the remuneration package, which provides the remuneration committee with the possibility to 
reward for subjectively assessed performance. Basically, the company can decide to incorporate 
such an element based on two fundamentally different approaches: 
1.  Operate a separate element, for example, 25% of the total bonus to reward performance that 
cannot be measured by objective standards. The performance based on objective targets is 
not affected by the subjective part of the bonus; 
2.  Operate an element that can change the objective part of the bonus upwards and downwards 
with, for example, 25% based on subjective performance assessment. This multiplier 
approach is more in line with the test of fairness as advocated by Eumedion in 2006, as well 
as with Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994), and Jensen, Murphy and Wruck (2004) 
recommendation 32. 
 
The question of how this element should be incorporated in the policy proves a topic of debate, 
and is directly or indirectly related to one’s view of the tasks, knowledge level and 
independence of the remuneration committee.
135 When the compensation committee can be 
trusted to perform its task well, approach 2 is preferable over approach 1, as it provides greater 
flexibility in measuring overall performance, helping to reduce noise in good objective 
                                                      
134 Some industries have specific measures of performance, such as the value of new business (VNB) in 
the life insurance industry, clinical milestones in the biotechnology industry, etc. 
135 Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argue that there should be no discretionary element, as the compensation 
committee cannot be trusted to be a good agent for shareholders. It will only use the discretionary element 
to increase pay of executives regardless of their performance.  
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measures and distortion in bad objective measures, and to adapt for unanticipated shocks or 
inadequately set targets. 
 
Step 3: Setting targets and performance incentive zone 
When performance measures have been selected, targets need to be set. Targets can be set using 
various approaches. Section 2.2 has shown that the budget method is mainly used. This is 
worrying, as Jensen (2003) has shown that setting targets based on budgets actually “pays 
people to lie”. However, there is no easy solution. Different methods of setting targets, such as 
using a delta approach, i.e. year-on-year growth, or peer comparison have other drawbacks. 
Year on year growth is not always possible or even desirable. Peer comparison results in the 
issue of selecting the right peers, and often there are comparability problems.  
 
Besides setting adequate targets, the performance range should be determined. Figure 2.3 
illustrated a typical performance incentive zone for a bonus plan. Nearly all companies cap the 
bonus payout. The market-performance incentive zone thus deviates from what Jensen, Murphy 
and Wruck (2004) perceive as a better alternative. They indicate that any kinks and non-
linearities result in gaming the system. Therefore, there should be no target setting, and caps 
should be very high or even non-existent, possibly working with a bonus bank, as illustrated in 
figure 2.15. 
 
Figure 2.15: Linear performance incentive zone – recommendation 26 of Jensen, Murphy 












The linear incentive zone is compelling from a theoretical and incentive viewpoint. However, 
the lack of explicit caps, which could result in significant bonus payments and, furthermore, the 
fact that the actual bonus payment is de-coupled from corporate targets, in the Netherlands, 









Actual bonus is independent of 
the target or budget.  
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regardless of the target. If the internal budget target equals ‘target # 2’ and shareholders also 
expect this level of performance from the company, the payment as reflected under ‘actual 
bonus’ might be scrutinised and perceived as ‘pay without performance’. The fully linear 
system, if introduced, should therefore be designed with great care, adding an effective bonus-
bank feature to prevent significant payouts that might be perceived as unjustified.
136 
 
Another argument why the fully linear performance-incentive zone is not often used in practice 
is the fact that executive compensation is used as a management steering tool. Creating specific 
targets in terms of acquisitions, progress made on certain projects, corporate social 
responsibility milestones, et cetera, can be a reason to make use of explicit targets. 
 
Step 4: Payment vehicle 
The final step is to determine the payment vehicle. For short-term incentives, this is typically 
cash. Within the long-term incentive, the grant vehicle is typically equity-based, i.e. options 
and/or shares. Decisions are based on various data, such as the current portfolio of the 
executive, market practice, growth opportunities of the company, etc. 
 
Step 5: Implementation 
The implementation phase includes drafting various documents, such as legal plan rules, 
internal communication documents, external communication documents, such as the 
remuneration report. In this phase the relevant departments, such as HR, legal, tax, accounting 
and finance, are further informed to ensure the plan is adequately administrated, the costs are 
properly allocated and, if desired, the equity plan is hedged. In the Netherlands, the 
remuneration policy needs to be adopted by the AGM. Shareholders approve the long-term 
incentive.  
  
Eclectic perspective – lens 2: policy structure 
The second lens summarises the way policy structure is determined. The compensation 
committee plays an important role in setting ex post compensation levels by designing the 
structure of compensation. Aligning the interests of management and shareholder (pay-for-
performance), is important in this phase. Designing an adequate compensation structure is not a 
sinecure. Various decisions can undermine the entire programme if they are suboptimal. 
Creating strong but dysfunctional incentives can eliminate the value/objective of the programme 
                                                      
136 Even in the case in which targets are set and agreed upon with shareholders, significant bonus 
payments might be perceived as unjustified in the public eye. A case example is the CEO of Dutch energy 
company Essent, who received a significant bonus payment in 2005, for the performance year 2004, and 




(reducing agency costs) and can even (significantly) increase agency costs, hereby destroying 
value. The remuneration committee needs to interpret market and other data, understand the 
strategy of the company, its definition of success, understand the historical and current 
financials of the company, as well as scenarios for the future, understand the working of various 
compensation instruments, etc. A compensation consultant is often hired to support in this 
process. Figure 2.16 provides an illustration of the flow of information:   
 











Predicting the eventual outcome is difficult, since decision rules are typically unknown. 
Different weights might be attached to the different elements; sometimes market practice is 
more heavily weighted, as compensation committee members do not want to deviate from what 
is ‘accepted in the market’, than in other cases, e.g. when the chairman of the committee has a 
clear and dominant view of what the programme should look like. The element of bounded 
rationality plays an important role, as the compensation committee does not know or does not 
go through all possible scenarios; i.e. logic of appropriateness rather than logic of consequence. 
Programmes can be partially based on criteria such as ‘the desire for simplicity’ and 
‘perception’ rather than reality. Please also refer to Murphy (2002), who states that share option 
programmes in the U.S. were partially based on the perceived costs rather than on the real 
economic costs. A check list of sub optimality is shown in table 2.22. 
 
As mentioned previously, eventual decisions are based on: i) The judgement of the 
remuneration committee; and ii) The various constraints the committee faces. We will further 






Other data / information
Financial Analysis
Strategy / objectives 
Investment decisions 






Table 2.22: Suboptimal compensation structure – normative check list 
Element Context 
Performance measures  1.  As there are no perfect performance measures, multiple criteria are 
combined to ensure line of sight, i.e. being able to influence the 
outcome, as well as goal alignment, i.e. long-term value creation. 
Overemphasising line of sight measures can result in destruction of 
company value. Overemphasising goal alignment measures can 
result in unmotivated executives and increased retention risk. 
2.  Although the plan will operate multiple measures to capture the 
above trade-off, operating too many performance measures can result 
in a lack of focus regarding what is important and divert effort away 
from important tasks.  
3.  Contracts in practice are typically incomplete. When exact 
definitions of performance measures are not clearly laid down in the 
contract, including how to deal with exceptional items, goodwill, 
acquisitions, etc., before the performance period starts, this results in 
ambiguity at the time of assessing the performance. When EPS is 
used, for example, will this be undiluted or diluted EPS? When 
Economic Profit is used, will there be an ‘investment relief’, and to 
what extent, or not? Etc. 
4.  Discretionary elements improve efficiency when the remuneration 
committee is a good agent for shareholders (and other stakeholders). 
If this is not the case, they result in decreased efficiency.  
Performance targets  5.  Targets that are too challenging will result in demotivated executives 
and a potential retention risk. This can, for example, be checked by 
comparing the actual payment versus target over a number of years 
relative to competitors.  
6.  Targets that are not challenging enough hurt the pay-for-performance 
principle.  
Performance incentive zone  7.  Performance incentive zones that are not linear over a vast portion 
could reward gaming and volatility. Cut-off points, if any, should be 
carefully chosen.   
Payment vehicle  8.  If the payment vehicle (cash, options, shares) is not properly 
selected, this results in excessive risk-taking or insufficient risk-
taking. Executives are exposed to both firm specific as well as 
systematic risk. This indicates that the risk position between the 
shareholder and the executive is different.
137  
 
2.5.3 Constraints of the remuneration committee 
In the previous sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2, the determination of the level and structure of executive 
compensation has been discussed on the basis of the real-life context. The first two lenses for 
the eclectic perspective were provided. The compensation committee plays an important role as 
it effectively makes decisions regarding ex ante and, indirectly, ex post compensation based on 
collected information and its own view. The constraints were not yet addressed.  
                                                      
137 Agency models that incorporate the CEO’s aversion to losses are promising in predicting reality. If the 
executive is more averse to losses, more stock options will be used, as shown by Dittmann, Maug and 
Spalt (2010).  
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Eclectic perspective – lens 3: constraints of the remuneration committee 
As the executive labour market is highly imperfect, the remuneration committee has significant 
leeway in which to make its own judgement, assuming there are no other restrictions. However, 
there are actually various constraints, which have become tighter over the last years as an 
answer to outcomes and imperfections of the market mechanism. As a result of increased media 
attention, political interference, corporate governance reforms, increased knowledge regarding 
the working of the executive labour market and compensation instruments, etc., the range of 
actions the compensation committee can choose from has decreased. Figure 2.17 illustrates the 
layers of constraints with which the remuneration committee is faced.  
 

















The first constraint is formed by the other members of the (supervisory) board. This body 
eventually needs to endorse the proposed policy levels and structure. The second level 
represents the shareholders. In the Netherlands, the AGM adopts the remuneration policy and 
approves the long-term incentive plan. The first cases of shareholders voting down the 
remuneration policy became manifest in 2008, e.g. Philips and Vastned. In some cases, 
important shareholders are invited to the table to provide their input before the policy is put up 
for a vote in the AGM. Generally speaking, the ownership structure is important in this respect. 
Block holders can often more effectively monitor these situations. In the final layer, all other 
constraints are depicted. Constraints can work both before and after the remuneration policy is 
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will not be inclined to approve a compensation package on which it anticipates public scrutiny, 
for fear of reputation damage. Even when this is not taken into account, public scrutiny might 
act as an ex post constraint due to  the remuneration level being adjusted afterwards, resulting 
from the public often having economic power, e.g. the power to stop buying the company’s 
product. 
 
If compensation committees fail to set adequate policies, their action space will become smaller 
and smaller as a result of the various parties depicted in figure 2.17 demanding greater influence 
to the detriment of the action space of the compensation committee.  
 
2.5.4 Categorisation of the remuneration committee 
The final lens entails the categorisation of the compensation committee, which further supports 
an eclectic view on executive compensation theories, because it can reconcile seemingly 
opposing theories of executive compensation.  
 
Eclectic perspective – lens 4: categorisation of the remuneration committee 
Agency theory, through the optimal contracting approach, has not provided conclusive evidence 
(Prendergast, 1999). Alternative theories have emerged, which has resulted in a total of 16 
different executive compensation theories (Otten, 2007). The managerial power framework has 
received considerable attention from both practitioners and academics. It is a reaction to 
unsuccessful attempts to explain a number of real life incentive contract aspects with the arm’s 
length bargaining view produced by traditional agency theory (Bebchuk, Fried and Walker, 
2002, Bebchuk and Fried, 2003, 2004). Supporting and non-supporting reactions are observed 
in literature. For example, in an experimental setting, Dorff (2004) shows that managerial power 
over directors does indeed dramatically impact the pay-setting process, resulting in ‘excessive’ 
executive compensation. On the other hand, Murphy (2002) states that the managerial power 
view is both problematic as a theoretical matter, and too simplistic to explain executive pay 
practices. Various practices are inconsistent with the managerial power hypothesis.
138 
                                                      
138 The managerial power hypothesis is largely inconsistent with the most important development in 
executive compensation practices in the U.S. in the 1990s: the escalation in option-based compensation 
for both top-level and lower-level executives, as it coincides with increasingly independent corporate 
boards. This would limit the power of CEOs over their boards and therefore cannot explain the rise in 
option-based compensation. Furthermore, CEOs hired from outside earn more than CEOs hired from the 
inside. Based on the managerial power approach, one would expect the opposite, as CEOs would use their 
relationship to extract rents. Note that Murphy and Zábojník (2007) provide a market-based explanation 
for the pronounced trend of outside hiring and increased CEO pay levels. Basically, the argument boils 
down to the change in the composition of managerial skills needed to manage a modern corporation. The 
assumption is that general components as opposed to firm-specific components of managerial capital are 
increasingly important. Transferability is also ‘priced’ in their model, while firm-specific capital is  
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In summary, and as discussed in section 2.4, the value of the managerial power approach is that 
it has shown there is an added agency problem; supervisory boards in a two-tier system, and 
board of directors in a one-tier system might not be perfect agents for the shareholders/owners 
of the firm (Jensen, Murphy and Wruck, 2004, as well as Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). The degree 
to which the CEO influences remuneration committee members has implications for the pay 
package and the nature of solutions to this problem. Collusion is defined as the extra power a 
CEO has over the remuneration committee apart from his or her ‘market’ bargaining power, in 
other words: the power to extract rents from the company.  
 
Secondly, the way decisions are made is essential. Does the remuneration committee base its 
decisions on all information required for overseeing all possible consequences, i.e. logic of 
consequence, or does it base its decisions on a limited amount of information and norms, such 
as market practice or corporate governance best practices, trust, culture, recommendations, 
rules, history and authority, i.e. logic of appropriateness. The latter also allows for the fact that 
the knowledge level regarding the company and/or compensation instruments might be low, 
which can result in taking suboptimal decisions.  
 












The illustration provides a dual continuum along which remuneration committee members, and 
eventually the committee as a whole, can be categorised. It is assumed that: i) CEOs prefer more 
rather than less compensation; ii) CEOs will exert the power they have to influence both the 
level and structure of their pay by influencing remuneration committee members to set 
remuneration according to his desire. 
                                                                                                                                                            
‘unpriced’. In contrast to the managerial power approach, this market-based explanation is consistent with 



































































The different theoretical perspectives on the practice of executive compensation are therefore 
not mutually exclusive. Area D provides an ideal picture, and recommendations for the practice 
of executive compensation should be based on getting as close as possible to this area, i.e. 
improve corporate governance and educate compensation committee members, and require a 




Seemingly opposing recommendations of different scholars can be interpreted on the basis of 
their starting point. With regard to a possible discretionary element in an annual bonus plan, 
often based on subjective performance assessment, the following citations provide an example: 
 
1) “As part of the effort to strengthen the link between bonus plans and performance, investors 
should resist bonus plans that include discretionary elements”  
2) “Bonus plans should include a subjective component” 
 
It is probably needless to say that the first citation is from the work of Bebchuk and Fried 
(2004) and the second from Jensen, Murphy and Wruck (2004). As discretionary elements are 
often based on subjective performance assessment, these statements seem difficult to reconcile. 
However, they can both be explained by figure 2.18. The starting point of Bebchuk and Fried 
(2004) is situated above the horizontal line in figure 2.18. If the CEO has influence over the 
remuneration committee, a subjective component can be an easy way to extract rents from the 
company, as there is no measurable performance linkage. As it lacks transparency towards 
shareholders, i.e. is camouflaged, it is difficult for outsiders to assess whether the bonus is 
justifiable or not. Therefore Bebchuk and Fried (2004) recommend against discretionary 
elements in bonus plans. The starting point of Jensen and Murphy (2004) is situated below the 
horizontal line in table 2.18, area C and especially area D. If a remuneration committee is not 
influenced by the CEO and acts in the interests of shareholders, subjective performance 
assessment can be an excellent way to improve the efficiency of a bonus plan. Subjective 
assessments can, for example, be used to reduce the ‘noise’ in good objective measures, to 
reduce the ‘distortion’ in bad objective performance measures, and can also adjust bonus 
payments for unanticipated shocks, such as terrorists attacks or shocks to world oil prices.           
In fact, it can be concluded that the recommendation of Bebchuk and Fried (2004) with regard 
to discretionary bonus elements only provides a temporary advice, and only for companies in 
which compensation committees are situated above the horizontal line in the matrix. If corporate 
                                                      
139 Scenario modelling is best practice provision II.2.8a of the Dutch Corporate Governance Code (2008).  
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governance is such that areas C and D are reflective of reality, their recommendation loses its 
value, and consequently puts question marks at the sustainability of a large part of their theory. 
Future empirical research, following a contingency approach, should identify what is prevalent 
under which circumstances.  
 
2.5.5 Summary and conclusion  
This section has summarised the practical context in which executive compensation decisions 
are made. The resulting eclectic perspective contributes to bridging theory and practice. The 
four lenses can be used by academic scholars to further interpret empirical research and can be 
an aid to defining new hypotheses. Various market actors can use the lenses to assess the quality 
of (remuneration committee) decision-making. The compensation committee obtains enhanced 
insight into their role as the ‘spider in the executive compensation web’. Without full 
understanding of their pivotal role and taking full responsibility for remuneration levels and 
structure, their action space will become smaller, e.g. as it has become smaller in recent years, 
as a result of various other parties demanding greater influence, to the detriment of the action 
space of the compensation committee. Policy makers can understand that it could be highly 
effective to target compensation committees directly, in view of their pivotal role. Shareholders 
or other stakeholders can initiate a discussion with the company / compensation committee on 
the remuneration policy in place, especially when a new remuneration policy is introduced. In 
such case, the process of adopting the policy would encompass a discussion based on the four 






2.6 Summary and conclusion 
2.6.1 Summary  
The objective of this chapter is to comment on some of the existing theoretical anchor points 
from a practical view, focusing on the role of the remuneration committee and its decisions.
140 
An eclectic perspective was taken, resulting in four lenses that summarise the practical 
comments. In section 2.2 to 2.5, four questions were answered: 1) What does the top executive 
remuneration landscape look like (level and structure)?; 2) What is the role of the remuneration 
committee in the executive remuneration level decision?; 3) What is the role of the 
remuneration committee in the executive remuneration structure decision?; 4) How are real-life 
executive remuneration decisions made? 
 
Based on the executive remuneration landscape in section 2.2, it was established that there are 
differences between Europe and the U.S. Within Europe, there are marked differences between 
countries. Within countries differences are observed between companies. It was concluded that 
insight into the ‘executive remuneration decision’ is needed to comprehend more clearly where 
these differences originate from. Linking theoretical anchor points to the practical context in 
which these decisions are made can provide such insight.    
 
Section 2.3 has focused on the dynamics of the remuneration level decision. Starting from the 
theoretically limiting case of the perfectly competitive market model, differences in 
compensation are mainly explained by differences in human capital. Ability in combination 
with investments in human capital, i.e. education, acquired skills and expertise, which result in 
relative scarcity, produce higher returns. This fundamentally explains why CEOs earn more 
than, for example, manufacturing employees, which is due to relative scarcity. Focusing on the 
CEO labour market demand and supply curves, we established that these are relatively inelastic 
for the largest listed companies in the economy. When an individual company is searching for a 
CEO, the labour demand is even perfectly inelastic. This is the result of no close substitution. 
Furthermore, companies are not easily deterred by high compensation levels, since CEO labour 
costs are only a fraction of the total costs of the company. There is only a very high natural cap 
from the demand side; in theory this is the point where the company cannot survive in the long-
term, and in practice the point where the market for corporate control acts when CEO pay is far 
from optimal. The market demand curve, which is largely a horizontal summation of individual 
demand, is therefore also relatively inelastic. This notion makes the perception and reality of the 
supply curve even more important in this market. Generally speaking, as a result of inelasticity, 
                                                      
140 It is here assumed that the remuneration committee effectively represents the full (supervisory) board.  
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small shifts in either the demand curve or the supply curve can explain significant changes in 
market prices from this perspective. Further deduction rendered the view that the CEO labour 
market displays significant deviations from the perfectly competitive model. This conclusion is 
based on a comparison with the labour market segment for manufacturing employees, and with 
the share market, one of the financial markets, based on the essential characteristics of perfect 
factor markets. Operational and informational efficiency is lowest in the CEO labour market as 
a result of high transaction costs, imperfect information characterised by private information 
and noise, labour immobility and the impossibility of arbitraging. Due to these imperfections, 
there is no single market-equilibrium compensation level. The labour demand and supply curves 
therefore can contribute to explaining general market results and movements; however, these 
fail to explain individual remuneration packages. The pricing mechanism in this market, apart 
from the invisible hand, consisting of weak competitive market forces, boils down to pay 
negotiations between the CEO candidate and the company assumed to be represented by the 
compensation committee, i.e. the visible hand of the compensation committee. The role of the 
remuneration (/selection) committee is to attract and retain a qualified CEO at the lowest 
possible costs to shareholders. Poor bargaining and a misperception of the supply side of the 
market can prevent such a situation from occurring. Furthermore, increased compensation 
disclosure has provided CEO candidates with a strong psychological aspiration to maximise, i.e. 
being paid at least as good as the upper half of the market. This can result in a continuing 
upward spiral, regardless of shifts in supply and demand curves. Due to the fact that there is no 
single equilibrium price, stakeholders are unable to assess whether the remuneration committee 
have performed their job well. Pay differences between CEOs in similar situations can, for 
example, be the result of inequalities in complexity that are difficult for the outside world to 
determine. However, they can also be the result of an excellent, or poorly, conducted 
negotiation. A labour market peer group comparison, in isolation, cannot be used to assess the 
situation, given the highly individual character of the human capital investment situation, i.e. a 
combination of a specific firm with a specific individual within a specific context. In case of 
compensation that is perceived as too high, this could offset costs of outrage that damages the 
company and its value, especially in an untrusting world that requires increased levels of 
disclosure and shareholder voting on remuneration policies. 
Section 2.4 has focused on the dynamics of the remuneration structure decision. Based on an 
overview of agency theory and the optimal contracting perspectives, it has become clear that the 
‘principal’s problem’ involves various trade-offs resulting in different optimal results within 
different organisations. The remuneration committee strikes a balance between security and risk 
(/incentives), line of sight versus goal alignment, over-investment versus under-investment, 
objective versus subjective performance measures, explicit incentives versus relational,  
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reputation and career concerns, etc. Furthermore, since process, context and the underlying 
model of man are all relevant, additional variation can be explained, given the different design 
of institutions. An eclectic or contingency approach is needed to understand which elements are 
most influential in which circumstances.  
 
Section 2.5 has summarised the four lenses of the eclectic perspective, to understand how the 
remuneration policy is determined in practice. Assessing the quality of the decision is relevant 
given the fact that decisions are not necessarily based on the logic of consequence.
141 
Stakeholders (in particular shareholders) can initiate a discussion based on the four lenses. 
 






















Lens 1: policy level – a discussion on the chosen external reference as well as the internal 
reference. Table 2.21, as presented in this chapter, can be used to analyse potential problems. 
                                                      
 
141 Nobel prize winner Daniel Kahneman has furthermore shown that people are not as rational as 
assumed by the concept of the homo economicus. 
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Lens 2: policy structure – a discussion on performance measures, e.g. the trade-off between line 
of sight and goal alignment, performance standards, performance incentive zones and payment 
vehicles. Figure 2.15 can help with analysing the shape of the performance incentive zone. 
Table 2.22 can help to assess overall problems with the proposed compensation structure.  
Lens 3: constraints – a discussion on the constraints as faced by the compensation committee. 
Which decisions are solely based on incentive theory and which can be partially or fully 
attributed to constraints? For example, is the choice for the long-term incentive vehicle solely 
driven by creating optimal alignment with shareholders, or is it partially or fully tax or 
accounting driven? Which part is related to corporate governance requirements? Is the level of 
compensation only based on the collected information, both internal and external reference, or 
also on perceived and/or real constraints? Et cetera.  
Lens 4: categorisation of the compensation committee – the outcome of the executive 
compensation programme can be used to further analyse the compensation committee. If the 
outcome of the executive compensation process cannot be explained by lens 1-3, a critical 
discussion with the compensation committee is needed. Are results based on a lack of 
knowledge of the company or compensation instruments, or is it likely that the committee 
favours top management of the company? Lens 4 can provide a starting point for such a 
discussion. Policy makers and corporate governance platforms can directly target the 
compensation committee. As a result of its pivotal role, it can improve the working of the 
executive labour market. The eclectic perspective shows that, despite the imperfections that 
characterise and will always be a part of the executive labour market, it is important to ensure 
results are as efficient as possible. Therefore compensation committees should strive for area D.  
2.6.2 Conclusion  
The design of executive compensation packages is characterised by countervailing forces and 
ambiguity. On the one hand, this is a direct consequence of the fact that executive compensation 
in itself is a device to bring parties with partially or totally opposite objectives closer together. 
On the other, this is caused by the fact that the mechanisms influencing the level and structure 
of an executive compensation package are sometimes forces in opposite directions, or that 
certain correlations are positive until a certain point and negative from that point onwards, for 
example, relating to the trade-off between monitoring and providing incentives, indicating that 





1) The pivotal role of the remuneration committee  
The remuneration committee has a pivotal role, in the top executive remuneration decision. This 
is based on the fact that the market is highly informationally as well as operationally inefficient. 
The imperfections of this market result in significant deviations from the competitive market 
model and create a relatively large bid-ask spread. This results in room to manoeuvre for the 
compensation committee. The knowledge level of the committee and its position towards the 
CEO, affect remuneration decisions. Stakeholders have become aware of this and have 
constrained the action space of the remuneration committee, for example by shareholders’ vote, 
corporate governance legal prescriptions and best practices, etc. 
 
2) The case for a contingency approach to empirical research 
The top-executive remuneration decision is highly case specific, depending on individual, 
company, industry and country elements. There is no single theory that really applies. After all, 
different forces can be stronger in different contexts, creating different results. Furthermore, 
taking an eclectic perspective has shown that seemingly opposing theories of executive 
compensation are often far from mutually exclusive. The four lenses, presented in this chapter, 
can contribute to the informational efficiency of the CEO labour market, by providing 
information on the executive compensation process and providing ways for shareholders and 
other stakeholders, to analyse and discuss the process outcome. Academics are provided with 
insight into the practical process, which contributes to enhanced interpretation of past empirical 
research and acts as an aid for future empirical research. The conclusion is that a contingency 
approach, that answers the question; ‘Which policies are observed under which circumstances?’, 
can help the research area further. Understanding the shape of executive compensation 
packages, and being able to effectively measure and compare these structures across firms and 
across countries, can therefore provide a powerful tool for enhanced understanding of the 
executive remuneration landscape. The following chapter 3, will focus on the design of such a 
single quantifiable yardstick to capture the essence of the remuneration policy / contract.  
 
3) The relevance of separating between ex ante and ex post remuneration in empirical research 
In practice, the remuneration policy process is split into decisions related to: i) The ex ante level 
of remuneration on the one hand, and; ii) The structure of remuneration that results in ex post 
remuneration on the other. Therefore, empirical research that mimics this process will achieve 
more detailed results. In chapter 4, I will show this for a dataset of profit centre heads.     
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Pay for performance in Europe and United States – 
Research Monitoring Committee Corporate Governance the Netherlands 
 
 
A) General questions  
 
Question 1: Context in which remuneration decisions are made: 
Most prevalent board model: one tier or two tier? 
How many of the companies in the research group have a separate committee which deals with 
the remuneration of the management board/top executives (such as a remuneration committee)? 
Please fill in the table below:  
 
Prevalence of separate Committee  Percentage of total sample 
There is a separate Remuneration (and nomination(appointments?)) 
committee 
% 
There is no separate committee which deals with remuneration related issues 
for the executive board/top executives 
% 
Total  100% 
 
Question 2: Tax constraints 
Which types of tax constraints are applicable? Examples: in the United States basic salary is 
‘capped’ at a million dollars, in the Netherlands equity-based long-term incentives are no longer 
deductible from corporation tax. Please fill in the table below: 
Applicable?  Applies to?   
Yes No  Corporation Individual 
Brief explanation/background 
Specific tax 
constraints related to 
basic salary? 
       
Specific tax constraint 
related to bonus 
plans? 
       





Tax favoured share 
option plan? 
       
Tax favoured share 
plan? 
       
 
How important are tax considerations in the design of the remuneration package based on your 
consulting estimate (scale from 1 to 5 on the direct compensation elements). Please fill in the 
table below: 
 
  1-Significantly 
important 
2  3 - Important  4  5-Not important
Basic salary           
Short-term 
incentive 
        
Long-term 
incentive 
        
 
Question 3: defining (expected/ex ante) pay levels 
How are total direct compensation levels (and mix) typically set (expected compensation)? 
 
  Tick box which is most applicable or 
provide relevant description 
External reference (labour market peer group)   
Internal reference (internal equity considerations or 
tournament incentives) 
 
Negotiation (i.e. based on bargaining power)   
Combination of elements above (please state specific 
combination) 
 
Other (please state)   
 
For the companies using an external reference group, please answer the questions below: 
 
  Please provide requested information 
Provide typical range of number of companies in the reference 
group (lower towards upper quartile) 
...to... 
Companies using cross industry versus companies using  …% cross industry versus …% industry  
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industry specific group (please provide percentages; if a 
combination applies please also provide figures for this 
combined approach) 
specific 
Companies using a national versus international group (please 
provide percentages) 
…% national versus …% international 
group 
Pay is typically referenced at lower quartile, median, upper 




When dividing total direct compensation in basic salary, annual bonus and long-term incentive, 
what are the lower quartile, median and upper quartile target and maximum bonus and the 
expected value of long-term incentive as a percentage of basic salary? Please fill in the tables 
below for the CEO position and executives on board level: 
 
CEO  Target 
bonus 
Maximum bonus Annual long-term incentive 
expected value 
Ratio fixed versus 
variable pay (TDC) 
Lower quartile  %  %  %  …% versus…% 
Median %  %  %  …%  versus…% 
Upper quartile  %  %  %  …% versus…% 







Annual long-term incentive 
expected value 
Ratio fixed versus 
variable pay (TDC) 
Lower quartile  %  %  %  …% versus…% 
Median % %  %  …%  versus…% 
Upper quartile  %  %    …% versus…% 
 
B) Design of short-term incentive plan 
 
Question 1 
How does the short-term incentive pay out? Please fill in the table below:
142 
 
Type of payment under the annual bonus plan  Percentage of total sample 
Cash % 
Shares % 
Combination of cash and shares  % 
Other % 
                                                      
142 Bonus conversion plans not to be included.   
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Total  100% 
 
Question 2 
Number of financial performance measures. Please fill in the table below: 
 










Type of performance measures. Please fill in the table below: 
 
Type of measures  Percentage of total sample 
Sales/revenue % 
Operating profit/EBIT(DA)  % 
Net profit  % 
Earnings per share (EPS)  % 
Cash flow  % 
Economic profit  % 
Return on equity (ROE)  % 
Return on invested capital (ROIC)  % 
Absolute Total Shareholder Return  % 
Relative Total Shareholder Return   
Other, i.e.:………………..  % 
Total  100% can be exceeded due to use of multiple 
measures 
 
Question 4  
Target setting financial measures. Please fill in the table below: 
 
Target setting approach  Percentage of total sample 
Budget % 
Year on year growth  %  
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Management expectations (often higher than 
conservative budget) 
% 
Relative to peer group  % 




Use of non-financial targets including personal targets. Please fill in the table below: 
 
Non-financial measures  Percentage of relevant sample 
Of the companies that use non-financial targets, which % of the 
target bonus is typically related to these targets? 
% 
How many companies use non-financial targets?  % 
Of the companies that use non-financial targets how many 
companies use personal non-financial targets (versus company 
non-financial targets such as client satisfaction)? 
% 
 
C) Design of long-term incentive plan 
 
Question 1 
Delivery vehicle. Please fill in the table below: 
 
Type of vehicle  Percentage of total sample 
Cash % 
(phantom) Options  % 
(phantom) Shares  % 
Combination of options and shares (please also provide typical 
ratio between options and shares) 
% 
Other, i.e.:………….  % 
Total  100% 
 
Question 2 
Settlement of equity-based vehicles. Please fill in the table below: 
 
Settlement  Percentage of total sample 
Cash % 
Equity % 




Use of quantitative (typically financial) performance conditions to grant/vesting of long-term 
incentive. Please fill in the table below: 
  
Performance conditions  Percentage of total sample 
At grant  % 
At vesting  % 
No (quantitative) performance conditions  % 
Total  100% 
 
Question 4 
Number of financial performance measures. Please fill in the table below: 
 









Type of performance measures. Please fill in the table below: 
 
Type of measures  Percentage of total sample 
Sales/revenue % 
Operating profit/EBIT (DA)  % 
Net profit  % 
Earnings per share (EPS)  % 
Cash flow  % 
Economic profit  % 
Return on equity (ROE)  % 
Return on invested capital (ROIC)  % 
Absolute Total Shareholder Return  % 
Relative Total Shareholder Return  % 
Other, i.e.:…………..  % 
Total  100% can be exceeded due to use of 




Target setting financial measures. Please fill in the table below: 
 
Target setting approach  Percentage of total sample 
Budget % 
Year on year growth  % 
Management expectations (often higher than 
conservative budget) 
% 
Relative to peer group  % 
Timeless standard  % 
Total 100% 
 
If other, please specify::……………………………. 
 
Question 7 
Is share ownership stimulated in your country (other than by individual companies at their own 
instigation? How is this stimulated? (i.e. guideline to own X% of basic salary in shares, holding 
requirements etc.). Please fill in the table below: 
 
  yes/no  Explanation (refer to guideline/best practice provision 
and the way ownership is stimulated) 
Through (national) corporate 
governance code 
  
Through institutional investor 
platform 
  
















Executive Remuneration Structure and the CompRisk Index 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The objective of this book, is to add to the managerial compensation contracting literature in 
three ways: i) Open the black box of the executive remuneration decision; ii) Capture the 
executive remuneration structure in a single quantifiable yardstick; iii) Work with a new and 
potentially unique dataset on profit centre head remuneration. In this research chapter, I focus 
on the second approach mentioned. The objective is to develop a single quantifiable metric that 
captures the essence of the executive remuneration structure. It is intended as input for (future) 
empirical research as well as for practical use by the remuneration committee to make more 
informed decisions. In this introduction, I first focus on the question of whether the structure of 
compensation contracts matters. Subsequently, the research questions are formulated and an 
overview of the areas of research is provided. 
3.1.1 Does remuneration structure matter?  
Within the agency literature, contract theory has focused on contractual solutions to the 
principal’s problem: adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection relates to attracting 
the right candidate. As discussed in chapter 2, one can mitigate this problem by the 
compensation structure. Adverse selection theory teaches that if a candidate with entrepreneurial 
spirit (and a relatively low risk profile) is sought, one must then design the contract so as to 
ensure that the right candidate will ‘self select’ into the job. Whether or not the agent ‘signs up’ 
for the upcoming performance period, depends on the offered contract. The level of risk in the 
contract is a proxy for the remuneration structure. The self-selection mechanism is corroborated 
by empirical evidence from Grund and Sliwka (2010), based on a representative dataset of the 
inhabitants of Germany. In their study on performance pay and risk aversion, they show that the 
willingness to take risks differs significantly among individuals.
143 Risk-averse individuals 
apply for jobs where performance-contingent pay is less likely. In conclusion, from the 
                                                      
143 That individual characteristics matter in risky choices has been demonstrated by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979, 1992). From an economic/mathematical perspective, risky decisions are governed by the 
product of probability and utility, called expected utility (Bernoulli, 1738; Edwards, 1954). Psychological 
experiments have shown that participants often prefer a sure thing of $W (paid at probability P = 1) over 
a gamble for a larger amount $J (paid at probability P < 1, while $0 is paid at probability 1 - P) even when 
the expected utility (U) of each option is equal (W * P = J * P). This leads to the conclusion that risk 
taking is governed more by the concern for loss than the desire for gain.  
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perspective of adverse selection, pay structure matters because it influences behaviour (here the 
choice for a certain job). 
 
Figure 3.1: Self-selection as a result of the shape of the remuneration structure 
This figure shows two contracts with equal expected costs for the company. Based on the perception of 
the value of the contract for the CEO candidate, a choice is made by him between more security, contract 





A candidate who expects to be in 
this part of the performance 
dimension will self-select  into 
company B (with more pay at risk) 
A candidate who expects to be in 
this part of the performance 
dimension will self-select  into 









The structure of the contract is furthermore important with regard to the issue of moral hazard. 
Through a combination of fixed pay (security) and compensation contingent upon defined 
performance levels (risk), shirking is discouraged and the agent is induced to find and execute 
projects with a positive net present value. This implies that the level of compensation risk is a 
proxy for the overall compensation structure.  
 
This gets us to the question whether incentives drive behaviour. The literature on pay and 
performance variability (managerial risk taking) confirms that it does. Coles et al. (2006) show 
a strong causal relation between managerial compensation structure and operational decisions. 
A higher sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility (vega) results in implementing a riskier 
policy (more R&D investments, fewer investments in property, plant & equipment, higher 
leverage, greater focus on fewer segments). That the structure of incentives can induce risk 
taking, for example resulting from the sensitivity of compensation to stock-price volatility 
(Guay, 1999),
144 has also been ascertained by Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) and DeFusco et 
                                                      
144 Guay (1999) highlights the difference between the slope of the relation between manager’s wealth and 
stock price (delta) and the convexity of the relation, which is the sensitivity of the manager’s wealth to 
stock return volatility (vega). Increased delta exposes managers to more risk, while increased vega helps  
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al. (1990) for the general industry and by Chen et al. (2006) for the banking industry. Providing 
incentives to take risk can be a value-enhancing decision as shown by Rajgopal and Shevlin 
(2002) for the oil & gas industry
145 and risk reduction can be a value-destroying action as shown 
by Low (2009) for Delaware companies.
146 However, risky incentives can also result in 
‘swinging for the fences’ (big losses and big wins), without additional average return for the 
company (Sanders and Hambrick, 2007), or it can cause managerial decisions to become unduly 
influenced by a risk-averse predisposition, harming the interests of external shareholders 
(Wright et al., 2007). Remuneration committees must therefore find an optimal level of 
incentive strength. Figure 3.2 provides a graphic representation of this choice. 
 
Figure 3.2: Agency costs - optimal zone 
This figure shows that in terms of incentive strength (/compensation risk), there is an optimal area, where 
agency costs are minimised. Going beyond that point, by providing the CEO with increased incentives / 
risk, can create a situation of increased agency costs.
147  
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Incentives should be strong enough to ensure that valuable but risky investments are made. 
However, if incentives are too strong, this can result in undertaking opportunistic actions, such 
as earnings management and timing the release of information. This can boost the likelihood of 
fraud allegations (Aboody and Kasznik, 2000; Chauvin and Shenoy, 2001; Bergstresser and 
Philippon, 2006; Burns and Kedia, 2006; Efendi et al, 2007; Denis et al., 2006), hereby 
                                                                                                                                                            
offset the aversion to risky projects that arises due to the increased delta. Coles, Daniel and Naveen 
(2006) find that the direction of causality runs both ways. Riskier firms are more likely to increase CEO 
portfolio delta and vega, and increased delta and vega lead to riskier firm policies and higher firm risk. 
145 Executive stock options reduce the managerial incentive problem, by motivating them to invest in 
risky, positive NPV projects (e.g. to overcome exploration risk measured by exploration activity).  
146 Legal protection in the state of Delaware against hostile takeovers (1995).  
147 The Dutch Corporate Governance Code, also implicitly assumes an optimal area. This can be 
illustrated by the evolving debate in the Netherlands. Best practices II.2.1 and II.2.3 of the Dutch 
Corporate Governance Code (2003) require companies to link performance conditions to their option and 
share plans. Ceteris paribus, such conditions increase compensation risk. A few years later, the committee 
that monitors compliance with the Code indicates in recommendation 19 of its report (2007) that pay 
should be capped beyond a certain point (to be determined by the company). Under the assumption of a 
fixed value approach this would decrease compensation risk.   
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increasing rather than decreasing agency costs (Jensen, 2004, 2005). We conclude that the 
structure of remuneration incentives matter.  
 
Types of incentives  
There are different types of incentives. A basic dichotomy is based on the difference between 
portfolio- and performance-incentives. The first category refers to the structure of the CEO’s 
portfolio of stock options and shares, which are (assumed to be) part of his wealth. The 
sensitivity of CEO wealth to share price movements (delta) and to share return volatility (vega) 
has been widely researched analytically and empirically, among others Hemmer et al. (1999), 
Guay (1999), Core and Guay (2002) and Coles et al. (2006). Note that a related stream of 
research focuses on the implications of the magnitude of the portfolio on the value of 
compensation, from the perspective of the executive. It concludes that if a risk-averse manager 
has a significant part of his wealth tied to his firm’s stock price the certainty equivalent value of 
that compensation contract can be substantially less than its cost as perceived by shareholders, 
e.g. Lambert et al. (1991), Hall and Murphy (2002).  
 
The second category refers to the structure of unvested rights, including the short-term incentive 
and the long-term incentive plans. In comparison to the first category, there is a fundamental 
difference. Shares and option portfolios in the first category can be directly linked to share price 
movements and return volatility. In contrast, the assessment of performance-incentives follows 
a two-staged approach. The underlying option and/ or share vehicle needs be taken into account, 
but even more important is the performance condition. It determines whether or not there will be 
an addition to the portfolio or not. Such a performance condition can become quite elaborate, 
such as the requirement to outperform 50% of the companies in a peer group, based on relative 
total shareholder return. I will focus on the details of such performance contract from an ex ante 
perspective and from the perspective of the principal that offers the contract to the agent.
148 
Note that the ex post perspective has been covered by the pay-for-performance literature; i.e. 
what are the determinants of realised pay? These types of correlation studies are particularly apt 
to provide evidence in respect of the question of whether pay is sensitive to the achieved level 
of performance (e.g. Jensen and Murphy, 1990a, b; Mehran, 1995; Coughlan and Schmidt, 
1985; Lewellen et al., 1987; Agrawal et al.,1991; Goldberg and Idson, 1995; Aggarwal and 
Samwick, 1999; and Core et al., 1999). However, at the moment of realisation, the package is 
no longer at risk which provides little insight in the ‘at risk’ character of the package.  
                                                      
148 It is not the objective to value the contract from the perspective of the executive (certainty equivalence 
approach). This would involve making assumptions on the risk preferences of the CEO. In contrast, the 
goal is, based on the perspective of the company and based on the valuation tools that are used in practice 





Therefore, the essence of the structure of performance incentives equals the level of risk the 
agent faces at t=0. Duffhues and Jobsen (2006) state that the development of a risk-return model 
could enhance insight into executive pay practices. Developing such measure could add to the 
understanding on both the moral hazard as well as the adverse selection issue. The objective is 
therefore to create such a single quantifiable yardstick, which I call the CompRisk index (CRI), 
explore its use and research its determinants.   
 
3.1.2 Research questions  
The research questions are based on this conclusion and are reflected in table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1: Research questions  
This table provides an overview of the research questions of this chapter, the objectives, and the reference 
to the relevant section. 
Research questions  Objectives  Section 
1) How to define a single 
quantifiable metric that can 
capture the structure, risk, or 
incentive strength of yearly 
compensation contracts? 
The typical definition of compensation at risk is 
expressed in terms of pay mix, i.e. the percentage of 
variable compensation. The objective is to improve this 
proxy by taking into account additional contract 
information (the structure of remuneration).  
3.2 
2) What is the level of risk in 
real-life compensation contracts 
in the Netherlands and the UK? 
We will execute CRI calculations and simulations for a 
dataset of large listed Dutch and UK companies. Our 
objective is to describe the landscape of remuneration 
structures in terms of the observed difference in 
compensation risk. What are typical ranges? Are these 
different for the Netherlands versus the UK? 
3.3 
3) How can the CompRisk 
index be used? 
Because the economic consequences of incentives can 
be significant, our objective is to increase the 
likelihood of measuring compensation risk in a 
practical context. We take a step towards reduction of 
time and complexity of the CRI. In addition, a 
benchmark matrix is provided and the link with the 
Sharpe ratio is discussed. 
3.4 
4) What are the determinants of 
compensation risk, as measured 
by the CompRisk index? 
We explore how the tool can be used for future 
research and we take a first step by researching the 
determinants of the CompRisk index (individual, 
company, industry, country and time effects). 
3.5 
3.1.3 Research structure 
Research questions 1 to 4, as reflected in table 3.1, are answered in section 3.2 to 3.5. Section 
3.6 provides a summary (3.6.1) and conclusion (3.6.2) as well as a subsection on future research 
(3.6.3).   
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3.2 Development of the Compensation Risk Index (CRI) 
In this section the CompRisk Index (CRI) is developed. The proxy for compensation risk that is 
built on, is the extent to which an executive’s compensation package depends upon ex-post 
states of the world (Gray and Cannella, 1997). The pay mix reflects the proportion of total pay 
that is at risk. However, it does not take the underlying pay structure into account. I propose an 
amended approach in which the weight of variable pay is taken as the starting point and contract 
details relating to the underlying pay structure are added. This approach is relevant based on the 
observation that we cannot classify pay as a binary variable based on how the company 
categorises pay (i.e. fixed versus variable). Within the proportion of so called ‘variable pay’, 
part of it is actually at risk and the other part can in fact be classified as fixed compensation 
(with differences per company). 
 
Our proxy is based on the extent to which variable pay is really at risk. It is based on the 
coefficient of variation, which measures the variation around the expected pay level (statistical 
dispersion measure). By way of example, I briefly digress to payout risk in the context of a 
lottery. Assume there are three lotteries, each with 10 possible outcomes, as reflected in table 
3.2.  
 
Table 3.2: Lottery payments in different states of the world   
This table shows the payments in different states of the world of lottery A, B, and C. The assumption is 
that only 10 possible states of the world exist. µ is the average payment and σ the payment population 
standard deviation.  
State of the world  Lottery A  Lottery B  Lottery C 
1 1,000,000  200,000  100,000 
2 0  200,000  100,000 
3 0  200,000  100,000 
4 0  200,000  100,000 
5 0  200,000  100,000 
6 0 0  50,000 
7 0 0  50,000 
8 0 0  50,000 
9 0 0  50,000 
10 0  0  50,000 
  μ = 100,000  μ = 100,000  μ = 75,000 
  σ = 300,000  σ = 100,000  σ = 25,000 
  σ/μ = 3  σ/μ = 1  σ/μ = 1/3  
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Lottery A and B have an equal expected payout value (μ = 100,000). Lottery A, however, has 
higher variability as measured by the standard deviation (σ), but also offers the opportunity to 
win a much higher amount; 1,000,000 (with 10% probability) versus 200,000 in lottery B (with 
50% probability). Lottery C is an atypical lottery as it provides for a minimum reward of 
50,000. It furthermore has a lower average payout than lottery A and B, but also much more 
security in view of the coefficient of variation of 1/3 versus 3 for lottery A and 1 for lottery B.  
 
Which lottery ticket would you buy, assuming you could pay for it with your own human 
capital? This is the question a candidate for a chief executive position must answer. Comparing 
only the expected level of compensation provides too little information to make such a decision. 
The executive is confronted with a trade-off between the expected pay level, on the one hand, 
and the risk in the actually paid out compensation (ex post), on the other. This ex-ante level of 
pay equals the average of possible future outcomes (ex-post pay level). The degree to which the 
ex-post realisations of pay can deviate from this expected level are captured in the standard 
deviation.  
 
In the remainder of the text, the coefficient of variation times 100 will be referred to as the 
CompRisk index or CRI. We will focus on the direct compensation elements (i.e. benefits are 
not taken into account
149) and differentiate between fixed compensation and the various forms 
of variable compensation. In order to calculate the CRI for each element, we need the weight in 
the total package and the coefficient of variation per compensation element. 
 
3.2.1 Fixed compensation 
The amount of fixed compensation in the total package equals security. The greater the amount 
of fixed compensation, the lower the risk for the executive, resulting in a higher operating 
leverage for the firm. Fixed compensation mainly consists of the basic salary including fixed 
elements, such as vacation allowance and additional end-of-year payments. We incorporate the 
weight of basic salary into our calculation of the CRI. The coefficient of variation equals zero. 
                                                      
149 Examples of benefits are a company car, golf-club membership, etc. Typically, the most important 
benefit is the pension. There is a great deal of noise regarding the disclosure of pensions over the research 
period (2001-2008). From the Dutch perspective, individualised disclosure of pensions at the beginning of 
the research period was virtually nonexistent. The disclosure of pensions has improved over the years. 
However, differences remain in actuarial assumptions, deviations between companies that disclose the 
average population premium versus a CEO-specific premium etc. Similar situations have been observed 
in other countries. Bebchuk and Jackson (2005) scrutinise the non-transparency of pension pay in the U.S. 
If transparency improves, research will be better able to take pension values into account. The conclusion 
of Kalyta and Magnan (2008) for Canada can be extended to other jurisdictions as well. They indicate 
that vague disclosure of supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs) may impede effective 
shareholder monitoring of this part of compensation.    
 
130
Severance pay can also be perceived as a form of fixed compensation. It is the payment that is 
made if the CEO is asked to leave the company. One would be able to observe the realised 
amount at the moment the CEO leaves. However, we are not interested in severance pay from a 
realised actual-value (ex-post) perspective but from a potential expected-value (ex-ante) 
perspective. The situation in which severance is paid is difficult to assess upfront (bad 
performance over one year, bad performance over several years, change in supervisors, change 
in shareholders, crisis, internal affairs, external factors,
150 etc.). The amount is furthermore 
difficult to assess. Severance is not often defined upfront as a certain amount. It is typically 
determined in terms of a maximum amount (but with a hardship clause
151). To limit the noise 
level in the index, severance pay is not directly incorporated in the left-hand-side variable.
152    
3.2.2 Variable compensation  
Variable compensation typically consists of a short-term incentive plan (STIP) and a long-term 
incentive plan (LTIP). The STIP is based on annual performance and is typically paid out in 
cash.
153 The long-term incentive plan for listed companies is typically in shares and/or in 
options and linked to a predetermined and measurable performance condition.  
 
In chapter 2 variable pay programs were discussed in relation to the trade-off between risk and 
distortion (Baker, 1992; Baker, 2002). A measure that is fully aligned with the goal of the 
company (long-term value creation) tends to be more difficult to directly influence than 
measures that are further away from this objective. I will take ‘cost efficiency’ as an example. 
                                                      
150 For example, the (unexpected) oil leakage in U.S. territorial waters resulted in the dismissal of BP’s 
CEO (2010). 
151 A hardship clause allows for deviation of the provision if the outcome would turn out to be 
unreasonable. The Dutch Corporate Governance Code also leaves room for such situations in best 
practice provision II.2.8: “The remuneration in the event of dismissal may not exceed one year’s salary 
(the ‘fixed’ remuneration component). If the maximum of one year’s salary would be manifestly 
unreasonable for a management board member who is dismissed during his first term of office, such 
board member shall be eligible for severance pay not exceeding twice the annual salary.”  
152 An alternative way of taking the contract termination clause into account, is to include it as a right-
hand-side variable in the regression analyses in section 3.5. This offers an ex-ante perspective and 
answers the question whether the risk in the ‘going concern’ package is a communicating vessel with 
upfront negotiated ‘soft landing’ conditions (i.e. higher compensation risk if severance pay and notice 
period are relatively generous). The standard models as reflected in section 3.5 do not take this into 
account. A separate regression was executed in which a ‘parachute’ dummy and the ‘notice’ period was 
included (see appendix 3.1 for a definition of both variables). It did not result in a rejection of the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients equal zero. This may be explained by the fact that corporate governance 
codes have been a force towards uniformity. For example: Best practice provision II.2.8 of the Dutch 
Corporate Governance Code (2003, 2008) states: ‘Remuneration in the event of dismissal may not exceed 
one year’s salary (the ‘fixed’ remuneration component). If the maximum of one year’s salary were 
manifestly unreasonable for a management board member who is dismissed during his first term of office, 
such a board member shall be eligible for severance pay not exceeding twice the annual salary. 
Companies that seek to comply with this provision follow this guidance. 
153 If the bonus is paid out in shares, there is typically a matching feature linked to it. This component is 
taken into account under the long-term incentives (in practice often referred to as ‘mid-term incentive’).  
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Cutting costs can be quite easy. You can start with firing your best paid employees, cut back on 
R&D expenses etc. However, it could be that your best paid employees are also the most 
valuable employees, and that cutting back on R&D will deteriorate your market position in the 
longer run. Making decisions in light of value creation, in a listed firm eventually measured by 
total shareholder return, is associated with uncertainty: are your actions today, right for the 
future?, will this be acknowledged by the market?, etc. Therefore, a variable pay design that is 
fully aligned with the goal of the company exhibits more risk (less direct influence by the CEO 
on the outcome). In reality, this payment risk is reduced in order to keep executives motivated. 
However, this cannot be done without introducing more distortive measurement (away from the 
company’s eventual goal). In a classic management paper, Kerr (1975) indicates that there are 
many examples of reward systems where the behaviours that are rewarded are those which the 
rewarder is trying to discourage, while the behaviour he desires is not being rewarded at all: 
‘The folly of rewarding A, while hoping for B’.  
 
Variable pay packages thus strike a balance between risk and distortion. This implies that 
remuneration committees select items from both the left- as well as the right-hand column of 
table 3.3.  
 
Table 3.3: Overview of pay design – risk versus distortion 
This table shows the trade-off between risk and distortion. Risk, for the executive, is lower if there is a 
greater direct impact of his actions on the outcome of the performance measure or payment vehicle. 
Distortion is lower if the measurement is more in line with the eventual goal of the company (i.e. long-
term value creation).  
Low risk - high distortion  High risk - low distortion 
Short-term focused measurement  Long-term focused measurement 
Individual performance measures  Group performance measures 
Accounting/internally based performance measures  Value-based/external performance measures 
Relative performance measures  Absolute performance measures 
Multiple measures  Single measure 
Cash-based vehicles  Equity-based vehicles 
 
From an overall variable-pay perspective, short-term incentives are typically composed of items 
from the left and long-term incentives of items from the right-hand column.
154 For listed 
companies, the performance measurement related to the LTIP is typically ‘outsourced to the 
share market’. Because there is less room for power as an explanatory variable of ex-post 
outcomes, one is able to simulate potential LTI outcomes based on performance. Short-term 
incentives are internally driven and one needs to cut through company culture as well as 
                                                      
154 If the long-term incentive becomes too risky, items from the left column are introduced. An example is 




‘camouflage’ (Bebchuk, 2004) to be able to say anything about payout variation. Both STI as 
well as LTI are further discussed in the next two subsections. I will operate within the 
boundaries of the International Financial Reporting Standards and especially IFRS2 on share-
based payments. 
3.2.2.1 Short-term incentive 
A short-term incentive plan rewards performance achieved over a one-year period. The typical 
structure of a short-term incentive plan is described in chapter 2, section 2.2.3. Bonus contracts 
include financial as well as non-financial measures, collective as well as individual measures, 
objective as well as subjective elements. Underlying targets can be based on budgets, year-on-
year growth (delta approach), timeless hurdles, or relative performance measurement. 
Combining payout under the different performance conditions can occur based on different 
methods such as the addition method, the multiplication method or the matrix approach.
155 
Finally, the remuneration committee has the discretionary power to adjust the bonus upward or 
downward under special circumstances. Disclosure of the STI contract structure is limited, and 
the associated yearly targets are often considered commercially sensitive and not disclosed 
upfront. Estimating payout variation based on contract information is therefore impossible in 
most cases.  
 
The weight of the (expected/average) STI can be based on the policy (target) STI level. Since 
the structure is unknown, variability of STI payouts can be taken into account based on two 
approaches: 
1.  Assume a uniform distribution; the coefficient of variation within the uniform distribution 
equals: ((maximum – minimum)/square root of 12)/((minimum + maximum)/2). Because 
the minimum bonus is zero, any given maximum level results in a coefficient of variation of 
0.58 (Evans et al. 2000). The CRI for the short-term incentive would thus be 58;  
2.  Make a prediction of potential payout variation for the upcoming year based on the 
coefficient of variation of the actual bonus payouts over the past years.  
 
                                                      
155 If the bonus plan has multiple measures to define the performance of the CEO, there are various ways 
to combine the results on each of the performance areas, in order to establish the eventual bonus payment: 
i) The additive approach combines the bonus earned under each performance measure but simply adding 
up the results. A bad result on one of the measures can be compensated by a good result on a different 
measure. This method reduces risk for the CEO; ii) The multiplication approach combines the bonus 
under each performance measure by multiplying the results. A growth measure, for example, can be 
combined with a return measure. If the score on one of the two is bad, this impacts the bonus result on the 
other measure as well. This approach increases the risk for the CEO; iii) The matrix approach can further 
refine the multiplication method by way of combining the results on performance measures. It can, for 
example, define a minimum score for each of the measures under which there is no payment at all. This 
approach, depending on its use, can further increase the risk for the CEO.       
 
133
The first alternative mentioned, emphasises the parts of the model for which information is 
available; the weights of the various compensation elements (basic salary, STI and LTI) as well 
as the structure of the LTI (see the next section 3.2.2.2). Such a proxy of compensation risk 
improves the proxy I build on, as it reflects additional information (not so much from the 
perspective of the STI as from the perspective of the LTI, discussed later).  
 
The second alternative mentioned, has the potential to further improve the proxy because it 
takes firm-specific elements for the STI into account. It can reveal the extent to which the STI is 
actually at risk. Given the specific role of the STI in the remuneration package (lower risk at the 
price of higher distortion), one can make a case for using this proxy even if there is full 
information at t=0 about the STI structure. This is because the ex-ante incentive structure does 
not always have a deterministic relationship with the ex-post outcome. Given the fact that the 
STI process (determining performance measures, setting targets and establishing the payout) 
takes place behind closed doors, there is significant freedom to reward good performance, but 
also what could be considered bad performance. As set forth in chapter 2, this can be based on 
the fact that targets are deliberately set at an easy level (pay-for-performance culture is less 
strict) or on the information asymmetry between the CEO and the remuneration committee. In 
other words, company-specific elements play an important role.  
 
This results in the desire to establish payout variation based on actual results. This approach 
observes actual behaviour and not what is communicated about the STI upfront. It therefore cuts 
through the company-specific performance culture and ‘camouflage’. Such an approach is 
(implicitly) supported by: behavioural economics (such as the work of Nobel Prize laureate 
Daniel Kahneman
156), research findings that establish insignificant or even negative association 
with performance (e.g. Duffhues and Kabir, 2008), the specific role of the STI in the 
remuneration package (lower risk and higher distortion), and my personal experience as a board 
room consultant. The following two examples from the dataset also promote this approach.  
 
The first example relates to a Dutch company, referred to as XYZ1. As a result of the 
introduction of the Dutch Corporate Governance Code, increased disclosure is observed on 
remuneration, starting in 2004. With regard to the short-term incentive plan, page 11 of the 
annual report in that year states:  
 
                                                      
156 For an overview essay of the work of Kahneman for which he was awarded The Bank of Sweden Prize 
in Economic Science in Memory of Alfred Nobel in October 2002, refer to Rabin (2003).  
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‘In addition, there is short-term variable remuneration at a maximum of 50% of the fixed 
salary. Objective, measurable financial targets are agreed in advance for this variable 
remuneration. These targets are not made public, for commercial and competitive reasons’. 
 
Starting the following year (2005), the annual report provides a comment with regard to the 
earned bonus amount as reflected in table 3.4. 
 
Table 3.4: STI payout over the period 2005-2008 (CEO of XYZ1) 
Year  Payout as a % of 
basic salary 
Comments in the annual (remuneration) report of the 
company in the specific year 
2008 50% 
“In 2008 the CEO received the maximum results-linked 
remuneration in respect of 2007, amounting to 50% of the 
annual salary, having comfortably met the specified 
performance criteria.” 
2007 50% 
“In 2007 the CEO received the maximum results-linked 
remuneration in 2006, amounting to 50% of the annual 
salary, having comfortably met the specified performance 
criteria.” 
2006 50% 
“The CEO received results-linked remuneration in 2006 
amounting to 50% of annual salary as a result of having 
comfortably exceeded the specified performance criteria.” 
2005 50% 
“The CEO received a bonus of 50% of salary as a result of 
having comfortably exceeded the specified performance 
criteria.” 
Coefficient  of  variation: 0,00  
 
The coefficient of variation in the bonus payout is zero in these years. This raises the question 
of whether the performance variation also equals zero for these years. Table 3.5 provides an 
overview of a number of different ways to measure performance. 
 
Table 3.5: XYZ1 performance over the period 2005-2008 
This table shows the performance of XYZ1, measured in terms of net income growth (%), return on assets 







equity  Tobin's Q 
2008 10.13  5.98  15.10  1.01 
2007 -38.95  6.40  16.91  1.26 
2006 149.18  5.88  36.15  1.53 
2005 29.24  5.42  18.58  1.56 
        
Coefficient  of  variation:  2.14 0.07 0.45 0.19  
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The average payout variability is 0.71 ((2.14 + 0.07 + 0.45 + 0.19)/4). With a 1-year time lag, 
this figure would be 0.66. This is not in line with the zero variability of the STI payouts. Payout 
variation does not seem to follow performance variation for this company. 
Let’s look at a different example: The Dutch company XYZ2. With regard to the short-term 
incentive plan, page 63 of the annual report (2005) states:  
 
‘With effect from 2005 the bonus scheme has been linked solely to financial performance 
criteria, i.e. net income and return on assets (ROA). The maximum level of the bonus that can 
be earned has been fixed at 50% of base salary. The extent to which the set targets have been 
achieved is partly determined on the basis of the annual financial statements as verified by the 
external auditor’. 
 
Table 3.6: STI payout over the 2005-2008 period (CEO of XYZ2) 
Year  Payout as a % of 
basic salary 
Comments in the annual (remuneration) report of the 
company in the specific year 
2008 0% 
“The Remuneration Committee held four meetings in 
2008. Matters discussed by the committee included 
the fixed and variable pay components of the 
members of the Board of Executive Directors based 
on the remuneration policy for the Executive Board 
that was approved by the General Meeting of 
Shareholders in 2004. For the 2008 financial year, no 
variable pay has been granted.” 
2007 49% 
“The Remuneration Committee held two meetings in 
2007. Matters discussed by the committee included 
the fixed and variable pay components of the 
members of the Board of Executive Directors based 
on the remuneration policy for the Executive Board 
that was approved by the General Meeting of 
Shareholders in 2004.” 
2006 20% 
“The Remuneration Committee held one meeting in 
2006. Subjects discussed by the committee included 
the fixed and variable remuneration of the members of 
the Board of Executive Directors in accordance with 
the remuneration policy for the Executive Board that 
was approved by the General Meeting of Shareholders 
in 2004.” 
2005 39% 
“At the meeting in January 2005 the number of shares 
to be granted in conformity with the share plan was 
determined, the targets for 2005 were discussed and 
the variable pay for 2004 was established on the basis 
of the previously set targets." 
      




The coefficient of variation of the bonus payout in these years is 0.81 (or 81%). Table 3.7 
provides an overview of a number of different ways to measure performance. 
 
Table 3.7 performance XYZ2 over the period 2005-2008 
This table shows the performance of XYZ2, measured in terms of net income growth (%), return on assets 







equity  Tobin's Q 
2008  -97.45  0.85 0.30 0.85 
2007 40.24  3.22  11.32  1.15 
2006  -31.17  2.76 7.88 1.15 
2005 2.31  3.60  11.21  1.12 
      
Coefficient  of  variation:  2.71 0.47 0.67 0.14 
 
The average payout variability, as measured by the coefficient of variation, is 1 ((2.71 + 0.47 + 
0.67 +0.14)/4). With a 1-year time lag, this number would be 0.89. This is more in line with the 
STI variability than is the first example. 
 
The example shows that different performance measures exhibit different variability. In the first 
example the coefficient of variation of return on assets is most comparable to the payout 
variability of the STI. In the second example, this is the case for a different measure, i.e. return 
on equity. Thus, working with a specific performance measure as a proxy for STI payout 
variability is less valuable than working directly with the observed payout variability. 
 
More important, the example confirms that companies are not alike. Some companies strictly 
follow the pay-for-performance adage and other companies do not. This is tied to company-
specific factors, such as corporate culture. There will be low payout variation at companies that 
apply a budget approach as the way to set targets, where a modestly performance-driven 
corporate culture exists and where the CEO has power over the remuneration committee (there 
is discretionary room to smooth bonus payouts). At other companies, which, for example, use a 
year-on-year growth approach for setting targets, where a highly performance-driven culture 
exists and where the remuneration committee is strict in following targets, payout variation is 
expected to be higher (to follow performance variation). This supports the use of historical data 
to establish a company-specific proxy. Historical evidence can show whether companies are 
more likely to be situated in one category or another. After all, companies can claim they 
adopted the pay-for-performance principle, but do they actually ‘put their money where their 
mouth is’? In terms of the length of the historical period, we apply the four-year period as 
described in best practice provision II.1.1 of the Dutch Corporate Governance Code (2008)  
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regarding the term in office.
157 As a robustness check, the analyses will also be executed for a 
period of 3 and 5 years. 
 
To get an initial understanding of the level of compensation risk observed in the Dutch and UK 
sample, I have clustered the companies in four categories. The clusters are based on the criterion 
to minimise Z.  
 
 
                                                          [3.1]




  CRi = the compensation risk calculated for company-year observation ‘i’  
  CRc = the compensation risk calculated for company-year observation ‘c’      
      = cluster of which observation i is a part 
  i = 1, 2,…N (all observations) 
  M = the total number of observations in cluster  
   
  c = 1,…M  
   
 
Minimising Z, implies that for each observation ‘i’, we extract the average of the cluster (c 
equals the index of observations in the cluster of which observation i is a part (Ai) and M equals 
the total number of observations in that cluster). Clusters have no overlap. Based on moving 
boundaries (repeated 63,960 times), the optimal boundaries are obtained where Z is minimal.    
 
The boundaries show minor variations between historical periods of different lengths (3, 4 and 5 
years) as well as for the Dutch and UK samples. We use the exact figures for the regressions 
and provide a guide for intuitive use below (based on the 4-year historical period).  
 
Table 3.8 STI clusters 
This table shows the lower and upper boundaries of the four short-term incentive plan clusters, as well as 
the proportion of the sample that is categorised in cluster 1, 2, 3, and 4. For example, it shows that 36% of 
                                                      
157 ‘A management board member is appointed for a maximum period of four years. A member may be 




























the observations are part of cluster 1, with a CRI between 0 and 25. CRI stands for ‘Compensation Risk 
Index’.    
Cluster  CRI - Lower boundary  CRI - Upper boundary  Proportion of sample 
1 0  25  36% 
2 25  50  34% 
3 50  100  21% 
4 100  200  9% 
 
The clusters range from ‘income smoothing’ (cluster 1) to real pay-for-performance (cluster 4). 
There is no stationary state for all companies over the full research period.
158 This is only the 
case for thirty percent of the companies which remain in the same cluster over the entire 
research period. Because we are particularly interested in the predictive power for the upcoming 
one-year bonus cycle, we have also made a dynamic calculation. From one year to the next, 
companies stay in the same cluster or move to the adjacent cluster in 95.4% of the cases 
(58.7%-points in the same cluster and 36.7%-points to the next cluster up or down). Part of this 
serial correlation can be attributed to the fact that there is overlap in the used historical period. If 
a period of 4 years is taken to predict the variability at the beginning of 2009, the years 2008, 
2007, 2006 and 2005 are used. For the beginning of 2008 the years 2007, 2006, 2005 and 2004 
are used.  
 
If a calculation is made without overlap, e.g. for the start of period 2009 (2008, 2007, 2006, 
2005) and 2005 (2004, 2003, 2002, 2001), this figure equals 63.8%. I consider the first 
mentioned figure of 95.4% of higher relevance, given the fact that serial correlation is stronger 
if the difference in the time period is shorter. An analogy can be made with the weather. 
Particularly in the Netherlands, one cannot speak of a stationary state of the weather (different 
weather is observed during different periods of the year). However, if one needs to predict 
tomorrow’s weather based on historical data, it is best predicted by today’s weather. This logic 
of serial correlation is applied to payout variability; i.e. the best estimate for the upcoming year 
is based on the previous period. This period should be long enough to provide a robust figure. 
However, if it is too long it loses its autocorrelation (e.g. due to CEO turnover, change in 
members of the remuneration/selection committee, change in remuneration structure, change in 
company strategy, etc.).  
 
                                                      
158 We thank prof. Kleijnen for the insight that it is impossible to know upfront when the stationary state 
will occur. The solution is to make time graphs and make a prediction based on these graphs.   
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The historical variation in the preceding 4 years is taken as a proxy for the upcoming bonus 
cycle. If the historical period is ‘polluted’ by a CEO change, the cluster in which the company is 
situated is used by taking the average value of the cluster as a proxy of the CompRiskSTI.  
 
3.2.2.2 Long-term incentive 
For the long-term incentive, the ex-ante compensation contract can typically be used to establish 
the CompRisk index, given the fact that contract details are often disclosed. A valuation 
methodology in line with IFRS 2 on share-based payment will be applied.
159 I will distinguish 
between the payout vehicle (cash, shares or options) and the performance measure. If the payout 
occurs in cash, there is no variation related to the vehicle. The payout variability fully depends 
on the performance measure. If the payout vehicle is in shares, the stock price is simulated at the 





















0                                               [3.2b] 
Where: t is the time period (based on the simulation period equal to the period in which the 
executive is exposed to the risk of share price movements), S0 is the share price at t=0; St is the 
share price at time period t. Furthermore:  
µ = ln(1+r-δ) in which r is risk free rate (based on the zero coupon government bond with 
remaining maturity equal to the relevant simulation period), δ is dividend yield (predicted based 
on a short historical period of 1 year and a longer period taking the average of 1, 3, 5 and 10 
years), ln = natural logarithm; 


















Var in which Var is the variance. The historical period used to predict future 
variance in the share price is a short historical period of 1 year (‘alternative A’) and, as an 
alternative, a longer period is used taking the average of 1, 3, 5 and 10 years (‘alternative B’).
 161 
 
                                                      
159 In February 2004, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issued the International 
Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 2 Share-based Payment. The effective date for applying the standard 
was 1 January 2005 for grants made after 7 November 2002 and not yet vested as of the effective date. 
The valuation rules used in practice and signed off on by the external auditor are applied in this chapter. 
These fair values provide the window frame through which stakeholders view share-based payments 
(including the CEO and the remuneration committee) and on which decisions are based.  
160 Refer to Stentoft (2004), among others.  
161 This is a robust form of estimation suggested by prof. dr. Kleijnen.  
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If not shares but options are used as a payout vehicle, we apply a two-staged approach. Until the 
vesting date, we simulate the share price as set out above (explicit ‘at risk’ period). After this 
period the executive is still exposed to share-price fluctuations as long as the options are not 
exercised (implicit ‘at risk’ period). To account for early exercise, the moment of exercise is 
estimated by taking the midpoint of the period between the end of the vesting period and the end 
of the contractual life. Over this period we will use the Black-Scholes formula (1973) as 
reflected in equation 3.3. In our research for the Corporate Governance Monitoring Committee 
(2007), we showed that this method correlates to a coefficient of 0.99 with the alternative 




-δT N(d1) – Pe
-rT N(d2)                                                    [3.3] 
 
where C is the Black-Scholes value of a European call option as modified to account for 
dividends by Merton (1973);  S is the price of the underlying stock at the valuation date; δ is the 
expected annual dividend rate over the life of the option; t is the time to maturity of the option 
in years; N is the cumulative probability function for normal distribution; P is the exercise price 
of the option; r is the annual risk free interest rate; d1 = [ln(S/P) + (r – δ + σ²/2)T]/σT
1/2; σ is the 
expected annual stock return volatility over the life of the option and d2 = d1 – σT
1/2. 
 
Because simulations are based on 10,000 iterations, it is necessary also to construct 10,000 
Black-Scholes values for a single grant. The split between the explicit and implicit at-risk period 
is particularly relevant if the vesting of the options is linked to a performance condition (instead 
of only an employment condition). The performance measure determines whether there is a 
second period or not and how many options are earned. Table 3.9 summarises the way 
performance measures have been taken into account. 
 
Table 3.9 Simulation of performance measures 
This table shows the equations that are used for the simulation of performance measures. Equation 3.2, 
which is also used for the simulation of share based vehicles, is used for the simulation of share price 
related measures: St is the share price at future time period ‘t’. Equation 3.4 shows the simulation of 
growth measures, based on the normal distribution. Average annual growth of earnings per share (EPS) is 
the most often observed measure in this category, and therefore taken as an example. Equation 3.5 shows 
the simulation of return measures, such as return on assets and return on equity, based on a normal 
                                                      
162 Also refer to van der Laan (2009), page 96. The approach is furthermore in line with IFRS2 which 
requires a flexible model that can take into account factors that have a fair-value impact. Monte Carlo 
simulation is used for the explicit at-risk period. The period after vesting is relatively short (taking early 
exercise into account). IFRS 2 states under B5: In these instances, the Black-Scholes-Merton formula 
may produce a value that is substantially the same as a more flexible option-pricing model.   
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distribution. Equation 3.6 shows the simulation of absolute measures, such as revenue objectives, based 
on a log-normal distribution. Equation 3.7 shows the simulation of other measures, such as personal 
targets, which are simulated based on the uniform distribution. For all equations, the average is reflected 
by ‘µ’ and the standard deviation by ‘σ’. All simulations are based on the sample average and standard 
deviation.  
Equation #  Distribution  µ  σ 
[3.2] 
Share price  t S  
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Again, the objective is to execute robust calculations. Therefore, a short- and longer-time period 
will be used to predict the average and standard deviations for the simulations. Share price data 
is available for each trading day. To avoid serial correlation, weekly data is used. The short time 
period equals 1 year (‘alternative A’) and the long period the average of 1, 3, 5 and 10 years 
(‘alternative B’). For internal measures, accounting data is used. These are only available once 
per year. In order to have a meaningful number of input factors a 4-year period is used for the 
short term scenario, alternative A (in line with best practice provision II.1.1 of the Dutch 
Corporate Governance Code regarding the term in office). The longer-term scenario, alternative 
B, is in line with the period used for share price-related conditions, i.e. based on the average of 




The correlation between the underlying vehicle and the performance measure is taken into 
account at the level of the underlying normal distribution (i.e. ln(St/St-1) for share prices; 
EPSt/EPSt-1 for EPS; Rt for return and ln(ABSt/ABSt-1) for absolute measures). Accounting data 
are available on a yearly basis. Therefore, share prices are matched on a yearly basis. In order to 
establish robust yearly share prices, the average share price is taken around the end of the year. 
St = average share price over the period of 2 weeks at the end of year t and 2 weeks at the start 
of year t+1. St-1 = average share price over the period of 2 weeks at the end of year t-1 and 2 
weeks at the start of year t. 
 
From data collection to calculation of the CompRiskLTI index – step by step 
Below, as an illustrative example, I will show the work flow from collection of the data, to 
establishing the CompRiskLTI index in 5 steps: 
 
1) Collection of plan details: The long-term incentive information is obtained through annual 
report research. The needed information is the vehicle (cash, shares or options), the performance 
measure, the vesting period, the vesting schedule, and in case of relative measurement the 
comparator companies. I will assume a ‘company A’ with a share plan which vests after 3 years 
based on the achievement of total shareholder return relative to a group of 9 industry peers 
(company B until J). There will be no vesting of shares if company A reaches the last position in 
the peer group. If the first position is achieved 200% of the conditionally granted shares will 
vest.    
 
Table 3.10: Vesting schedule of company A 












2) Calculation of vehicle parameters as input for the simulation: The payment vehicle is a 
share. Therefore, I will follow equation 3.2 to simulate future share price paths. The share at t= 
0 is the starting point; S0 = 10. As input for the simulation the risk free rate (r) is established, 
based on same currency zero coupon government bonds, with an equal maturity until the vesting 
period, i.e. 3 years. For this example, I will assume r = 4%. Volatility (σ) and dividend yield (δ)  
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of the company are calculated based on historical share data. As aforementioned, for the sake of 
robustness, I will run every simulation twice, based on two different historical periods to 
determine input data; a) the 1 year preceding the grant; b) an average of input data calculated for 
the 1, 3, 5 and 10 year period preceding the grant. In this example, I will only focus on the first 
alternative. The period of 1 year is used to establish the paid out dividend as a percentage of the 
underlying share price. For this example, I will assume a company with no dividend yield; δ = 
0%. Based on weekly share price data the volatility is established, which is the standard 
deviation of the return provided by the stock in one year when the return is expressed using 
continuous compounding; σ = 30%. 
 
3) Calculation of performance measure parameters as input for the simulation: The measure of 
performance is total shareholder return, relative to a group of industry peers. Therefore, also for 
the simulation of the performance condition, I rely on equation 3.2. For this purpose the 
dividend yield is calculated (assume here 0%), share price volatility (assume a range between 
10% and 100%) for each of the 9 other companies (B to J), as well as the correlation 
coefficients between the companies. In the simulation program @Risk, the correlation 
coefficients are linked to equation 3.2, through a correlation matrix.
163 I will assume here a 
correlation of 0.75 between the companies A till J. The reported correlations from the @Risk 
program after simulation are reflected in figure 3.3. 
                                                      
163 This footnote provides information on the procedure that @Risk follows in correlating output. It is 
based on the rank order correlation coefficient as developed by C. Spearman in the early 1900's. It is 
calculated using rankings of values, not actual values themselves (as is the linear correlation coefficient). 
A value's "rank" is determined by its position within the min-max range of possible values for the 
variable. @RISK generates rank-correlated pairs of sampled values in a two-step process: (i) A set of 
randomly distributed "rank scores" is generated for each variable. If 100 iterations are to be run, for 
example, 100 scores are generated for each variable. Rank scores are simply values of varying magnitude 
between a minimum and maximum. @RISK uses van der Waerden scores based on the inverse function 
of the normal distribution. These rank scores are then rearranged to give pairs of scores which generate 
the desired rank correlation coefficient. For each iteration there is a pair of scores, with one score for each 
variable.  (ii) A set of random numbers (between 0 and 1) to be used in sampling is generated for each 
variable. Again, if 100 iterations are to be run, 100 random numbers are generated for each variable. 
These random numbers are then ranked smallest to largest. For each variable, the smallest random 
number is then used in the iteration with the smallest rank score, the second smallest random number is 
used in the iteration with the second smallest rank score, and so on. This ordering based on ranking 
continues for all random numbers, up to the point where the largest random number is used in the 
iteration with the largest rank score. In @RISK, this process of rearranging random numbers happens 
prior to simulation. It results in a set of paired random numbers that can be used in sampling values from 
the correlated distributions during an iteration of the simulation. This method of correlation is known as a 
"distribution-free" approach because any distribution types may be correlated. Although the samples 
drawn for the two distributions are correlated, the integrity of the original distributions is maintained. The 
resulting samples for each distribution reflect the distribution function from which they were drawn.  
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Figure 3.3: Reported correlation coefficients by @Risk (screen print) 
The screen print below shows the correlation coefficients as reported by the simulation program @Risk, 
between company A and the other companies. The output values are close to the input value of 0.75 for 
each company. Minor differences are based on the Monte Carlo sampling technique and the way 




4) Simulation: the simulation creates 10,000 states of the world for Company A, as well as its 
peers B to J. An example of summary statistics for Company A is shown in figure 3.4.    
 
Figure 3.4: Reported summary statistics by @Risk (screen print) 
The screen print below shows summary statistics as reported by the simulation program @Risk.  
Summary Statistics 
Statistic  Value  %tile  Value 
Minimum 1,634059191  5%  4,277481556 
Maximum  64,84980774 10% 5,086484432 
Mean  11,31262402 15% 5,801242828 
Std Dev  6,255058473  20%  6,441934109 
Variance 39,1257565 25%  7,039144039 
Skewness 1,785468178 30%  7,56442976 
Kurtosis 8,483121783 35% 8,12199688 
Median  9,845453262 40% 8,661812782 
Mode  8,294364929 45% 9,218281746 
Left  X  4,277481556 50% 9,845453262 
Left P  5%  55%  10,54853821 
Right  X  23,03297424 60% 11,26042175 
Right P  95%  65%  12,07635307 
Diff  X  18,75549269 70% 13,04786968 
Diff P  90%  75%  14,04928303 
#Errors 0  80%  15,28295898 
Filter Min    85%  16,75198174 
Filter 
Max   90%  19,08836937 




5) Calculation of CompRisk: For each state of the world, the relevant payment is calculated by 
combining the value of the underlying vehicle (step 3) with the associated vesting result (table 
3.10) based on the performance simulation (step 4). Discounting all the payments to t = 0 and 
calculating the mean and standard deviation, results in an average value of 12.90 per 
performance share and a standard deviation of the value of 8.32. The CompRisk index is 
therefore (8.32/12.90) * 100 = 64.50.    
 
3.2.3 Total Direct Compensation (TDC)  
The CompRisk index at the total direct compensation level reflects the total risk stemming from 
the combination of fixed compensation (basic salary) and variable compensation (short-term 
and long-term incentives). 
 
Assume: 
  B = basic salary (security) 
  S = short-term variable pay 
  L = long-term variable pay 
  TDC = Total Direct Compensation = B + S + L 
 
             
    
    
  100 
                                                             [3.8a] 
Where: 
  σ = standard deviation 
  µ = average 
 
I will first break down the nominator (for now based on the square of the standard deviation, i.e. 
the variance): 
) ] ( [ () ( ) ( )( ) [ ] SL L S L S L S TDC TDC L S L S E TDC E σ σ σ μ μ μ μ μ σ 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 + + = − − + − + − = − =  
To simplify the interpretation, the covariance is rewritten in terms of the correlation coefficient 
between S and L. The average value of TDC is shown as well: 
 
L S SL L S TDC σ σ ρ σ σ σ 2
2 2 2 + + =                                




Where: ρ = correlation coefficient between S (short-term incentive) and L (long-term incentive 
payout).  
 
Besides equation 3.8a, the CompRisk index therefore also depends on equation 3.8b:   
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As a final alternative, I rewrite the index in terms of the STI and LTI only, where security is 
taken into account to establish the weights within the total direct compensation package.  
 
              
   
2     
2  2         
          
  100 
=   
  




    
2
 2     
  
   
  
   *100 
=    
       
     
2
  
       
     
2
 2     
       
   
       
     
=           
2
           
2
 2                    
                    [3.8c]
                          
Where: wS and wL equal the weight of the STI and the LTI respectively, in the total direct 
compensation package (i.e. the sum of base salary, target STI and fair value of the LTI). The CR 
equation shows that variable pay components can theoretically be used as a hedge within the 
compensation package. A negative payout correlation between S and L reduces the overall 
variability of the package and consequently the CR index. Furthermore, as base salary is a 
constant factor, it reduces the variability when the ratio of fixed versus variable pay is higher. 
We test the equations 3.8a to 3.8c in a simplified example. Table 3.11 transforms the lottery 
example of table 3.2 into a TDC example.  
 
Table 3.11 CompRisk calculation based on a simplified simulation  
Remuneration figures in 1,000. Applying the 3 different TDC CompRisk equations [3.8a, b, c] for the 
base case, results in the same answer of 57:  
i) Equation 3.8a: (678/1200)*100 = 57;  
ii) Equation 3.8b (correlation coefficient is determined based on the reflected values for the base case and 




2*(400/1200)*(400/1200)*0.91287*61*112)) = 57  
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Base case  B STI  LTI TDC    Alternative 1  B STI  LTI  TDC 
1  400  800 1200  2400    1  800  400 600 1800 
2  400  700 1000  2100    2  800  350 500 1650 
3  400  600 800  1800    3  800  300 400 1500 
4  400  500 600  1500    4  800  250 300 1350 
5  400  400 400  1200    5  800  200 200 1200 
6  400  400 0 800    6  800  200 0 1000 
7  400  300 0 700    7  800  150 0  950 
8  400  200 0 600    8  800  100 0  900 
9  400  100 0 500    9  800  50 0 850 
10  400  0 0  400   10  800  0 0  800 
µ 400  400  400  1200   µ 800  200  200  1200 
σ²  0  60000  200000 460000   σ² 0  15000  50000  115000 
σ  0  245 447 678    σ 0  122  224  339 
CompRisk 0  61  112  57   CompRisk 0 61  112  28 
                 
Alternative 2  B STI  LTI TDC    Alternative 3  B STI  LTI  TDC 
1  400  1600  2000    1  400   2400  2800 
2  400  1400  1800    2  400   2000  2400 
3  400  1200  1600    3  400   1600  2000 
4  400  1000  1400    4  400   1200  1600 
5  400  800   1200    5  400   800  1200 
6  400  800   1200    6  400   0  400 
7  400  600   1000    7  400   0  400 
8  400  400  800    8  400   0  400 
9  400  200  600    9  400   0  400 
10  400  0     400    10  400     0  400 
µ 400  800    1200   µ 400    800  1200 
σ² 0  240000    240000    σ² 0    800000  800000 
σ 0  490    490    σ 0    894  894 
CompRisk  0  61    41    CompRisk  0      112  75 
 
Table 3.11 shows that in the base case, the CEO earns a base salary of 400,000 and an equal 
expected short-term incentive (STI) and long-term incentive (LTI) payout. Total direct 
compensation (TDC) equals 1.2 million. This is an equal situation for the base case and the 3 
presented alternatives. The LTI is more at risk than the STI; CR of 112 versus 61 respectively. 
The TDC CompRisk equals 57. Alternative 1 shows that if base salary were twice as high and 
variable compensation twice as low this would not change the CR of the STI and LTI, but 
would lower the TDC CompRisk from 57 to 28. Alternative 2 and 3 show the outcome for the 
case of no LTI and no STI, respectively. CompRisk of TDC equals 41 and 75, respectively. In 
alternative 3, the CEO is exposed to the greatest risk but also has the opportunity to earn 2.8 
mln. In the remainder of this chapter, I will use equation 3.8c to determine the CompRisk of 
TDC, and as a starting point the standard assumption of zero correlation between STI and LTI.  
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3.3. Descriptive statistics – level of risk in compensation contracts (NL and UK) 
In order to determine the compensation risk of real life contracts, a dataset was developed based 
on Dutch and UK companies. The time period equals 2001-2008. Because extensive contract 
information is needed, I have focused on the largest listed companies in each of these 
jurisdictions. Large listed companies are more transparent about their pay practices than smaller 
and/or non-listed companies. The FTSE 100 index in the UK, and the AEX (large cap), AMX 
(mid cap) and AscX (small cap) indices in the Netherlands are used. The criterion for inclusion 
in the dataset was that the company is listed in 2008 as well as in the prior four-year period. 
This results in a group of 161 companies. Of these companies, 4 have a dual listing (i.e. listed 
both in the Netherlands as well as the UK); of the remaining companies 62 have a Dutch listing 
and 95 a UK listing. The total number of firm-years equals 1,216. Table 3.12 provides an 
overview of the companies in the sample per year, table 3.13 the observations per industry,
164 
and table 3.14 an overview of the scope figures.  
 
Table 3.12: Number of companies per year 











Table 3.13: Number of observations per industry 
Industry number  Industry name  Number of obs.  Number of obs (%) 
0001  Oil & gas   53  4% 
1000  Basic materials  78  6% 
2000  Industrials 265  22% 
3000  Consumer goods  141  12% 
4000  Health care  46  4% 
5000  Consumer services  191  16% 
6000  Telecommunications 32  3% 
7000  Utilities 39  3% 
8000  Financials 291  24% 
9000  Technology 80  7% 
   1216  100% 
                                                      
164 Industries based on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB), offered by FTSE and Dow Jones.   
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Table 3.14: Scope figures  
This table shows the scope figures of the companies in the data sample. ‘N’ refers to the number of 
observations in the UK, NL and total sample. Because 4 companies (Logica, Reed Elsevier, Royal Dutch, 
Unilever) have both a Dutch and a UK listing, the number of observations  in the total sample equals 
1,216 instead of 1,247 (768+479).  
Sample  Statistics  Revenue (€ mln)  Total assets (€ mln)  Market 
capitalisation (€ mln)  Employees 
25th percentile  1,483 2,839  2,462  5,603 
50th percentile  4,671 9,177  5,611  21,600 
75th percentile  14,375 30,529  14,563  54,393 
UK 
N 768  768  768  768 
25th percentile  312 491  286  1,772 
50th percentile  1,270 1,434  857  5,640 
75th percentile  4,023 6,728  3,833  21,662 
NL 
N 479  479  479  479 
25th percentile  797 1258  1,020  2,938 
50th percentile  2,948 4,476  3,329  10,864 
75th percentile  11,090 18,643  10,357  39,437  Total sample 
N  1,216 1,216  1,216  1,216 
          
The UK companies differ from the Dutch companies, e.g. in terms of size (the UK companies 
are larger), board structure (UK companies have a one-tier board and Dutch companies typically 
have a two-tier board), etc. In the regressions this is taken into account by incorporating 
variables to control for size, governance, and other relevant factors. 
 
In the following subsections, the results of the CompRisk index calculations are provided for the 
companies in the dataset. A distinction is made between the short-term incentive (STI), the 
long-term incentive (LTI) and total direct compensation (TDC). 
 
3.3.1 Short-term incentive 
For the short-term incentive, I have calculated the CompRisk index based on 3, 4 and 5 year 
historical data, in line with the calculation methodology as described in section 3.2. Within the 
research period (2001-2008), there are fewer results if the historical period used to calculate the 
CRI is longer. Refer to table 3.15 and graph 3.1 for an overview of the calculation results.  
 
Table 3.15: Total sample table CompRisk index STI for 3, 4 and 5 year historical period 
This table shows the CompRisk index for the short-term incentive plan. The index is calculated based on 
3, 4, and 5 year data (CR STI3, CR STI4, CR STI5 respectively) as described in section 3.2.2.1. As an  
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example: ‘CR STI 3’ stands for the CompRisk calculated for the short-term incentive remuneration 
element, based on 3 year historical data. 
Statistics  CR STI 3  CR STI 4  CR STI 5 
25th percentile  12  18  24 
50th percentile  33  35  38 
Mean 45  46  48 
75th percentile  65  67  63 
      
N 735  575  414 
 
Graph 3.1: Total sample graph CompRisk index STI for 3, 4 and 5 year historical period 
This graph shows vertical box plots of the CompRisk index for the short-term incentive (STI) 
remuneration element, based on 3, 4, and 5 year historical data. In this vertical box plot, the y-axis is 
numerical (here: CompRisk figures), and the x-axis is categorical (here: the selected time period of 3, 4 
and 5 year history). Reading of the graph box is facilitated by the explanation below. The upper and lower 
adjacent values are calculated based on Tukey (1977), at 1.5 times the interquartile range. Values outside 
this cluster, are labelled ‘outside values’ and plotted separately. For a guide on content see table 3.15.   
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The average compensation risk based on a 4-year historical period equals 46. The typical range 
(25
th to 75
th percentile) is between 18 and 67. The differences between the UK and the 




Table 3.16: NL versus UK comparison of CompRisk index figures STI 
This table shows a comparison of the NL and UK CompRisk index for the short-term incentive plan.
165 
The index is calculated based on 3, 4, and 5 year data, as described in section 3.2.2.1. As an example: ‘CR 
STI 3’ stands for the CompRisk calculated for the short-term incentive remuneration element, based on 3 
year historical data. 
Statistics  CR STI 3     CR STI 4     CR STI 5 
 NL  UK    NL  UK    NL  UK 
25th percentile  13  12    18  18    31  23 
50th percentile  37  31    37  34    42  37 
Mean 46  45    46  47    50  47 
75th percentile  86  65     69  67     65  57 
            
N  273  482     208  383     142  284 
 
The comparison in table 3.16 shows that differences between the UK and NL are minor 
(especially for the 4-year calculation and somewhat more pronounced for the 3- and 5-year 
calculation). If this is the case, disparities in compensation risk are reflective of industry, 
company or individual differences and not related to the specific country. In terms of outliers we 
observe some differences as reflected in graph 3.2. 
 
Graph 3.2: NL versus UK comparison CompRisk STI  
This graph shows vertical box plots, for the Dutch (NL) and UK sample, of the CompRisk index for the 
short-term incentive (STI). For a guide on content see table 3.16. See graph 3.1 for a guide on how to read 

















                                                      
165 The N (count of observations) of NL and UK does not equal the total count given the fact that Logica 
CMG, Reed Elsevier, Royal Dutch Shell and Unilever are part of both data cuts but only once part of the 
total data sample.     
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3.3.2 Long-term incentive  
For the long-term incentive, the CompRisk index is calculated based on the relevant contract 
details for the specific grant. As input for the valuation, I rely on 1-year historical data 
(alternative A). As a robustness check, I have also run the valuations by taking into account a 
longer historical period that is weighted towards the present by taking the average of 1, 3, 5 and 
10 years (alternative B). In line with the calculation methodology as described in section 3.2, 
descriptive statistics are presented for the simulation outcomes for the research period (2001-
2008). Whether or not the CEO is exposed to risk stemming from the LTI starts with the 
question of whether or not the CEO receives an LTI grant. The prevalence of these grants is 
reflected in table 3.17.    
 
Table 3.17: Prevalence of LTI grant in the research period (based on firm-years) 
This table shows, for the total sample, in how many firm-years there was an LTI grant for the CEO. The 
table also shows a comparison between the Dutch and UK sample. 
   Total sample     NL     UK 
 #  %    #  %    #  % 
LTI   1034  85    356  74    709  92 
No LTI   182  15     123  26     59  8 
                
N  1216     479     768 
 
In the total sample, in 85% of the firm-years an LTI grant was made to the CEO. In the 
remainder of this section, I will focus on these 1,034 LTI observations. LTI grants are more 
prevalent in the UK than in the Netherlands (92% versus 74% of firm-years). For the country 
samples, I focus on the 356 Dutch LTI observations and 709 UK observations.
166 CompRisk 
index figures for the LTI component are presented in table 3.18 and graph 3.3 for the total 
sample and in table 3.19 and graph 3.4 for the country samples.   
 
Table 3.18: Total sample of CompRisk index LTI for alternative A and B 
This table shows the CompRisk index for the long-term incentive (LTI) plan. The CompRisk index is 
calculated based on the contractual LTI in place in the research year. Determining the expected payout 
and variation around the average is based on simulation. Input for the simulation, such as company 
volatility, is based on two alternative historical periods, as described in section 3.2.2.2. The shorter time 
period is referred to as ‘A’ and the longer time period is referred to as ‘B’. Example: ‘CR LTI A’ stands 
for the CompRisk, calculated for the long-term incentive, based on historical data under alternative A. 
                                                      
166 As mentioned above, Logica CMG, Reed Elsevier, Royal Dutch and Unilever are counted once for the 
full sample. However, in the separate samples, these companies are used in both subsamples. This implies 
that the sum of the UK and NL observations overstates the number of observations in the total sample (by 
31 observations).   
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Statistics  CR LTI A  CR LTI B 
25th percentile  80  93 
50th percentile  118  128 
Mean 135  140 
75th percentile  162  173 
    
N 1034  1034 
 
Graph 3.3: Sample box plot of CompRisk index LTI for alternative A and B 
This graph shows vertical box plots, for the Dutch (NL) and UK sample of the long-term incentive (LTI). 






















The average compensation risk based on alternative A equals 135. The typical range is between 
80 and 162. This implies that LTIs are by nature riskier than STIs. The differences between the 
Netherlands and the UK are reflected in table 3.19 and graph 3.4.  
 
Table 3.19: NL versus UK comparison of CompRisk index figures LTI 
This table shows a comparison of the NL and UK CompRisk index for the long-term incentive plan. The 
CompRisk index is calculated based on the contractual LTI in place in the research year. Determining the 
expected payout and variation around the average is based on simulation. Input for the simulation, such as 
company volatility, is based on two alternative historical periods, as described in section 3.2.2.2. The 
shorter time period is referred to as ‘A’ and the longer time period is referred to as ‘B’. As an example: 
‘CR LTI A’ stands for the CompRisk, calculated for the long-term incentive remuneration element, based 
on historical input data under alternative A.  
Statistics  CR LTI A    CR LTI B 
 NL  UK    NL  UK 
25th percentile  90  75    104  85 
50th percentile  133  111    143  122  
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Statistics  CR LTI A    CR LTI B 
 NL  UK    NL  UK 
Mean 149  126    153  133 
75th percentile  177  154    189  159 
          
N 356  709    356  709 
 
Graph 3.4: NL versus UK comparison of CompRisk LTI 
This graph shows vertical box plots, for the Dutch (NL) and UK sample of the CompRisk index for the 
long-term incentive (LTI). See table 3.19 for a guide on the content. See graph 3.1 for a guide on how to 
























Differences are observed between the Netherlands and the UK. Long-term incentives in the 
Netherlands are riskier than in the UK, given the higher CompRiskLTI figures.  
3.3.3 Total Direct Compensation 
At the total direct compensation level variable pay (STI and LTI) is combined with fixed 
compensation, in order to establish the total risk associated with the direct compensation 
elements. Table 3.20 provides an overview of the sample. We present the results of 6 analyses. 
The first 3 reflect alternative A for the long-term incentive and for the STI 3-, 4- and 5-year 
historical data. The second three results reflect alternative B for the LTI and the same scenarios 
for the STI as described under A. It is assumed that there is no correlation between the STI and 
LTI payouts. This assumption is based on the different timing of payouts (STI after 1 year and 
LTI typically after 3 years) and the different ways that STI and LTI performance is measured 
(accounting versus market-based performance). It is furthermore in line with academic studies 
that have found no or little direct correlation between cash bonus payouts and share price 
movements. For the sake of completeness, we also show the extreme scenarios of absolute 
positive and negative correlation in appendix 3.2 (ρ = 1 and -1 respectively).  
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Table 3.20: Total sample table of CompRisk index TDC (ρ = 0) 
This table shows the CompRisk index for total direct compensation (TDC). TDC is the sum of basic 
salary, the expected value of the short-term incentive (STI) plan and the expected value of the long-term 
incentive (LTI) plan. In terms of the STI, the index is calculated based on 3, 4, and 5 year data, as 
described in section 3.2.2.1. In terms of the LTI, the CompRisk index is calculated based on the 
contractual LTI in place in the research year. Determining the expected payout and variation around the 
average is based on simulation. Input for the simulation, such as company volatility, is based on two 
alternative historical periods, as described in section 3.2.2.2. The shorter time period is referred to as ‘A’ 
and the longer time period is referred to as ‘B’. As an example: ‘CR TDC 3 A’ stands for the CompRisk, 
calculated for total direct compensation, based on 3 year historical data for the STI and based on 
historical input data under alternative A for the LTI. The assumed correlation coefficient (ρ) between the 
STI and the LTI equals zero. 
Statistics  CR TDC 3 A  CR TDC 4 A  CR TDC 5 A     CR TDC 3 B  CR TDC 4 B  CR TDC 5 B 
           
25th  percentile  21 22 24    24 26 27 
50th  percentile  32 33 34    38 39 39 
Mean  37 37 38    42 42 43 
75th  percentile  49 48 49      56 55 55 
           
N  735 575 414      735 575 414 
 
 
Graph 3.5 Sample box plot of CompRisk index TDC (ρ = 0) 
This graph shows the CompRisk index for total direct compensation (TDC). See table 3.20 for a guide on 

















The results are quite similar, especially within alternative A and B (LTI). The amount of fixed 
compensation together with the weight and structure of the LTI are dominant factors in the 
compensation risk of the total package. Since this is the case, the analysis is extended to include  
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the uniform distribution for the STI. This provides an overview of the total sample of 1,216 
firm-year observations. 
 
Table 3.21: Total sample table of CompRisk index TDC (STI = uniform, ρ = 0) 
This table shows the CompRisk index for total direct compensation (TDC). TDC is the sum of basic 
salary, the expected value of the short-term incentive (STI) plan and the expected value of the long-term 
incentive (LTI) plan. In terms of the STI, the index is calculated based on the uniform distribution. In 
terms of the LTI, the CompRisk index is calculated based on the contractual LTI in place in the research 
year. Determining the expected payout and variation around the average is based on simulation. Input for 
the simulation, such as company volatility, is based on two alternative historical periods, as described in 
section 3.2.2.2. The shorter time period is referred to as ‘A’ and the longer time period is referred to as 
‘B’. As an example: ‘CR TDC U A’ stands for the CompRisk, calculated for total direct compensation, 
based on the uniform distribution for the STI and based on historical input data under alternative A for the 
LTI. The assumed correlation coefficient (ρ) between the STI and the LTI equals zero. 
Statistics  CR TDC U A     CR TDC U B 
25th percentile  22    23 
50th percentile  33    36 
Mean 42    43 
75th percentile  49     55 
      
N 1,216      1,216 
 
Graph 3.6: Total sample graph of CompRisk index TDC (STI = uniform, ρ = 0) 
This graph shows the CompRisk index for total direct compensation (TDC). See table 3.21 for a guide on 



















For the CompRiskTDC index based on a uniformly distributed STI, a similar pattern is observed 
as in the analyses for 3, 4 and 5 years, but it is also established that the full dataset is tainted by  
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a few outliers. These outliers have to be dealt with, in the regression analyses of sections 4.4 
and 4.5.  
 
Table 3.22: NL versus UK comparison of CompRisk index figures TDC (ρ = 0) 
This table shows a comparison for the NL and UK sample of the CompRisk index for total direct 
compensation (TDC). TDC is the sum of basic salary, the expected value of the short-term incentive 
(STI) plan and the expected value of the long-term incentive (LTI) plan. In terms of the STI, the index is 
calculated based on 3, 4, and 5 year data, as described in section 3.2.2.1. In terms of the LTI, the 
CompRisk index is calculated based on the contractual LTI in place in the research year. Determining the 
expected payout and variation around the average is based on simulation. Input for the simulation, such as 
company volatility, is based on two alternative historical periods, as described in section 3.2.2.2. The 
shorter time period is referred to as ‘A’ and the longer time period is referred to as ‘B’. As an example: 
‘CR TDC 3 A’ stands for the CompRisk, calculated for total direct compensation, based on 3 year 
historical data for the STI and based on historical input data under alternative A for the LTI. The assumed 
correlation coefficient (ρ) between the STI and the LTI equals zero. 
Statistics  CRTDC3A CRTDC4A CRTDC5A      CRTDC3B CRTDC4B CRTDC5B 
  NL UK NL UK NL UK    NL UK NL UK NL UK 
25th  percentile  14 26 16 27 18 28    15 30 17 31 19 31 
50th  percentile  26 36 27 36 29 37    30 42 31 42 32 41 
Mean  30 41 31 40 33 41    34 47 35 46 36 46 
75th  percentile  40 53 40 51 43 51      50 59 51 57 53 56 
               
N  273 482 208 383 142 284      273 482 208 383 142 284 
 
Graph 3.7: NL versus UK comparison of CompRisk TDC (ρ = 0) 
This graph shows vertical box plots, for the Dutch (NL) and UK sample of the CompRisk index for total 
direct compensation (TDC). See table 3.22 for a guide on the content. See graph 3.1 for a guide on how to 





















The analysis is extended to include the uniform distribution for the STI. This gives an overview 
of the total sample of firm-year observations. 
 
Table 3.23: NL versus UK comparison table of CompRisk index TDC (STI=uniform, ρ=0) 
This table shows a comparison for the NL and UK sample of the CompRisk index for total direct 
compensation (TDC). TDC is the sum of basic salary, the expected value of the short-term incentive 
(STI) plan and the expected value of the long-term incentive (LTI) plan. In terms of the STI, the index is 
calculated based on the uniform distribution. In terms of the LTI, the CompRisk index is calculated based 
on the contractual LTI in place in the research year. Determining the expected payout and variation 
around the average is based on simulation. Input for the simulation, such as company volatility, is based 
on two alternative historical periods, as described in section 3.2.2.2. The shorter time period is referred to 
as ‘A’ and the longer time period is referred to as ‘B’. As an example: ‘CR TDC U A’ stands for the 
CompRisk, calculated for total direct compensation, based on the uniform distribution for the STI and 
based on historical input data under alternative A for the LTI. The assumed correlation coefficient (ρ) 
between the STI and the LTI equals zero. 
Statistics  CR TDC U A     CR TDC U B 
  NL UK    NL UK 
25th  percentile  16 27    17 30 
50th  percentile  25 38    27 42 
Mean  34 47    35 50 
75th  percentile  39 55    44 60 
         
N 479  768      479  768 
 
Graph 3.8: NL versus UK comparison graph of CompRisk index TDC (STI=uniform, ρ=0) 
This graph shows vertical box plots, for the Dutch (NL) and UK sample of total direct compensation 






















Table 3.22/3.23 and graph 3.7/3.8 show that compensation risk at the TDC level is more 
pronounced in the UK than in the Netherlands. 
3.3.4. Summary 
In section 3.3, the Dutch and UK markets were researched with respect to compensation risk 
related to the short-term incentive, long-term incentive and total direct compensation. Table 
3.24 provides a summary and comparison. The results are significant, as shown in appendix 3.3. 
 
Table 3.24: NL versus UK comparison of CompRisk 
CompRisk NL  UK 
Short-term incentive   =  = 
Long-term incentive  +  - 
Total direct compensation  -  + 
 
Table 3.24 shows that the STI CompRisk in the Netherlands is similar to the UK, and that the 
LTI CompRisk is higher in the Netherlands than in the UK. The sum leads to the CompRisk of 
total direct compensation. In order to interpret the CompRiskTDC figures, additional information 
is needed. Table 3.25 shows the weight of variable pay as a percentage of total direct 
compensation. 
 
Table 3.25: NL versus UK comparison of variable pay as % of total direct compensation 
This table shows variable pay as a percentage of total direct compensation. Variable pay is defined as the 
sum of the target STI and the expected LTI value (under alternative A and B). Total direct compensation 
is defined as the sum of these variable remuneration elements plus fixed compensation.   
Statistics A      B 
 NL  UK    NL  UK 
25th  percentile  30 49  30 49 
50th  percentile  42 60  42 61 
Mean  43 59  43 60 
75th  percentile  57 70    57 71 
          
N  479  768    479  768 
 
Table 3.24 and 3.25 show that comparing compensation elements in isolation can give a 
distortive view. Based on the sum of the risk of the separate STI and LTI, one would expect a 
higher compensation risk for total direct compensation in the Netherlands. However, as a result 
of more variable pay within the total compensation package, the UK has more pay-at-risk at the 
overall level.  3.4 Use of the CompRisk index 
In this section, I discuss the use of the CompRisk index. I will focus on two aspects specifically: 
1.  The CompRisk matrix: This section adds a dimension to plain vanilla pay-level 
benchmarking. In practice, decisions on pay levels are often made in isolation. A 
benchmark is executed and based on this market reference, a decision is made whether the 
package qualifies as market competitive and should be adjusted or not. Pay structure (i.e. 
payment risk) is discussed separately. It could be advocated that pay levels should be 
assessed in conjunction with the associated risk. A CompRisk matrix, combining 
compensation level and risk, can provide such an overview and enhances the quality of 
decision making. An alternative way of benchmarking, based on the Sharpe ratio, is 
discussed as well; 
2.  Drivers of compensation risk: This section is intended to provide scholars and remuneration 
committees with a better understanding of the drivers of risk from a contract-design 
perspective.  
 
3.4.1 The CompRisk matrix 
In order to assess the market competitiveness of the CEO pay level, remuneration committees 
periodically execute a benchmark study. They collect remuneration figures (with or without the 
help of a pay consultant) based on a group of companies that are considered relevant from a 
labour market-competition perspective. The market results are ranked from the lowest- to the 
highest-paying company. Typical anchor points to establish the market competitive position of 
the CEO are the 25
th percentile, the median and the 75
th percentile. As mentioned above, pay 
decisions are often made in isolation. Situation below the market median is often a trigger to 
adjust pay levels upward. However, if the risk of this compensation is also below the median, 
this decision might not be optimal. A matrix in which both the expected value of the reward (ex-
ante compensation) as well as the risk (potential ex-post payout variation) is reflected enhances 
decision making (see figure 3.5).    
 
Figure 3.5: CompRisk matrix  
This figure shows the CompRisk matrix. This matrix adds a dimension to traditional pay benchmarking. 
Typically, only the expected reward level (y-axis) is referenced against a group of peers. The additional 
risk classification, which can be based on the CompRisk index (x-axis), provides additional insight into 
the underlying structure of the remuneration package. The executive remuneration policy of a company 
can be classified in one of the reflected categories A till D.   
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This breaks down into the following categories: 
  Section A: These compensation packages may not be easily defendable vis-à-vis 
stakeholders. The compensation level is situated at the top of the reference group, while the 
risk faced by the executive is situated at the bottom. Part of this category are packages that 
may be categorised in terms of a ‘free ride’ for the CEO (e.g. risk below the 25
th percentile 
and reward above the 75
th percentile);  
  Section B: These compensation packages are characterised by very strong incentives. Such 
a situation can only be optimal when corporate governance is strong (i.e. adequate 
supervision). If the chance of detecting improper behaviour is small, this situation can result 
in an increase of agency costs (value destruction) instead of a decrease of agency costs 
(value creation); 
  Section C: Without the combined risk versus reward approach, companies in section C will 
be inclined to adjust compensation levels upward. However, when the CompRisk index is 
added, one observes that the compensation risk is also positioned below the median. 
Therefore, the case for an adjustment in compensation levels will be significantly smaller; 
  Section D: Problems can arise when hiring or retaining executives, especially if the 
compensation level is situated at the bottom of the reference group; meanwhile, the risk 
faced by the executive is situated at the top. 
 
One can make more informed decisions based on the matrix. I offer a real-life case study to 
illustrate this point. One of the companies in the research sample is the company XYZ3. The 
2008 annual report (page 40) assesses the labour-market peer group for the executive board.  
 
‘The peer group used to assess the competitiveness of the overall remuneration provided to the 
Corporate Executive Board is the same as that used to benchmark the performance of the 
Company. This peer group reflects company XYZ3’s geographic operating areas and the 
markets most relevant in relation to the recruitment and retention of top management. In 
addition, peer group companies are selected based on relevant size, public listing and liquidity 
Below median  Above median 
Above median 
Below median 






"Free ride" "Situation with significant risk; 
strong corporate governance is needed"  
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of shares. The peer group: Company A, Company B, Company C, Company D, Company E, 
Company F, Company G, Company H, Company I, Company J, Company K’. 
 
When executing a benchmark for the CEO position, this results in the following overview 
(ranking based on TDC level). 
 
Table 3.26: Level benchmark for the CEO of Company XYZ3 – ranking based on TDC 
Company  Level (basic pay)  Level (STI)  Level (LTI)  Level (TDC) 
Company A  251706  95888  2856772  3204366 
Company B  1000000  2272500  731185  4003685 
Company C  900000  900000  3030264  4830264 
Company D  1290300  1290300  3108100  5688700 
Company E  836990  1255485  3876416  5968891 
Company F  877375  1078740  4316805  6272921 
Company G  1522747  2537912  2524598  6585258 
Company H  967823  2419558  9175167  12562548 
Company I  799706  997653  12368536  14165894 
Company J  1047097  3350710  9854871  14252679 
Company K  1042063  1042063  14088081  16172206 
        
Company XYZ3  945000  945000  596901  2486901 
 
Apart from the question of whether this peer group is indeed relevant for Company XYZ3 from 
a labour-market perspective, the results show that Company XYZ3 pays its CEO less than the 
other companies. In isolation this might result in upward pressure on CEO pay within Company 
XYZ3. As a second step, the associated compensation risk is calculated (see table 3.27).
167  
 
Table 3.27: Risk benchmark for CEO of Company XYZ3 – ranking based on TDC  
Company     CompRisk (STI)  CompRisk (LTI)  CompRisk (TDC) 
Company B    26   83   21  
Company G    42   61   29  
Company J    33   91   63  
Company H    56   117   86  
Company C    7   158   99  
Company A    67   112   100  
Company D    39   223   122  
Company F    15   219   151  
Company I    81   208   182  
Company E    72   335   218  
Company K     89   291   253  
Company XYZ3     23   50   15  
 
                                                      
167 The analysis is based on 4-year historical data for the STI and alternative A for the LTI (1-year 
historical share price data).  
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Table 3.26 shows that Company XYZ3 has the lowest proportion of variable pay (% of TDC). 
Pay is thus less ‘at risk’ within Company XYZ3.  The STI and LTI structures further emphasise 
this notion (see table 3.27). In the matrix reflected in figure 3.6, the insights from steps 1 and 2 
are combined. Compensation levels and risk are reflected by percentile ranking.  
 
























On page 40 of the 2008 annual report, Company XYZ3 states that: ‘The target Total Direct 
Compensation level is typically at the 50th percentile’. This implies that when establishing the 
total direct-compensation level, the anchor point chiefly used is the median of the reflected peer 
group. The matrix in figure 3.6 shows that Company XYZ3 is positioned at the bottom of the 
peer group in its compensation level. However this is also the case in terms of compensation 
risk. This would reduce the need for an adjustment of the pay levels.  
 
Figure 3.6 is based on percentile ranking. This forces an equal amount of observations in each 
group. For a well defined peer group this is defendable. However it does not provide 
information on the incidence of a mismatch between risk and reward from a broader 
perspective, as defined by categories A and D in figure 3.5. To provide further insight, the 1,216 
observations in the dataset, as described in the previous section, are used. To differentiate 
between lower income CEOs and higher income CEOs, 6 income categories are defined. Two 
are based on the highest and lowest paid CEOs (TDC above 95
th and below 5
th percentile 
respectively), the remaining four buckets are bounded by the 25
th, median and 75
th percentile.   
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Table 3.28 Income categories 
Income category  Lower boundary  Upper boundary 
I  € 0  € 322,494 
II  € 322,494  € 832,564 
III  € 832,564  € 1,602,563 
IV  € 1,602,563  € 2,963,581 
V  € 2,963,581  € 7,259,527 
VI €  7,259,527  ∞ 
 
A mismatch is defined if reward (as measured by TDC-A) is above the median of the relevant 
bucket and risk (as measured by CompRiskTDC – 4A) below the median and vice versa.    
 
Table 3.29: Matching risk and reward 
Risk / reward category  Risk/reward  Prevalence (numbers)  Prevalence (%) 
Mismatch – A  -/+  259 21% 
Match – B  +/+  349 29% 
Match – C  -/-  345 28% 
Mismatch – D  +/-  263 22% 
 
In approximately 3/5
th of the cases there is a match between risk and reward. In 2/5
th of the 
cases the reward is above the median and risk below the median, or vice versa. In the mismatch 
category A, a further classification can be made. If a ‘free-ride’ would be identified as risk 
below the 25
th percentile of the bucket and reward above the 75
th percentile of the bucket, this 
results in 60 observations or 5% of the sample. Whether or not there is a situation of excess 
remuneration is difficult to establish. It can also be a proxy for individual characteristics. For 
example: the mean firm related wealth for the CEOs in this group is 189% higher than in the 
remaining sample (and 52% higher ownership expressed as a percentage of company stock). 
The tenure as CEO is also different. CEOs in the ‘free-ride group’ are on average 8.3 years in 
office versus 4.9 years in the remaining sample. 
 
The human capital Sharpe Ratio – an introduction  
An alternative way to compare pay packages is the use of the Sharpe ratio (1966, 1994). 
Drawback is that it requires a (risk free) human capital benchmark at the individual level and 
therefore may introduce noise. In order to provide an introduction to the use of the Sharpe ratio 
for human capital investment, and to provide insight in its relation to the CompRisk index, I will 
rework the CompRisk index for this purpose. Starting from the CompRisk index (divided by 
100), the inverse is taken. The Sharpe Ratio is based on this metric and controls for a (risk free)  
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benchmark level. The ex ante Sharpe ratio for a portfolio of financial assets is defined in 
equation 3.9.     
         
B P R R d
~ ~ ~





≡           [3.9b] 
 
The differential return is shown in 3.9a, where: Rp equals the return on the portfolio and RB the 
return on a benchmark portfolio or security (such as a risk free investment). The tildes over the 
variables indicate that the exact values may not be known in advance. The ex ante Sharpe ratio 
is defined in equation 3.9b, where: d-bar stands for the expected value of d and sigmad the 
predicted standard deviation of d.
168 In order to get an approximation of the Sharpe ratio for 
human capital investments, the returns are translated in terms of rewards. Rp transforms into the 
reward for investing human capital (i.e. total direct compensation) and σp equals the standard 
deviation of these rewards. RB, the benchmark reward, can be established by the lowest income 
level that is observed in the sample and equals € 145,135. This level is in the same ballpark as 
the constant factor of 11.98918 or € 161,003, in a regression of the (natural logarithm 
transformed) TDC level based on the ratio of variable pay to total direct compensation (t-
statistic of 313.39). In other words, this is the level of compensation at 0% variable pay and 
therefore the guaranteed level of compensation if the CEO would choose for a risk free reward 
in return for the investment of his human capital. The complication is that there are different 
CEOs with different ability. Effectively this separates the CEO labour market in different 
segments. Therefore, the results will be based on the six income categories as previously 
defined.
169 To account for the individual differences between CEOs within the same category, 
the benchmark is defined at the individual level. For each person, the (risk free) benchmark is 
calculated as the sum of base salary plus half of his target variable compensation.
170 As a 
robustness check on the calculations, I also use an exchange ratio between fixed and variable 
pay of 1:3 and 1:4. Graph 3.9 shows the results of the calculation of the reward-to-variability 
ratios. 
                                                      
168 If the benchmark portfolio has a fixed return of RB, the standard deviation of ‘d’ equals the standard 
deviation of RP. 
169 Separate regressions are run for each income category. The constant factors may be used as the riskless 
benchmark per group. However, because the prevalence of variable pay is higher in the highest income 
groups, differences in the R² of the regressions are found as well as differences in the significance of the 
constant factor. Because there is always the risk that income categories are not adequately selected (do 
not define a group of CEOs with similar ability), an individual benchmark proxy for riskless investment 
of human capital is used. 
170 This is a proxy for the certainty equivalence.   
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Graph 3.9 Overview of reward-to-variability ratios  
This graph shows the median reward-to-variability ratios for each income category I to VI. Ratios are 
calculated based on equation 3.9. TDC and its variability are based on alternative A for the long-term 


















a t i o
 
 
Graph 3.9 details the conclusion from the regression results. It shows that reward-to-variability 
ratios are similar between the categories. Testing of the significance of differences is based on 
the Mann-Whitney test
171 and an equality of medians test.
172 The only category that shows a 
significant different pattern than the rest of the sample is income category II, which contains 
CEOs with an income between € 832,564 and € 1,602,563. Significantly higher ratios are 
observed in comparison to the other categories. These CEOs are able to negotiate a higher 
reward for each unit of risk.     
 
Concluding 
In conclusion, higher-income-CEOs are typically linked to greater compensation risk (as 
measured by the CompRisk index). After controlling for income level, a significant higher 
reward is found for each unit of risk, within income category II. In this section it was shown that 
the CompRisk index can be used to detect a mismatch between risk and reward. Such a 
mismatch is not necessarily a value destroying action given the fact that it can also reveal 
something about the risk aversion of the CEO. However, it is a situation that the remuneration 
committee should carefully monitor. The tool can further provide information about the absolute 
                                                      
171 Tests the hypothesis that two independent samples (i.e., unmatched data) are from populations with the 
same distribution using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, (Wilcoxon 1945; Mann and Whitney 1947). 
172 A nonparametric sample test on the equality of medians. It tests the null hypothesis that the samples 
were drawn from populations with the same median. The chi-squared test statistic is computed both with 
and without a continuity correction.  
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level of risk in the package. In some cases risk exposure may go beyond efficient levels. This 
can be shown from an ex-ante and an ex-post perspective.  
  Ex ante: given a certain level of ex-ante compensation, risk-averse executives are only 
willing to be exposed to a certain level of risk. If the company wants to expose them to 
more risk at the same compensation level, they will do anything in their power to reduce the 
risk (including sandbagging the budget process, creating the perception that certain targets 
can never be met, etc.).  
  Ex post: the company increases risk faced by the executive and also increases compensation 
level in order to get the executive to accept this deal. If this creates a situation where there is 
too much at stake for the executive (e.g. being able to become financially independent if the 
target is met), executives will strive to reach this target, which may include long-run value-
destroying actions.  
 
In other words, too much of a good incentive can provide an incentive to destroy rather than to 
create company value. Because it is difficult to establish the adequate level of compensation risk 
in isolation, one can make a relative measurement as a way of detecting compensation risk 
beyond the level of direct competitors. Such a benchmark can be a starting point to assess the 
quality of corporate governance. In a situation of weak company governance, the probability of 
bad behaviour increases. 
 
3.4.2 Drivers of compensation risk 
In this section, the drivers of the level of risk are discussed. By running a deterministic 
regression, a better understanding is obtained of these drivers and a simplified formula is 
established to determine (a proxy of) the CompRisk index. This could be an aid for future 
research. Furthermore, practitioners can follow this route if time and/or cost considerations 
prevent them from running a comprehensive CompRisk analysis.  
 
The time consumption and complexity are chiefly related to the (simulations for the) long-term 
incentive. One can obtain the fixed compensation amount directly. Equations 3.3b and 3.3c 
showed that the greater the amount of fixed compensation, the lower the risk for the executive. 
One can also obtain the risk of the short-term incentive directly by running the coefficient of 
variation over an historical period (e.g. 3, 4 or 5 years). The long-term incentive requires 
simulation and is the most elaborate part. In order to increase practicality and circumvent the 
necessity of a simulation, I run a deterministic regression to obtain a regression formula for 
CompRiskLTI. If a high R
2 is obtained,
 the fitted values will be a good predictor of the actual 
CompRiskLTI.   
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3.4.2.1 Deterministic regression - CompRiskLTI  
The CRI of the LTI is established through simulation. The process of calculating the input 
parameters and running the simulations is time-consuming, as shown in the five step process of 
section 3.2.2.2. The analysis per company-year typically takes between 2 and 8 hours, 
depending on the number of LTI plans the company has. The number of plans per firm-year is 
reflected in graph 3.10. In the Netherlands fewer LTI combinations are observed.  
 














Each simulation is executed twice, based on ‘alternative A’ and ‘alternative B’ for input 
parameter calculation. The total number of firm-years is 1,216. In 1,034 of the cases, there are 
one or more LTI plans. The number of LTI plan simulations equals 1,738 under alternative A 
and the same amount under alternative B. This results in a total number of 3,476 simulations. 
Based on the 1,034 combined valuations and the midpoint of 5 hours per company-year, the 
total calculation/ simulation time equals 5,170 hours or 2.5 years (based on a 40-hour workweek 
and 52 weeks per year). Given the time-intensiveness of running these simulations, our 
objective is to establish a formula, based on deterministic regression, in order to obtain a good 




Four types of payout are distinguished: cash, shares, deferred shares, options. If all 4 (or even 3) 
weights in the regression model are included, this would result in multicollinearity problems. I 
will therefore take the base case of an LTI in (performance) shares. In relation to shares, it is 
expected that a greater weight of options increases compensation risk (given the asymmetrical  
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payout structure). The weight of deferred shares may increase or decrease compensation risk. 
Because performance measurement is less stringent in comparison to ordinary performance 
shares, it is most likely that the correlation will be negative. The weight of options and deferred 
shares is included in the regressions. Because cash in itself has no volatility, it takes on the risk 
of the underlying performance measure. This is accounted for in the volatility parameter of the 
underlying vehicle.  
 
Volatility of vehicle 
An increase in the underlying volatility of the company’s share price increases compensation 
risk for the executive if payout of the LTI is equity related.
173 If the underlying vehicle is cash, a 
zero is recorded to reflect the fact that there is no exposure to the company’s share price through 
the vehicle.  
 
Volatility of the performance measure 
Volatility also plays a role in the performance measurement. It is expected that a higher 
variation in the measure of performance results in a higher payout risk.
174 Since different 
measures of performance are observed, the underlying variation is expressed in terms of the 
coefficient of variation (for accounting return and growth measures) and volatility (for share 
price). A percentile ranking is used for each type of measure to obtain a single input factor. 
 
Type of performance measure 
In line with IFRS2 on the valuation of share-based payments, I distinguish between market-
based and non-market-based performance measures. It is expected that if a greater percentage of 
the grant is linked to market-based conditions, the risk for the executive will be greater. Internal 
measures are closer to the sphere of influence of the CEO.  
 
Number of performance measures & plans 
It is expected that the use of a greater number of performance measures reduces the risk for the 
executive. In case of one measure of performance, the result is binary (good or bad). It is 
impossible to compensate bad performance on one measure with good performance on another. 
                                                      
173 In the model, a regressor is included that captures the volatility of the underlying vehicle (i.e. the 
relevant share-price return volatility in the case of equity-based compensation and zero in the case of 
cash). 
174 This is typically the case. However, if the company sets extraordinarily challenging targets, an increase 
in the variation of the measure of performance could actually result in greater probability of reaching this 
stretching target. Stulz (1996) has shown that these companies will not hedge and actively pursue risky 
investment opportunities.    
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The number of LTI plans will have a similar effect. More plans (e.g. options and shares instead 
of only options) prevent a situation where ‘all your eggs are in one basket’.   
 
Time 
Time is a factor that influences compensation risk as well. It is expected that a longer vesting 
period increases the risk for the executive. In this period the LTI is conditional upon 
achievement of a certain level of performance. The longer the period, the more uncertainty 
arises (e.g. future business conditions, relevance of targets, personal situation, etc.). Time can 
also play a mitigating role. A longer exercise period after the vesting period for options reduces 
the risk for the executive. The executive has more time to choose a good moment to exercise the 




One can attribute the remaining, unexplained variance to other factors. The most important is 
the target level and shape of the performance incentive zone. Because this is firm specific, it is 
impossible to take this into account in this general regression.  
 
Table 3.30: Summary of expectations for the regression factors 
Factor  Positive / negative effect 
Weight of options   + 
Weight of deferred shares  +/- 
Volatility  of the underlying vehicle  + 
Volatility of the performance condition  + 
Weight of market based condition  + 
Number of performance conditions  - 
Number of LTI plans  - 
Vesting period  + 
Remaining exercise period  - 
 
The regression analysis is based on the combined dataset of alternative A and B to obtain the 
most robust results. This is possible given the fact that a deterministic regression will be run. 
The total number of observations equals 2,432 (2*1,216). In section 3.3 the problem of outliers 
was identified. To counter this, the CRI is transformed based on its square root.
175 Furthermore, 
extreme observations are taken out; i.e. observations with Cook’s D larger than 0.01
176 and 
                                                      
175 Applying a logarithm is impossible given the fact that the CR can also equal zero. 
176 Total number of 24 observations  
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residuals larger than 4 times the standard deviation
177. The remaining number of observations 
equals 2,391 (i.e. 98.3% of the sample). Tables 3.31 to 3.33 and graph 3.11 show the results. 
There is no collinearity in the model. The mean VIF equals 1.63. The highest individual VIFs 
are 2.24 and 2.25 for ‘Vesting period’ and ‘Vehicle volatility’, respectively. Table 3.31 shows 




Besides OLS, I have run the same model using different robust estimation techniques, as 
reflected  in appendix 3.4 (Huber-White sandwich estimator, resampling of observations based 
on bootstrap and jack-knife estimation and iteratively reweighted least squares).
178 The results 
of the robustness checks are consistent. All variables are significantly different from zero in the 
model, exhibit the same sign, and contribute to the explanation of CompRiskLTI.  
 
    
Table 3.31: Correlation coefficients 
This table shows pair wise correlation coefficients. * p<0.05. 















Options 1                 
Deferred 
shares -0.2706*  1               
Vehicle 
volatility  0.4787* 0.0718*  1             
Performance 
volatility 0.0793*  -0.0260  0.4752*  1           
Market weight  -0.1147*  -0.0163  0.1939*  0.3611*  1         
# of conditions  -0.1048*  -0.0747*  0.0541*  0.2261*  -0.1136*  1       
# of plans  -0.0149  0.2101*  0.1471*  0.1064*  0.1085*  -0.1386*  1     
Vesting period  0.2687*  0.1632*  0.6158* 0.4570* 0.3724*  0.1939*  0.2519*  1   
Exercise 
period 0.4587*  -0.1331*  0.2732*  0.0572*  -0.0582* -0.0322 0.0413*  0.1926*  1 
                                                      
177 Total number of 17 observations 
178 Note: Although the CompRiskLTI equals zero if there is no LTI risk (e.g. no LTI plan or a cash payout 
without additional conditions), I have decided not to force the regression line through the origin (RTO). 
Regression through the origin (RTO) has the disadvantage of producing various irrelevant statistical 
parameters (e.g. the coefficient of determination, R², cannot be used to determine a good fit). I have 
therefore run a normal regression, taking observations with a CR LTI of zero into account. The resulting 
value of the constant factor equals 0.17 (square of 0.412) which approximates zero.  
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Table 3.32: Regression results CompRiskLTI   
This table shows the deterministic regression of CompRiskLTI.  based on OLS regression. Robustness 
checks are reflected in appendix 3.3. The coefficient, p-value (within parentheses) and t-statistic are 
reflected. Stars stand for: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
Variable   Coefficient  t-stat 
Options .03305119***  34.88 
 (0.0000)    
Deferred shares  -.01305476***  -11.77 
 (0.0000)    
Vehicle volatility  .09969443***  41.67 
 (0.0000)    
Performance volatility  .01537809***  14.79 
 (0.0000)    
Market weight  .01116261***  12.97 
 (0.0000)    
# of conditions  -.24956478**  -2.92 
 (0.0036)    
# of plans  -.01783035**  -2.99 
 (0.0028)    
Vesting period  .16201936***  55.37 
 (0.0000)    
Exercise period  -.0129064***  -4.96 
 (0.0000)    
_cons .41208254***  6.25 
   (0.0000)      
Observations   2391    
Adjusted R²  .92266625
 
Graph 3.11: CompRisk fitted values (OLS) versus CompRisk observations  
This graph shows the fitted values of the OLS regression versus the actual CompRiskLTI figures. The 




























Table 3.33: Overview of variables plus ranking of the beta coefficient 
This table shows the description of variables used in the regression. The standardised beta coefficient and 
the ranking of this coefficient are also reflected. It can be perceived as a ranking of the impact of the 
different variables. The beta coefficient is based on the regression coefficients, standardised to have a 
mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1.  
Variable Description  Ranking of standardised 
absolute beta coefficient  Beta 
Vesting period  Weighted vesting period (in 
months)  1  .4712375 
Vehicle volatility  Volatility of the underlying 
vehicle (in %)  2  .3554854 
Options  Weight of options in the total 
LTI package (in %)  3  .2793544 
Performance volatility  Volatility of the performance 
condition (in percentage rank)  4  .1063819 
Market weight  Weight of market condition in 
the total package (in %)  5  .0903978 
Deferred shares  Weight of deferred shares in 
the total LTI package (in %)  6  -.076844 
Exercise period  Remaining exercise period after 
the vesting period (in months)  7  -.0319575 
# of conditions 
Dummy variable: 1 if each euro 
is governed by at least 2 
performance conditions 
8  -.0190514 
# of plans  Number of LTI plans (square)  9  -.0182451 
 
The results are in line with the expectations from table 3.30.
179 A proxy for the LTI can be 
obtained based on the obtained regression formula. Compensation risk for the TDC level can be 
calculated by combining this figure with the fixed compensation and the STI. In the next 
section, the drivers of TDC compensation risk are summarised. 
 
3.4.2.2 Summary of the drivers of compensation risk 
Below, I provide an overview of the factors that determine compensation risk (ceteris paribus) 
at the total direct compensation level and from a deterministic perspective. It can serve 
remuneration committees as a guide to the drivers of compensation variability / risk. Under the 
assumption that people respond to incentives, the compensation structure will impact the 
company’s value. 
1.  The amount of fixed versus variable compensation: The greater the amount of fixed 
compensation (security) as a percentage of total compensation, the lower the risk for the 
executive; 
2.  Payout vehicle: Shares are riskier than cash, options are riskier than shares; 
                                                      
179 In section 3.5 the determinants of the CompRisk index are researched, based on non-deterministic 
explanatory variables (individual, company, industry and country characteristics).   
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3.  Volatility of the payout vehicle: The higher the share price volatility, the higher the risk for 
the executive; 
4.  Variation in performance condition: Greater fluctuations in company performance (market 
and non-market) impose a greater risk on the executive; 
5.  Type of performance condition: Market-based conditions are typically riskier than non-
market based conditions due to the level of influence the executive has over the outcome of 
the measure of performance; 
6.  Number of variable compensation plans & performance measures: More plans and different 
types of measures to determine company performance prevent putting all eggs in one basket 
and thus limits risk; 
7.  Circuit breaker: The use of a circuit breaker in the variable component increases the risk for 
the executive. If the target under the circuit breaker is not achieved, the total payout is zero; 
8.  Target levels: Setting targets for the sake of variable compensation plans is typically the 
result of answering the following questions: a) What level of performance is expected (by 
shareholders and other stakeholders) and b) What do executives and supervisors believe that 
can actually be achieved? Setting targets that are too stretching imposes too much risk on 
the executive and might result in retention problems. This could, for example, stem from 
yearly growth targets that result in a ‘hockey stick curve’. Setting targets that are too easy 
reduces the risk for the executive, but creates incomprehension and dissatisfaction among 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Setting the right targets is thus a balancing act; 
9.  Shape of the payout curve (or performance incentive zone): There is a difference between 
linear payout curves versus trenched/staged payout zones. The latter alternative exhibits 
kinks that create additional risk to the executive. At these points the relationship between 
one unit of additional performance and the associated level of payout is non-linear. This 
could create a situation where there is ‘too much at stake’ and even result in 




3.5 Determinants of the CompRisk index  
In the previous section 3.4, the drivers of the CompRisk index were established from a 
deterministic perspective. In this section, I will further explore its use for academic research. In 
the academic field, one can use the tool as input for various research projects. For example, one 
can use the tool as an exogenous variable to explain company performance, managerial risk 
taking, etc. It can also be used to reveal company-specific characteristics (e.g. as a proxy of the 
performance culture). 
 
In this section, I will focus on the explanatory variables of compensation risk. In other words, 
which factors determine whether a company operates a certain incentive structure (e.g. low 
versus high risk)? We will refrain from using the deterministic variables defined in the previous 
section. The company chooses these variables that make up the structure of the plan (given the 
company’s underlying risk). The objective is to find out which factors determine this choice. 
 
3.5.1 Theory & hypothesis development 
Our hypothesis is that explanatory factors can be based on individual, company, industry and 
country aspects. We primarily rely on factors that have been proven to explain CEO 
compensation. We assume that for a risk- and effort-averse agent, utility is increased if 




Tenure in the CEO position (-) 
As tenure increases, the CEO is able to build influence within the firm, which may increase his 
political power. This power is related to the CEO’s position in particular. The CEO might use 
this power to tie his compensation package more directly to his own preferences (Finkelstein 
and Hambrick, 1989; Hill and Phan, 1991; Cyert et al., 1997; Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 
1999); higher pay at a given level of risk or lower risk at a given level of pay. It is therefore 
expected that there is a negative correlation between compensation risk and CEO tenure.  
 
Compensation level (+) 
Given a certain level of pay, the CEO is only willing to accept a certain level of risk 
(influenced by personal characteristics). It is expected that a higher risk will only be 
accepted if higher compensation can be earned. This trade-off between risk and return is  
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expected to result in a positive correlation between pay level and pay risk (after controlling 
for the size of the company).
  
 
Ownership / firm related wealth (-) 
In the certainty equivalence literature, firm related wealth is an important parameter because it 
can have a negative impact on the certainty equivalent of the uncertain payoffs that make up the 
remuneration package, Lambert et al. (1991). If firm related wealth is high, this may coincide 
with offering a less risky package to the CEO, given the exacerbated inefficiency between 
remuneration costs (shareholder perspective) and remuneration value (CEO perspective).  
 
Company effects 
Company size (+/-) 
It is not expected that a specific relationship between firm size and compensation risk exists. We 
take firm size (through the natural logarithm of total assets) into account as a control variable. 
 
Company performance (+) 
If incentives are constructed to support value-enhancing behaviour, one would expect to see a 
positive correlation between high-performing companies and compensation risk. Performance is 
measured by Tobin’s Q and relative total shareholder return.  
 
Performance culture is difficult to measure. A company dummy will control for firm-fixed 
effects. Companies with a culture that focuses on pay-for-performance will have more pay at 
risk and subsequently a positive correlation with the CompRisk index. 
 
Risk (+) 
If the company exhibits greater risk, one would expect that variable pay will be influenced 
by this risk. We measure risk by the ‘price swing’ in a given year (highest minus lowest 
share price in the given year is divided by the midpoint).  
 
The auditor may influence the risk culture of the company. The ‘big four’ (KPMG, Deloitte, 
Ernst & Young and PricewaterhouseCoopers) are recorded as dummy variables (KPMG left 
out to avoid collinearity).  
 
CEO = Chair (-) 
CEO duality is a proxy for the power of the CEO over the board and remuneration committee. 
When the CEO is also chairman, the extent of board control diminishes, and the CEO is better  
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able to influence his compensation (Boyd, 1994; Core et al., 1999; Cyert, Kang and Kumar, 
2002). This could result in lower risk. 
 
Percentage of non-executive directors on the main board (+) 
The number of non-executive directors as a percentage of the total number of directors is a 
measure of good governance. It is expected that a higher percentage of NEDs is associated 
with a stronger counterbalance for the CEO and thus linked to more compensation risk 
(reduction of free ride for the CEO).  
 
Capital structure – debt ratio (-) 
Capital structure can have a disciplining effect on management. If gearing is high, less pay at 
risk is needed because there is stronger oversight.  
 
Presence of large external shareholder (+/-) 
The presence of large external shareholders is related to the previous variable. Several 
researchers provide evidence that the monitoring performed by these large external shareholders 
reduce rent extraction by managers (Dyl, 1988; Cyert et al., 1997; Kraft and Niederprüm, 1999). 
Also, Gómez-Mejía et al. (1987) and Tosi and Gómez-Mejía (1989) determine that the 
incentives of CEOs and shareholders are better aligned when the company has a 5% external 
shareholder (i.e. greater compensation risk). An alternative hypothesis is that more effective 
external oversight reduces the need for strong incentives. Therefore, a neutral prediction is 
assumed.  
 
Industry effects  
A number of researchers state that the industry in which a firm operates may influence 
executive compensation levels (Agarwal, 1981; Balkin and Gómez-Mejía, 1987; Deckop, 1988; 
Boyd, 1994). Proxies for the level of diversification and industry fall out of the model when 
using firm-fixed effects. The relevance of industry affiliation is indirectly taken into account by 
calculating the relative total shareholder return (i.e. relative to the TSR performance of the other 
companies in the dataset and in the same ICB classification).  
 
Country effects 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999), Conyon and Murphy (2000) and Oxelheim and 
Randøy (2005) find that CEO compensation is higher in Anglo-Saxon firms than in continental 
European firms. Furthermore, it is expected that higher total compensation risk would be found 
in the UK than in the Netherlands in view of the acuter shareholder focus in the UK in  
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comparison to the Netherlands. More aggressive incentives to increase shareholder returns 
would be in line with this. Country dummies fall out of the regression model, given the fact that 
company fixed effects are taken into account. 
  
Time effects 
Time dummies are included in the model to account for changes over time. Due to increased 
corporate governance requirements over the research period, in terms of tying pay to 
performance, it is possible that an increase in compensation risk will be found. From a 
theoretical perspective, there is a neutral expectation.  
 
3.5.2 Data & methodology 
The dataset was described in section 3.3. Given the issue of outliers, it is decided to winsorise 
observations below the 1
st percentile and above the 99
th percentile. The data can be considered 
an unbalanced panel. The end of the data for all companies equals 2008. The data go back to 
2001, depending on their historical availability.
180 A  Breusch Pagan Langrangian multiplier test 
is run for random effects (xttest0), which shows that the unit-specific error term is not zero 
(rejected at the 99.99% level). The Hausman specification test is also executed. Both provide 
indications that unit-fixed effects need to be applied to the model (units are companies in the 
sample and incorporated through the technique of absorbing indicators). Furthermore, since 
there are concerns with regard to the presence of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity, a 
robust regression scheme is applied, through the robust cluster option in STATA.  
 
Table 3.34 Summary statistics of regression variables 
This table shows the untransformed descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables used in the 
regressions in this section, in alphabetical order. To ensure, that figures are roughly in the same order of 
magnitude, the natural log is taken of the variables “CEO ownership”, “TDC (A, B)” and “total assets”, 
for purposes of the regressions. For a detailed overview of the description and source of the variables, see 
appendix 3.1.  
Variable  Observations   Mean   Standard deviation  Minimum   Maximum 
          
Bank (%)  1216  3.566652  6.955562  0  44.7 
CAPEX 1216  7.104592  12.22903  0  166 
CEO ownership (€)  1216  2.03e+07  1.37e+08  0  3.15e+09 
CEO tenure  1216  5.105263  5.886619  0  39 
Debt-ratio   1216  41.72909  22.73369  0  99 
Deloitte 1216  .1891447  .3917847  0  1 
                                                      
180 Data availability (number of companies per year) 2008:161; 2007: 161; 2006: 161; 2005: 161; 2004: 
161; 2003: 160; 2002: 146; 2001:105.  
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Variable  Observations   Mean   Standard deviation  Minimum   Maximum 
Ernst & Young  1216  .1463816  .3536338  0  1 
Exec. Chair  1216  .0970395  .2961333  0  1 
Individual (%)  1216  1.800123  7.865161  0  63.01 
Industrial (%)  1216  3.574803  8.353063  0  60.57 
Insurance (%)  1216  3.443853  5.46103  0  53 
Investment (%)  1216  10.62867  12.23749  0  57.02 
Listed (years)  1216  11.36678  4.460565  0  29 
NED (%)  1216  40.10197  31.69161  0  100 
New CEO year  1216  .140625  .3477773  0  1 
No Remco  1216  .1225329  .3280352  0  1 
Nom. Trust (%)  1216  6.116856  17.69153  0  100 
Pension (%)  1216  .6157262  3.550016  0  39 
Priceswing 1216  .514906  .2929718  .07658  188.016 
PWC 1216  .3634868  .4812012  0  1 
Relative TSR (%)  1216  -.0361842  27.93211  -100  183 
TDC (A)  1216  2462629  3390865  145135  7.17e+07 
TDC (B)  1216  2469669  3424590  145135  7.69e+07 
Tobin's Q  1216  1.554363  .7837851  .6225  7.92301 
Total assets (* mln €)   1216  72151.95  291079.6  18  3719582 
 
 
All correlation coefficients are below 0.7. Because the mean VIF equals 1.99, with all 
individual factors below 7, there are no multicollinearity concerns.  
 
3.5.3 Results of the analyses 
The determinants of the CompRisk index of the total direct-compensation package are 
researched based on the 1,216 observations in the dataset. These observations are built up by the 
sum of fixed remuneration in combination with short- and long-term variable remuneration.  
 
For the STI compensation risk the actual variation in bonus payouts, based on 4-year historical 
data (see section 3.2.2.1) is used.
181 For the LTI, the regression is based on alternative A (see 
section 3.2.2.2). In some years there is no LTI grant, (15% of the cases). This implies that the 
value of the LTI is zero, as is the risk associated with long-term compensation. In these cases, 
TDC is calculated based on the remaining two components: fixed compensation and short-term 
variable remuneration. Table 3.35 shows the results of the analysis. Robustness checks of the 
conclusions are executed in section 3.5.4. 
 
                                                      
181 For each year, the weight is determined based on the STI weight in that year. The coefficient of 
variation is based on 4-year historical data. The dataset is bounded to the year 2001. If no 4 year data 
could be obtained a proxy is taken based on the average coefficient of variation for that company.  
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Table 3.35 Determinants of CompRiskTDC (ρ = 0)
  
This table shows the results of the regression for the CompRisk index of total direct compensation, based 
on alternative A for the long-term incentive (see section 3.2.2.2) and the STI on 4-year historical data (see 
section 3.2.2.1). The panel regression takes into account unit fixed effects at the company level.   
Estimation of standard errors is robust to disturbances being heteroskedastic and autocorrelated 
(observations are clustered per company). The coefficient, p-value (italic) and t-statistic are reflected. 
Stars stand for significance: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. CompRisk, TDC, CEO ownership, and total 
assets are natural log transformed. Variables are reflected in the following groups; individual, company, 
industry, and time effects. 
Variable  CompRisk - TDC 4AV A 
 Coefficient  t-stat 
    
Individual effects    
TDC (A)  .95183157***  9.80 
  0.0000  
CEO tenure  -.03894284***  -5.99 
  0.0000  
New CEO year  .01587442  0.34 
  0.7335  
CEO ownership (ln value €)  .00460929  0.70 
 0.4848   
    
Company effects     
Nom. Trust (%)  -.00019271  -0.05 
  0.9563  
Bank (%)  -.00667587  -1.63 
  0.1053  
Insurance (%)  -.00957323  -1.62 
  0.1077  
Investment (%)  -.00114288  -0.44 
  0.6635  
Pension (%)  -.01873103  -1.37 
  0.1730  
Industrial (%)  -.01125342***  -3.69 
  0.0003  
Individual (%)  -.00492749  -0.48 
  0.6324  
Total assets (ln)  .02817648  0.61 
  0.5416  
Debt-ratio (sqrt)  .02541169**  2.39 
  0.0179  
CAPEX -.00177408  -0.97 
  0.3328  
Tobin's Q  .09072721***  2.72 
  0.0072  
Priceswing -.00629322  -0.07 
  0.9412  
PWC -.33701409**  -2.05 
  0.0416  
Ernst & Young  -.70343873*  -1.87 
  0.0636   
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Variable  CompRisk - TDC 4AV A 
 Coefficient  t-stat 
Deloitte -.0125442  -0.10 
  0.9211  
Exec. Chair  .01491041  0.15 
  0.8807  
NED (%)  -.00014829  -0.04 
 0.9642   
    
Industry effects     
Relative TSR (%)  -.0005819  -1.10 
 0.2712   
    
Time effects     
Time dummies (2003-2008)  yes  
    
_cons -9.8950324***  -7.31 
   0.0000     
    
Observations 1216   
Adjusted R²  .6943527     
  
Below, the conclusions are stated in respect of table 3.35.  
 
Individual effects 
At the individual level, a significant correlation (p<0.001) is observed between compensation 
risk and level of remuneration. Economic intuition would support the notion of a correlation 
between risk and reward for human capital, similar to the trade-off between risk and return for 
portfolios of assets. Higher rewards for the CEO in the form of remuneration come at the cost of 
greater risk associated with the payout.  
 
CEO tenure negatively correlates to compensation risk. The longer the CEO is in office, the less 
pay is ‘at risk’. A possible explanation for this finding is taken from managerial power theory. 
From this perspective, tenure in the position is a power variable. Building up tenure is 
associated with building up power over remuneration decisions.  
 
Company effects 
Outside block holders seem to have similar demands regarding the link between pay and 
performance. However, companies that are owned for a greater part by industrial companies 
exhibit less compensation risk. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that these parties 
give more attention to the dark side of strong incentives (which could induce risk-taking 
behaviour beyond the company’s appetite) and focus on less risky investments based on this  
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perspective. An alternative explanation is the reduced need for incentives if external oversight is 
stronger. 
 
There is some evidence that companies with a greater debt ratio (higher gearing) exhibit a 
stronger link between pay and performance. The economic intuition that companies with more 
debt are already disciplined and need fewer incentives, is in line with the negative regression 
result between companies in the cross sectional regression of section 3.5.4 (robustness checks). 
The within companies effect of a positive correlation, found here, may be explained by 
movements within the ‘debt category’. In this explanation, a company with low leverage with 
the ambition to produce greater returns for shareholders may increase gearing as well as 
incentives over time. For extreme cases (financial distress), this is also in line with Stulz (1996).  
 
There is a correlation found between the Tobin’s Q ratio and greater compensation risk for the 
CEO. This could indicate that high-performing companies believe in the power of incentives to 
obtain excellent business results. Alternatively, greater incentive strength causes better company 
performance as measured by the ratio between market value and book value of assets.  
 
In terms of the auditors, the most significant correlation was found between PWC and lower 
CEO compensation risk (in comparison to KPMG, which is left out to avoid multicollinearity). 
Companies that have lower compensation at risk tend to choose PWC as their auditor and/or 
PWC tends to invest in becoming and remaining the auditor of these companies. 
 
Industry effects 
Because company-fixed effects were used, industry dummies and diversification-category 
variables fall out of the model. In order to obtain an industry effect, the industry-adjusted total 
shareholder return was calculated. Greater or lower industry-adjusted return does not 
significantly correlate to compensation risk. Earlier it was observed that, in absolute terms, there 
is a correlation between the CompRisk index and Tobin’s Q. This might indicate that 
remuneration plans within industries are similar. In this explanation, competitors keep an eye on 






A specific country dummy was not incorporated in the model because it is part of the company 
fixed effects. In order to research country specific effects, I will calculate separate regressions 
for the UK and the Netherlands as part of the robustness checks presented in section 3.5.4.  
 
Time effects 
Time dummies were included in the regression analysis in which the years 2001 and 2002 were 
left out to avoid multicollinearity in this unbalanced panel dataset. Ceteris paribus, it is expected 
that time itself is not a significant determinant of compensation risk. However, changes over 
time can be picked up through this dummy. Year dummies are significant and the sign is 
negative. This implies that compensation risk has decreased over the research period. A possible 
explanation can be found in the use of long-term incentive vehicles. In the early years of the 
sample, a relatively high use of options is observed, whereas this prevalence decreases over 
time.  
 
Graph 3.12-A: Average weight of the use of options, shares and cash per year  
This graph shows the development of the weight of the 3 observed long-term incentive vehicles, options, 



















Graph 3.12-A, shows that companies have reduced the weight of options in favour of shares, 
over the years.
182 Because shares have a lower payout risk than options, this could contribute to 
the explanation of the reduced compensation risk over time. 
                                                      
182 This includes the use of deferred shares. The risk of deferred shares is often lower than that of stand- 
alone performance shares. The underlying reasoning is that these shares typically originate from the  
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3.5.4 Robustness checks  
In the previous section, 7 conclusions were drawn based on the executed CompRisk regression 
analyses: TDC (+), CEO tenure (-), industrial % (-), debt-ratio (+), Tobin’s Q (+), PWC (-), time 
effects (-). The objective for this section is to find out whether these conclusions still stand 
under different robustness checks and to allow for nuances (sign and significance). Appendix 
3.5 panel A to E provides the results of the additional regressions.  
 
Panel A 
In panel A, the results of the same fixed effects model are shown, but now for seven different 
proxies of the CompRisk index. In the previous section 3.5.3 the CompRisk index was based on 
alternative A for the long-term incentive (see section 3.2.2.2) and 4 year historical data for the 
short-term incentive (see section 3.2.2.1). Appendix 3.5 shows additional calculations, based on 
3-year and 5-year historical data for the STI, as well as the uniform distribution. In addition, it 
shows all of these proxies, but now based on alternative B for the long-term incentive 
calculation. All seven conclusions are supported by significant estimators with the same sign as 
found in the previous section.  
 
Panel B 
In panel B the assumption of no correlation between the STI and LTI payouts is abandoned.  
Panel B shows the regression results, based on the extreme correlation between the short- and 
long-term incentive (coefficients of minus 1 and plus 1 respectively). For perfectly positive 
correlation all conclusions are supported. The alternative with perfect negative correlation also 
supports the conclusions, with the exception of the debt-ratio (not significant). Note that the 
alternative in which ρ = -1 is highly unlikely. Given the different timing of payouts, no 
correlation is expected. If there is any correlation, this would generally be positive given the fact 
that short- and long-term incentives eventually support the same company objective of long-
term value creation, e.g. I have never observed a situation in which the CEO was rewarded with 
put options on the company’s share price. 
 
Panel C 
Panel C shows a cross sectional study. Because the dataset consists of eight years, regressions 
per year result in a maximum of 161 observations. To ensure robustness of the results, the 
regression is based on the average variable value per company over the research years. The 
adjusted R² of the cross sectional regression equals 64% versus 69% of the fixed effects model. 
                                                                                                                                                            
payout of the short-term incentive and therefore do not always include a performance condition. In such a 
case, if the CEO holds onto these shares for a certain period of time, the shares are matched at a 
predetermined ratio.  
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All, but two conclusions are supported. No significant correlation is found for the variable 
‘industrial %’. Furthermore, the positive correlation of debt-ratio in the fixed effects model 
turns into a significant negative correlation in the cross sectional model. The economic intuition 
that companies with more debt are already disciplined and need fewer incentives, is in line with 
the negative regression result, between companies. The within companies effect of a positive 
correlation may be explained by movements within the ‘debt category’. In this explanation, a 
company with low leverage with the ambition to produce greater returns for shareholders may 
increase gearing as well as incentives over time. 
 
Panel D and E 
Panel D and E provide further insight in country specific factors. They show the fixed effects 
model as presented in table 3.35 of the previous section, but now split for the UK and the 
Netherlands. The UK regression in panel D supports all seven conclusions. The Dutch sample 
regression in panel E supports the sign of all conclusions. Five are significant: TDC (+), CEO 
tenure (-), industrial % (-), Tobin’s Q (+), time effects (-). Not significant are the variables debt-
ratio (t-statistic of 1.44) and PWC (t-statistic of -1.38). This could be the result of the fact that 
the sample is smaller than the UK sample (388 versus 657 observations).  
 
The country specific regressions can add to the explanation of observed nuances. For example, 
time dummies in both the UK as well as the NL sample are negative and significant. However, 
t-statistic significance for the Netherlands is lower and starts to be significant in 2005 in 
comparison to the UK which already shows significance in 2004. Graph 3.12 panel A showed 
the evolution of LTI vehicles for the total sample, in order to explain the negative evolvement of 
CompRisk over time. A more detailed inspection of the country specific vehicle evolution as 
shown in graph 3.12 panel B and C can explain the small differences between the UK and the 
Netherlands.  
 
The UK t-stats might be higher given the fact that the abandonment of stock options in favour of 
shares is more pronounced in the UK sample than the Dutch sample (close to 90% use of shares 
versus close to 60% respectively at the end of the research period). Because shares have lower 
compensation risk than options, this can contribute to the explanation of decreasing 
compensation risk in the UK at the highest significance level (p<0.001).  
 
The fact that significance is found for the time dummies 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008, in the 
regression analysis for the Dutch sample, seems to be explained by panel C. The trend of 
switching options for shares reaches its high point in 2005 and stabilises in the years after.  
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Graph 3.12-B: Average weight of the use of options, shares and cash per year  
This graph shows the UK development of the weight of the 3 observed long-term incentive vehicles, 



















    
 
 
Graph 3.12-C: Average weight of the use of options, shares and cash per year  
This graph shows the Dutch development of the weight of the 3 observed long-term incentive vehicles, 























3.6 Summary & conclusion 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) conclude their survey on corporate governance by the following 
question, among others, for further research: ‘Given the large impact of executive’s actions on 
values of firms, why aren’t very high powered incentive contracts used more often in the United 
States and the rest of the world?’ Meanwhile, this question has been answered. Too much of a 
good incentive results in counterproductive behaviour. Incidence of backdating stock options,
183 
misstatements, fraud, overvalued equity and financial distress have been linked to incentive 
strength, Denis et al. (2006), Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), Cullinan et al. (2006), Jensen 
(2004, 2005), Efendi, Srivastava and Swanson (2004), Tian (2004).  
 
Measuring incentive strength (compensation at risk) is therefore important because it allows for 
conclusions on both sides of the trade-off. Within the dichotomy of portfolio- versus 
performance-incentives, I have focused on the latter from an ex ante perspective. A measure of 
compensation at risk that is typically used is the ratio between variable and fixed compensation. 
I have aimed to improve this proxy by taking underlying contract details into account.  The 
following questions were researched: 
 
1.  How to define a single quantifiable metric that can capture the structure, risk or incentive 
strength of yearly compensation contracts? 
2.  What is the level of risk in real life compensation contracts in the Netherlands and the UK? 
3.  How can the CompRisk index be used? 
4.  What are the determinants of compensation risk, as measured by the CompRisk index? 
 
3.6.1. Summary 
Compensation risk is measured, based on the degree to which ex-post realisations of pay can 
differ from the ex-ante expected compensation. The coefficient of variation is used for this 
purpose (see equation 3.8a), in which µTDC  equals the expected value of total direct 
compensation and σTDC the standard deviation of (potential) realisations.  
                                                      
183 ‘Het Financieele Dagblad’ (1 June 2006) reports on backdating of option contracts in the United 
States. The SEC and the Justice Department started a criminal investigation of about 20 companies with 
regard to alleged manipulation of option programs. Several executives were fired based on these 
allegations. These executives had been granted options on a date when the company’s share price was at a 
low. The suspicion was that these options had been backdated to this moment. An example was the 
general counsel at McAfee who was fired for receiving 20,000 options dated 14 April 2000 with an 
exercise price of $19.75. Later that month the share price rose to above $25. Another example is Vitesse 
Semiconductor, which fired three members of its executive board, including the CEO and CFO, who had 
repeatedly received options at low exercise prices just before a significant rise in the company’s share 
price.    
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                        [3.8a] 
 
The eventual compensation risk at the total direct-compensation level depends on the ratio 
between fixed and variable compensation as well as the structure of the short- and long-term 
incentive plan. In order to obtain robust research results, the proxy for compensation risk is 
calculated based on multiple ways to obtain the input parameters. For the long-term incentive, 
input is needed for simulation of the plan payouts (e.g. volatility, dividend yield, correlation 
coefficients of peers in the case of relative measurement of firm performance). The work is 
based on IFRS 2 valuations. These are executed by companies for accounting purposes and 
signed off on by the external auditor. Two historical periods were considered: A) 1-year 
historical data; B) an average of 1-, 3-, 5- and 10-year historical data. For the STI, the proxy for 
CompRiskSTI is directly based on the STI outcomes from the past, using 3-, 4- and 5-year 
historical data. Given data limitations and in view of CEO turnover (69% of the CEOs in the 
dataset are in the position ≤ 5 years), no longer historical period was taken.  
 
Typical ranges of STI, LTI and TDC compensation risk are reflected in table 3.36.  
 
Table 3.36: Typical CompRisk ranges (ρ = 0) 
This table shows an overview of the typical compensation risk ranges for the short-term incentive (STI), 
the long-term incentive (LTI), and total direct compensation (TDC). The CompRiskSTI is based on 4 year 
historical data. The CompRiskLTI is based on input data under alternative A. The CompRiskTDC follows 
from these two calculations (4A). In addition, it is reflected for the STI based on the uniform distribution 
(UA).   
Statistics CompRisk  STI (4)  CompRisk LTI (A)  CompRiskTDC (4A)  CompRiskTDC (UA) 
25th percentile  18  80  22  22 
50th percentile  35  118  33  33 
Mean 46 135  37  42 
75th percentile  67  162  48  49 
        
N 575  1034  575  1216 
 
Table 3.36 shows that short-term incentives are less risky than long-term incentives. 
CompRiskTDC therefore particularly depends on the weight and structure of the long-term 
incentive. To provide more insight into the determinants of LTI risk, a deterministic regression 
was run. The following factors explained the variation in CompRiskLTI (adjusted R
2 of 92%). 




1.  Vesting period: If the period in which the LTI is conditional upon employment and/or 
achievement of performance criteria is longer, the CompRiskLTI is higher;  
2.  Volatility of the underlying vehicle: Higher company volatility creates greater potential 
variation in the LTI payout; 
3.  Option weight: If the weight of options (in relation to shares) in the total LTI package is 
higher, this results in higher risk for the CEO; 
4.  Volatility of the performance condition: Higher volatility in the measures of performance 
results in higher risk; 
5.  Market condition: If the type of condition is linked to market performance (share price, total 
shareholder return), this creates greater risk for the CEO. Internal measures (such as cost 
control, accounting return, etc.) are more within his sphere of influence than the share price 
(which is also influenced by deviations of market expectations, sentiments, etc.); 
6.  Deferred shares weight: If the weight of deferred shares (in relation to other share plans) in 
the total LTI package is higher, this results in lower risk for the CEO. Deferred shares 
typically have no or weak performance conditions in relation to ordinary performance share 
plans; 
7.  Exercise period: If granted options have a longer exercise period, this limits the risk for the 
CEO. The CEO has a longer period to optimally time the exercise of his options. This is 
especially relevant if options are out-of-the-money. The probability that underwater options 
gain an intrinsic value is higher if the period until expiry is longer;   
8.  Number of performance conditions: A situation in which there are multiple performance 
measures (at least 2 per euro
184) moves away from putting all one’s eggs in one basket and 
reduces payout risk; 
9.  Number of LTI plans: A similar hedge applies if the number of different LTI plans 
increases.  
 
Knowledge of the different drivers of compensation risk (fixed versus variable compensation 
and structure of the variable pay plans), puts remuneration committees in a position to make 
more informed decisions. Figure 3.5 confronts the compensation level with compensation risk 
and helps the visualisation of this. Based on six income categories, it was found that a mismatch 
(areas A and D), occurs in approximately 2/5
th of the cases. In category A, a potential free-ride 
is possible. If a free-ride would be defined as a reward above the 75
th percentile and risk below 
the 25
th percentile, this would add up to 5% of the observations in the dataset. Companies that 
                                                      
184 Satisfaction of dummy condition: If there is one LTI plan governed by two measures, this condition is 
satisfied. If there are two plans, one of which has two measures and the other of which has one measure, 
the criterion is not satisfied. If there is a third plan with three measures, depending on the weight of the 
different plans, the condition is or is not satisfied.  
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are situated in area D may have a potential retention or hiring issue because pay is below the 
median level and risk is above this level. 
 
Figure 3.5: CompRisk matrix 
This figure shows the CompRisk matrix. This matrix adds a dimension to traditional pay benchmarking. 
Typically, only the expected reward level (y-axis) is referenced against a group of peers. The additional 
risk classification, which can be based on the CompRisk index (x-axis), provides additional insight into 
the underlying structure of the remuneration package. The executive remuneration policy of a company 
can be classified in one of the reflected categories A till D. 
Below median Above median
Above median
Below median





Expected value of 
reward
"Freeride" "Situation with significant risk; 
strong corporate governance is needed"
 
The matrix can help from a socioeconomic perspective. In the past, the public and other 
stakeholders have scrutinised pay increases. Remuneration committees have defended these 
increases by pointing out that CEO pay is situated below the median of the reference market. By 
including the risk perspective, these grounds no longer suffice. If the company is in area C, 
there is little ground for an adjustment in isolation, because the compensation risk is also 
situated below the median.  
 
In addition, for each income category, reward-to-variability ratios (based on the Sharpe ratio) 
were calculated. The calculations control for an individual risk free benchmark. Minor 
differences are observed per category in terms of the reward that is earned per unit of risk. Only 
category II, which contains CEOs with an income between € 832,564 and € 1,602,563, shows 
significantly higher median ratios.  
 
In the final part of this study, it was researched whether the observed trade-off between pay 
level and pay risk is also supported through regression analyses. Table 3.37 shows an overview 




Table 3.37: CompRiskTDC regression results – economic effects 
This table shows an overview of the significant variables in the CompRiskTDC regression. The economic 
effect is calculated, based on an event size of 1 standard deviation ((coefficient * (mean + 1SD)) – 
(coefficient * mean)). For dummy variables, the economic effect is equal to the b-coefficient. Stars stand 
for significance: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
                                              CompRisk - TDC 4AV A 
Variable   Significance Economic  effect 
CEO tenure  ***  -0.23 
Debt-ratio (sqrt)  **  0.06 
Dummy 2004  ***  -0.22 
Dummy 2005  ***  -0.41 
Dummy 2006  ***  -0.53 
Dummy 2007  ***  -0.53 
Dummy 2008  ***  -0.44 
Ernst & Young  *  -0.70 
Industrial (%)  ***  -0.09 
PWC ** -0.34 
TDC (A)  ***  0.89 
Tobin's Q  ***  0.07 
 
The highest economic effect and the highest t-stats are found for the variable Total Direct 
Compensation. This positive and significant correlation between pay level and pay risk is 
illustrated in graph 3.13, for the six income categories as defined in this chapter (I to VI). 
Higher income CEOs are linked to higher compensation risk. 
 
Graph 3.13: Risk versus reward based on 6 income categories 
This graph shows the 25
th, 50
th and 75
th CompRiskTDC figures per income category (I to VI). Income 
categories are defined in table 3.28. CompRisk is based on scenario A for the long-term incentive and the 

























In this section 5 conclusions are provided that are based on the regression in section 3.5. The 
listed conclusions are supported by multiple robustness checks. We discuss the following 
themes:  
1) The executive remuneration decision – balancing risk & reward  
2) Do high-performing companies believe in the pay-for-performance adage? 
3) Managerial power and compensation risk  
4) Country effects – the importance of a holistic approach  
5) Time effects – replacing options with shares 
 
1) The executive remuneration decision – balancing risk & reward  
This chapter has researched the correlation between pay risk and reward. A significant 
correlation between risk level and pay level was found. This could imply that CEOs are only 
willing to accept higher risk if this coincides with a higher level of expected pay or that higher 
expected pay can only be justified to stakeholders if the associated pay risk increases as well. It 
is thus concluded that risk is higher in the higher income categories. After controlling for the 
individual benchmark level, one would expect to see no or limited differences. This indeed is 
the case; reward-to-variability ratios (based on Sharpe, 1966, 1994) show similarity between the 
6 defined income categories (see section 3.4.1). The only category that shows a significant 
different pattern than the rest of the sample is income category II, which contains CEOs with an 
income between € 832,564 and € 1,602,563. These CEOs receive a significantly higher reward 
for each unit of risk. This may indicate that competition is strong in this segment of the CEO 
labour market, which causes remuneration committees to bid up against each other. In general, 
it is concluded that the remuneration committee has the task to balance risk and reward, such 
that company objectives are supported.  
 
2) Do high-performing companies believe in the pay-for-performance adage? 
The regression results in section 3.5 show that there is a significant and positive correlation 
between Tobin’s Q and the CompRiskTDC index. Duffhues (2006) describes Tobin’s Q as an 
important report mark for the organisation. Companies with a higher report mark tend to use 
greater incentive strength. An alternative explanation is that companies with a stronger link 
between pay and performance perform better as measured in terms of Tobin’s Q. 
 
3) Managerial power & compensation risk 
Economic logic would dictate that the utility of a CEO is positively related to the level of 
compensation and negatively related to the risk associated with this remuneration. The results in  
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the following chapter 4, support the first part of this statement. There, it is established that the 
only real CEO power variable that positively and significantly correlates to excess remuneration 
is CEO tenure. The longer the CEO is in his position, the more power he obtains to set 
compensation to increase his utility. With regard to the second part of the statement anecdotal 
evidence was found in section 3.4.1. If a ‘free-ride’ would be identified as a mismatch between 
risk and reward such that risk is below the 25
th percentile of the income category and reward 
above the 75
th percentile of the range, this results in 60 observations or 5% of the sample. The 
tenure in this ‘free-ride group’ is on average 8.3 years as opposed to 4.9 years for the remaining 
part of the sample. Further support was found in the regression analysis of section 3.5.3. The 
tenure of the CEO negatively correlates to the remuneration risk as measured by the CompRisk 
index.  
 
4) Country effects - the importance of a holistic approach  
 
In this chapter the top end of the UK and Dutch markets were researched with respect to 
compensation risk related to the short-term incentive, the long-term incentive and total direct 
compensation. The analysis in section 3.3 showed that a holistic approach is needed, when it 
comes to assessing compensation risk. Summing up the relative STI and LTI positioning does 
not result in the correct conclusion for TDC. The UK shows similar compensation risk for the 
STI and lower compensation risk for the LTI. When viewed in isolation, the sum would result in 
overall lower compensation risk at the TDC level. However, as a result of an overall higher 
weight of variable pay in the UK, the risk of total direct compensation is higher. All direct 
compensation elements should therefore be taken into account to reach meaningful conclusions. 
 
5) Time effects – replacing options with shares 
Time dummies (2003-2008) are included in the regression analysis. Ceteris paribus, it is 
expected that time itself is not a significant determinant of compensation risk. However, 
changes over time can be picked up through this dummy. The year dummies are significant and 
the sign is negative. This implies that compensation risk has decreased over the research period. 
A possible explanation can be found in the use of long-term incentive vehicles. In the early 
years of the sample, a relatively high use of options is observed. In the year 2001, the (average) 
weight of options in the LTI program equalled 61.5% versus 36.8% in shares. At the end of the 
research period, these figures were 18.7% and 76.6%, respectively. Because shares have a lower 




3.6.3 Future research  
There are various areas that one can explore further. In this chapter, I have used the CompRisk 
index as an endogenous variable and focused on the direct compensation elements (base salary, 
bonus, long-term incentive). Alternatively, the CompRisk index can be used as a right-hand-side 
variable, for example, in empirical work that researches the determinants of company 
performance or managerial risk taking. It can be used as a proxy for company (performance) 
culture or CEO risk aversion. With ongoing improvements in remuneration disclosure in 
Europe, one will be able to use the index to explore different countries and add other 
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Appendix 3.1: Overview of exchange rate and research variables  
Exchange rate used: GPB-EUR: 1.472 (average over the 2001-2008 period).  
 
The table below provides an overview of the research variables, a description, the source and a 
reference to the section in which the variable is used. 
Variable name  Description and source  Section 
# of conditions  Dummy variable; 1 if each euro in the long-term incentive plan is 
governed by 2 or more performance conditions. Source: annual 
reports, current research (fair value calculation). 
3.4 
# of plans  Number of LTI plans (square transformed). Source: annual reports.  3.4 
2003  Time dummy 2003  3.5 
2004  Time dummy 2004  3.5 
2005  Time dummy 2005  3.5 
2006  Time dummy 2006  3.5 
2007  Time dummy 2007  3.5 
2008  Time dummy 2008  3.5 
Bank  (%)  Percentage of share capital owned by banks. Source:  annual 
reports, Manifest. 
3.5 
Basic salary (€)  Salary including fixed elements, such as vacation allowance and 
additional end-of-year payments. 
3.5 
CAPEX  Capital expenditures divided by revenues (expressed as a 
percentage). Source: S&P (CapitalIQ). 
3.5 
CEO ownership (ln value 
€) 
Share capital owned by the CEO (expressed as a EUR amount). For 
the regressions, the variable is natural log transformed. Source: 
annual reports, Manifest. 
3.5 
CEO tenure  Tenure of the CEO in current position (expressed in years). Source: 
annual reports. 
3.5 
CRI Compensation  risk  index.  3.1-3.6 
CRLTI  Compensation risk of the long-term incentive plan.  3.1-3.6 
CRSTI  Compensation risk of the short-term incentive plan.  3.1-3.6 
CRTDC  Compensation risk of total direct compensation.  3.1-3.6 
Debt-ratio (sqrt)  Debt to total capital ratio (expressed as a percentage). The square 





Variable name  Description and source  Section 
Deferred shares  Weight of deferred shares in the total LTI package (expressed as a 
percentage).  Source: annual reports, current research (fair value 
calculations). 
3.4 
Deloitte  Auditor dummy variable; 1 if the company is audited by the 
specific company. Source: annual reports. 
3.5 
Employees  The number of employees as per the end of the fiscal year. Source: 
annual reports, S&P (CapitalIQ). 
3.3 
Ernst  &  Young  Auditor dummy variable; 1 if the company is audited by the 
specific company. Source: annual reports. 
3.5 
Exec. Chair  Executive  chairman dummy variable; 1 if exec/CEO and chair. 
Source: annual reports, Manifest. 
3.5 
Exercise period  Remaining exercise period after the moment of vesting (expressed 
in months). Source: annual reports, current research (fair value 
calculations).  
3.4 
Individual  (%)  Percentage of share capital owned by individuals (personal 
investments). Source: annual reports, Manifest.   
3.5 
Industrial (%)  Percentage of share capital owned by industrial companies. Source: 
annual reports, Manifest. 
3.5 
Insurance (%)  Percentage of share capital owned by insurance companies. Source: 
annual reports, Manifest. 
3.5 
Investment (%)  Percentage of share capital owned by investment funds. Source: 
annual reports, Manifest. 
3.5 
LTI value (A)  Annualised value of the long-term incentive, calculated based on 
alternative A. Under alternative A, the input parameters for the 
calculation are based on 1 year historical data. Source: DataStream, 
Central Bank, annual reports, IFRS2 valuation techniques. 
3.5 
LTI value (B)  Annualised value of the long-term incentive, calculated based on 
alternative B. Under alternative A, the input parameters for the 
calculation are based on the average of 1, 3, 5 and 10 year 
historical data. Source: DataStream, Central Bank, annual reports, 
IFRS2 valuation techniques. 
3.5 
Market capitalisation  Total market capitalisation in the research year per 31 December. 
Source: DataStream. 
3.3 
Market weight  Weight of market condition (such as TSR) in the total LTI package 




Variable name  Description and source  Section 
value calculation). 
NED (%)  Percentage of non executive directors in the board (available for 
one-tier boards). Source: annual reports, Manifest. 
3.5 
New CEO year  Dummy variable; 1 if a new CEO is appointed in the given year. 
Source: annual reports, company websites. 
3.5 
Nom.  Trust  (%)  Percentage of share capital owned by nominee/trust. Source: 
annual reports, Manifest. 
3.5 
Notice  Company notice period of involuntary contract termination 
(expressed in months). Source: annual reports. 
3.5 
Options  Weight of options in the total LTI package (expressed as a %). 
Source: annual reports, current research (fair value calculations). 
3.4 
Parachute  Dummy variable; 1 if there is a ‘soft landing’ measured by the 
possibility of a higher severance payment than 1 times annual 
salary. Source: annual reports, Manifest. 
3.5 
Pension  (%)  Percentage of share capital owned by pension funds. Source: 
annual reports, Manifest. 
3.5 
Performance  volatility  Volatility of the performance condition. Source: annual report, 
S&P (CapitalIQ), current research (fair value calculations).  
3.4 
Policy STI value (€)  Target value of the short-term incentive in euro.  3.5 
Priceswing  Swinging for the fences’ indicator; highest share price in the 
researched year minus the lowest share price divided by the 
midpoint. Source: DataStream (share prices). 
3.5 
PWC  Auditor dummy variable; 1 if the company is audited by the 
specific company. Source: annual reports. 
3.5 
Relative TSR (%)  Relative Total Shareholder Return measured on a yearly basis, by 
share price movements as well as dividends paid out and reinvested 
in the stock. Industry average (based on the companies in the 
sample) is deducted to obtain the relative figure (expressed as a 
percentage). Source: DataStream. 
3.5 
Revenue  Revenue per the research year (expressed in millions of euro). 
Source: annual reports, S&P(CapitalIQ).  
3.3 
TDC (A,B)  Total direct compensation, i.e. the sum of basic salary, target value 
of the short-term incentive plan and the annualised expected value 
of the long-term incentive plan. Under alternative A, the input 




Variable name  Description and source  Section 
based on 1 year historical data. Under alternative B, the input 
parameters are based on the average of 1, 3, 5 and 10 year 
historical data. 
Tobin's Q  Q ratio: book value of debt plus market value of equity divided by 
book value of total assets. Source: annual reports, S&P 
(CapitalIQ). 
3.5 
Total assets   Total assets per end of book year expressed in millions of Euro. 
Natural logarithm of total assets is used for the regressions. of 
Source: annual reports, S&P (CapitalIQ). 
3.3, 3.5 
Vehicle volatility  Volatility  of the underlying vehicle, i.e. zero in the case of cash 
and equal to share price ‘volatility’ in case of options and shares. 
Share price volatility, measured over a 1-year historical period 
(alternative A) and by taking the average of a period of 1, 3, 5 and 
10 years (alternative B). Source: DataStream (share prices). 
3.4 























Appendix 3.2: Comparison of CompRiskTDC (ρ = 1/ρ = 0/ρ = -1) 
The tables below, show the impact of STI and LTI correlation on the risk of the total 
compensation package. Theoretically, these two instruments can be used as a hedge to mitigate 
payout risk (ρ = -1). The tables show that compensation risk would indeed be relatively low in 
this scenario. If the structure of the LTI were perfectly (negatively) mimicked by the STI, it 
would create a perfect hedge, resulting in no risk for the CEO (i.e. CompRisk of 0). This would, 
for example, involve the grant of put options on the company’s stock price. This is not observed 
in the research sample. It is not in line with the objective of a variable pay contract. It is 
therefore expected that the correlation coefficient is 0 or positive. Because of the different 
timing of payout, a correlation of zero is assumed. In addition, the results of the extreme cases 
of a correlation coefficient of 1 and minus 1 are also shown. 
 ρ = 1                      
Statistics  CR TDC 3 A  CR TDC 4 A  CR TDC 5 A     CR TDC 3 B  CR TDC 4 B  CR TDC 5 B 
           
25th  percentile  25 28 30    28 31 34 
50th  percentile  39 41 42    45 46 48 
Mean  43 44 46    48 49 50 
75th  percentile  58 58 59      64 65 65 
N  735 575 414      735 575 414 
          
ρ = 0                      
Statistics  CR TDC 3 A  CR TDC 4 A  CR TDC 5 A     CR TDC 3 B  CR TDC 4 B  CR TDC 5 B 
           
25th  percentile  21 22 24    24 26 27 
50th  percentile  32 33 34    38 39 39 
Mean  37 37 38    42 42 43 
75th  percentile  49 48 49      56 55 55 
N  735 575 414      735 575 414 
          
ρ = -1                      
Statistics  CR TDC 3 A  CR TDC 4 A  CR TDC 5 A     CR TDC 3 B  CR TDC 4 B  CR TDC 5 B 
           
25th  percentile  10 10 10    13 13 13 
50th  percentile  21 21 21    26 26 26 
Mean  27 26 27    32 31 32 
75th  percentile  38 37 39      45 44 45 
N  735 575 414      735 575 414 
 
Because the CompRisk tool is particularly used in relative sense (e.g. company X exhibits a 
higher risk than company Y), the absolute values are less relevant than the relative positioning.  Appendix 3.3: CompRisk comparison UK versus NL – robustness check based on Mann-Whitney test 
This table shows the results of the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. Based on the Mann-Whitney two-sample statistic, the null hypothesis is tested that two independent 
samples (i.e., unmatched data) are from populations with the same distribution. Differences are significant, if the null hypothesis is rejected. Tests are performed for the 
short-term incentive (based on 3, 4 and 5 year historical data; see section 3.2.2.1), the long-term incentive (based on alternative A and B; see section 3.2.2.2), and total 
direct compensation (based on basic salary and combinations of the STI and LTI, see section 3.2.2.3).  
Null hypothesis  Determination of input    Observations     Mann-Whitney     Relative position 
      NL UK Combined    z-stat  Prob  >  |z| H0 Rejected (yes /no)    NL  UK  
                        
Short-term incentive                       
CompRisk NL = CompRisk UK  3    276  479  755    0.726  0.4678  No    =  = 
CompRisk NL = CompRisk UK  4    211  380  591    0.814  0.4158  No    =  = 
CompRisk NL = CompRisk UK  5    145  281  426    1.338  0.1808  No    =  = 
                        
Long-term incentive                       
CompRisk NL = CompRisk UK  A    356  709  1065    4.850  0.0000  Yes    +  - 
CompRisk NL = CompRisk UK  B    356  709  1065    5.435  0.0000  Yes    +  - 
                        
Total direct compensation                        
CompRisk NL = CompRisk UK  UA    479  768  1247    -11.255 0.0000  Yes    -  + 
CompRisk NL = CompRisk UK  3VA    479  768  1247    -10.163 0.0000  Yes    -  + 
CompRisk NL = CompRisk UK  4VA    479  768  1247    -10.684 0.0000  Yes    -  + 
CompRisk NL = CompRisk UK  5VA    479  768  1247    -10.463 0.0000  Yes    -  + 
                        
CompRisk NL = CompRisk UK  UB    479  768  1247    -11.187 0.0000  Yes    -  + 
CompRisk NL = CompRisk UK  3VB    479  768  1247    -10.166 0.0000  Yes    -  + 
CompRisk NL = CompRisk UK  4VB    479  768  1247    -10.657 0.0000  Yes    -  + 
CompRisk NL = CompRisk UK  5VB     479  768  1247     -10.353 0.0000  Yes     -  +  
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Appendix 3.4: Drivers of compensation risk – robustness checks 
This table shows the same model as table 3.29, now with robust estimation of standard errors. IRLS stands for iteratively reweighted least squares.   
Variable     Huber-White     Bootstrap     Jack-knife     IRLS 
    Coefficient  t-stat   Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient t-stat 
Options   .03305119***  28.14    .03305119***  30.43   .03305119***  28.03   .03195478***  41.25 
    (0.0000)      (0.0000)      (0.0000)      (0.0000)    
Deferred shares    -.01305476***  -10.64    -.01305476***  -12.53   -.01305476***  -10.60   -.01223223***  -13.49 
    (0.0000)      (0.0000)      (0.0000)      (0.0000)    
Vehicle volatility    .09969443***  31.24    .09969443***  32.18   .09969443***  31.08   .10882386***  55.64 
    (0.0000)      (0.0000)      (0.0000)      (0.0000)    
Performance volatility    .01537809***  11.91    .01537809***  12.89   .01537809***  11.87   .00981706***  11.55 
    (0.0000)      (0.0000)      (0.0000)      (0.0000)    
Market weight    .01116261***  10.01    .01116261***  13.31   .01116261***  9.97   .01338316***  19.02 
    (0.0000)      (0.0000)      (0.0000)      (0.0000)    
# of conditions    -.24956478*  -2.43    -.24956478*  -2.70   -.24956478*  -2.42   -.17580109*  -2.51 
    (0.0152)      (0.0069)      (0.0156)      (0.0120)    
# of plans    -.01783035***  -4.74    -.01783035***  -3.87   -.01783035***  -4.69   -.01446476***  -2.97 
    (0.0000)      (0.0001)      (0.0000)      (0.0030)    
Vesting  period   .16201936***  37.22   .16201936***  42.12   .16201936***  37.04   .16236974***  67.88 
    (0.0000)      (0.0000)      (0.0000)      (0.0000)    
Exercise period    -.0129064***  -5.16    -.0129064***  -4.52   -.0129064***  -5.14   -.01275222***  -5.99 
    (0.0000)      (0.0000)      (0.0000)      (0.0000)    
_cons   .41208254***  9.99    .41208254***  10.29   .41208254***  9.95   .16237326**  3.01 
      (0.0000)          (0.0000)          (0.0000)          (0.0026)     
Observations      2391      2391      2391    2391       
Adjusted R²  .92266625 .92266625 .92266625 .94797104    
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Appendix 3.5: Determinants of the CompRisk index - robustness checks  
 
Panel A: seven alternative CompRiskTDC proxies  
The two tables below show the results of the regression for seven alternative ways to calculate the CompRisk index of total direct compensation. It is based on both 
alternative A and B for the long-term incentive (see section 3.2.2.2). The different CompRiskTDC proxies are furthermore determined by the way short-term incentive 
compensation risk is calculated: ‘U’ stands for uniform distribution, ‘3AV’ stands for CompRiskSTI calculated based on 3 year historical data, ‘4AV’ is based on 4 year 
historical data, and ‘5AV’ is based on 5 year historical data. The panel regression takes into account unit fixed effects at the company level.  Estimation of standard 
errors is robust to disturbances being heteroskedastic and autocorrelated (observations are clustered per company). The coefficient, p-value (italic) and t-statistic are 
reflected. Stars stand for significance: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. CompRisk, TDC, CEO ownership, and total assets are natural log transformed. Variables are 
reflected in the following groups; individual, company, industry, and time effects. 
 
Alternative A for calculation of the long-term incentive  
 1    2    3 
Variable  CompRisk - TDC U A     CompRisk - TDC 3AV A     CompRisk - TDC 5AV A 
 Coefficient  t-stat    Coefficient t-stat    Coefficient  t-stat 
               
Individual effects               
TDC  (A)  .86969508*** 11.83   1.0415946*** 8.76    .94771677*** 10.04 
  0.0000     0.0000      0.0000  
CEO  tenure  -.0253744*** -4.93   -.04632808***  -5.00    -.03631754*** -6.18 
  0.0000     0.0000      0.0000  
New CEO year  .04543312  1.11    -.03262158  -0.56    .02010165  0.46 
  0.2676     0.5787     0.6480   
CEO ownership (ln value €)  .00342816  0.66    .00405121  0.51    .00463003  0.75 
 0.5071      0.6117     0.4551   
               
Company  effects               
Nom. Trust (%)  -.00012071  -0.03    .00004741  0.01    .00045362  0.10 
  0.9767     0.9894      0.9193   
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Bank (%)  -.00511496  -1.62    -.00732432  -1.48    -.0070825*  -1.82 
  0.1079     0.1396     0.0710   
Insurance  (%)  -.00600691 -1.17   -.01273029  -1.45    -.0090328 -1.52 
  0.2455     0.1488      0.1294  
Investment  (%)  -.0011097 -0.48    .00065916 0.21    -.00148225 -0.56 
  0.6340     0.8332      0.5785  
Pension  (%)  -.00339258 -0.30   -.01603372  -1.10    -.01387952 -1.14 
  0.7618     0.2733      0.2566  
Industrial  (%)  -.00970658*** -3.97   -.00980253***  -3.12    -.01094352*** -3.90 
  0.0001     0.0021      0.0001  
Individual  (%)  -.00764509 -0.90    -.0051002  -0.33    -.00620954 -0.65 
  0.3678     0.7400      0.5171  
Total  assets  (ln)  .00214248 0.05    .03248976  0.63    .02146486 0.49 
  0.9583     0.5325      0.6271  
Debt-ratio (sqrt)  .02416073***  2.81   .02829897**  2.39   .02376649**  2.38 
  0.0056     0.0178      0.0185  
CAPEX  -.00178198 -1.02   -.00261697  -1.09    -.00162404 -0.94 
  0.3089     0.2780      0.3480  
Tobin's Q  .07920726***  2.82    .08983526** 2.30    .09511501*** 3.00 
  0.0054     0.0229      0.0032  
Priceswing .02675409  0.39    -.04034169  -0.39    -.01679119  -0.21 
  0.6988     0.6961      0.8340  
PWC -.21961753*  -1.74    -.50368772**  -2.17    -.35703162**  -2.17 
  0.0841     0.0314      0.0316  
Ernst & Young  -.6285115**  -2.36    -1.0593083* -1.95    -.74772201* -1.95 
  0.0196     0.0530      0.0524  
Deloitte  -.04819133 -0.49   -.01783391  -0.10    -.04008786 -0.32 
  0.6245     0.9188      0.7513  
Exec.  Chair  .09100455 1.14    .0162115  0.13    .03579337 0.37 
  0.2565     0.8936     0.7092   
NED  (%)  .00190742 0.71    .00093302  0.24    .00019755 0.06 
  0.4792     0.8103      0.9493  
               
Industry  effects               
Relative TSR (%)  -.00071357  -1.50    -.00070607  -1.09    -.000844  -1.66  
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 0.1357     0.2772      0.0981  
               
Time  effects               
Time dummies (2003-2008)  yes      yes     yes   
               
_cons  -8.6377279*** -8.20   -11.103839***  -6.80    -9.7689131*** -7.44 
   0.0000         0.0000         0.0000     
               
Observations  1216     1216      1216  






Alternative B for calculation of the long-term incentive  
 4    5    6    7 
Variable  CompRisk - TDC U B     CompRisk - TDC 3AV B     CompRisk - TDC 4AV B     CompRisk - TDC 5AV B 
 Coefficient  t-stat    Coefficient t-stat    Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient  t-stat 
                     
Individual effects                     
TDC  (B)  .8524307*** 11.76    1.0176997*** 8.70    .92915415*** 9.90    .92556263*** 10.14 
  0.0000      0.0000     0.0000     0.0000   
CEO  tenure  -.02468384***  -4.32    -.04477933*** -4.88    -.03761201*** -5.78   -.03483696***  -5.87 
  0.0000      0.0000     0.0000     0.0000   
New CEO year  .02521425  0.67    -.04977747  -0.92    -.00049243  -0.01   .00786562  0.20 
  0.5037      0.3602     0.9908     0.8456  
CEO ownership (ln value €)  .00155666  0.34    .00065098  0.09    .00189991  0.32    .00198509  0.36 
  0.7364      0.9259     0.7470     0.7226  
                     
Company  effects                     
Nom. Trust (%)  .00167359  0.43    .00163832  0.41    .00136405  0.40    .00212006  0.49 
  0.6679     0.6796     0.6922     0.6247  
Bank  (%)  -.00411071 -1.53    -.00590287  -1.37    -.00576006*  -1.72   -.00621746 -2.01 
  0.1291     0.1717     0.0872     0.0458   
Insurance  (%)  -.00590431  -1.32    -.01331283* -1.66    -.0099225* -1.97  -.00937132*  -1.84 
  0.1890      0.0981     0.0511     0.0682   
Investment  (%)  -.0020816  -1.04   -.00003808 -0.01    -.00170479 -0.71   -.00201003  -0.83 
  0.3004      0.9893     0.4798     0.4063   
Pension  (%)  -.00657577 -0.65    -.02072206  -1.44    -.02308078*  -1.79   -.01830253 -1.61 
  0.5140      0.1519     0.0751     0.1096  
Industrial  (%)  -.01051351***  -4.90    -.01074342*** -3.86    -.01232882*** -4.63   -.01193672***  -4.86 
  0.0000      0.0002     0.0000     0.0000   
Individual  (%)  -.00754934  -1.21   -.00434229 -0.32    -.00480242 -0.59   -.00611211  -0.82 
  0.2266      0.7489     0.5532     0.4115   
Total  assets  (ln)  -.00650856 -0.17   .02674186 0.56   .02182537 0.52    .01468644  0.37 
  0.8623     0.5796     0.6034     0.7124   
Debt-ratio  (sqrt)  .01859737**  2.60   .02246435** 2.07   .0200064** 2.15   .01833098**  2.11 
  0.0103      0.0400     0.0333     0.0360    
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CAPEX  -.00211009  -1.22   -.00284335 -1.16    -.00196317 -1.11  -.0018844  -1.12 
  0.2254     0.2460      0.2667     0.2635   
Tobin's Q  .05392951*  1.95    .06764464*  1.79    .07085158**  2.18    .07171059**  2.30 
  0.0534     0.0759      0.0307     0.0226  
Priceswing  -.10550279  -1.61   -.16378377 -1.62    -.13333724 -1.61   -.14103854*  -1.82 
  0.1085      0.1080     0.1085     0.0711   
PWC  -.24626784**  -2.10   -.52359913** -2.43   -.35860172** -2.41   -.37701118**  -2.55 
  0.0369      0.0163     0.0173     0.0118   
Ernst & Young  -.57218857**  -2.01    -1.000192*  -1.79   -.65076284*  -1.66  -.68916046*  -1.75 
  0.0465      0.0751     0.0982     0.0823   
Deloitte -.03020991  -0.29    -.01102948  -0.06   6,56E-03  0.00   -.02456245  -0.20 
  0.7731      0.9494     10.000     0.8435   
Exec.  Chair  .08984832  1.27   .02448402 0.21   .01968322 0.22    .04058572  0.47 
  0.2073      0.8302     0.8261     0.6397  
NED  (%)  .00057762  0.24   -.00144975 -0.40    -.00231309 -0.74   -.00201128  -0.69 
 0.8068      0.6914      0.4617     0.4905   
                     
Industry  effects                     
Relative TSR (%)  -.00084498*  -1.71    -.00081798  -1.25    -.00074364  -1.41   -.00092839*  -1.80 
 0.0885      0.2128      0.1597     0.0737  
                     
Time  effects                     
Time dummies (2003-2008)  yes      yes     yes     yes   
                     
_cons  -8.1137509***  -7.79    -10.473891*** -6.46    -9.2915886*** -7.09   -9.1690965***  -7.21 
   0.0000         0.0000         0.0000         0.0000     
                     
Observations  1216      1216     1216     1216   
Adjusted R²  .77620297         .68208084         .73314122         .74393954     
 
 Panel B: ρ = -1 / ρ = 1 
The table below shows the results of the regression for two alternative ways to calculate the CompRisk 
index of total direct compensation; based on a correlation coefficient of minus 1 and plus 1. It is based on 
alternative A for the long-term incentive (see section 3.2.2.2) and 4 year historical data for the short-term 
incentive (3.2.2.1). The panel regression takes into account unit fixed effects at the company level.   
Estimation of standard errors is robust to disturbances being heteroskedastic and autocorrelated 
(observations are clustered per company). The coefficient, p-value (italic) and t-statistic are reflected. 
Stars stand for significance: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. CompRisk, TDC, CEO ownership, and total 
assets are natural log transformed. Variables are reflected in the following groups; individual, company, 
industry, and time effects. 
 
Variable  CompRisk - TDC 4AV A       CompRisk - TDC 4AV A 
ρ = -1  Coefficient t-stat   ρ = 1  Coefficient t-stat 
              
Individual effects            
TDC (A)  1.217469***  9.14      .9173684***  9.39 
  0.000       0.000  
CEO tenure  -.0320387***  -3.12     -.0415043***  -6.08 
  0.002       0.000  
New CEO year  .075846  0.91      -.0133584  -0.29 
  0.363       0.774  
CEO ownership (ln value €) .0020681  0.19      .0047486  0.72 
 0.849        0.470  
           
Company effects            
Nom. Trust (%)  -.0001576  -0.02     .0003763  0.11 
  0.981       0.910  
Bank (%)  -.0110364*  -1.86     -.005636  -1.32 
  0.064       0.190  
Insurance (%)  -.0181493**  -1.97     -.0088894  -1.44 
  0.051       0.153  
Investment (%)  -.0022832  -0.45     -.000682  -0.27 
  0.656       0.789  
Pension (%)  .0114758  0.30      -.0212974  -1.64 
  0.764       0.104  
Industrial (%)  -.019161***  -2.85     -.0108566***  -3.82 
  0.005       0.000  
Individual (%)  -.0088349  -0.68     -.004312  -0.40 
  0.500       0.689  
Total assets (ln)  .0598959  0.52      .0267386  0.62 
  0.602       0.537  
Debt-ratio (sqrt)  -.0078614 -0.32     .0248009**  2.37 
  0.746       0.019  
CAPEX -.000535  -0.18     -.0023835  -1.23 
  0.855       0.221  
Tobin's Q  .1390783**  2.18      .0828181**  2.48 
  0.031       0.014  
Priceswing .0158938  0.11      -.0043794  -0.05 
  0.915       0.958   
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PWC -.7894688**  -2.62     -.320377*  -1.92 
  0.010       0.057  
Ernst & Young  -.7893449  -1.40    -.7948724**  -2.00 
  0.163       0.048  
Deloitte .217436  0.96     -.0787762  -0.60 
  0.340       0.547  
Exec. Chair  .0100563  0.06      .0129549  0.13 
  0.952       0.897  
NED (%)  .0009417  0.15      -.0000319  -0.01 
 0.879        0.992  
           
Industry effects            
Relative TSR (%)  -.0032087***  -3.12     -.0002357  -0.43 
 0.002        0.667  
           
Time effects            
Time dummies (2003-2008)          
           
_cons -14.02274***  -7.33     -9.241712***  -6.82 
   0.000            0.000     
            
Observations 1216        1216   
Adjusted R²  0.4906            0.6970      
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Panel C: Cross sectional results 
This table shows the results of the regression for the CompRisk index of total direct compensation, based 
on alternative A for the long-term incentive (see section 3.2.2.2) and based on 4 year historical data for 
the short-term incentive (see section 3.2.2.1). The cross-sectional regression is based on eight-year 
average values. The coefficient, p-value (italic) and t-statistic are reflected. Stars stand for significance: * 
p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. CompRisk, TDC, CEO ownership, and total assets are natural log 
transformed. Variables are reflected in the following groups; individual, company, industry, and time 
effects. 
Variable  CompRisk - TDC 4AV A 
 Coefficient  t-stat 
      
Individual effects    
TDC (A)  .4685093***  6.56 
  0.000  
CEO tenure  -.0248236***  -3.28 
  0.001  
New CEO year  -.9533352***  -2.64 
  0.009  
CEO ownership (ln value €)  .0029185  0.32 
  0.748  
    
Company effects    
Nom. Trust (%)  .0009751  0.49 
  0.622  
Bank (%)  .0092992  1.44 
  0.152  
Insurance (%)  -.004012  -0.48 
  0.632  
Investment (%)  -.0005827  -0.15 
  0.879  
Pension (%)  -.0014766  -0.15 
  0.883  
Industrial (%)  .0018399  0.36 
  0.718  
Individual (%)  .0036582  0.86 
  0.389  
Total assets (ln)  -.0328261  -1.10 
  0.272  
Debt-ratio (sqrt)  -.0387652*  -1.97 
  0.050  
CAPEX .0159543***  4.71 
  0.000  
Tobin's Q  .1098678**  2.27 
 0.025   
Priceswing 1.264957***  5.48 
  0.000  
PWC -.1408367*  -1.67 
  0.097  
Ernst & Young  -.1679472  -1.56 
  0.120   
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Deloitte -.1197328  -1.17 
  0.244  
Exec. Chair  .3990756***  2.64 
  0.009  
NED (%)  .0012477  0.76 
  0.446  
    
Industry effects    
Relative TSR (%)  -.0170644***  -4.76 
  0.000  
    
_cons -3.387975  -3.91 
   0.000     
    
Observations 161   





Panel D: UK sample results 
This table shows the UK results of the regression for the CompRisk index of total direct compensation 
(years with no CEO change), based on alternative A for the long-term incentive (see section 3.2.2.2) and 
the STI based on 4-year historical data (see section 3.2.2.1). The panel regression takes into account unit 
fixed effects at the company level. Estimation of standard errors is robust to disturbances being 
heteroskedastic and autocorrelated (observations are clustered per company). The coefficient, p-value 
(italic) and t-statistic are reflected. Stars stand for significance: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
CompRisk, TDC, CEO ownership, and total assets are natural log transformed. Variables are reflected in 
the following groups; individual, company, industry, and time effects. 
Variable  CompRisk - TDC 4AV A 
UK sample  Coefficient t-stat 
      
Individual effects    
TDC (A)  .8793653***  7.13 
  0.000  
CEO tenure  -.0455441***  -4.70 
  0.000  
CEO ownership (ln value €)  .0009266  0.11 
  0.917  
    
Company effects     
Nom. Trust (%)  -.0028817  -0.78 
  0.438  
Bank (%)  -.0036596  -0.93 
  0.356  
Insurance (%)  -.010454  -1.25 
  0.215  
Investment (%)  .0004215  0.12 
  0.907  
Pension (%)  -.0341865  -0.90 
  0.369  
Industrial (%)  -.0067831*  -1.98 
  0.051  
Individual (%)  -.0059411  -0.48 
  0.629  
Total assets (ln)  .0689534  1.35 
  0.181  
Debt-ratio (sqrt)  .0286292**  2.52 
  0.013  
CAPEX .0006526  0.24 
  0.810  
Tobin's Q  .096221**  2.49 
  0.014  
Priceswing .0174733  0.14 
  0.891  
PWC -.6107299**  -2.39 
  0.019  
Ernst & Young  -1.169794*  -1.93 
  0.056  
Deloitte .1431054  0.54  
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  0.590  
Exec. Chair  .0294901  0.33 
  0.743  
NED (%)  .003011  0.78 
  0.435  
    
Industry effects     
Relative TSR (%)  -.000285  -0.41 
  0.685  
    
Time effects     
Time dummies (2003-2008)  yes  
    
_cons -9.459893***  -5.31 
   0.000     
    
Observations 657  
Adjusted R²  0.6501      
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Panel E: NL sample results 
This table shows the NL results of the regression for the CompRisk index of total direct compensation 
(years with no CEO change), based on alternative A for the long-term incentive (see section 3.2.2.2) and 
the STI based on 4-year historical data (see section 3.2.2.1). The panel regression takes into account unit 
fixed effects at the company level. Estimation of standard errors is robust to disturbances being 
heteroskedastic and autocorrelated (observations are clustered per company). The coefficient, p-value 
(italic) and t-statistic are reflected. Stars stand for significance: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
CompRisk, TDC, CEO ownership, and total assets are natural log transformed. Variables are reflected in 
the following groups; individual, company, industry, and time effects. 
Variable  CompRisk - TDC 4AV A 
NL sample  Coefficient t-stat 
      
Individual effects    
TDC (A)  1.548639***  4.91 
  0.000  
CEO tenure  -.0259541**  -2.59 
  0.010  
CEO ownership (ln value €)  .0024912  0.23 
  0.822  
    
Company effects     
Nom. Trust (%)  -.0060126  -1.32 
  0.193  
Bank (%)  -.0106741  -1.53 
  0.131  
Insurance (%)  -.0114381  -0.86 
  0.395  
Investment (%)  -.005898  -1.66 
  0.103  
Pension (%)  -.008499  -0.54 
  0.590  
Industrial (%)  -.0195743***  -3.37 
  0.001  
Individual (%)  -.0108781  -0.54 
  0.589  
Total assets (ln)  -.0454041  -0.28 
  0.778  
Debt-ratio (sqrt)  .0384351  1.44 
  0.154  
CAPEX -.0137863  -1.59 
  0.118  
Tobin's Q  .1607538**  2.42 
  0.016  
Priceswing -.0463323  -0.38 
  0.702  
PWC -.330803  -1.38 
  0.171  
Ernst & Young  -.3277725  -1.05 
  0.297  
Deloitte -.0952851  -0.62  
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  0.541  
Exec. Chair  (dropped)   
    
NED (%)  .0383964**  2.49 
  0.016  
    
Industry effects     
Relative TSR (%)  -.000527  -0.39 
  0.697  
    
Time effects     
Time dummies (2003-2008)  yes  
    
_cons -17.02284***  -4.23 
   0.000     
    
Observations 388   






































































Determinants of Profit Centre Head Remuneration 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The objective of this book, is to add to the managerial compensation contracting literature in 
three ways: i) Open the black box of the executive remuneration decision; ii) Capture the 
executive remuneration structure in a single quantifiable yardstick; iii) Work with a new and 
potentially unique dataset on profit centre head remuneration. In this research chapter, I focus 




The remuneration of chief executive officers (CEO) has received ample attention in the 
academic literature.
186 Despite the fact that the CEO plays a very important role in the 
organisation, Porter (1980) claims that profit centres are ultimately of key interest in obtaining a 
competitive advantage, as many strategic decisions are made by the top managers of these profit 
centres. Therefore, the analysis of compensation for executives below the very top of the 
corporate hierarchy is important (Lambert, Larcker and Weigelt, 1991). However, hardly any of 
the academic literature is focused on the topic of compensation of profit centre heads (PCHs).  
 
Table 4.1 provides a first insight into the relative absence of research in this specific area, based 
on a recent search in the SSRN and JSTOR databases. The general topic of “executive 
compensation” renders a maximum number of hits in SSRN of 1,431. The more specific topic 
of “CEO compensation” returns 926 hits. For the JSTOR database these numbers are 125 and 
94 respectively. In contrast, various combinations for PCH compensation return a maximum of 
3 hits.  
 
                                                      
185 A profit centre head has profit & loss responsibility for a part of the company. Depending on the 
structure of the organisation, he is responsible for a geographical area or a line of business / division. 
Titles that companies use to identify this position are for example: ‘managing director’, CEO Europe, 
Executive Vice President, business unit director, area manager, president Americas.    
186 An overview of the literature on the determinants of CEO compensation is provided in appendix 4.5. 222 
 
Table 4.1: Search results CEO and PCH compensation in JSTOR & SSRN 
This table shows the search results in the JSTOR and SSRN databases for various terms related to CEO 
and PCH compensation. The search engines are not completely the same. SSRN executes the abstract 
search also in the title and keywords.   
Search terms in JSTOR  # HITS IN 'ABSTRACT'  # HITS IN 'TITLE' ONLY 
CEO AND compensation  94  36 
Chief AND executive AND officer AND compensation  14  3 
Executive AND compensation  125  100 
Profit AND centre AND head AND compensation  0  0 
Profit AND centre AND manager AND compensation  0  0 
Profit AND center AND head AND compensation  0  0 
Profit AND center AND manager AND compensation  1  1 
Business AND unit AND head AND compensation  0  0 
Business AND unit AND manager AND compensation  0  2 
 
Search terms in SSRN  # HITS IN ‘ABSTRACT’   # HITS IN TITLE ONLY 
CEO AND compensation  926  201 
Chief AND executive AND officer AND compensation  92  2 
Executive AND compensation  1,431  355 
Profit AND centre AND head AND compensation  0  0 
Profit AND centre AND manager AND compensation  0  0 
Profit AND center AND head AND compensation  0  0 
Profit AND center AND manager AND compensation  2  0 
Business AND unit AND head AND compensation  0  0 
Business AND unit AND manager AND compensation  3  0 
 
The almost non-existence of research on profit centre head compensation is likely a result of the 
limited requirements by corporate governance codes or law, to disclose the compensation 
information of individual top managers (Ferrarini et al, 2003). For the United States, there is 
some information, but only in cases where the profit centre head falls within the category of the 
handful highest paid (proxy) officers.
187 Occasionally U.S. companies are willing to disclose 
individual remuneration information of all their top managers including the profit centre heads. 
In conclusion, detailed PCH information below the top executive team for the U.S. is scarce. It 
is even scarcer for European firms. Because it qualifies as private information, empirical 
research on this subject is difficult to execute. As several researchers call for exploration of the 
topic (Bushman, Indjejikian and Smith, 1995; Rajgopal and Srinivasan, 2006), we will provide 
for such research in this chapter, based on a unique dataset of 645 European firms covering 
16,415 CEO / PCH observations over the time span 2000-2008, made available by Towers 
Perrin.
188  
                                                      
187 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2006 adopted disclosure rules which require 
public companies to disclose the remuneration information for the CEO and its four other most highly 
paid executive officers (Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 174 / Friday, September 8, 2006 / Proposed 
Rules). 
188 If data is reflected, this is done at a high level to respect the proprietary nature. 223 
 
4.1.1 Research questions 
We will base our analysis on three of the major themes in the remuneration literature; traditional 
agency theory, managerial power theory and corporate tournament theory.   
 
Since Jensen and Meckling (1976), the literature on CEO compensation has been dominated by 
agency theory. This economic theory based on the principal-agent setting, claims that three 
problems emerge from the separation of ownership: 
1.  First, there is a misalignment of interest between managers and shareholders. Shareholders 
strive for the creation of shareholder wealth through increases in the market value of the 
firm’s common stock, while managers pursue their own career and wealth;  
2.  Second, managers have more information about the firm than shareholders; this means there 
is information asymmetry. Because of this asymmetry of information, shareholders are not 
perfectly able to observe whether managers take the right actions that enhance shareholder 
value; 
3.  Third, shareholders are able to hold well-diversified portfolios which make them neutral for 
firm-specific risk (but not for systemic risk). In contrast, managers are tied to a specific firm 
with their (human) capital, and exposed to full company risk. This makes them risk-averse. 
 
Because of the misalignment of interests and the different risk preferences, together with the 
imperfect monitoring by shareholders, agency costs arise. It is a general belief that in order to 
reduce these agency costs, compensation contracts of managers need to be tied to a performance 
measure which contributes to the enhancement of long-term shareholder value. In this way, the 
misalignment of interests between shareholders and managers is reduced.  
From this perspective, empirical research has focused on the determinants of CEO pay and 
particularly the expected relationship between executive compensation and firm performance 
(among others Agarwal, 1981; Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Murphy, 1985; Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990a; Abowd, 1990; Leonard, 1990). This has not always been an easy task (Hall and 
Liebman, 1998; Murphy, 1998). This conclusion has added an important dimension to more 
recent research. Other factors than performance could be important in explaining the executive 
compensation landscape. An important factor which is suggested by Bebchuk, Fried and Walker 
(2002) and Grinstein and Hribar (2003), is that managerial power can be of substantial 
influence. Managerial power theory suggests that the board is not operating at the arm’s length 
ideal. Rather, the CEO may have substantial influence over the board which he uses during the 
bargaining over executive compensation to influence his pay. It was in these types of studies 
that personal characteristics and the firm’s corporate governance structure gained increased 
attention (Lewellen et al., 1985; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989; Tosi and Gómez-Mejia, 1989; 224 
 
Yermack, 1996; Cyert, Kang, Kumar and Shah, 1997; Core et al., 1999; Conyon and Murphy, 
2000; Murphy, 2002; Bebchuk et al., 2002, 2007). 
  
As mentioned, we will also take into account an alternative stream of research, originated by 
Lazear and Rosen (1981). They state that, often, positions are filled through promotion from 
within, and that pay rises strongly with hierarchical level. For subordinates of the CEO, these 
pay gaps would create the right incentives for eliciting effort and making human capital 
investments (Bognanno, 2001). This perspective thus has implications for the level and structure 
of pay for the level(s) below the executive board, but also for the CEO himself. With the 
absence of the implicit incentives for the CEO, that arise from the opportunities to move up the 
hierarchical ladder, it is expected that incentives stem more explicitly from the compensation 
package; i.e. bonuses and LTI plans tied to company performance (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992). 
Ortín-Ángel and Salas-Fumás (1998) were able to confirm this view; they find that the relative 
size of the bonus with respect to base salary increases as one moves up the hierarchical ladder. 
 
These discussions have brought us to the following research questions: 
 
Table 4.2: Research questions  
This table provides an overview of the research questions of this chapter, the objectives, and the 
references to the relevant theory focus and section. 
Research questions  Objectives  Theory 
focus 
Section 
1) What are the 
determinants of 
profit centre head 
remuneration? 
We will research the determinants and divide 
the analysis in two perspectives: i) ex ante 
perspective: expected compensation in terms of 
base salary, total target cash compensation, total 
target direct compensation, pay structure; ii) ex 
post perspective: actual compensation in terms 






2) What are the 
determinants of the 
CEO-PCH 
remuneration gap? 
We will research the determinants and divide 
the analysis in an i) ex ante perspective: base 
salary, total target cash compensation, total 
target direct compensation, pay structure; ii) ex 
post perspective: actual compensation in terms 






3) Do CEOs have 
more power to 
influence their actual 
bonus than PCHs? 
A proxy for excess remuneration is constructed. 
We will research: i) Pay-for-performance: is the 
pay-for-performance adage equally applied to 
the CEO and the PCHs?; ii) Pay-without-
performance: which additional factors can 
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A limitation to the research is that we do not have performance at the individual profit centre 
level. We will use performance at the company level combined with the relative size of the 
profit centre. For ex ante or expected compensation, the absence of performance information at 
the individual business unit level is less relevant, because here we measure the remuneration 
level at t=0 (before performance). For the analysis of ex post or realised compensation, we will 
control for the human capital starting point (ex ante compensation).   
4.1.2 Research structure  
In the remainder of this chapter we will test the described theories: section 4.2 will provide 
descriptive statistics of the dataset. In section 4.3 we will address question 1, on the 
determinants of PCH compensation. Section 4.4 will deal with research question 2 and section 
4.5 with research question 3. After some introductory remarks, each of these sections is divided 
in three subsections: theory & hypothesis development, data & methodology and the results of 
the analyses. Section 4.6 provides for a general summary and a conclusion. 226 
 
4.2 Descriptive statistics of the dataset 
In this section, we will provide descriptive statistics of the dataset. As the data qualify as 
proprietary, we will respect the inherent limitations. However, given the unique nature of the 
sample as well as the academic call for exploration of this topic, we will provide extensive 
summary statistics.  
4.2.1 Companies, industries & countries  
The sample consists of 645 of the largest European companies, both listed as well as non-listed. 
The total number of firm-year-position observations is 16,415. The time span is 2000-2008. The 
dataset can be qualified as an unbalanced panel, given the fact that data is not always available 
for each company for each of these years. In tables 4.3 to 4.6 we will provide detailed overviews 
of the number of observations related to public versus private companies, one-tier versus two-
tier governed companies, industry origin and location of the profit centres, on a year-to-year 
basis.  
 
Table 4.3: Overview public versus private companies 
          Year                   
Company  status    2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008    Weighted  average 
Private    %  26 20 23 24 20 21 18 17 18    20 
Public  %  74 80 77 76 80 79 82 83 82    80 
               
Total  observations  617  1000 1523 1902 2184 2358 2289 2146 2396     16415 
 
As 20% of the observations relate to non-listed companies, data collection on specific company 
parameters for these firms is no sinecure.  
 
Table 4.4: One-tier versus two-tier governance 
          Year                   
Board  governance   2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008    Weighted  average 
One-tier  %  84 83 79 78 76 77 75 74 74    77 
Two-tier  %  16 17 21 22 24 23 25 26 26    23 
                                   





Table 4.5: Overview of industries (two-digit SIC)  
This table shows which observations are related to which industry, based on two-digit SIC. SIC stands for 
Standard Industrial Classification. 
      Year                    
SIC  (two-digit)  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008      Total 
               
10  8  8  7  10 12 11 18 16 12    102 
13  10 21 30 35 48 25 25 16 19   229 
14  5 9  12   2 5 8  13  15    69 
15  22 35 40 50 45 26 29 23                270 
16      21 38 13 30 28 43 38   211 
17            2  4  2           8 
20 30  55  101  111  138  179  117  89  87    907 
21  3  7  8 19  19  20  17  13 5   111 
22        5    18  17  17           57 
23       2  8  9  2  21   42 
25      20 12 20 18 20 15 27   132 
26    21 27 11 13 18  7  9  4    110 
27  32 41 40 38 61 58 55 52 64   441 
28  46  105  97  147 165 166 175 161 172    1234 
29  9  10 24 19 25 32 29 26 28   202 
30  7  14 18 19 21 25 30 25 27   186 
31  6  19          12  2   39 
32  17 24 30 33 33 21 21 13 35   227 
33  6  15 71 59 57 51 57 51 66   433 
34  8 24  29  12  28  28 4 13 6   152 
35  9  16 17 35 46 41 36 33 38   271 
36  20 39 70 83 76 93 88 79  101   649 
37  40  65  116 149 147 147 171 129  71    1035 
38  14 25 32 35 21 35 83 74  127   446 
39        3  4  6  9   22 
40  4    7 20  14  22 6 19  14   106 
41       5  5  2  6  6  11    35 
42  3 10  14 9 12  12  13  12  11   96 
43       8    10  8  9  12    47 
44  10  10  14  5  3  3               45 
45  22 27 30 38 36 37 51 40 28   309 
47  13 19 26 22 12 10  3  3  17   125 
48  41  66  67  103 123 140 107 123 108    878 
49  32  37  72  104 173 122 132 116 150    938 
50  17 21 58 66 68 95 98 99  103   625 
51  8 15 7 11  12  33  27  38  35   186 
52  4 4 5 5 5 4 5 5                37 
53  13 15 24 34 41 49 27 30 26   259 
54  7  12 10 26 39 47 39 23 22   225 228 
 
      Year                    
SIC  (two-digit)  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008      Total 
55        2 2 2 2 3 4   15 
56      2 2 6 6  17   6   39 
57  3 3 3 6 7  18  13  8 8   69 
58      5    3 11 7 12  18   56 
59  6 8  16  11  14  8 8 5 5   81 
60  20  44  114 166 256 256 210 172 246    1484 
61  4 2 4 5 8  10  10  22  52    117 
62    3  7  12 17 21 33 58 22    173 
63  32 61 62 83  106  108  109  72 74   707 
64       6    5  10  5   26 
65      8  16 17 17 52 47 38    195 
67  17 25 24 62 62 63 80 91 91   515 
70  24 22 28 22 37 29 26 18 68   274 
72        2  2  10 14 19 21    68 
73  37 38 47 54 78  120  109  109  141   733 
75  2  2    3  3  5  2             17 
78        2 3 2 3 2 2   14 
79  6 3 2 9 9 7 6 2  18    62 
87      57  69  13  19 9 41  66   274 
                                   
Total  617  1000 1523 1902 2184 2358 2289 2146 2396      16415 
 
Some industries are more prevalent in the dataset than others. There are 3 industries with more 
than 1,000 observations each: chemicals & allied products (SIC 28), auto, aircraft & ship-
building industry (SIC 37), banks (SIC 60). Together, they represent 22.9% of the observations. 
 
Table 4.6: Country overview (profit centre locations)  
      Y e a r                     
Country  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008      Total 
               
AUT        4  113  117  95    329 
BEL  31  43  77  111 131 148 118 147 175  981 
DEU    26  79 104  151  131 92 123  195  901 
ESP      104 168 223 233 226 220 320  1494 
FRA 122 271 424 497 555 692 584 453 688  4286 
GBR 390 423 532 638 622 596 641 612 575  5029 
ITA      1  42 54 61 60 50 64   332 
NLD  74  128 167 166 224 279 258 239 210  1745 
SWE    109  110  105  116  103  104  103           750 
SWZ      29 71  108  111  93 82 74   568 
                                   
Total  617  1000 1523 1902 2184 2358 2289 2146 2396     16415 229 
 
In order to provide further insight into the companies in the dataset, we provide summary 
statistics of scope (employees, total assets, revenue) as well as company age in graph 4.1 and 
4.2. 
 
Graph 4.1: Scope (employees, assets sales) 
This graph shows vertical box plots of the scope parameters of the companies in the dataset. Reading of 
the graph box is facilitated by the explanation below. The upper and lower adjacent values are calculated 
based on Tukey (1977), at 1.5 times the interquartile range. Values outside this cluster, are labelled 
‘outside values’ and plotted separately. All scope figures are natural log transformed. 
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The strength of the (scope) box plot is that it provides an overview of size indicators in a single 
graph. As the direct interpretation might be less intuitive because of the natural logarithm 
transformation, we will provide these scope figures again in section 4.2.2 without this 
transformation. There, we will use these figures to put the compensation figures of CEOs and 






Graph 4.2: Overview of company age in years  
This graph shows the cross sectional age of the companies in the dataset. Age is expressed in terms of the 
number of years that have passed since the year of incorporation. For interpretation of the graph box, see 

























4.2.2 CEOs and PCHs 
In this section we will present summary statistics of CEO and PCH compensation figures, and 
some personal characteristics. To provide background on the relevant company we will provide 
scope indicators as well. Table 4.7 provides an overview of the number of CEOs and PCHs per 
year.  
 
Table 4.7: Overview of CEOs and PCHs 
        Y e a r                
Position  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008    Total 
               
CEO  140 180 232 296 314 356 338 336 321  2513 
PCH  -  Profit  Centre  Head  477  820  1291 1606 1870 2002 1951 1810 2075  13902 
                                   
Total    617  1000 1523 1902 2184 2358 2289 2146 2396    16415 
 
Table 4.7 indicates a total number of 13,902 company-year-PCH observations. The 
corresponding CEO in various cases was not always part of the remuneration survey on which 
we have based our analysis. In order to execute CEO-PCH comparability analyses, we have 
scanned all relevant sources (annual reports, company websites, etc.) in order to fill in the CEO 
gaps. Due to disclosure constraints throughout Europe, (particularly related to non-listed 
companies as well as the early years in the sample), this has not always been possible. For 231 
 
‘easy’ items such as tenure, we succeeded in 89% of the cases. More complex items such as 
compensation figures were recorded in 80% of the cases. In all of these cases, the CEO earns at 
least a base salary that could be recorded. Depending on company characteristics (such as being 
listed or not) this is complemented with a short-term incentive program (STIP) and / or a long-
term incentive plan (LTIP). Panel A and B of table 4.8 provide so-called position summary 
tables for the CEO and PCH position.  
 
Table 4.8: Position summary table – Panel A (CEO position) 
This table shows a summary of remuneration figures, personal characteristics and company characteristics 
for the CEO position, over the research period (2000-2008). For a detailed overview of descriptions and 
sources of the variables see appendix 4.1. The table makes use of the cross sectional properties of the 
dataset. In the regression analyses in the upcoming sections we have added a time dummy in order to 
establish the effects related to time. For summary tables per year, see appendix 4.2. All values are 
denominated in EUR. All remuneration related percentages, express a percentage of base salary.  Used 
average exchange rates over the period 2000-2008: GBP-EUR: 1.490651, USD-EUR: 0.885573, CHF-
EUR: 0.646034, SEK-EUR: 0.109271, JPY-EUR: 0.007758. Source: www.oanda.com. 
Chief Executive Officer  N  p5  p25  p50   mean  p75  p95 
Base  salary  2018 364911  615927  889410  943415  1192384 1714666 
Base increase %  1324  0  1  5  7  10  23 
STI  target  value  1603  112764  280000 500000 682925 847173  1917717 
STI target %  1603  25  40  50  68  90  130 
STI max %  1551  44  65  100  113  150  240 
STI value  1786  0  238248  536634  790954  1025918  2570915 
STI %  1786  0  35  64  79  106  200 
LTI value  1710  0  153507  498580  997279  1133989  3358066 
LTI %  1710  0  23  56  92  107  268 
Total target variable %  1488  30  75  119  157  188  387 
Total  variable  %  1515  25  70  123 170 213 439 
Total  Target  Cash  2018 464087  825000  1256829 1485898 1866745 3400000 
Total  Cash  2018 491722  886000  1334732 1659791 2064254 4040576 
Total  Target  Direct  Compensation 1710 579190 1158282 1925000 2537745 3016231 6229086 
Total  Direct  Compensation  1710 572424 1162090 1936734 2640015 3187862 6648000 
Age  of  individual  2142  43  50 54 54 58 63 
Tenure position (years)  2216  0  1  3  4  6  12 
Tenure company (years)  2231  1  4  10  14  22  36 
Span of control (# of employees)  2449  1026  8117  23275  47839  66473  171995 
Company total employees  2449  1026  8117  23275  47839  66473  171995 
Company total assets (* 1 mln)  2391  420  2494  8608  73923  35130  435599 
Company total sales (* 1mln)  2380  343  2143  5990  17277  17278  64204 
Responsibility  (relative  size  PC)  2513  100  100 100 100 100 100 
 232 
 
Table 4.8: Position summary table – Panel B (PCH position) 
This table shows a summary of remuneration figures, personal characteristics and company characteristics 
for the PCH position, over the research period (2000-2008). For a detailed overview of descriptions and 
source of the variables see appendix 4.1. The table makes use of the cross sectional properties of the 
dataset. In the regression analyses in the upcoming sections we have added a time dummy in order to 
establish the effects related to time. For summary tables per year, see appendix 4.3. All values are 
denominated in EUR. All remuneration related percentages, express a percentage of base salary. Used 
average exchange rates over the period 2000-2008: GBP-EUR: 1.490651, USD-EUR: 0.885573, CHF-
EUR: 0.646034, SEK-EUR: 0.109271, JPY-EUR: 0.007758. Source: www.oanda.com. 
Profit Centre Head  N  p5  p25  p50  mean  p75  p95 
Base  salary  13902 112104 174000 250000 306228 384818  674199 
Base  increase  %  8508  0 3 5 6 8 18 
STI target value  12678  23348  51949  95024  156337  185000  469276 
STI  target  %  12678  15 26 40 49 50 100 
STI  max  %  11172  28 44 60 74 90 154 
STI  value  12280 6711  44237 89177  183699  196964  585323 
STI  %  12280  4  24 37 51 59 122 
LTI value  13192  0  12298  72218  176965  188398  660345 
LTI  %  13192  0  7  29 48 60 147 
Total target variable %  12041  21  44  71  90  112  210 
Total  variable  %  11735  16  41  73 100  121 245 
Total  Target  Cash  13902 138464 226800 339780 448801 551399 1097836 
Total  Cash  13902 138451 226451 341564 475533 559641 1177307 
Total  Target  Direct  Compensation 13192 156591 270000 431453 628919 756970 1691169 
Total  Direct  Compensation  13192 155000 268199 437746 657449 775291 1781372 
Age of individual  9862  39  45  49  49  55  60 
Tenure position (years)  8492  0  1  2  3  4  9 
Tenure company (years)  9517  1  5  13  15  24  34 
Span of control (# of employees)  7159  10  264  1380  5704  5000  24180 
Company total employees  2449  1026  8117  23275  47839  66473  171995 
Company total assets (* 1 mln)  2391  420  2494  8608  73923  35130  435599 
Company total sales (* 1mln)  2380  343  2143  5990  17277  17278  64204 
Responsibility (relative size PC)  10928  0  2  9  20  25  94 
 
Panel A and B of table 4.8 show apparent differences between the CEO and PCH position. On 
average the CEO is older than the PCH, earns more in absolute euro terms and has a higher ratio 
of variable versus fixed compensation, i.e. more explicit performance incentives (see “total 
variable %” and “total target variable %”).  233 
 
4.3 Determinants of profit centre head (PCH) remuneration 
This section explores the determinants of PCH remuneration. We will first describe the existing 
theory and develop our hypotheses. Subsequently, we will discuss the data & methodology. 
Finally, the results of the analyses are presented.  
 
4.3.1 Theory & hypothesis development 
When determining the factors that influence the compensation of profit centre heads, it is 
difficult to rely on existing academic literature, given the limited amount of research available. 
Fisher and Govindarajan (1992) is an exception to the rule. The determinants of PCH 
compensation were researched on the basis of a U.S. data set. Given the fact that their data 
include the years 1982 through 1986, the results from this study might be outdated; furthermore, 
a U.S. based dataset might not be representative for the European situation. For these reasons 
we first discuss the factors influencing CEO compensation that are presented in the academic 
literature. Next, we summarise the results of the Fisher and Govindarajan PCH study to 
complete the overview. We conclude this section by formulating a hypothesised model of the 
determinants of PCH compensation. 
 
4.3.1.1 Overview existing literature – determinants of CEO remuneration  
This section expounds the determinants of CEO compensation put forth by the empirical and 
theoretical research in the past. We will classify the determinants into four levels, namely: 




Several researchers have found a positive relationship between CEO tenure and compensation. 
Firstly, it is stated that a longer tenure may reflect a higher contribution or ability of the CEO. 
This could be the case because of the human capital acquirement over time, or because CEOs 
with better abilities are able to survive longer in this position (Bebchuk, Cremers and Peyer, 
2007). Secondly, it is argued that as tenure increases, the CEO is able to build influence within 
the firm which may increase his political power. The CEO might use this power to tie his 
compensation package more closely to his own preferences (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989; 
Hill and Phan, 1991; Cyert et al., 1997; Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999; Bebchuk et al, 
2007). 
Age 
An increase in age generally results in an increased experience and human capital acquirement, 234 
 
and hence, in a higher level of compensation. However, this increase in compensation shows a 
concave pattern. After 50-55 years of age, investment in training and human capital 
accumulation decreases. This may result in a diminishing growth of compensation (Ortín-Ángel 
and Salas-Fumás, 1998; Conyon and Murphy, 2000). 
Externally Hired 
When a firm forgoes its internal labour market to hire a CEO from outside the company, it is 
able to choose from a larger opportunity set of managers and, hence, has a better possibility of 
matching a manager to the firm. This can be costly when it is assumed that especially general 
skills are priced, instead of firm-specific skills (Murphy and Zábojník, 2003). Furthermore, 
outsiders are sometimes already CEO. This implies that they have higher opportunity costs, 
which requires a higher compensation (Deckop, 1988; Bebchuk, Fried and Walker, 2002). Also, 
Bebchuk and Fried (2005) state that the outside CEO has strong negotiation power resulting 
from the hypothesis that directors are willing to give in to higher compensation requests, to 
prevent a breakdown of the whole negotiation process, which may eventually be more costly.  
Education 
Observable human capital variables, such as education, serve as a measure of potential 
productivity when they are taken as proxies of managers’ ability and opportunity costs. It is in 
this light an important determinant of pay. However, the importance of education in setting 
CEO compensation fades over time, as information about the true productivity comes to notice 
(Leonard, 1990; Ortín-Ángel and Salas-Fumás, 1998). 
Ownership stake 
At significant levels of CEO ownership (> 25%), the CEO is likely to be entrenched and is able 
to control operating decisions as well as board decisions. This means that major stakeholders 
and the board of directors have less influence over CEO pay. CEOs in this position are in 
essence able to set their own compensation (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989; Tosi and Gómez-




Baumol (1959) indicates that executive compensation is closely related to the scale of 
operations. This is underscored by various others researchers who found that firm size, 
measured by sales, number of employees, or market capitalisation, is a major determinant of the 
complexity of the firm. For example, an increased span of control requires better managerial 
skills from the CEO. This implies that larger firms have a need for better-qualified managers; 
increased compensation should compensate for these additional requirements (Becker, 1964; 235 
 
Ciscel, 1974; Agarwal, 1981; Rosen, 1982; Baker et al., 1988; Deckop, 1988.) 
It is also argued that larger firms have more ability to afford higher fixed cost expenditures than 
small firms, so they are better able to pay higher wages to CEOs (Balkin and Gómez-Mejia, 
1987; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989). 
Furthermore, Simon (1957) proposed a sociological explanation based on the relationship 
between company size and management levels. He states that most authority relations within 
firms are hierarchical structured in a pyramid-form with many management levels. Companies 
tend to adhere to an appropriate difference in compensation between these levels. This implies 
that wage differences among CEOs are hence directly related to the number of management 
levels within the firm. As large firms have more management levels in the hierarchy, CEOs of 
these firms receive higher compensation than those of small companies.  
Firm performance 
The basic theory of the firm is based on the view that because of separation of ownership, 
proper compensation incentives need to be provided to managers in order to elicit shareholder 
value maximising behaviour. If this theory holds, we should also observe a relation between 
executive compensation and firm performance, rather than only a relation between executive 
compensation and firm size, as the latter gives the incentive to managers to only increase the 
scope of the firm’s operations, which is not always in the best interest of the shareholders. There 
are several researchers that indeed document a strong relationship between CEO compensation 
and firm performance, such as Lewellen and Huntsman (1970), Hall and Liebman (1998), Kraft 
and Niederprüm (1999), and Conyon and Schwalbach (2000). Hall and Liebman state that the 
relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance is for the largest part generated 
by the changes in value of the CEO’s stock and stock options. In Europe, shares and options are 
a less significant part of total compensation than in the U.S. However, a similar logic applies. 
We can conclude that executive compensation is related to both firm size and firm performance 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989). Ciscel and Carroll (1980) already indicated that both views 
are complementary, rather than substitute explanations for the determinants of executive 
compensation. 
Capital structure 
Bebchuk et al. (2007) find a relationship between a firm’s capital structure and CEO 
compensation. They suggest that leverage is viewed as costly to the CEO as he might suffer a 
loss of reputation in the case of default. Hence, the CEO might require more compensation 
when leverage is high. 236 
 
Presence of institutional investors 
For a dataset of 1,914 firms included in the S&P’s ExecuComp database from 1992 through 
1997, Hartzell and Starks (2003) find a negative relationship between institutional ownership 
concentration and the level of executive compensation. They argue that the presence of 
institutions serves a monitoring role to reduce the agency problem between management and 
shareholders. Institutional investors reduce the ability of managers to extract rents through 
compensation. Note that this U.S. practice may not necessarily translate to the European 
corporate governance context.  
Presence of large external shareholder 
Related to the previous variable is the presence of large external shareholders. Several 
researchers provide evidence that the monitoring performed by these large external shareholders 
reduce the rent extraction by managers (Dyl, 1988; Cyert et al. 1997; Kraft and Niederprüm, 
1999). Also, Gómez-Mejia et al. (1987) and Tosi and Gómez-Mejia (1989) determined that the 
incentives of CEOs and shareholders are better aligned when the company has a 5% external 
shareholder. When companies lack an outside dominant shareholder, CEOs tend to be rewarded 
more for performance realised outside of their control.  
CEO = Chair 
When the CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors, there is said to be CEO duality. 
Several researchers proved that CEO duality is positively related to CEO compensation. Conyon 
and Murphy (2000) view the combination of CEO and chairman of the board as a proxy for 
increased responsibility and ability of the CEO. As was discussed earlier, CEOs are 
compensated for such additional requirements in the form of increased pay levels. Second, they 
state that CEO duality is a proxy for the power of the CEO over the board and remuneration 
committee. When the CEO is also chairman, the extent of board control diminishes, and the 
CEO is better able to influence his compensation (Boyd, 1994; Core et al., 1999; Cyert, Kang 
and Kumar, 2002; Bebchuk et al. 2007).  
Board size 
Yermack (1996) and Core et al. (1999) document a positive relationship between board size and 
the level of CEO compensation. They state that larger boards might be less effective, which 
makes it more difficult for large boards to perform effective monitoring. Hence, CEOs may be 
more able to extract rents in the event of large boards.
189 
                                                      
189 There are others determinants, such as ‘busy board’. When a majority of outside directors serve on 
three or more boards, the board is viewed as ‘busy’. When directors are overstretched, it is argued, they 237 
 
Industry effects 
A number of researchers state that the industry in which a firm operates may have influence on 
the level of executive compensation (Agarwal, 1981; Balkin and Gómez-Mejia, 1987; Deckop, 
1988; Boyd, 1994; Conyon, Peck and Sadler, 2001). According to Hill and Phan (1991) this is 
because CEO compensation is set with reference to the pay levels of other CEOs in the industry. 
Furthermore, they argue that CEO compensation is a result of supply and demand for CEOs in 
an industry. 
O’Reilly et al. (1988) found that conglomerates pay their CEOs more than non-conglomerates. 
Murphy (1998) presented evidence that companies in the financial services industry receive 
higher compensation than CEOs of companies in non-financial industries. 
 
Country effects 
Murphy (1998) provides an international comparison of the pay level and structure of CEO 
compensation contracts. It was found that U.S. CEOs receive significantly higher compensation 
than CEOs in other countries. If we compare U.S. CEOs with European CEOs, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999), Conyon and Murphy (2000), and Oxelheim and Randøy (2005) 
find that CEO compensation is higher in Anglo-American firms than in continental European 
firms.  
An overview of the determinants of CEO compensation that are found in the academic literature 
is provided in appendix 4.5.  
 
4.3.1.2 Overview existing literature – determinants of PCH remuneration 
The extensive body of research on CEO compensation contrasts sharply with the absence of 
papers on the determinants of profit centre head compensation. Fisher and Govindarajan (1992) 
is an exception to the rule. According to Fisher and Govindarajan (1992), when studying the 
determinants of profit centre head compensation, we cannot simply transfer the factors that 
determine CEO compensation to the profit centre level.
190 Therefore, in this section we will 
discuss their results in detail. Similar to the previous section on CEO compensation, we will 
                                                                                                                                                            
may not be effective monitors (Core et al., 1999; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). Again, diminished 
monitoring provides the CEO with the possibility to increase his compensation. 
190 First, the maximisation of shareholder value is an important criterion used in previous studies to judge 
a CEO’s performance; however, it is difficult to measure the shareholder value creation at the profit 
centre level. Second, pay may be a more important motivator for a PCH than for a CEO. Because a 
typical CEO has more wealth than a typical PCH, a CEO may also be stimulated through other factors 
like power and prestige. Finally, the process and politics of setting the pay of a PCH and a CEO might 
differ as the setting of a PCH’s pay is normally done within the company while the pay of a CEO is also 
determined by the board of directors and the shareholders. 238 
 
classify the determinants into four levels, namely: individual, company, industry, and country 
effects, and present the sign of the coefficient found by Fisher and Govindarajan (1992).  
Individual effects 
Job / firm tenure (+) 
Fisher and Govindarajan argue that job tenure and firm tenure are potential sources of 
managerial power. When the job tenure and firm tenure of a PCH increases, the period of time 
to build up a relationships with the CEO has also increased. These established relationships 
shape an implicit contract that may allow the PCH to increase his compensation. Furthermore, 
job tenure and firm tenure may also account for human capital development, due to increased 
experience. Uniting the arguments on managerial power and human capital development, Fisher 
and Govindarajan suggest a positive relationship between job tenure and firm tenure and PCH 
compensation. 
Age  (+) 
Elaborating on the human capital argument, Fisher and Govindarajan state that, typically, 
experience increases with age. For this reason, increased age translates into an enlarged human 
capital acquirement. Profit centre heads are compensated for this increased human capital 
development through means of higher pay. 
Education (+) 
The relationship between education and PCH compensation is in line with the argument on age. 
According to Fisher and Govindarajan, increased education should account for increased 
expertise and, therefore, a higher level of compensation. 
 
Company effects 
Firm size / (relative) profit centre size (+) 
Although firm size and the level of CEO compensation are significantly related, the effect of 
firm size on PCH compensation needs not to be the same. Large firms tend to be more complex; 
however, this complexity is not necessarily transferred to the profit centre level. Profit centres 
might be designed and compensated as separate pillars; then, firm size would be unrelated to 
PCH compensation. However, Fisher and Govindarajan find evidence in line with the opinion of 
Simon (1957). He argued that larger firms have more hierarchical levels, and that most firms 
tend to create appropriate wage differences between these levels. As profit centres belong to the 
upper echelons of an organisation, this should imply that the larger the firm, the greater the level 
of PCH compensation. Together with the greater ability of larger firms to pay higher wages, this 
leads to the conclusion of Fisher and Govindarajan that firm size is positively related to profit 239 
 
centre head compensation. Next to firm size, the specific size of the profit centre is also related 
to PCH compensation. Fisher and Govindarajan state that larger profit centres are likely to be 
more complex than smaller profit centres, and therefore, require better skilled managers. Not 
only might the absolute size of the profit centre affect the compensation of the PCH, the relative 
size may also be important. A relatively larger profit centre might have more power because it 
may contribute relatively more to the firm performance and, hence, is considered to be more 
important. This power may able a PCH to extract more resources, including compensation. 
Fisher and Govindarajan find a positive relationship between PCH compensation and profit 
centre size as well as relative profit centre size. 
Firm performance (+) 
Fisher and Govindarajan test whether PCH compensation is related to firm performance, as 
existing academic literature found a correlation between firm performance and CEO 
compensation. They argue that when firm performance is high, there is a greater ability to pay. 
In addition, firm performance is determined by profit centre performance. However, the 
correlation between firm performance and base salary of profit centre heads proved to be 
insignificant.
191 However they did find a relationship between the bonus component of PCH 
compensation and firm performance: the better firm performance, the larger the bonus 




The study of Fisher and Govindarajan includes controls for industry variations. The results 
indicate that conglomerates pay higher PCH wages than the other industries included in their 
sample (only financial services companies tend to pay their PCHs more than conglomerates do). 
These findings are consistent with the results of O’Reilly et al. (1988) for CEOs. A possible 
explanation for the fact that conglomerates tend to pay higher PCH wages might be that 
conglomerates are more complex than firms operating in a homogeneous industry context. This 
higher level of complexity calls for better skilled profit centre managers, and hence, higher 
compensation.  
                                                      
191 Firm performance is often measured by a firm’s return on equity (ROE). Establishing the ROE of a 
profit centre is difficult as profit centres do not have easily identifiable asset bases. For this reason, Fisher 
and Govindarajan were not able to define an objective financial measure of profit centre performance, and 
hence, do not further deal with issues regarding the relation between profit centre performance and PCH 
compensation.   240 
 
Country effects 
Fisher and Govindarajan do not deal with country variation as their data sample is solely based 
on the U.S.  
4.3.1.3 Development of hypotheses 
We take, as a starting point, the factors of the Fisher and Govindarajan study that have proven to 
be of influence in determining PCH pay. Table 4.9 provides an overview of these factors. 
 
Table 4.9: Summary determinants of PCH remuneration 
This table shows an overview of the variables in the Fisher and Govindarajan (1992) study that have 
proven to be of influence on PCH remuneration.  
Variable   Positive / negative effect 
Job/firm tenure  + 
Age + 
Education + 
Firm size and (relative) profit centre size  + 
Firm performance and (relative) profit centre performance  + 
Industry factors: Conglomerates  + 
 
Our model is reflected in equation 4.1 and is an extension of the Fisher and Govindarajan model 
(taking into account the determinants of CEO compensation), with a few amendments:  
 
i) In comparison to the Fisher and Govindarajan (1992) study, our dataset lacks information on 
education of the PCH. Education is traded for experience / productivity once individuals have 
climbed the corporate ladder. Experience is part of the dataset through the variables company 
tenure, position tenure and age. As we will only study PCHs that are one or two reporting levels 
away from the CEO position, we believe that the omission of PCH education will not 
significantly affect our model; ii) In terms of performance variables at the individual profit 
centre level we have the relative performance contribution, measured by the relative size of the 
business unit. Due to the fact that we will be (primarily) looking at ex ante (policy) 
remuneration levels (and control for policy levels in the ex post analyses, and incorporate 
performance measures at the company level), the absence of other performance measures at the 
profit centre level will only play a limited role in the results of the model; iii) Changing 
disclosure requirements over the research period (2000-2008), in different countries, and for 
listed versus non-listed companies, imposes a difficulty on the collection of block holder 
information. Therefore, we have used a single source to collect this information 
(Amadeus/REACH). This ensures consistency and reduces noise in the dataset. The available 
information provided by this source is for a single moment in time. It is applicable to the end of 241 
 
the research period. We have used this information as a proxy for the other years; iv) As a result 
of the fact that we research multiple countries, we are able to include additional factors to the 
model, e.g. to research the impact of one-tier versus two-tier governed companies and country 
specific practices (Abowd and Bognanno, 1999; Conyon and Schwalbach, 2000; Murphy, 1998; 
LaPorta et al., 1999; Oxelheim and Randøy, 2005). 
PCH Compensation Levelit = α + β1Ageit + β2DummyExternallyHiredRecentlyit + 
β3PositionTenureit + β4CompanyTenureit + β5ReportingLevelit + β6InternationalScopeit + 
β7SpanofControlit + β8PCRelativeSizeit + β9FirmSizeit + β10CompanyAgeit + β11IPOAge + 
β12Governance(DummyTwo-tierBoard)it + β13CapitalExpenditures%ofSalesit + 
β14FirmPerformanceit + β15FirmRiskit + β16BlockHolderTotal%i  + β17BlockHolderType%i + 
β18DummyFinancialCompanyit  + β19DiversificationLevel(Conglomerate)it +  
β20DummyCountryit  + β21DummyTimei + εit           [4.1] 
4.3.2 Data & methodology  
As was reflected in table 4.6, there are 13,902 PCH-firm-year observations. As aforementioned, 
the disclosure requirements in Europe (especially in the early part of the sample and for non-
listed companies) are limited. This implies that not in all cases we have been able to collect the 
right-hand-side variables. Furthermore, survey right-hand-side variables (such as tenure and 
relative PC size) were not always recorded for each case. In combination this can cause a 
“butterfly effect”. The trade-off is clear. Including more variables in the dataset creates a 
decreasing number of total observations. In line with Greene (2003) we will follow the zero-
order method of replacing each missing value, with the sample regressor average for all 
variables that are not dummies. This results in no changes and is equivalent to dropping the 
incomplete data. The benefit of this approach is that it is not necessary to delete the whole 
observation line. However, there is no free lunch. The approach has the disadvantage of 
resulting in a lower R
2. With regard to dummy variables from the survey, we have recorded a 
one if we are certain that the relevant variable is applicable. For example, for the dummy 
variable “externally hired” we have recorded a one in those cases were we have the information 
that the person is indeed externally hired and zero in all other cases. The same is true for the 
category variable ‘international scope’. This is defended, based on the experience that if the 
characteristic is not relevant, it is not (always) filled in.
 
 
Our objective is to research both time variant and invariant determinants of PCH remuneration. 
In terms of the regression methodology, we have therefore used pooled OLS. In order to 
account for the fact that multiple observations are related to the same company, as well as the 
possibility that residuals can behave non-independent within companies, we will cluster the 242 
 
observations per company. This results in standard errors being robust to disturbances being 
heteroskedastic and autocorrelated. To take into account time, country and industry effects, we 
have used dummy variables. Pearson correlation coefficients are below 0.4
192 and the mean VIF 
equals 2.00.   
4.3.3 Results of the analyses 
We have split this section in an ex ante and ex post perspective. Ex ante refers to the policy 
remuneration levels (base salary, target STI, annualised expected long-term incentive value as 
well as the sum of total target cash and total target direct compensation). Typically, the policy 
remuneration level rewards for the built-up human capital. Ex post refers to the actual earned 
bonus levels (i.e. actual STI, actual total cash, and total direct compensation). We would expect 
these levels to be tied to performance after controlling for the target remuneration level.
193 
4.3.3.1 Ex ante perspective 
Table 4.10 and 4.11 present the results of the analyses. Table 4.10 reflects (natural logarithm 
transformed) remuneration levels in euro and table 4.11 reflects individual policy elements of 
the pay structure expressed as a percentage of base salary. 
                                                      
192 In two instances, the correlation coefficient is higher than 0.4: i) the correlation coefficient between 
company assets (ln) and company employees equals 0.428; ii) the correlation coefficient between gearing 
and the dummy for companies in the financial services industry equals 0.5379.  
193 Long -term incentives are typically directly tied to company performance (e.g. share price within listed 
firms) and therefore typically satisfy the pay-for-performance adage (apart from the discussion on 
rewarding for luck, among others Bertrand and Mullanaithan, 2001).  Table 4.10: PCH compensation – policy pay levels 
This table shows the results of the regression for the ex ante or policy compensation levels, following equation 4.1. In terms of the regression methodology, we have 
used pooled OLS, based on estimation of standard errors that are robust to disturbances being heteroskedastic and autocorrelated. Observations are clustered per 
company. We have used four dependent variables: i) ‘Base salary’ equals all fixed components including elements such as vacation allowance; ii) ‘Base increase’ 
equals the increase in base salary in the research year; iii) ‘TTC’ is total target cash, which equals the sum of base salary and target cash bonus; iv) ‘TTDC’ is total 
target direct compensation (TTDC) which equals the sum of base salary, target cash bonus and the annualised long-term incentive value. Remuneration figures are 
expressed in EUR and are natural log transformed. Base salary increase is expressed as a percentage. The coefficient, p-value (italic) and t-statistic are reflected. Stars 
stand for significance: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Variables are reflected in the following groups: individual, company, industry, and country effects. Time 
dummies have been included in the model. The variable ‘Company assets’ is natural log transformed.    
 
Variable  Base salary (ln)     Base increase (%)     TTC (ln)     TTDC (ln) 
 Coefficient  t-stat    Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient  t-stat 
                        
Individual effects (job & personal characteristics) 
Age  0.011113 *** 11.33   -0.081543  ***  -4.37  0.010228 *** 9.43   0.009289 *** 7.26 
  0.0000       0.0000       0.0000     0.0000   
Dummy externally hired recently  0.044323 *  2.29   -1.125734 ***  -3.49   0.026882   1.09    0.009081   0.32 
  0.0224       0.0005       0.2757     0.7496   
Position tenure  -0.000816   -0.40   -0.130879 ***  -3.81   -0.002520   -0.92    0.000700   0.21 
  0.6899       0.0002       0.3565     0.8343   
Company tenure  -0.002989 *** -3.78   0.025137   1.80   -0.003827 *** -4.36   -0.004201 *** -3.91 
  0.0002       0.0721       0.0000     0.0001   
Reporting  level  -0.393750 *** -24.24   -0.940118  ***  -4.19  -0.456029 *** -25.11  -0.501844 *** -22.14 
  0.0000       0.0000       0.0000     0.0000   
International scope  0.070719 *** 10.88   -0.032387   -0.35  0.097437 *** 11.52   0.116995 *** 11.63 244 
 
Variable  Base salary (ln)     Base increase (%)     TTC (ln)     TTDC (ln) 
 Coefficient  t-stat    Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient  t-stat 
  0.0000       0.7262       0.0000     0.0000   
Span  of  control  0.000004 *** 5.15   0.000001    0.10   0.000004 *** 4.81   0.000004 *** 3.95 
  0.0000       0.9242       0.0000     0.0001   
PC relative size  0.002885 *** 9.25   0.005730   1.42    0.002996 *** 8.16    0.003945 *** 8.42 
  0.0000       0.1573       0.0000     0.0000   
                       
Company effects (size, age, capital, performance, risk, governance, block holders) 
Company assets (ln)  0.082253 *** 11.19   0.009027   0.09    0.093914 *** 9.52    0.117288 *** 8.95 
  0.0000       0.9298       0.0000     0.0000   
Company  employees  0.000001 *** 3.31   0.000003    1.10   0.000001 **  3.23   0.000001 *  2.29 
  0.0010       0.2717       0.0013     0.0225   
Company  age  -0.000121   -0.79   0.007157  **  2.81   -0.000173  -0.88   -0.000185  -0.77 
  0.4301       0.0051       0.3788     0.4424   
IPO age   0.011093 **  2.66   -0.012781   -0.28   0.013849 **  2.78    0.017308 *  2.57 
  0.0079       0.7777       0.0056     0.0104   
Governance (dummy two-tier board)  -0.075812 **  -2.65   -0.187082   -0.58   -0.093855 *  -2.36    -0.118693   -1.91 
  0.0082       0.5629       0.0184     0.0564   
Liquidity  ratio  -0.000024   -0.90   -0.000599  *  -2.24  -0.000038  -1.28   -0.000042  -1.60 
  0.3705       0.0258       0.2025     0.1109   
Gearing  -0.000001   -0.18   -0.000112  **  -2.89  0.000000  0.06   0.000000  0.04 
  0.8546       0.0040       0.9513     0.9672   
Capital expenditure% of sales  0.000049   0.58   0.001406   1.49    -0.000043   -0.47    -0.000034   -0.28 245 
 
Variable  Base salary (ln)     Base increase (%)     TTC (ln)     TTDC (ln) 
 Coefficient  t-stat    Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient  t-stat 
  0.5637       0.1374       0.6352     0.7834   
ROCE  0.000630   1.50   0.010778    1.61   0.000270  0.56   0.001339  1.90 
  0.1349       0.1083       0.5748     0.0574   
Profit  margin  -0.000485   -1.61   0.009670   1.90   -0.000334  -0.87   -0.000312  -0.82 
  0.1087       0.0583       0.3864     0.4110   
Interest  coverage  0.000068 *** 10.08   0.000060    0.56   0.000080 *** 8.17   0.000085 *** 5.58 
  0.0000       0.5744       0.0000     0.0000   
Volatility  0.000274   1.53   0.003613  ***  3.64   0.000267  0.89   0.000193  0.66 
  0.1274       0.0003       0.3723     0.5125   
Tobin's  Q  (market-to-book)  0.000153   0.48   -0.001446   -0.46  -0.000121  -0.27   -0.000257  -0.48 
  0.6292       0.6441       0.7882     0.6291   
Block holders total %  -0.000775   -1.42   0.000832   0.13    -0.001992 **  -2.98    -0.002746 *** -3.32 
  0.1563       0.8973       0.0030     0.0009   
Block holder % (insurance company)  0.001399 *  2.40   0.011459   0.79    0.003486 **  3.16    0.004754 **  2.93 
  0.0165       0.4317       0.0016     0.0035   
Block holder % (bank)  0.000253   0.40   -0.011830   -1.48   0.000696   0.69    0.001514   1.50 
  0.6870       0.1384       0.4885     0.1342   
Block holder % (industrial company)  0.001022 *  2.20   -0.001801   -0.29   0.001434 *  2.36    0.001328   1.65 
  0.0281       0.7683       0.0186     0.0993   
Block holder % (nominee/trust)  -0.002586   -1.53   -0.009118   -0.57   -0.001596   -0.69    -0.000904   -0.39 
  0.1258       0.5663       0.4912     0.6961   
Block holder % (financial company)  0.000346   0.43   -0.006993   -0.67   0.001417   1.50    0.001802   1.71 246 
 
Variable  Base salary (ln)     Base increase (%)     TTC (ln)     TTDC (ln) 
 Coefficient  t-stat    Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient  t-stat 
  0.6639       0.5013       0.1346     0.0874   
Block holder % (individual / family)  0.000824   0.60   -0.024966   -0.88   -0.000089   -0.06    0.000125   0.06 
  0.5465       0.3809       0.9521     0.9486   
Block holder % (foundation)  -0.000454   -0.39   0.024552   1.63    0.000200   0.13    0.000944   0.55 
  0.6938       0.1032       0.8928     0.5837   
Block holder % (emp./ man. /directors)  -0.060862 **  -3.11   -0.250677   -1.58   -0.079781 *** -4.36    -0.079407 *  -2.43 
  0.0020       0.1148       0.0000     0.0155   
Block holder % (private equity)  0.003167   1.42   -0.016732   -1.49   0.003292   1.27    0.002516   0.74 
  0.1573       0.1376       0.2046     0.4575   
Block holder % (state)  -0.000515   -0.61   -0.000505   -0.05   -0.000558   -0.56    -0.002366   -1.55 
  0.5435       0.9571       0.5787     0.1206   
                        
Industry effects  
Dummy financial company  -0.031864   -0.78   0.123075   0.26    -0.010442   -0.19    -0.030050   -0.42 
  0.4376       0.7977       0.8500     0.6739   
Diversification level (conglomerate)  0.014459   0.98   -0.133498   -0.69   0.022831   1.34    0.038865   1.68 
  0.3291       0.4878       0.1807     0.0938   
                        
Country effects 
Country  dummy  (Austria)  -0.345570 ** -3.05   0.255187   0.24   -0.339808 **  -2.71   -0.500632 **  -3.07 
  0.0024       0.8084       0.0069     0.0022   
Country  dummy  (Belgium)  -0.104297 *  -2.05   -0.333771   -0.64  -0.152591 *  -2.20   -0.255945 **  -2.65 247 
 
Variable  Base salary (ln)     Base increase (%)     TTC (ln)     TTDC (ln) 
 Coefficient  t-stat    Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient  t-stat 
  0.0411       0.5212       0.0281     0.0082   
Country dummy (France)  -0.187566 *** -4.59   0.519860   1.23   -0.264288 *** -5.29   -0.199501 **  -2.76 
  0.0000       0.2188       0.0000     0.0059   
Country  dummy  (Germany)  -0.255267 *** -5.01   1.223831   1.30   -0.153051 **  -2.60   -0.162359 *  -2.45 
  0.0000       0.1938       0.0094     0.0144   
Country  dummy  (Italy)  -0.009691   -0.15   1.441692   1.23   -0.049996  -0.61   -0.071288  -0.68 
  0.8806       0.2186       0.5439     0.4999   
Country  dummy  (Spain)  -0.171233 ** -3.03   2.651469  **  2.74   -0.085249  -1.25   -0.177995 *  -2.03 
  0.0025       0.0063       0.2109     0.0429   
Country dummy (Sweden)  -0.508155 *** -9.04   0.515000   0.90   -0.659556 *** -9.90   -0.827638 *** -8.92 
  0.0000       0.3662       0.0000     0.0000   
Country dummy (Switzerland)  -0.490870 *** -8.38   -0.141513   -0.23  -0.515873 *** -6.24   -0.430924 *** -4.08 
  0.0000       0.8212       0.0000     0.0001   
Country  dummy  (UK)  0.366163 *** 8.92   1.494448  ***  3.31   0.353875 *** 6.86   0.378601 *** 5.19 
  0.0000       0.0010       0.0000     0.0000   
                        
Time effects 
Time dummies (2001-2008)  yes       yes       yes       yes  
                       
_cons 11.804834 *** 106.60   14.156680  ***  8.49   12.129100 *** 86.91   12.381563 *** 68.42 
  0.0000       0.0000       0.0000     0.0000    
                                           248 
 
Variable  Base salary (ln)     Base increase (%)     TTC (ln)     TTDC (ln) 
 Coefficient  t-stat    Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient  t-stat 
Observations  13902      8508       13902      13192    





 Observations related to table 4.10: 
 
Individual effects 
As we would expect, the age of the position holder is a positive determinant of base salary as 
well as the other (total) compensation definitions.  
 
Externally hired individuals are able to negotiate a higher base salary. However, once in the 
position they are much less likely to get a (strong) base salary raise. This could imply that 
during the time of hiring, the company is willing to pay immediately at the higher end of the 
salary range, determined for the specific position, to get the person willing to transfer. It is 
typical that insiders follow a growth path over the first years in the position. The longer the 
individual is in the same position, the smaller the salary increase (as shown in table 4.10 by a 
negative correlation between base increase and position tenure as well as with age). It is likely 
that this ‘final level’ for the insider in absolute terms is lower than for (recent) external hires. 
 
Company loyalty seems to be not rewarded, given the fact that there is a negative and 
significant correlation between company tenure and the absolute level of pay (all definitions). 
This is in line with Murphy and Zabojnik (2007), who explore the hypothesis that general skills 
are more priced than firm specific skills. 
 
We observe expected correlations for reporting level (PCHs that are further away from the 
CEO, earn less than their counterparts reporting directly to the CEO), international scope 
(greater scope increases complexity and therefore pay), span of control (increase of job 
complexity and pay), relative size of the profit centre (increase of job complexity and pay). 
 
Company effects 
An increase in company size, in terms of assets and employees, is correlated with higher pay. 
 
The presence of block holders, as measured by the total percentage of stock owned by block 
holders, has a disciplining effect on total pay, expressed by negative correlations with target 
total cash and target total direct compensation. Some individual differences for the type of block 
holders are picked up by the model as well. The governance of the company also affects the 
level of compensation. Two-tier governed companies pay less in terms of total cash 
compensation (after controlling for size and county differences), than one-tier companies. At the 
10% significance level this conclusion also holds for total direct compensation. 
 250 
 
Some other observations: i) Companies that are longer listed, pay more than non listed 
companies and recently listed companies; ii) The level of interest coverage is positively related 
to pay.      
 
Industry effects 
The industry dummy to pick up financial companies here is not significant. This implies that in 
terms of total policy remuneration levels, the financial industry seems to be no different than the 
general industry. However, we will see important differences in the way variable pay is geared 
(short versus long-term) in the discussion regarding table 4.11. 
 
Country effects 
There are country differences in comparison to the Dutch practices, especially notable for the 
UK (higher pay) and for Sweden and Switzerland (lower pay).  
 
Time effects 
The time dummies are positive and significant. In relation to the year 2000, pay has increased 
each year, stabilising in the year 2007 and showing a decrease in 2008 (returning more or less to 
the regressor value in 2005). The start of the financial crisis could be a possible explanation for 
this. 
 
Based on the same right-hand-side variables, table 4.11 further zooms in on the variable pay 
elements and the mix between these elements 
 Table 4.11: PCH compensation – pay structure / mix 
This table shows the results of the regression for the ex ante or policy compensation structure, following equation 4.1. It focuses on the various aspects of variable pay 
as a percentage of fixed remuneration. In terms of the regression methodology, we have used pooled OLS, based on estimation of standard errors that are robust to 
disturbances being heteroskedastic and autocorrelated. Observations are clustered per company. We have used five dependent variables: i) ‘STI target %’ equals the 
policy short term incentive level, paid out if targets are met (instead of underperformed or exceeded) as a percentage of base salary; ii) ‘STI max %’ equals the policy 
short-term incentive level, paid out in case of defined ‘maximum performance’, expressed as percentage of base salary; iii) ‘LTI%’ equals the total annualised value of 
all long-term incentive components (including e.g. stock options with and without condition, restricted shares and performance shares), expressed as a percentage of 
base salary; iv) ‘STI target & LTI%‘ equals the total target variable pay as a percentage of base salary; v) ‘ST versus LT ratio’ is the STI policy target percentage 
divided by the LTI percentage. If the ratio is higher than 1, the company has a greater short-term focus through its incentive pay. It can therefore also be translated a 
proxy of short-term focus. The coefficient, p-value (italic) and t-statistic are reflected. Stars stand for significance: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Variables are 
reflected in the following groups: individual, company, industry, and country effects. Time dummies have been included in the model. The variable ‘Company assets’ 
is natural log transformed.   
Variable  STI target %  STI max %  LTI %  STI target & LTI %  ST versus LT ratio 
 Coefficient  t-stat Coefficient  t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient  t-stat 
                    
Individual effects (job & personal characteristics) 
Age -0.254420 *  -2.25 -0.369879 *  -2.01 -0.253586   -1.73 -0.452687 *  -2.40 -0.006049     -0.94 
  0.0249    0.0451    0.0837    0.0168     0.3458    
Dummy externally hired recently  -1.688035   -0.94 -7.101804 **  -2.89 5.004333   0.59  -5.290940   -1.16 0.046573    0.35 
  0.3478    0.0040    0.5538    0.2456    0.7262   
Position tenure  0.117232   0.72 -0.371066   -1.38 0.604405   1.51  0.537886   1.17 -0.030731 ** -2.74 
  0.4706    0.1678    0.1308    0.2441    0.0064   
Company tenure  -0.142346 **  -2.70 -0.244960 **  -2.75 -0.165659   -1.25 -0.336265 *  -2.46 -0.005145    -1.25 
  0.0071    0.0062    0.2113    0.0142    0.2110   
Reporting level  -9.227246 *** -7.09 -16.282408 *** -7.79 -18.583484 *** -4.64 -24.410528 *** -8.68 0.229245 ** 2.66 252 
 
Variable  STI target %  STI max %  LTI %  STI target & LTI %  ST versus LT ratio 
 Coefficient  t-stat Coefficient  t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient  t-stat 
  0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0080   
International  scope  4.148602 *** 4.84 6.865336 *** 4.24 5.943617 *** 4.80 9.446242 *** 7.05 0.018832   0.36 
  0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.7220   
Span  of  control  0.000118   1.70 0.000146   1.29 0.000416   1.66 0.000432   1.71 -0.000001     -0.16 
  0.0893    0.1961    0.0969    0.0878    0.8722   
PC relative size  0.031664   1.21 0.031818   0.89  0.171130 **  2.67  0.236554 *** 3.78 0.001132    0.35 
  0.2261    0.3752    0.0077    0.0002    0.7267   
                
Company effects (size, age, capital, performance, risk, governance, block holders) 
Company assets (ln)  2.648971 *** 3.50 4.390659 **  3.28  5.132556 **  3.00  6.709353 *** 4.03 -0.062516    -1.12 
  0.0005    0.0011    0.0028    0.0001    0.2616   
Company employees  0.000017   1.09 0.000029   1.18  -0.000007   -0.14 0.000070   1.64 -0.000001    -0.52 
  0.2761    0.2384    0.8883    0.1007    0.6055   
Company age  0.002885   0.12 0.003472   0.09  0.029504   0.42  -0.024985   -0.62 0.000528    0.40 
  0.9075    0.9295    0.6776    0.5346    0.6888   
IPO age   0.631458   1.78 1.030547   1.41  0.624947   0.81  1.397490   1.56 0.056059 *  1.98 
  0.0763    0.1599    0.4179    0.1190     0.0487   
Governance (dummy two-tier board)  -4.561278   -1.40 -14.957237 *  -2.15 -12.332279   -1.20 -9.595947   -0.97 -0.341560 *  -2.32 
  0.1618    0.0323    0.2314    0.3331     0.0210   
Liquidity ratio  -0.000620   -0.25 -0.003210   -0.82 0.003606   0.44  -0.006634   -1.49 -0.000078    -0.41 
  0.8018    0.4097    0.6609    0.1370     0.6795   
Gearing  0.000330   1.31 0.000181   0.40 0.000314   0.50 0.000406   0.60 0.000026     1.31 253 
 
Variable  STI target %  STI max %  LTI %  STI target & LTI %  ST versus LT ratio 
 Coefficient  t-stat Coefficient  t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient  t-stat 
  0.1918    0.6881    0.6201    0.5455     0.1907   
Capital expenditure% of sales  -0.013958   -1.24 -0.009930   -0.54 0.000763   0.03  0.023903   0.77 -0.001115 *  -2.11 
  0.2150    0.5862    0.9759    0.4434     0.0351   
ROCE  -0.008337   -0.20 0.077045   1.11 0.337120 *  2.02 0.155338   1.26 -0.004599 *  -2.21 
  0.8384    0.2659    0.0439    0.2095     0.0276   
Profit margin  0.012999   0.28 -0.055053   -0.85 0.074262   0.86  0.027661   0.30 -0.001056    -0.54 
  0.7812    0.3971    0.3916    0.7655     0.5881   
Interest  coverage  0.001742 *  2.57 0.000317   0.27 0.001385   0.45 0.001762   0.79 -0.000023     -0.35 
  0.0105    0.7882    0.6549    0.4318     0.7246   
Volatility -0.002667   -0.20 0.002597   0.10  0.007220   0.21  -0.021394   -0.96 0.000929     0.75 
  0.8444    0.9219    0.8305    0.3352     0.4515   
Tobin's Q (market-to-book)  -0.049598   -1.55 -0.079208   -1.30 0.003276   0.06  -0.097013 *  -2.00 -0.000480    -0.33 
  0.1205    0.1948    0.9528    0.0464     0.7397   
Block holders total %  -0.211675 **  -3.16 -0.332694 **  -2.83 -0.355819 * -2.21 -0.468351 *** -3.60 -0.003358     -0.86 
  0.0017    0.0048    0.0276    0.0003     0.3917   
Block holder % (insurance company)  0.377152   1.71 -0.002613   -0.01 0.630389 *  2.30  0.987437 *  2.23 -0.004348    -1.27 
  0.0874    0.9890    0.0215    0.0264     0.2043   
Block holder % (bank)  0.095744   1.71 0.264940   1.87  0.288439   1.56  0.354821 *  2.14 -0.001514    -0.36 
  0.0882    0.0614    0.1202    0.0328     0.7206   
Block holder % (industrial company)  0.101440 *  2.01 0.157760   1.68  0.103282   0.98  0.128418   1.34 0.001648    0.56 
  0.0446    0.0934    0.3278    0.1818     0.5782   
Block holder % (nominee/trust)  0.307419   1.78 0.405306   1.81  1.291148   0.78  -0.119456   -0.40 0.031972    1.62 254 
 
Variable  STI target %  STI max %  LTI %  STI target & LTI %  ST versus LT ratio 
 Coefficient  t-stat Coefficient  t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient  t-stat 
  0.0750    0.0707    0.4383    0.6876     0.1068   
Block holder % (financial company)  0.241434 **  3.19 0.309280   1.69  0.201936   1.46  0.362285 *  2.47 -0.000184    -0.05 
  0.0015    0.0913    0.1443    0.0138     0.9615   
Block holder % (individual / family)  -0.033651   -0.32 0.035828   0.15  0.322254   1.06  0.026928   0.11 0.001515    0.22 
  0.7515    0.8814    0.2903    0.9161     0.8271   
Block holder % (foundation)  0.165895   0.95 0.260654   0.74  0.116875   0.48  0.159528   0.53 0.005791    0.41 
  0.3429    0.4605    0.6316    0.5983     0.6814   
Block holder % (emp./ man. /directors)  -2.852576 *  -2.42 -5.380053 *  -2.15 -0.370997   -0.12 -7.491502 **  -2.94 0.099022    1.86 
  0.0157    0.0321    0.9030    0.0034     0.0638   
Block holder % (private equity)  0.023875   0.43 0.021575   0.19  -0.212399   -1.28 -0.177430   -1.05 0.009733    1.26 
  0.6643    0.8479    0.2011    0.2935     0.2082   
Block holder % (state)  -0.016066   -0.25 -0.102244   -0.88 -0.203599   -1.12 -0.248239   -1.52 0.000184    0.02 
  0.8049    0.3778    0.2638    0.1293     0.9833   
                
Industry effects  
Dummy financial company  12.614861 *  2.44 28.091006 **  2.67  -6.767992   -0.97 2.671702   0.28 0.586020 *  2.48 
  0.0150    0.0079    0.3300    0.7788     0.0135   
Diversification level (conglomerate)  1.389754   1.02 5.485355 **  2.67  1.364266   0.31  1.926553   0.43 -0.102579    -1.01 
  0.3080    0.0077    0.7569    0.6649     0.3114   
                
Country effects 
Country dummy (Austria)  0.762414   0.09 6.072780   0.30  -28.952899 *  -2.55 -21.033981   -1.49 0.423138    1.01 255 
 
Variable  STI target %  STI max %  LTI %  STI target & LTI %  ST versus LT ratio 
 Coefficient  t-stat Coefficient  t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient  t-stat 
  0.9315    0.7660    0.0109    0.1363     0.3108   
Country dummy (Belgium)  -5.283062   -0.88 -8.372606   -0.65 -26.259471 *  -2.11 -28.888153 *  -2.03 0.451557    1.31 
  0.3810    0.5150    0.0356    0.0433     0.1893   
Country dummy (France)  -7.337041 *  -2.10 -22.850182 **  -3.02 13.056023   1.07  -1.373215   -0.11 -0.529821 *  -2.36 
  0.0363    0.0026    0.2865    0.9139     0.0187   
Country dummy (Germany)  21.092007 *** 5.28 36.053810 *** 3.46  0.117446   0.01  19.741784 *  2.29 0.138036    0.43 
  0.0000    0.0006    0.9904    0.0226     0.6680   
Country dummy (Italy)  -6.149576   -1.03 -25.079242 *  -2.26 -5.679883   -0.41 -5.853562   -0.36 -0.222679    -0.50 
  0.3021    0.0244    0.6808    0.7159     0.6174   
Country dummy (Spain)  14.056615   1.73 -1.017354   -0.07 -23.789386   -1.69 -1.384022   -0.09 0.278103    0.70 
  0.0835    0.9450    0.0922    0.9284     0.4857   
Country dummy (Sweden)  -18.116275 *** -4.10 -25.716368 **  -2.71 -38.515943 **  -3.20 -49.576260 *** -3.72 0.540607    1.03 
  0.0000    0.0069    0.0014    0.0002     0.3025   
Country  dummy  (Switzerland)  1.837202  0.44 15.408144  1.43 18.677608  0.94 19.139451  0.92 -0.240937     -0.50 
  0.6604    0.1530    0.3472    0.3601     0.6146   
Country dummy (UK)  0.006878   0.00 2.539375   0.34  -3.051365   -0.27 -0.859574   -0.07 -0.361290    -1.56 
  0.9984    0.7364    0.7898    0.9429     0.1196   
                    
Time effects 
Time dummies (2001-2008)  yes     yes     yes   yes     yes   
                 
_cons 38.309962 *** 4.08 64.265325 *** 3.32  65.987509 *  2.23  113.528690 *** 3.99 1.786104 ** 2.73 256 
 
Variable  STI target %  STI max %  LTI %  STI target & LTI %  ST versus LT ratio 
 Coefficient  t-stat Coefficient  t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient  t-stat 
  0.0001    0.0010    0.0258    0.0001    0.0066   
                                          
Observations  12678    11172    13192    12041    9413    
Adjusted R²  0.220772       0.246041       0.056993       0.1793065       0.07428318      
 
 
 Table 4.11 shows that the pay structure model has a lower R
2 than the pay level model (see table 
4.10). We have the following observations: 
 
Individual effects 
Short-term variable pay decreases with age. This might be a response of companies to overcome 
the horizon problem. A similar observation can be made for the variable ‘Position tenure’. 
Being longer in the position has a negative correlation with a priori short-term focused 
incentives (ST versus LT ratio).  
 
We also observe that a PCH that is closer to the CEO, in terms of his reporting level (direct 
report instead of indirect report), earns a higher level of variable pay.  
 
Furthermore, international scope is positively related to more variable pay. An explanation for 
this may be that a job with international responsibility comes with exposure to a more 
competitive international labour market. Following the international norm rather than the local 




Company size is positively related to the use of incentives. Larger companies have greater 
means to set up, sometimes administrative burdensome, variable pay programs, due to 
economies of scale.   
 
Companies with greater capital expenditures seem to be less short-term focused, as reflected by 
the negative correlation with the proxy for short-term focus (‘ST versus LT ratio’). This may be 
caused by the fact that the impact of investments is especially revealed over a longer period of 
time, which forces the company to also be more long-term focused in terms of remuneration.   
 
Companies with a higher Tobin’s Q are associated with overall lower total variable pay as a 
percentage of base salary. At the 95% confidence level, this shows that better company 
performance is not necessarily correlated with a greater amount of incentives. As stated by 
Jensen and Murphy (2010), “It is not how much you pay, but how.” This implies that the 
underlying structure of remuneration matters, as researched in chapter 3 of this book, where we 
did find a positive correlation between remuneration structure, as measured by the CompRisk 
index, and Tobin’s Q.  
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The total percentage of block holders, results in a disciplining effect on variable pay under all 
definitions; i.e. a significantly negative b-coefficient.  
 
Industry effects 
The financial services sector is significantly correlated to a short-term focus in terms of variable 
pay. We will discuss this issue further in: “A note on the financial services sector” at the end of 
these (initial) conclusions. Other industry effects are found at conglomerates, which tend to set 
higher maximum STI policy levels.  
 
Country effects 
Germany is well known for its high bonus levels. Indeed, we observe significantly (at the 99.9% 
confidence level) higher bonuses. Approximately 21%-points higher than the Netherlands in 
terms of target STI and 36%-points higher in terms of maximum STI. In Germany, cash pay-
outs are more tax efficient and therefore more observed. For Sweden we observe overall lower 
levels of variable compensation, both STI and LTI. This might be the result of its culture, 
promoting more equality. In terms of the short-term versus long-term focus we only observe a 
(negative) significant estimator for France. Indeed, France is well known for its higher levels of 
long-term compensation in comparison to short-term compensation. This is also emphasised by 
the negative correlation with ‘STI target %’ and ‘STI max%’. Fiscal motives are important 
drivers of this (long-term share compensation is tax efficient in France). 
 
Time effects 
Short-term variable compensation as a percentage of fixed compensation has increased over the 
years. Approximately 17%-points for 2008, in relation to 2000, for the target STI. For the 
maximum STI level the increase amounts to 32%-points. From CEO research we know that LTI 
levels have increased as well over this period. We do not observe this at the PCH level, over the 
research period. This may be caused by a desire to assess performance close to the sphere of 
influence of the position. Long-term incentives are typically equity based. PCHs have less 
influence on the share price than CEOs.    
 
A note on the financial services sector 
Following the financial crisis, the financial services sector has been scrutinised, late 2008 and 
continuing in 2009 and 2010. There were accusations of taking excessive risk and being 
myopic. The question whether pay packages in the preceding years have contributed to this has 
been a question of debate. A call for reform of pay practices was made by various corporate 259 
 
governance bodies as well as regulators and financial market authorities.
194 In table 4.10 we 
have seen that financial services companies do not tend to pay more than general industry 
companies. However table 4.11 shows that the manner in which pay is structured, does differ 
from the general industry. Short-term variable pay is significantly higher than in the other 
industries (target as well as maximum). Furthermore the proxy for ‘short-term focus’ is 
positively correlated to the financial services sector dummy.  
 
4.3.3.2 Ex post perspective  
Now that we have discussed the remuneration policy in terms of the total level and the 
relationship between fixed and variable pay, we will focus on the actual (bonus) outcome. How 
much is actually earned by the PCH and where does this relate to?  
 
Table 4.12 shows two panels (A and B). On top of the variables of panel A, panel B includes the 
remuneration target value (ex ante remuneration) as one of the explanatory variables. This is 
taken into account through adding the target STI level in the actual STI regression, the level of 
base salary plus target STI in the TC regression and the level of base salary plus target STI plus 
expected LTI value in the TDC regression. Panel B thus controls for the ‘human capital starting 
point’. The panels in conjunction allow for stronger conclusions on the various individual, 
company, industry and country effects.  
 
 
Table 4.12: Actual remuneration levels – panel A 
This table shows the results of the regression for the ex post or realised compensation levels, following 
equation 4.1. In terms of the regression methodology, we have used pooled OLS, based on estimation of 
standard errors that are robust to disturbances being heteroskedastic and autocorrelated. Observations are 
clustered per company. We have used three dependent variables: i) ‘Actual STI value’ which equals the 
paid out bonus; ii) ‘TC’ is total cash which equals base salary plus actual bonus; iii) total direct 
compensation (TDC) which equals base salary plus actual cash bonus plus the annualised value of long-
term incentives. Remuneration figures are expressed in EUR and are natural log transformed. The 
coefficient, p-value (italic) and t-statistic are reflected. Stars stand for significance: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; 
*** p<0.001. Variables are reflected in the following groups: individual, company, industry, and country 
                                                      
194 Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken (NVB) “Banking Code”, September 2009; Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) “Reforming remuneration practices in financial services”, August, 2009; Financial 
Stability Board “Principles for Sound Compensation Practices – Implementation Standards”, September 
2009; International Institute of Finance (IIF) “Final report of the committee on market best practices: 
Principles of conduct and best practice recommendations”, July 2008; Community of European Banking 
Supervisors (CEBS) “High-level principles of Remuneration Policies”, April 2009. 260 
 
effects. Time dummies have been included in the model. The variable ‘Company assets’ is natural log 
transformed. 
Variable   Actual STI value (ln)  TC (ln)     TDC (ln) 
 Coefficient  t-stat Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat
              
Individual effects (job & personal characteristics) 
Age 0.00917*** 4.10 0.010414*** 9.52   0.009714  *** 7.41
  0.00000   0.000000     0.000000    
Dummy externally hired recently  -0.06538  -1.31 -0.018577  -0.78   -0.028859    -1.00
  0.1910   0.4374     0.3153    
Position tenure  0.01502*** 3.41 0.009550*** 3.68   0.009957  **  2.82
 0.0007   0.0003     0.0049    
Company tenure  -0.00629*** -3.98 -0.003861*** -4.40  -0.004345  *** -4.01
  0.0001   0.0000     0.0001    
Reporting level  -0.63211***-19.54 -0.458040***-23.59   -0.500387  ***-21.22
  0.0000   0.0000     0.0000    
International scope  0.14448*** 9.19 0.096171***11.75   0.116908  ***11.66
  0.0000   0.0000     0.0000    
Span of control  0.00000**  2.86 0.000004*** 4.90   0.000004  *** 3.72
  0.0044   0.0000     0.0002    
PC relative size  0.00348*** 4.95 0.002788*** 7.07   0.003824  *** 7.66
  0.0000   0.0000     0.0000    
              
Company effects (size, age, capital, performance, risk, governance, block holders) 
Company assets (ln)  0.18441*** 9.41 0.110191***10.29   0.129305  *** 9.55
  0.0000   0.0000     0.0000    
Company  employees  0.00000  1.37 0.000001* 2.53   0.000001  * 2.13
 0.1697   0.0117     0.0337    
Company age  0.00024  0.69 0.000089  0.44   -0.000039    -0.16
  0.4890   0.6588     0.8759    
IPO age   0.02057*  2.09 0.014701** 2.89   0.018591  **  2.76
 0.0366   0.0040     0.0060    
Governance (dummy two-tier board)  -0.22878*  -2.30 -0.129180** -3.15   -0.141423  *  -2.29
 0.0220    0.0017     0.0221    
Liquidity  ratio  -0.00001 -0.15 -0.000023 -0.65   -0.000032   -1.09
 0.8819    0.5167     0.2777    
Gearing  0.00001 1.05 0.000002 0.48   0.000002   0.30
 0.2947   0.6291     0.7635    
Capital expenditure% of sales  -0.00005  -0.25 0.000031  0.34   0.000039    0.31
  0.8055   0.7314     0.7573    261 
 
Variable   Actual STI value (ln)  TC (ln)     TDC (ln) 
 Coefficient  t-stat Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat
ROCE 0.00627*** 4.23 0.001904*** 3.46   0.002586  *** 3.36
 0.0000    0.0006     0.0008    
Profit  margin  -0.00037 -0.43 -0.000413 -0.93   -0.000385   -0.85
 0.6659    0.3517     0.3974    
Interest coverage  0.00009*** 5.37 0.000084*** 8.85   0.000106  *** 6.85
  0.0000   0.0000     0.0000    
Volatility  0.00017 0.58 0.000281 1.23   0.000192   0.83
  0.5619   0.2178     0.4093    
Tobin's  Q  (market-to-book)  0.00055 0.93 0.000434 1.06   0.000289   0.54
  0.3541   0.2915     0.5884    
Block holders total %  -0.00505*** -4.02 -0.002527*** -3.95  -0.003122  *** -3.70
  0.0001   0.0001     0.0002    
Block holder % (insurance company)  0.00299  1.06 0.002540** 3.17   0.004175  **  3.18
 0.2885    0.0016     0.0015    
Block holder % (bank)  0.00286*  2.13 0.001371  1.83   0.001991    1.92
 0.0339    0.0671      0.0557    
Block holder % (industrial company)  0.00252  1.94 0.002123*** 3.41   0.001939  *  2.36
 0.0533    0.0007     0.0184    
Block holder % (nominee/trust)  0.00155  0.33 -0.000221  -0.12   -0.000508    -0.17
  0.7442   0.9061     0.8685    
Block holder % (financial company)  0.00622*** 3.84 0.002377*  2.43   0.002412  *  2.22
  0.0001   0.0155     0.0265    
Block holder % (individual / family)  0.00219  0.74 0.002749  1.82   0.002402    1.21
  0.4583   0.0688     0.2265    
Block holder % (foundation)  -0.00116  -0.58 0.000159  0.14   0.000430    0.30
 0.5606   0.8890     0.7673    
Block holder % (emp./ man. /directors) -0.05941  -1.40 -0.058066*  -2.00   -0.066379    -1.69
  0.1612   0.0460     0.0913    
Block holder % (private equity)  -0.00053  -0.14 0.002823  1.27   0.002149    0.66
  0.8860   0.2055     0.5118    
Block holder % (state)  -0.00177  -1.03 0.000450  0.44   -0.001363    -0.91
 0.3039    0.6606     0.3644    
              
Industry effects  
Dummy financial company  0.17435  1.56 0.069132  1.18   0.032979    0.45
 0.1192    0.2376     0.6503    
Diversification level (conglomerate)  0.05149  1.63 0.025972  1.51   0.042963    1.82
 0.1030    0.1317     0.0697    262 
 
Variable   Actual STI value (ln)  TC (ln)     TDC (ln) 
 Coefficient  t-stat Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat
              
Country effects  
Country dummy (Austria)  -0.48217*  -2.06 -0.410854*  -2.55   -0.549469  **  -2.91
 0.0400    0.0110      0.0037    
Country dummy (Belgium)  -0.24333  -1.85 -0.148177*  -2.22   -0.244506  **  -2.72
 0.0655    0.0270      0.0067    
Country dummy (France)  -0.38615*** -3.77 -0.224130*** -4.77   -0.177769  **  -2.60
 0.0002    0.0000      0.0096    
Country dummy (Germany)  0.19357*  2.15 -0.217072** -3.23   -0.215972  **  -2.86
  0.0320   0.0013     0.0044    
Country  dummy  (Italy)  -0.33736 -1.75 -0.113333 -1.32   -0.125498   -1.15
  0.0799   0.1863     0.2501    
Country dummy (Spain)  -0.09377  -0.70 -0.110049  -1.65   -0.191088  *  -2.21
  0.4841   0.0990     0.0275    
Country dummy (Sweden)  -0.99234*** -6.99 -0.622596*** -9.35  -0.788477  *** -8.78
  0.0000   0.0000     0.0000    
Country dummy (Switzerland)  -0.45600**  -2.83 -0.481011*** -6.43   -0.428046  *** -3.98
  0.0048   0.0000     0.0001    
Country dummy (UK)  0.42281*** 4.09 0.351282*** 6.97   0.380168  *** 5.40
  0.0000   0.0000     0.0000    
              
Time  effects              
Time dummies (2001-2008)  yes      yes        yes    
              
_cons 10.1889***37.07 11.9320***81.37   12.2001  ***66.27
  0.0000   0.0000     0.0000    
                              
Observations  11761   13902     13192    
Adjusted R²  0.501164        0.578277         0.558675       
 
Table 4.12: Actual remuneration levels – panel B 
This table shows the results of the regression for the ex post or realised compensation levels, following 
equation 4.1. In terms of the regression methodology, we have used pooled OLS, based on estimation of 
standard errors that are robust to disturbances being heteroskedastic and autocorrelated. Observations are 
clustered per company. We have used three dependent variables: i) ‘Actual STI value’ which equals the 
paid out bonus; ii) ‘TC’ is total cash which equals base salary plus actual bonus; iii) total direct 
compensation (TDC) which equals base salary plus actual cash bonus plus the annualised value of long-
term incentives. Remuneration figures are expressed in EUR and are natural log transformed. The 263 
 
coefficient, p-value (italic) and t-statistic are reflected. Stars stand for significance: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; 
*** p<0.001. Variables are reflected in the following groups: individual, company, industry, and country 
effects. Time dummies have been included in the model. The variable ‘Company assets’ is natural log 
transformed. In addition to panel A, the ex ante remuneration levels are incorporated as right-hand-side 
variables: i) ‘STI target value’ equals the expected or target bonus amount paid out if targets are met 
(instead of underperformed or exceeded);  ii) ‘Base salary’ equals all fixed components including 
elements such as vacation allowance; iii) ‘LTI value’ equals the annualised value of all long-term 
incentive components (including e.g. stock options with and without condition, restricted shares and 
performance shares). These three elements are expressed in EUR and are natural log transformed.       
Variable   Actual STI value (ln)  TC (ln)     TDC (ln) 
 Coefficient  t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient  t-stat
Individual effects (contract, job & personal characteristics) 
STI target value (ln)  0.869918*** 38.55 0.216281***11.38 0.172022*** 8.95
  0.000    0.000   0.000  
Base salary (ln)      0.811721***31.07 0.620043***24.06
      0.0000   0.0000  
LTI value (ln)          0.236257***21.42
         0.0000  
Age 0.000592  0.44 -0.000587  -1.35 -0.001176**  -2.68
  0.659700    0.176000   0.007600  
Dummy externally hired recently  -0.020484  -0.59 -0.048619***-4.54 -0.014143   -1.23
  0.5558    0.0000   0.2199  
Position tenure  0.012426**  3.19 0.008995*** 6.53 0.007486*** 6.66
  0.0015    0.0000   0.0000  
Company tenure  0.000159  0.16 0.000215  0.61 -0.000050   -0.14
 0.8707    0.5414   0.8904  
Reporting level  -0.081634*** -3.60 -0.003112  -0.39 -0.006609   -0.79
  0.0003    0.6993   0.4302  
International scope  0.024967**  2.85 0.009582** 3.15 0.009506**  2.88
 0.0046   0.0017   0.0042  
Span of control  -0.000001  -1.30 0.000000  -0.78 0.000000   -0.29
 0.1953    0.4376   0.7711  
PC relative size  0.000457  1.17 -0.000361*  -2.21 -0.000211   -1.20
  0.2442    0.0275   0.2309  
           
Company effects (size, age, capital, performance, risk, governance, block holders) 
Company assets (ln)  0.057477*** 5.15 0.009819*  2.17 0.004647   1.13
 0.0000    0.0302    0.2597  
Company employees  0.000000  -0.23 0.000000  -1.35 0.000000   -0.61
  0.8195    0.1778   0.5442  264 
 
Variable   Actual STI value (ln)  TC (ln)     TDC (ln) 
 Coefficient  t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient  t-stat
Company age  0.000342  1.79 0.000041  0.38 -0.000041   -0.49
 0.0746    0.7015   0.6274  
IPO age   0.003264  0.65 0.000654  0.33 0.001927   0.94
  0.5174    0.7400   0.3470  
Governance (dummy two-tier board)  -0.050255  -0.98 -0.019245  -0.90 -0.019739   -1.04
  0.3271    0.3694   0.3005  
Liquidity ratio  -0.000001  -0.02 -0.000002  -0.10 -0.000041   -1.35
 0.9826   0.9207   0.1784  
Gearing 0.000005  1.20 0.000002  1.09 0.000001    0.93
  0.2293    0.2754   0.3530  
Capital expenditure% of sales  0.000279  1.84 0.000067  0.94 0.000102   1.91
 0.0668    0.3457   0.0562  
ROCE 0.005255*** 4.07 0.001102** 2.99 0.000854*  2.42
  0.0001    0.0029   0.0159  
Profit margin  0.000399  0.62 0.000249  1.05 0.000267   1.56
  0.5364    0.2955   0.1195  
Interest coverage  0.000022*  2.48 0.000001  0.31 0.000001   0.27
 0.0135    0.7566   0.7911  
Volatility 0.000164  1.06 0.000045  0.84 0.000094    1.92
  0.2879    0.4012   0.0548  
Tobin's Q (market-to-book)  -0.000149  -0.49 -0.000030  -0.21 0.000011   0.10
 0.6275    0.8358    0.9237  
Block holders total %  -0.002364*  -2.58 -0.001059***-4.16 -0.001014***-4.08
  0.0100    0.0000   0.0001  
Block holder % (insurance company)  -0.002180*  -2.25 -0.000066  -0.21 0.000324   0.90
 0.0248    0.8327   0.3666  
Block holder % (bank)  0.001953*  2.09 0.000588  1.91 0.000608*  2.38
  0.0369    0.0565   0.0175  
Block holder % (industrial company)  0.001795*  2.35 0.000876*** 3.75 0.000696**  3.09
  0.0190    0.0002   0.0021  
Block holder % (nominee/trust)  -0.004560  -0.94 0.000503  0.47 0.001124   1.54
 0.3488    0.6357   0.1253  
Block holder % (financial company)  0.002025*  2.01 0.000739  1.88 0.000266   0.77
  0.0444    0.0611   0.4433  
Block holder % (individual / family)  0.000294  0.13 0.001717*  2.51 0.001777*  2.22
  0.8950    0.0125   0.0271  
Block holder % (foundation)  -0.000104  -0.07 0.000552  0.88 0.000411   0.36
  0.9438    0.3772   0.7163  265 
 
Variable   Actual STI value (ln)  TC (ln)     TDC (ln) 
 Coefficient  t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient  t-stat
Block holder % (empl./ man. /directors) 0.004711  0.51 0.010289*  2.26 0.020829*** 4.28
 0.6107    0.0239   0.0000  
Block holder % (private equity)  -0.002509  -1.45 -0.000183  -0.31 -0.000322   -0.54
  0.1488    0.7559   0.5919  
Block holder % (state)  0.001492  1.68 0.001513*** 3.92 0.001709**  2.92
 0.0944    0.0001    0.0037  
           
Industry effects  
Dummy financial company  0.016240  0.35 0.057775** 2.90 0.050770**  2.84
 0.7296   0.0038    0.0046  
Diversification level (conglomerate)  0.000507  0.03 0.005131  0.93 -0.004671   -0.63
 0.9748    0.3516   0.5276  
           
Country effects  
Country dummy (Austria)  -0.018843  -0.28 -0.016439  -0.39 0.001832   0.04
  0.7790    0.6979   0.9670  
Country dummy (Belgium)  -0.016484  -0.23 -0.004809  -0.18 -0.004059   -0.15
  0.8212    0.8558   0.8829  
Country dummy (France)  -0.082167  -1.47 0.006555  0.31 0.017501   0.82
  0.1425    0.7551   0.4154  
Country dummy (Germany)  0.048246  0.85 -0.066752  -1.56 -0.090419*  -2.19
  0.3972    0.1200   0.0289  
Country dummy (Italy)  -0.085843  -0.98 -0.045915  -1.20 -0.031394   -0.83
 0.3277    0.2288   0.4073  
Country dummy (Spain)  -0.024670  -0.34 0.057100  1.93 0.012544   0.48
 0.7339    0.0540    0.6287  
Country dummy (Sweden)  -0.068622  -0.72 0.030309  0.94 0.059299   1.64
 0.4726    0.3462   0.1008  
Country dummy (Switzerland)  -0.189917  -1.61 -0.041721  -1.19 0.016075   0.35
  0.1075    0.2364   0.7292  
Country dummy (UK)  0.116573  1.90 -0.021096  -0.95 -0.034715   -1.57
 0.0577   0.3437   0.1177  
           
Time  effects           
Time dummies (2001-2008)  yes      yes      yes    
           
_cons 0.965050**  3.31 0.079671  0.50 0.696980*** 4.55
  0.0010    0.6179   0.0000    266 
 
Variable   Actual STI value (ln)  TC (ln)     TDC (ln) 
 Coefficient  t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient  t-stat
                            
Observations 10725    12533      9339  
Adjusted R²  0.752613        0.910300         0.942587     
 
The general conclusion, related to table 4.12, is that panel B is a more efficient model. It has a 
significantly higher R², (e.g. moving from 58% to 91% for TC), and thus adds significant 
explanation to the model. Furthermore, a single variable, i.e. ex ante remuneration, replaces 
explanation of multiple variables such as: country effects, governance model, company tenure, 
time effects. This renders a model with fewer variables, because the latter variables can be taken 
out of the model. Actual pay is thus explained by target pay (human capital starting point). In 
addition, panel B reflects the other variables that are relevant, and we will discuss the significant 
ones below.    
 
Individual effects 
In terms of influencing actual pay-outs, table 4.12B shows that there is a negative correlation 
between being externally hired (recently) and total cash compensation. This may be related to 
negotiation power. At the moment of hire, the candidate has the possibility to influence his ex-
ante compensation. Table 4.10 showed that external hires receive a higher base salary. 
However, we also saw that once in the firm, the likelihood of getting a strong base salary 
increase is lower. The fact that the negotiation power drops once in the firm is also emphasised 
by table 4.12. There is a negative correlation with the actual received total cash compensation. 
The negotiation power needs to be built up by position tenure. Indeed, we see a positive and 
significant correlation between actual pay (all definitions) and years in position.  
 
In addition, we observe positive correlations with actual pay and international scope of the 
position. PCHs with international scope responsibility might be more important for the company 
than PCHs with local responsibility only, which results in more power to negotiate a higher 
actual compensation.  
 
Company effects 
There is a positive correlation between company size as measured by (ln) assets. It could be that 
larger firms are less efficient in establishing the real performance of the PCH. Paying out below 
target level requires a stronger business case towards the individual than paying at or above 
target. This could create an upward bias in larger firms, also because the “price of inefficiency” 
in such companies is less directly observed; the larger the company is, the lower the top 267 
 
management compensation costs as fraction of total cash flows. We also observe positive 
correlations with the level of ROCE and interest coverage. There is a negative correlation with 
the total percentage of block owners. Certain type of block holders are associated with higher 




There is a tendency in the financial sector that variable pay is more guaranteed. The financial 
services dummy is positively and significantly correlated with total cash and total direct 
compensation. This is an effect that goes beyond the identified performance and personal 
characteristics. It could be the result of hedging human capital risk; i.e. the risk that potentially 
strong performers for the future, will leave the company if the variable element of the 
remuneration package would not be paid out.   
 
Country effects 
There are no specific country effects other than Germany at the total direct compensation level. 
In relation to the Netherlands, and the other countries, there is some evidence that the Germans 
are more strict in establishing the actual total direct compensation level (negative correlation). 
Country effects are incorporated in the ex ante remuneration level, that has been added to the 
model as a control variable. In comparison, Panel A, in which the ex ante remuneration level is 
not incorporated, does show significant country effects for all of the countries in the dataset 
(except for Italy).   
 
Time effects 
The only effects related to time that we observe, are 2007 and 2008. These years seem to be the 
peak in terms of actual pay-outs. Given the start of the financial crisis late 2008 this has caused 
a debate on the effectiveness of variable pay. Do strong incentives mitigate the agency problem, 
or are they part of the problem, stimulating managers to “swing for the fences”.  
 
A note on the relevance of performance I 
Although we do not have specific details on performance at the individual profit centre level, in 
panel B, we were still able to explain between 75% (STI actual pay-out) and 91% (total cash 
pay-out) of the variation in the dataset. The lion share is explained by the underlying policy 
levels. Therefore it seems that current performance is not the most important factor in 
explaining the variation in actual observed STI levels. It is one of many other factors, including 
past performance, expected future performance, managerial power etc. In section 4.5 we will 
further elaborate on pay-for-performance, pay-for-power and ‘pay-for-x’. 268 
 
4.4 Corporate tournaments and the CEO-PCH remuneration gap  
Besides the determinants of profit centre head remuneration in isolation, an additional research 
topic relates to the question how the level of PCH compensation compares to the level of 
compensation of the CEO. A real-life example of ABN AMRO (2006) shows that internal pay 
relativity matters, among others, because it can be used as a reason to increase CEO pay. At the 
annual shareholders’ meeting, Aarnout Loudon, chairman of the supervisory board, proposed to 
increase the maximum bonus of the board of management from 125% of basic salary to 200% 
of basic salary, partially based on the fact that executives below board level could earn larger 
bonuses than board of management members (Financieele Dagblad, 28 April 2006). The 
compensation relations between the upper echelons in an organisation are often approached by 
means of the tournament theory, initiated by Lazear and Rosen (1981). This section explores the 
pay gap between the CEO and the PCH from this corporate tournament perspective. We will 
first describe the existing theory and develop our hypotheses. Subsequently, we will discuss the 
data & methodology. Finally, the results of the analyses are presented.  
4.4.1 Theory & hypothesis development 
In this chapter the theoretical framework is created, which serves as the basis for formulating 
the hypotheses belonging to the research questions. Figure 4.1 shows a diagram of the 
theoretical framework of this section. It is structured as a corporate pyramid where we 
determine PCH remuneration in relation to the CEO.  








Most organisations have a pyramid-shaped structure (Beckman, 1977; Rosen, 1982). When a 








higher compensation for moving up the corporate ladder serves as a prize won by the employee 
that performs better compared to his colleagues. This implies that a career path is the outcome 
of competition among colleagues to climb the hierarchical ladder and attain higher 
compensation over the life cycle (Rosen, 1986). These tournament-incentives induce effort 
(Bognanno, 2001). 
 
In principle, tournament theory applies to employees in all layers of the organisation. However, 
most research on this subject is addressed towards to the final phase of the tournament: the one 
to become CEO. The possibility of moving up the hierarchical ladder, with the accompanying 
increase in compensation, generates motivation in the tournament. However, as one approaches 
the top of the organisation, the possibility to engage in future rounds of promotion diminishes 
(Conyon et al., 2001). Rosen (1986) states that in order to keep aligning the interests of 
shareholders and managers, it is important to keep motivating employees to strive for 
promotion, all the way to the top. To facilitate these incentives, extra weight needs to be placed 
on the compensation increases in the upper hierarchical levels, especially when the candidate 
has reached the CEO position, as this is the final stage of the tournament and no future 
promotion opportunity (within the company) is left. 
 
For this reason, tournament theory predicts that wage differentials between hierarchical levels 
increase when one moves up in the organisation. This means that there is a convex relationship 
between compensation and organisational level, with a significant wage gap of employees / 
PCHs in relation to the CEO (Conyon et al., 2001; Rajgopal and Srinivasan, 2006). 
 
4.4.1.1 Overview existing literature 
Although several researchers have written about the theoretical importance of compensation 
differences between CEOs and the level(s) below for incentive reasons, there is very little 
empirical research available. Furthermore, the research devoted to the determinants of these 
wage disparities is geared towards the wage difference between the CEO and the immediate and 
observed level below (other directors). In our research, we go one level deeper into the 
organisation, i.e. working with data that is not publicly available.  
 
As a start we will summarise the findings of the existing research on the determinants of the pay 
gaps between CEOs and the immediate level below. In common with the prior sections, we will 
classify the determinants into four levels, namely: individual, firm, industry, and country 




Henderson and Fredrickson (2001) control for CEO tenure in their study. This factor has been 
linked to CEO pay by several researchers (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989; Hill and Phan, 
1991; Cyert et al., 1997; Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999; Bebchuk et al, 2007); longer 
relative tenure may increase the compensation of the CEO relative to his subordinates. 
 
Externally hired 
CEOs that are hired from the outside may command higher compensation (Deckop, 1988; 
Bebchuk, Fried and Walker, 2002). To control for this, Henderson and Fredrickson (2001) also 
control for externally hired CEOs. 
 
New CEO year 
Rajgopal and Srinivasan (2006) argue that new CEOs are often paid large sign-on bonuses. 
They assume that the other executives on the team do not receive such large bonuses or are not 
replaced in the same year as the year of CEO change, and hence, expect that in the year of CEO 
change, the pay dispersion among the top executives increases. They find evidence to support 
this expectation. An alternative hypothesis is that the difference in pay is lower in this year, 




It is argued that larger firms are more complex and more difficult to manage. In this case, the 
CEO is more valuable and has an important role in the coordination of activities (Chandler, 
1962). For this reason, the CEO may attract a compensation premium, which results in a higher 
wage dispersion (Henderson and Fredrickson, 2001; Rajgopal and Srinivasan, 2006). Rajgopal 
and Srinivasan find, consistent with tournament theory, evidence for a strong relationship 
between large firms and higher wage dispersion. 
 
Firm age 
In the study of Rajgopal and Srinivasan (2006) it is stated that younger firms need to attract a 
better qualified CEO, who is able to guide the firm through the early years of existence. They 
argue that these firms are likely to allow larger pay dispersion among the top executive team; 
hence, they suggest a negative relationship between firm age and pay dispersion between CEOs 
and the immediate level below.  
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Number of subordinates 
Eriksson (1999) finds a stable convex relationship between compensation and hierarchical level. 
He states that the larger the responsibility in terms of subordinates, the larger the wage gap.  
 
Number of a firm’s businesses (diversification) 
The effect of the number of businesses within the firm on the pay gap between the CEO and the 
immediate level below is inconclusive. Henderson and Fredrickson (2001) argue that the 
number of businesses influences the coordination needs. When the businesses are related, it 
increases the operational interdependencies that need to be arranged. In case of unrelated 
businesses, the amount of information that the executive team needs to consider to evaluate 
investment decisions is increased. Tournament theory suggests that larger pay dispersion is 
effective in this case to resolve monitoring difficulties that arise from the interdependencies. On 
the other hand, a contradicting view involves the premise that firms with a large number of 
businesses have many profit centres that behave like separate entities. The managers of these 
profit centres have high bottom-line accountability, and hence large pay gaps between these 
managers and the CEO may be ineffective as this high accountability already elicits strong 
effort of the profit centre managers (Henderson and Fredrickson, 2001).   
Henderson and Fredrickson do not report conclusive results on this view and call for future 
research.  
 
Shared power (CEO ≠ chair) 
As discussed in section 4.3.1.1 on the determinants of CEO compensation, if the CEO is also 
the chairman of the board of directors, this may positively influence his level of compensation. 
Henderson and Fredrickson (2001) share this view and state that when the CEO is sharing the 
power with others, the wage dispersion may be lower as the CEO is less able to dominate the 
pay setting process.  
 
Female board 
Rajgopal and Srinivasan elaborate on the fact often put forth, that female executives are paid 
less than their male counterparts. They examined the pay dispersion in the top executive team in 
relation with the proportion of female managers in the top manager group, and expected to find 
a smaller wage gap in case of a female CEO. However, they presented the surprising result that 
pay dispersion is higher when a large proportion of the top executive team is female. We 
include a proxy for a gender effect, based on a dummy that records ‘1’ if the CEO is female.  272 
 
R&D activity / Capital investment activity 
In order to create and utilise investment opportunities, firms need to attract a more skilled 
manager (Lazear & Rosen, 1981). Rajgopal and Srinivasan (2006) argue that firms with a 
dispersed compensation structure are more able to attract such managers. Hence, they state a 
positive relationship between pay dispersion and investment opportunities. Henderson and 
Fredrickson (2001) consider R&D expenditures and capital investment activity sources of 
coordination needs. When the investment activity and expenditures increase, the size and 
complexity of the projects also increases. In order to make informed choices among competing 
projects, CEOs need to have a thorough understanding of the characteristics of these projects. 
These complex decisions require significant coordination needs and demand group effort. As 
noted in the section on the number of a firm’s businesses, in these cases larger pay gaps are 
efficient in order to resolve monitoring difficulties that originate from the need for team effort.  
 
Industry effects 
Elaborating on the arguments on the noisiness of firm’s environment is the following finding of 
Rajgopal and Srinivasan (2006). They present the evidence that riskier industries are associated 
with larger wage disparities compared to more stable industries.  
Henderson and Fredrickson (2001) collected data on the internal pay structures of firms in four 
industry groups, namely: chemicals, high-tech equipment, natural resources and conglomerates. 
They controlled for industry effects by employing dummy variables. We will follow this 
approach, but use more detail; i.e. 58 industry dummies (based on two-digit SIC).  
 
Country effects 
The Henderson and Fredrickson study (2001) and the paper of Rajgopal and Srinivasan (2006) 
are both based on a U.S. data sample. Eriksson’s study (1999) involves Danish data. However, 
no comparison of the size of wage gaps between countries is made. Hence, due to a lack of 
academic literature on this topic, no implications on the effect of country factors in the size of 
the pay gap between CEOs and the immediate level below can be made.  
4.4.1.2 Development of hypotheses 
Now that we have discussed the general research on tournament theory, and the academic 
literature specifically concentrated on the factors influencing the wage gap between CEOs and 
the immediate level below, we need to transfer this to the level of the profit centre heads in our 
sample. Starting point is the literature overview in table 4.13. 273 
 
Table 4.13: Summary determinants of remuneration gap CEO and immediate level below 
This table shows an overview of the variables in the Henderson & Frederickson (2001), Rajgopal and 
Srinivasan (2006), Eriksson (1999) studies that have proven to be of influence on the remuneration gap 
between the CEO and the immediate level below.  
Variable   Positive / negative effect  Reference 
CEO tenure  +  Henderson & Fredrickson (2001) 
Externally hired  +  Henderson & Fredrickson (2001) 
Gender (female executive)  +  Rajgopal & Srinivasan (2006) 
Shared power (CEO ≠ chair)  - 
Henderson & Fredrickson (2001)
Rajgopal & Srinivasan (2006) 
Star executives  +  Rajgopal & Srinivasan (2006) 
New CEO year  +  Rajgopal & Srinivasan (2006) 
Number of subordinates  + 
Henderson & Fredrickson (2001)
Eriksson (1999) 
Firm size  + 
Henderson & Fredrickson (2001)
Rajgopal & Srinivasan (2006) 
Firm age  -  Rajgopal & Srinivasan (2006) 
Noisiness of firm environment  + 
Rajgopal & Srinivasan (2006) 
Eriksson (1999) 
R&D activity / Capital investment activity  + 
Henderson & Fredrickson (2001)
Rajgopal & Srinivasan (2006) 
Number of a firm's businesses   +  Henderson & Fredrickson (2001) 
 
We follow the hypothesis that there will be a positive remuneration gap between the CEO and 
PCH. This will be the case for the two types of PCHs in our dataset: i) Directly reporting to the 
CEO (level 2 in the organisation); ii) One level below (level 3 in the organisation). We have 
seen initial evidence in the position summary table 4.8, when comparing panel A (CEO) and B 
(PCH). We combine the available information in our dataset with the factors presented in the 
academic literature into the following model: 
CEO-PCH Remuneration Gapit = α + β1ReportingLevelDiffernceit + β2AgeDifferenceit + 
β3ExternallyHiredRecentlyDifferenceit + β4PositionTenureDifferenceit + 
β5CompanyTenureDifferenceit +  + β6PositionInternationalScopeDifferenceit + 
β7DummyPreviousCEOit + β8DummyNewCEOYearit + β9DummyCEO=Chairit + 
β10CEOShareValueOwnedit+ β11CEOSharePercentageOwnedit + β12DummyFemaleCEOit + 
β13DummyEducationit + β14FinancialPaperit +  β15LargePaperit + β16MediaCEOit  + β17FirmSizeit + 
β18SpanofControlDifferenceit + β19SalesDifference + β20CompanyAgeit  + β21IPOAgeit + 
β22Governance(DummyTwo-tierBoard)it + β23SizeMainBoardit + β24NED%MainBoardit  + 274 
 
β25SizeSupervisoryBoardit + β26FirmPerformanceit + β27FirmRiskit + 
β28CapitalExpenditures%ofSalesit + β29BlockHolderTotal%i  + β30BlockHolderType%i + 
β31DummyPresenceRemunerationCommitteeit + β32DummyPresenceRemunerationAdvisorit + 
β33DummyTowersPerrinit + β34DummyMercerit + β35DummyNBSit + β36DummyKeplerit + 
β37DummyMonksPartnershipit + β38DiversificationLevel(Conglomerate)it + β39DummyCountryit 
β40DummyIndustryit + β41DummyTimei + εit           [4.2] 
 
Special attention is required for the board differences between the various countries. To be able 
to take these into account in the combined dataset we have used 4 different variables: 
  Dummy variable two-tier board; 
  Board size variable records the number of individuals part of the main board in the one-tier 
as well as two-tier governed companies; 
  In order to control for the fact that there are non-executives in the board of directors of one-
tier companies, we have recorded the percentage of non-executive directors in the main 
board (i.e. 0 for two-tier board and the relevant percentage for one-tier boards); 
  To take into account the size of the supervisory board we have added this variable (i.e. 0 for 
one-tier governed companies and the relevant number of individuals for two-tier boards). 
 
Finally, we have constructed a “media CEO variable”.
195 Based on the LexisNexis (LN) 
database we were able to gain access to a large number of published articles. Our hypothesis is 
that CEOs that are mentioned in all types of different newspapers and magazines, build up star 
qualities. These people become well known and typically are engaged in a greater network. We 
expect the percent rank of the total hits per year in LN to be significantly (and positively) 
related to the CEO-PCH remuneration gap. Therefore we will test the null hypothesis that the 
media-CEO variable equals zero. Rejecting the null would be in line with our expectations. 
 
Hypothesis 4.1: 
H0: media CEO variable beta = 0  
H1: media CEO variable beta > 0 
 
We control for the number of hits in the country’s largest paper / weekly magazine and the 
country’s financial paper. The variables are constructed by taking the percent rank of the 
number of hits within each year, for each country. The selected sources are within the 
                                                      
195 The concept of media / star CEO is known in the literature (Malmendier and Tate, 2009; Bebchuk et 
al., 2006).  275 
 
boundaries of the availability in LexisNexis. This is a limitation as the paper/magazine may not 
be representative for the country. The overview is reflected in table 4.14. 
 
Table 4.14: Overview of used papers /weekly magazines to control media-CEO variable  
This table shows the available newspapers / weekly magazines in LexisNexis that were used as control 
variables, for the media-CEO variable we have created.
196 
Country Large  newspaper  Financial  newspaper 
Austria Die  Presse  Wirtschaftsblatt 
Belgium  Het Nieuwsblad  De Tijd 
France  Le Monde  La Tribune 
Germany  Der Spiegel  Der Tagespiegel 
Italy La  Stampa MF 
Netherlands (the)  De Telegraaf  Het Financieele Dagblad 
Spain El  Pais  Cinco  Dias 
Sweden Esmerk  Affarsvarlden 
Switzerland Le  Temps  Handelszeitung 
United Kingdom  The Times  The Daily Telegraph 
 
4.4.2 Data & methodology 
The starting point for the analysis is the dataset as described in section 4.2. Important for the 
current study is the fact that we will use CEO-PCH combinations. We have attempted to collect 
data for all CEOs for which we have PCHs in the dataset. Given the limited disclosure 
throughout Europe (especially in the early part of the research period and for non-listed 
companies) we did not succeed in all cases. We were able to establish 10,726 CEO-PCH firm-
year combinations for which we have at least one compensation element (base salary). Adding 
the other direct compensation elements results in a decreasing number of observations 
depending on the disclosure of companies. In most cases, companies also disclose the actual 
bonus (but not always the target and or maximum policy level). Long-term incentives are added 
if applicable. Our dependent variables are in line with the ones used by Eriksson (1999), 
Henderson and Fredrickson (2001) and Rajgopal and Srinivasan (2006). However, similar to 
section 4.3, again we will sharply differentiate between ex ante (policy) levels and ex post 
(actual) levels.
197  
                                                      
196 Not available in LexisNexis: Het Laatste Nieuws (Belgium), Financial Times Deutschland (Germany), 
Il Carrier e della Sera (Italy), Aftonbladet (Sweden), Neue Zurcherzeitung (Switzerland), Financial Times 
(UK).  
197 We will not express the remuneration gaps as a percentage of base salary (as we did for the PCH in 
isolation study), given the fact that significant differences are found in terms of base salary between 276 
 
As with the previous study on the determinants of PCH remuneration, right-hand-side variables 
(such as tenure and size of the PC) could not always be recorded for each case. In line with 
Greene (2003) we will follow the zero-order method of replacing each missing value, with the 
sample regressor average for all variables that are not dummies. This results in no changes and 
is equivalent to dropping the incomplete data. The benefit of this approach is that it is not 
necessary to delete the whole observation line. However, there is no free lunch. The approach 
has the disadvantage of resulting in a lower R
2. With regard to dummy variables from the 
survey, we have recorded a one if we are certain that the relevant variable is applicable. For 
example, for the dummy variable “externally hired” we have recorded a one in those cases were 
we have the information that the person is indeed externally hired and zero in all other cases. 
The same is true for the category variable ‘international scope’. This is approach is based on the 
experience that if the characteristic is not relevant, it is not (always) filled in.
 
Our objective is to research both time variant and invariant determinants of PCH remuneration. 
In terms of the regression methodology, we have therefore used pooled OLS. We control for 
industry and country fixed effects as well as year fixed effects through 58 industry dummies, 9 
country dummies and 8 year dummies. In order to account for the fact that multiple 
observations are related to the same company, as well as the possibility that residuals can 
behave non-independent within companies, we will cluster the observations per company. This 
results in standard errors being robust to disturbances being heteroskedastic and autocorrelated. 
We have avoided multicollinearity by leaving out the country the Netherlands in the country 
dummies, and the year 2000 in the time dummies.  
 
In the model, all Pearson correlation coefficients are below 0.4, except for i) The governance 
dummy two-tier board with the size of the supervisory board (0.7598), ii) Media-CEO with the 
large paper and financial paper rank (0.6377, 0.6304, and 0.6273 between these papers). All 
coefficients remain below 0.8. More important, the total mean VIF equals 2.46, with all 
individual factors remaining below 10. Therefore, we have no concerns about multicollinearity.    
 
Outliers 
As a result of the fact that we deal with differences in compensation, we observe outliers (and a 
heteroskedasticity problem). To reduce this problem we delete the seldom observed negative 
and zero pay differences. We will describe these negative data at the beginning of section 4.4.3, 
but will take them out of the regression analysis to allow for a natural log transformation of the 
policy remuneration levels. The deleted observations amount to 0.6% of the base salary cases, 
                                                                                                                                                            
CEOs and PCHs. Working with different figures on which the percentages are based would create a 
distorted image. 277 
 
1% of the total cash cases, and 0.8% of the total direct compensation cases. For the ex post 
remuneration analysis the number of negative cases is too large (e.g. 10.3% for the actual STI 
level) and therefore we will not delete these cases, but rely on outlier analysis for this section 
instead; deleting those observations with residuals greater than 4 times the standard deviation, 
equals 1.2% of the base salary observations, 1.3% of the total cash observations and 0.6% of the 
total direct compensation observations. 
 
Endogeneity problem and sample selection bias 
In this part of the research, the CEO position is part of the data sample. The impact of CEO 
dismissal is much larger than PCH dismissal given the fact that we observe an average of 5 to 6 
PCHs per CEO. The selectivity of CEO dismissal may cause incorrect estimation of the effects 
of the explanatory variables. Our objective is to obtain consistent estimators. We will approach 
this issue by working with two alternative approaches: 
  We treat the issue as an endogeneity problem that only impacts the intercept term and apply 
a dummy variable that equals 1 in the year of a CEO change and 0 in all other cases; 
  We treat the issue as a sample selection problem that can also affect beta terms, and censor 
the years in which a CEO dismissal occurs. We provide the results with correction for 
sample selection bias, if we have reason to believe that a bias exists. In order to still be able 
to work with company cluster robust standard errors we apply the full information 
maximum likelihood approach of Heckman (1976, 1979), in which the parameters of all 
equations are estimated simultaneously, (instead of the alternative two-step procedure that 
only allows for jackknifed and bootstrapped standard errors). 
 
4.4.3 Results of the analyses 
Graph 4.3 provides an initial overview of the differences in policy remuneration levels between 
CEOs and PCHs. In a very small number of cases the PCH earns more than the CEO. This is 
typically attributable to difference in nationalities (for example, a CEO from the Netherlands 
and a PCH with U.S. nationality). These types of differences are sometimes also observed in the 
financial services sector, if the specific PCH is considered of ultimate importance to the 
profitability of the company. Finally, it could be a way to camouflage high earners. Keeping 
such persons out the board of directors implies that there is typically no requirement to disclose 
pay levels. The described negative difference between the CEO and the PCH can be as much as 
1 million euro at base salary level, to 4 million euro at total target direct compensation level.  
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Graph 4.3: Overview policy gap pay gap  
This graph shows the difference in remuneration between the CEO and PCH in terms of yearly base 
salary, total target cash, and total target direct compensation. The figures are expressed in millions of 
EUR. For interpretation of the graph box, see graph 4.1.  














Typically the CEO-PCH gap is positive. The mean (positive) difference between the CEO and 
PCH equals € 660,300 at base salary level, € 1,123,568 at total target cash level and   
€ 1,860,411 at total direct compensation level. When working with the actual STI level these 
last two figures are € 1,321,936 and € 1,869,513 respectively. In line with the superstar effect as 
described by Rosen (1981), the difference can increase significantly, to multiples of these 
figures: maximum of € 3.7 mln (base salary), € 9.5 mln (TTC), 9.9 mln (TC), € 40 mln (TTDC) 
and € 42 mln (TDC) respectively. In the next two sections, we will provide the results of the 
regression analyses.  
4.4.3.1 Ex ante perspective 
Tables 4.15 and 4.16 present differences in policy pay levels. Table 4.15 shows the results of 
the full sample analysis with a dummy to account for the year in which a new CEO is hired. 
Table 4.16 uses sample selection techniques. The Heckit full information maximum likelihood 
model is used. If the approach does not result in a significant ‘athro’, we show the selection of 
observations in which no CEO change occurs.  
 
The CEO-PCH gap is defined as CEO remuneration minus PCH remuneration for the following 




Table 4.15: CEO-PCH remuneration gap - policy levels (full sample) 
This table shows the results of the regression for the ex ante or policy compensation levels, following 
equation 4.2. The full sample of observations with positive remuneration difference (CEO minus PCH) is 
used. In terms of the regression methodology, we have used pooled OLS, based on estimation of standard 
errors that are robust to disturbances being heteroskedastic and autocorrelated. Observations are clustered 
per company. We have used three dependent variables: i) ‘Base salary gap’ equals all fixed components 
including elements such as vacation allowance; ii) ‘TTC gap’ is total target cash, which equals the sum of 
base salary and target cash bonus; iii)  ‘TTDC gap’ is total target direct compensation (TTDC) which 
equals the sum of base salary, target cash bonus and the annualised long-term incentive value. 
Remuneration gap figures are expressed in EUR, and are natural log transformed. The coefficient, p-value 
(italic) and t-statistic are reflected. Stars stand for significance: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
Variables are reflected in the following groups: individual, company, industry, and country effects. Time 
dummies have been included in the model. The variable ‘Company assets’ is natural log transformed.  
Variable  Base salary gap (ln)   TTC gap (ln)     TTDC gap (ln) 
 Coefficient  t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
            
Individual effects (job & personal characteristics) 
Reporting level difference  -0.326217***-15.76 -0.324808***-13.54  -0.350371 *** -11.53
  0.0000   0.0000     0.0000    
Age difference  0.011290*** 6.61  0.008770*** 4.02    0.004535    1.55 
  0.0000   0.0001     0.1208    
Externally hired recently difference  -0.002181 -0.07 0.038361 1.13    0.028518     0.73 
  0.9429   0.2580     0.4688    
Position tenure difference  0.001158  0.51  0.011027*  2.33    0.009627    1.83 
  0.6077   0.0204     0.0686    
Company tenure difference  -0.001993  -1.88 -0.001374  -1.13  -0.000600    -0.36
  0.0612   0.2607     0.7209    
International scope difference  0.020453  1.36  0.038068**  2.74    0.032118    1.88 
  0.1734   0.0064     0.0609    
Previous CEO  0.173486*** 3.40  0.231662*** 4.25    0.258880 ***  3.60 
  0.0007   0.0000     0.0004    
New CEO year  -0.141931*** -3.38 -0.152488**  -3.01  -0.217192 **  -3.00
  0.0008   0.0027     0.0029    
Dummy CEO = Chair  0.041954  0.53  0.038352  0.39    0.078233    0.62 
  0.5950   0.6967     0.5383    
CEO share value owned  0.000000  1.64  0.000000  0.98    0.000000    0.75 
  0.1011   0.3271     0.4535    
CEO share percentage owned  -0.004942  -1.21 -0.003381  -1.27  -0.004891    -1.62
  0.2255   0.2043     0.1064    
Dummy female CEO  -0.467818*  -2.05 -0.282545  -0.95  -0.286605    -0.77280 
 
Variable  Base salary gap (ln)   TTC gap (ln)     TTDC gap (ln) 
 Coefficient  t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
  0.0413   0.3407     0.4416    
Dummy education (PhD, Prof)  0.299334**  2.83  0.253996*  2.07    0.374595 *  2.30 
  0.0049   0.0386     0.0221    
Financial paper (control)  -0.001415  -1.79 -0.000094  -0.10   0.000175    0.17 
  0.0735   0.9222     0.8619    
Large paper (control)  -0.000205  -0.26 -0.000755  -0.86  -0.000356    -0.34
  0.7926   0.3885     0.7339    
Media CEO  0.004582*** 4.66  0.005366*** 4.21    0.004468 **  2.95 
  0.0000   0.0000     0.0033    
Span of control difference  0.000001  1.93  0.000001*  2.20    0.000002 **  2.93 
  0.0540   0.0286     0.0036    
Sales difference  0.000000  0.41  0.000001  0.46    0.000000    0.16 
  0.6812   0.6445     0.8710    
              
Company effects (size, age, capital, performance, risk, governance, block holders, remuneration advisor) 
Company assets (ln)  0.080689*** 5.28  0.072968*** 3.93    0.115302 ***  4.93 
  0.0000   0.0001     0.0000    
Company age (years)  0.000229  0.59  0.000451  1.03    0.000422    0.81 
  0.5522   0.3043     0.4181    
IPO age (categories)  0.016951  1.67  0.016448  1.49    0.009839    0.73 
  0.0964   0.1376     0.4688    
Governance (dummy two-tier board)  -0.196174  -1.29 -0.248942  -1.52  -0.156344    -0.88
  0.1988   0.1295     0.3770    
Size of the main board  0.010938  1.29  0.006982  0.74   -0.012538    -1.11
  0.1963   0.4600     0.2679    
NED percentage on main board  -0.003331*** -3.44 -0.000579  -0.52  -0.001181    -0.90
  0.0006   0.6040     0.3686    
Size of the Supervisory Board  -0.002798  -0.29 0.010989  0.66   -0.033554    -1.72
  0.7734   0.5098     0.0860    
Tobin’s Q (market-to-book)  0.000078  0.14  -0.000232  -0.24  -0.000351    -0.44
  0.8855   0.8106     0.6594    
Liquidity ratio  0.004307  1.02  0.004412  0.30    0.021019    0.85 
  0.3062   0.7651     0.3954    
Solvency ratio  0.000470  0.46  -0.000106  -0.09  -0.000639    -0.43
  0.6476   0.9296     0.6690    
ROCE 0.001717*  2.26  0.000346  0.46    0.000183      0.17 
  0.0240   0.6474     0.8620    
Profit margin  -0.000755  -1.47 0.000108  0.25    0.000402    0.79 281 
 
Variable  Base salary gap (ln)   TTC gap (ln)     TTDC gap (ln) 
 Coefficient  t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
  0.1409   0.8028     0.4294    
Gearing 0.000030  0.75  0.000047  1.46    0.000008      0.21 
  0.4551   0.1449     0.8375    
Interest coverage  0.000045**  2.62  0.000028  1.66    0.000053    1.48 
  0.0091   0.0968     0.1408    
Capital expenditure % of sales  0.000140  0.98  0.000200  0.81   -0.000049    -0.17
  0.3284   0.4171     0.8654    
Volatility -0.000157  -0.66 0.000059  0.47    -0.000114      -0.66
  0.5077   0.6410     0.5118    
Block holders total %  -0.002017  -1.50 -0.003556**  -2.67  -0.004232 **  -2.74
  0.1330   0.0078     0.0063    
Block holder % (insurance company)  -0.004706  -1.92 0.003166  1.01    0.002925    0.93 
  0.0551   0.3143     0.3555    
Block holder % (bank)  0.000330  0.19  0.002146  1.26    0.004341 *  2.23 
  0.8501   0.2071     0.0261    
Block holder % (industrial company)  0.000458  0.40  0.002079  1.67    0.002587    1.76 
  0.6917   0.0963     0.0793    
Block holder % (nominee/trust)  0.007113  1.75  0.001056  0.31    0.001856    0.48 
  0.0801   0.7591     0.6307    
Block holder % (financial company)  -0.000073  -0.05 0.002644  1.66    0.002902    1.61 
  0.9566   0.0985     0.1092    
Block holder % (individual / family)  0.002743  0.42  -0.003957  -0.39  -0.003340    -0.37
  0.6712   0.6954     0.7135    
Block holder % (foundation)  0.003409  1.71  0.001991  0.84   -0.000640    -0.22
  0.0881   0.4018     0.8266    
Block holder % (emp./ man./directors)  0.026695  1.56  -0.029906  -0.77   0.016552    0.33 
  0.1182   0.4432     0.7421    
Block holder % (private equity)  0.001295  0.60  -0.001360  -0.64  -0.002261    -0.75
  0.5518   0.5212     0.4563    
Block holder % (state)  -0.001846  -0.94 -0.002954  -1.48  -0.004820 *  -2.03
  0.3485   0.1388     0.0429    
Dummy presence rem. comm.  0.124499*  2.13  -0.017526  -0.22  -0.084082    -0.84
  0.0339   0.8284     0.3988    
Dummy presence rem. advisor  0.059777  1.36  0.016751  0.32    0.140050    1.88 
  0.1746   0.7495     0.0613    
Dummy Towers Perrin   -0.027685  -0.53 0.043395  0.75    0.076654    1.06 
  0.5937   0.4566     0.2901    
Dummy Mercer  0.177331  1.27  0.224738  1.87    0.218944    1.87 282 
 
Variable  Base salary gap (ln)   TTC gap (ln)     TTDC gap (ln) 
 Coefficient  t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
  0.2051   0.0622     0.0622    
Dummy NBS  -0.058634  -0.84 -0.142731  -1.42  -0.025553    -0.29
  0.4023   0.1577     0.7706    
Dummy Kepler  -0.170941  -1.54 0.082362  0.70    0.056367    0.41 
  0.1235   0.4819     0.6856    
Dummy Monks Partnership  0.311641**  3.06  0.238842*  2.26    0.603167 ***  3.64 
  0.0023   0.0246     0.0003    
              
Industry effects              
Diversification level (conglomerate)  -0.006798  -0.22 0.040063  1.34    0.036236    0.96 
  0.8293   0.1805     0.3354    
Industry dummies (SIC two-digit)  yes      yes        yes     
              
Country effects              
Country dummy (Austria)  0.230174  1.19  0.170944  0.57    0.383325    0.88 
  0.2327   0.5659     0.3787    
Country dummy (Belgium)  0.033209  0.25  0.090414  0.61    0.057999    0.36 
  0.7990   0.5397     0.7169    
Country dummy (Spain)  0.670776*** 3.56  0.109623  0.42   -0.024462    -0.09
  0.0004   0.6754     0.9311    
Country dummy (France)  0.178491  1.61  0.031008  0.22    0.079007    0.46 
  0.1087   0.8281     0.6426    
Country dummy (Germany)  0.216705  1.55  0.207408  1.28    0.616630 **  2.63 
  0.1224   0.2000     0.0088    
Country dummy (Italy)  0.615918*** 4.30  0.332684  1.37    0.369457    1.06 
  0.0000   0.1710     0.2889    
Country dummy (Sweden)  0.294643*  2.42  0.079158  0.56   -0.029687    -0.16
  0.0158   0.5784     0.8706    
Country  dummy  (Switzerland) -0.017799 -0.13 -0.078262 -0.46   -0.137765      -0.62
  0.8975   0.6443     0.5379    
Country dummy (UK)  0.568897*** 5.34  0.469644*** 3.98    0.435741 **  2.91 
  0.0000   0.0001     0.0038    
              
Time effects              
Time dummies (2001-2008)  yes      yes        yes     
              
_cons 10.812937*** 45.65 11.325848*** 41.56   11.498706  ***  31.92
  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000    283 
 
Variable  Base salary gap (ln)   TTC gap (ln)     TTDC gap (ln) 
 Coefficient  t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
                             
Observations  10660   7311   6701    
Adjusted R²  0.504736        0.542129         0.546943      
 
Table 4.16: CEO-PCH remuneration gap – policy levels (sample selection) 
This table shows the results of the regression for the ex ante or policy compensation levels, following 
equation 4.2. In terms of the regression methodology, we have used the Heckit full information maximum 
likelihood model to correct sample selection bias resulting from CEO turnover. The selection equation (1 
if the company stays with the company in the research year) is reflected in appendix 4.4. For this part of 
the model, a superset is used. For this superset we have added CEO specific characteristics (CEO age, 
CEO position tenure, CEO company tenure, and CEO international scope). In case of a selection bias 
(significant ‘athro’), we follow this procedure and show the results, i.e. for ‘Base salary’ and ‘TTC’. For 
TTDC we did not get a significant result. As a robustness check we censor the years in which a CEO 
change occurs and show the remaining selection of observations, based on pooled OLS. For both models 
we estimate standard errors that are robust to disturbances being heteroskedastic and autocorrelated. 
Observations are clustered per company. We have used three dependent variables: i) ‘Base salary gap’ 
equals all fixed components including elements such as vacation allowance; ii) ‘TTC gap’ is total target 
cash, which equals the sum of base salary and target cash bonus; iii) ‘TTDC gap’ is total target direct 
compensation (TTDC) which equals the sum of base salary, target cash bonus and the annualised long-
term incentive value. Remuneration gap figures are expressed in EUR, and are natural log transformed. 
The coefficient, p-value (italic) and t-statistic are reflected. Stars stand for significance: * p<0.05; ** 
p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Variables are reflected in the following groups: individual, company, industry, and 
country effects. Time dummies have been included in the model. The variable ‘Company assets’ is 
natural log transformed. 
Variable 
Heckit 
Base salary gap (ln)   
Heckit 
TTC gap (ln)    
Sample OLS  
TTDC gap (ln) 
 Coefficient  t-stat Coefficient t-stat    Coefficient  t-stat
Individual effects (job & personal characteristics) 
Reporting level difference  -0.327306***-15.40 -0.328100*** -13.99  -0.344798***-10.67
  0.0000   0.0000     0.0000  
Age difference  0.010427*** 5.60  0.009185***  4.09    0.007089*  2.52 
  0.0000   0.0000     0.0121  
Externally hired recently difference  0.061271 1.73  0.100410**  2.70  0.013900    0.34 
  0.0843   0.0069     0.7354  
Position tenure difference  -0.003296  -1.26 0.003857   0.85    0.010428   1.93 
  0.2085   0.3961     0.0546  
Company tenure difference  -0.002262*  -2.04 -0.001179   -0.92   -0.001254   -0.81




Base salary gap (ln)   
Heckit 
TTC gap (ln)    
Sample OLS  
TTDC gap (ln) 
 Coefficient  t-stat Coefficient t-stat    Coefficient  t-stat
International scope difference  0.016940  1.09  0.029514*  2.04    0.028405   1.64 
  0.2737   0.0410     0.1026  
Previous CEO  0.180191**  3.24  0.250118***  4.12    0.256272*** 3.48 
  0.0012   0.0000     0.0006  
Dummy CEO = Chair  -0.076386  -0.91 -0.052092   -0.52    0.104844   0.83 
  0.3646   0.6032     0.4097  
CEO share value owned  0.000000  1.51  0.000000   1.13    0.000000   0.99 
  0.1308   0.2565     0.3252  
CEO share percentage owned  -0.004892  -1.22 -0.003192   -1.24   -0.004007   -1.67
  0.2215   0.2153     0.0951  
Dummy female CEO  -0.652220**  -2.97 -0.536878   -1.72   -0.453048   -1.20
  0.0029   0.0857        0.2320    
Dummy education (PhD, Prof)  0.188131  1.76  0.049391   0.49    0.174502   0.87 
  0.0785   0.6276        0.3825    
Financial paper (control)  -0.001949*  -2.43 -0.000796  -0.77    0.000330  0.31 
  0.0150   0.4442     0.7535  
Large  paper  (control)  0.000423 0.54  0.000166 0.18    0.000138 0.13 
  0.5891   0.8586     0.8961  
Media CEO  0.004246*** 4.14  0.005028***  3.90    0.003141*  2.00 
  0.0000   0.0001     0.0457  
Span of control difference  0.000001**  2.71  0.000002**  3.29    0.000003*** 4.33 
  0.0067   0.0010     0.0000  
Sales difference  0.000000  0.41  0.000001   1.01    0.000001   0.78 
  0.6786   0.3132     0.4367  
            
Company effects (size, age, capital, performance, risk, governance, block holders, remuneration advisor) 
Company assets (ln)  0.078395*** 5.00  0.071648***  3.81    0.126185*** 5.00 
  0.0000   0.0001     0.0000  
Company age (years)  -0.000078  -0.19 0.000327   0.71    0.000489   0.93 
  0.8462   0.4801     0.3548  
IPO age (categories)  0.007694  0.72  0.010562   0.87    0.008011   0.55 
  0.4708   0.3816     0.5832  
Governance (dummy two-tier board)  -0.255865  -1.68 -0.284481   -1.67   -0.122828   -0.69
  0.0938   0.0948        0.4900    
Size of the main board  0.009415  1.11  0.002932  0.29   -0.013388  -1.17
  0.2663   0.7719     0.2413  




Base salary gap (ln)   
Heckit 
TTC gap (ln)    
Sample OLS  
TTDC gap (ln) 
 Coefficient  t-stat Coefficient t-stat    Coefficient  t-stat
  0.0001   0.4652     0.3207  
Size of the Supervisory Board  -0.005616  -0.59 0.008950   0.56   -0.039815*  -2.12
  0.5520   0.5721        0.0349    
Tobin’s Q (market-to-book)  0.000025  0.04  -0.000101   -0.12   -0.000040   -0.05
  0.9648   0.9069        0.9624    
Liquidity ratio  -0.004973  -0.99 0.008601   0.57    0.016152   0.70 
  0.3224   0.5716        0.4845    
Solvency ratio  0.000826  0.74  -0.000015   -0.01    0.000129   0.09 
  0.4573   0.9912        0.9295    
ROCE  0.001722*  2.51  0.000970   1.28    0.000692   0.61 
  0.0121   0.2019        0.5431    
Profit  margin  -0.000413 -0.93 0.000302 0.69    0.000537 1.04 
  0.3532   0.4911     0.3006  
Gearing  -0.000001 -0.02 0.000048 1.19    0.000009 0.22 
  0.9880   0.2356     0.8265  
Interest  coverage  0.000030 1.69  0.000014 0.78    0.000060 1.56 
  0.0901   0.4374     0.1200  
Capital expenditure % of sales  0.000085  0.58  0.000208  0.82    0.000015  0.05 
  0.5624   0.4142     0.9619  
Volatility  -0.000246 -1.02 0.000010 0.06    -0.000047 -0.23
  0.3086   0.9495     0.8157  
Block holders total %  -0.001819  -1.41 -0.002867   -1.94   -0.004379**  -2.66
  0.1586   0.0529        0.0081    
Block holder % (insurance company)  -0.004955  -1.93 0.003004   0.97    0.003807   1.12 
  0.0532   0.3330        0.2620    
Block holder % (bank)  0.001249  0.75  0.002783   1.57    0.004062   1.88 
  0.4543   0.1170        0.0605    
Block holder % (industrial company)  0.000366  0.33  0.001821   1.34    0.002983   1.89 
  0.7431   0.1811        0.0597    
Block holder % (nominee/trust)  0.006277  1.56  0.000544   0.15    0.001388   0.32 
  0.1190   0.8789        0.7527    
Block holder % (financial company)  -0.000013  -0.01 0.002221   1.28    0.002994   1.59 
  0.9929   0.1997        0.1120    
Block holder % (individual / family)  0.004857  0.73  -0.002098   -0.19   -0.001682   -0.17
  0.4661   0.8480        0.8668    
Block holder % (foundation)  0.001935  0.90  0.001210  0.48   -0.000351  -0.12




Base salary gap (ln)   
Heckit 
TTC gap (ln)    
Sample OLS  
TTDC gap (ln) 
 Coefficient  t-stat Coefficient t-stat    Coefficient  t-stat
Block holder % (emp./ man./directors)  0.043163**  2.79  -0.035813  -1.22    0.027359  0.63 
  0.0052   0.2220     0.5277  
Block holder % (private equity)  0.000153  0.08  -0.002856  -1.57   -0.002993  -0.95
  0.9378   0.1159     0.3422  
Block  holder  %  (state)  -0.000450 -0.24 -0.002391 -1.23    -0.004186 -1.74
  0.8132   0.2198     0.0820  
Dummy presence rem. comm.  0.144141*  2.45  -0.039778  -0.47   -0.111658  -1.05
  0.0144   0.6400     0.2954  
Dummy presence rem. advisor  0.050481  1.01  0.014690   0.25    0.164192*  2.10 
  0.3104   0.8022     0.0367  
Dummy Towers Perrin   -0.081780  -1.52 -0.006381   -0.10    0.040752   0.56 
  0.1280   0.9178     0.5784  
Dummy Mercer  0.056616  0.40  0.132815   1.19    0.157162   1.30 
  0.6913   0.2344     0.1936  
Dummy NBS  -0.040636  -0.51 -0.104258   -0.99   -0.032967   -0.34
  0.6133   0.3243     0.7372  
Dummy Kepler  -0.205235  -1.42 -0.050054   -0.35   -0.123989   -0.76
  0.1566   0.7294     0.4490  
Dummy Monks Partnership  0.552057*** 4.36  0.653706   1.85    0.588390**  3.23 
  0.0000   0.0646     0.0013  
            
Industry effects 
Diversification level (conglomerate)  -0.025800  -0.77 0.011519   0.39    0.046329   1.23 
  0.4425   0.6985        0.2180    
Industry dummies (SIC two-digit)  yes     yes       yes    
            
Country effects 
Country dummy (Austria)  0.503044*** 3.35  0.756910***  3.95    0.912741*  2.38 
  0.0008   0.0001     0.0176  
Country dummy (Belgium)  -0.002624  -0.02 0.110639   0.79    0.066689   0.41 
  0.9834   0.4290     0.6823  
Country dummy (Spain)  0.612992*** 3.42  0.132011   0.50   -0.104061   -0.35
  0.0006   0.6153        0.7239    
Country  dummy  (France)  0.192465 1.78  0.131149 0.91    0.114128 0.69 
  0.0756   0.3630     0.4880  
Country dummy (Germany)  0.221539  1.69  0.298053*  1.97    0.579486**  2.75 




Base salary gap (ln)   
Heckit 
TTC gap (ln)    
Sample OLS  
TTDC gap (ln) 
 Coefficient  t-stat Coefficient t-stat    Coefficient  t-stat
Country dummy (Italy)  0.566353*** 3.86  0.322803   1.31    0.333039   0.94 
  0.0001   0.1905     0.3487  
Country dummy (Sweden)  0.255151*  1.98  0.064209   0.48   -0.068709   -0.41
  0.0479   0.6292     0.6804  
Country dummy (Switzerland)  0.021493  0.13  0.010124   0.06   -0.038826   -0.17
  0.8942   0.9540     0.8638  
Country dummy (UK)  0.535829*** 5.03  0.469501***  3.99    0.463023**  3.16 
  0.0000   0.0001     0.0017  
Time effects            
Time dummies (2001-2008)  yes      yes        yes     
            
_cons 11.128650*** 45.56 11.527238***  42.35    11.340917*** 30.45
  0.0000   0.0000     0.0000    
                            
Observations          5694    
Adjusted  R²          0.579111    
athrho  -1.7157819***   -1.3282952***       
lnsigma  -.62305902***       -.64373331***               
 
The observations related to table 4.15 and 4.16 are reflected below.  
 
Individual effects 
The tables immediately emphasise the relevance of tournament theory for all definitions of 
remuneration. Being further away from the CEO position (as measured by the difference in 
reporting level, i.e. -1 for the PCH that reports directly to the CEO and -2 for the PCH that 
reports indirectly to the CEO), results in a larger CEO-PCH pay gap.  
 
Difference in age and position tenure is generally related to a higher pay gap. Difference in 
company tenure has a negative correlation with the base salary pay gap. This could be explained 
by the fact that CEOs that are longer employed by the company earn lower fixed salary 
increases. 
 
If the CEO is retained from outside of the company, and especially if the candidate was already 
CEO, we observe a significant positive relationship with all compensation definitions. 288 
 
Apparently, such a candidate is able to negotiate a significant premium, due to an already strong 
current position.    
 
If the CEO is female this reduces the base salary pay gap. This could imply that companies that 
have a more egalitarian view on the corporate tournament (from a base salary perspective) are 
more likely to hire a female CEO or that the CEO earns a lower base salary in comparison to 
male colleagues. We find no indications that the pay gap in case of a female CEO is different on 
a total compensation basis.  
 
The education dummy is positive for all definitions of pay within the full sample regression 
(table 4.15). Academics (PhD, professors) in a CEO position, increase the pay gap with 
subordinates at the 95% confidence level. It is not observed in the sample selection model. 
 
In table 4.15 we have controlled for a new CEO year, and indeed we observe a negative 
relationship especially at the total (target) compensation level. 
 
The media CEO variable is significant and positive. We will elaborate on this at the end of this 
section under the header: “A note on media CEOs”. 
  
Company effects 
The pay gap increases with the size of the firm (measured by ln company assets), and the 
difference between the CEO and PCH in terms of span of control. The difference in sales 
responsibility does not provide for an additional significant explanatory factor.  
 
The size of the supervisory board is a mitigating factor on the total pay gap (table 4.16). Given 
the fact that supervisory board members are more and more held accountable for relative 
differences in a company (pay building), a larger supervisory board might increase the 
probability that one of the members steps on the break if the gap would become larger between 
the top of the house and the levels below.
198  
 
The total percentage of block holders has a disciplining effect on the pay gap at the total direct 
compensation level (negative correlation). 
 
                                                      
198 As an example, in the amended Dutch corporate governance code (2008), best practice provision II.2.2 
states: “The supervisory board shall determine the level and structure of the remuneration of the 
management board…with due regard for the pay differentials within the enterprise.” 289 
 
We observe a positive correlation between the presence of a remuneration committee and the 
base salary gap. A possible explanation could be that if a remuneration committee is present, 
there is greater attention for the CEO pay topic. This might result in more market comparison 
studies, which can result in an upward force on CEO pay. In terms of overall pay governance; 
the presence of a remuneration committee is not associated with a smaller or a higher pay gap at 
the total compensation level. Nor is the presence of a remuneration advisor in the model with 
new CEO year dummy. In the selected sample of no change, the TTDC is positively related to 
the presence of remuneration advisor. In terms of the correlation with specific advisory firms, 
Monks Partnership seems to be linked to greater pay gaps. 
 
Industry effects 
When running the models, the dummy for financial companies was not statistically significant, 
implying that there is no reason to assume that the CEO-PCH gap is larger or smaller in 
financial companies relative to the general industry. Therefore we decided to run the model with 
control dummies for each two-digit SIC code. The test that the combined estimators of the 58 
industries are equal to zero is refuted at the 99% confidence level. In terms of individual 
industries we observe positive and significant indicators (at the 99.9% confidence level) for the 
industries publishing, food and grocery retail stores, paper products, furniture, and clothing 
retail. We found negative and significant estimators for eating places retail, and railroads. 
 
Country effects 
Country differences are observed. For example, the UK exhibits higher pay gaps than the 
Netherlands, under all remuneration definitions.  
 
Time effects 
In terms of time effects, pay differences between the CEO and PCH have increased over the 
research period  
 
A note on media CEOs 
An interesting result is the fact that our proxy of a media CEO is positive and significant. The 
null hypothesis of 4.1 is thus rejected, in line with our expectations. CEOs that have greater 
media exposure exhibit a greater pay gap with subordinates under all pay policy definitions.
199 
The managerial power hypothesis might provide an explanation for this. Media CEOs use their 
star qualities and power to increase their remuneration level. Alternatively, the positive 
                                                      
199 This is mitigated at the total direct compensation level if a greater part of this media attention is caused 
by the financial press, rather than the overall press.  290 
 
difference could be related to reputation risk. Greater exposure brings about greater personal 
reputation risk and demands a premium.  
4.4.3.2 Ex post perspective 
Tables 4.17 and 4.18 present differences in actual pay levels i.e. the CEO-PCH gap defined as 
CEO remuneration minus PCH remuneration, based on: i) Actual STI; ii) Total target cash (TC) 
which equals base salary plus target cash bonus; iii) Total direct compensation (TDC) which 
equals base salary plus actual cash bonus plus the annualised value of long-term incentives. 
 
Table 4.17 shows the results of the full sample analysis with a dummy to account for the year in 
which a new CEO is hired. Table 4.18 uses sample selection techniques. The Heckit full 
information maximum likelihood model is used. If no sample selection bias is detected by the 
model (no significant ‘athro’), we show a robustness check based on the selection of 
observations in which no CEO change occurs.  
 
In section 4.3 it was shown that for the ex post remuneration model, the incorporation of ex ante 
remuneration levels as right-hand-side variable results in a greater explanatory value than 
running the regression without the target remuneration levels. Therefore we include the target 
STI in the actual STI regression, target total cash in the total cash regression, and target total 
direct compensation in the total direct compensation regression). This controls for the level of 
human capital and isolates the effects of size, performance, power et cetera, on actual 
compensation.  
 
Table 4.17: CEO-PCH remuneration gap – actual levels (full sample)  
This table shows the results of the regression for the ex post or realised compensation levels, following 
equation 4.2. The full sample of observations with positive remuneration difference (CEO minus PCH) is 
used. In terms of the regression methodology, we have used pooled OLS, based on estimation of standard 
errors that are robust to disturbances being heteroskedastic and autocorrelated. Observations are clustered 
per company. We have used three dependent variables: i) ‘Actual STI value gap’ which equals the paid 
out bonus; ii) ‘TC gap’ is total cash which equals base salary plus actual bonus; iii) ‘TDC gap’ is total 
direct compensation which equals base salary plus actual cash bonus plus the annualised value of long-
term incentives. Remuneration gap figures are expressed in EUR. The coefficient, p-value (italic) and t-
statistic are reflected. Stars stand for significance: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Variables are 
reflected in the following groups: individual, company, industry, and country effects. Time dummies have 
been included in the model. The variable ‘Company assets’ is natural log transformed. The ex ante 
remuneration levels are incorporated as right-hand-side variables: i) ‘STI target value gap’ equals the 
expected or target bonus amount paid out if targets are met (instead of underperformed or exceeded);  ii) 
‘Base salary gap’ equals all fixed components including elements such as vacation allowance; iii) ‘LTI 291 
 
value gap’ equals the annualised value of all long-term incentive components (including e.g. stock 
options with and without condition, restricted shares and performance shares). These three elements are 
expressed in EUR and are natural log transformed. 
Variable  Actual STI value gap   TC gap     TDC gap 
 Coefficient  t-stat  Coefficient  t-stat    Coefficient  t-stat 
                
Individual effects (contract, job & personal characteristics) 
STI target value  1.02***23.11           
  0.0000             
TTC     1.03***138.98         
     0.0000          
TTDC           0.97  ***58.74
           0.0000    
Reporting level difference  -29315.14  -1.91 -31698.36*** -3.47    11614.66    0.56
  0.0575   0.0005     0.5748      
Age difference  -134.70  -0.10 -382.77  -0.6    27.00    0.02
  0.9181   0.5481     0.9875      
Externally hired recently difference  328.06 0.01 -7143.69 -0.59   -795.87      -0.03
  0.9895   0.5552     0.9782      
Position tenure difference  3325.01  1.32 3056.87*  2.46    1470.08    0.48
  0.1891   0.0137     0.6296      
Company tenure difference  718.30  0.83 509.43  1.31    -1061.85    -0.82
  0.4084   0.1917     0.4139      
International scope difference  9877.56  1.22 3253.81  0.68    6482.81    0.63
  0.2246   0.4953     0.5316      
Previous CEO  42109.56  1.15 26554.74*  2.29    30212.19    0.60
  0.2492   0.0221     0.5489      
New CEO year  -130940.13**  -2.84 -100029.01*** -7.21   -174412.36 *** -4.43
  0.0048   0.0000     0.0000      
Dummy CEO = Chair  70186.71  1.36 63318.78*** 3.52    -18138.25    -0.27
 0.1740    0.0004     0.7852       
CEO share value owned  -0.0007  -1.68 -0.0006*** -5.06    -0.0003    -0.86
  0.0941   0.0000     0.3878      
CEO share percentage owned  -1080.14  -0.86 -1073.13  -1.06    -645.92    -0.58
  0.3891   0.2876     0.5635       
Dummy female CEO  -184382.87*  -2.06 -106154.93**  -3.22   -208812.58    -1.37
 0.0403    0.0013     0.1724       
Dummy education (PhD, Prof)  45475.85  0.41 27196.49  1.09   -331656.56    -1.56
  0.6785   0.2757     0.1188      
Financial paper (control)  852.92  1.76 360.68  1.56    470.16    0.69292 
 
Variable  Actual STI value gap   TC gap     TDC gap 
 Coefficient  t-stat  Coefficient  t-stat    Coefficient  t-stat 
  0.0789   0.1188     0.4926      
Large paper (control)  -740.58  -1.39 -315.51  -1.32    575.23    0.68
  0.1664   0.1869     0.4972      
Media CEO  173.35  0.29 158.31  0.53    -951.22    -1.03
  0.7735   0.5952     0.3024      
Span of control difference  0.00  0.00 0.01  5.4    -0.93 *  -2.34
  0.9987   0.9106     0.0197      
Sales difference  -1.49**  -3.15 -1.56  0.11    -0.38    -0.63
  0.0017   0.0000***     0.5321      
                
Company effects (size, age, capital, performance, risk, governance, block holders, remuneration advisor) 
Company assets (ln)  22191.57*  2.08 21644.99*** -6.14    18069.55    1.36
  0.0383   0.0000     0.1733      
Company age (years)  -230.66  -0.50 -275.05**  -3.23    -391.71    -0.75
  0.6172   0.0012     0.4522      
IPO age (categories)  12470.06*  2.25 13715.20*** 6.1    10675.11    1.49
  0.0253   0.0000      0.1378      
Governance (dummy two-tier board)  49519.89  0.68 64734.79  1.77    66229.25    0.73
  0.4945   0.077     0.4687      
Size of the main board  498.73  0.12 -1041.19  -0.6    -2104.37    -0.40
  0.9062   0.5503     0.6896      
NED percentage on main board  -323.59  -0.54 -343.83  -1.88    -303.40    -0.37
  0.5917   0.0598     0.7139      
Size of the Supervisory Board  -4815.68  -0.76 -9979.03*** -3.52    -15745.75    -1.82
  0.4462   0.0004     0.0688      
Tobin's Q  -928.74**  -2.68 -931.82*** -4.57    -639.57    -1.30
  0.0077   0.0000     0.1935      
Liquidity ratio  45226.76**  2.65 37340.67*** 6.12    1840.41    0.11
  0.0083   0.0000     0.9088      
Solvency ratio  -842.53  -1.14 -674.08*  -2.31    -1387.48    -1.75
  0.2552   0.0208     0.0809      
ROCE 1477.26  1.39 1822.55*** 6.5    865.89      0.74
  0.1653   0.0000     0.4594      
Profit margin  -412.46  -0.58 -867.74*** -5.39    -752.13    -0.84
  0.5631   0.0000     0.4002      
Gearing 12.84  0.52 9.24  0.5    -22.44      -0.92
  0.6009   0.6137     0.3582      
Interest coverage  8.38  0.97 9.36  0.95    6.50    0.36293 
 
Variable  Actual STI value gap   TC gap     TDC gap 
 Coefficient  t-stat  Coefficient  t-stat    Coefficient  t-stat 
  0.3317   0.3400     0.7209      
Capital expenditure % of sales  201.26  1.26 151.43**  2.97    -70.48    -0.42
  0.2083   0.003     0.6759      
Volatility 99.50  0.78 103.16  1.11    83.08      0.66
  0.4336   0.269     0.5125      
Block holders total %  -1030.79  -1.35 -1178.84*** -4.19    -1514.95    -1.51
  0.1764   0.0000     0.1331       
Block holder % (insurance company)  -1033.10  -0.83 -245.04  -0.55    -924.04    -0.77
  0.4098   0.5823     0.4420      
Block holder % (bank)  440.17  0.70 906.69**  2.62    894.06    0.90
  0.4837   0.0087     0.3699      
Block holder % (industrial company)  432.23  0.63 606.30*  2.43    1365.49    1.63
  0.5321   0.0152     0.1037      
Block holder % (nominee/trust)  3045.09  1.70 2316.70**  2.75    3211.91    1.44
  0.08930   0.006     0.15070      
Block holder % (financial company)  875.30  1.14 1180.63**  3.09    1967.54    1.95
  0.2564   0.002     0.0521      
Block holder % (individual / family)  342.93  0.17 694.23  0.66    3268.00    1.20
  0.8670   0.5081     0.2328      
Block holder % (foundation)  3079.69**  2.63 3222.24*** 5.99    3086.51    1.77
  0.0090   0.0000     0.0775       
Block holder % (emp./ man./directors)  -5880.74  -0.37 -1250.37  -1.41    68374.82 **  3.09
  0.7090   0.1592     0.0022      
Block holder % (private equity)  -3894.94**  -3.15 -3431.03*** -5.71    -1721.40    -0.94
  0.0018   0.0000     0.3500      
Block holder % (state)  3869.47  1.66 3866.27*** 9.98    6737.79 *  2.20
  0.0976   0.0000     0.0281      
Dummy presence rem. comm.  2686.47  0.06 2933.00  0.17    129672.14    1.84
  0.9556   0.8638     0.0661      
Dummy presence rem. advisor  69993.87  1.58 70629.68*** 5.25    -3899.95    -0.07
  0.1149   0.0000     0.9451      
Dummy Towers Perrin   34650.39  0.79 4974.41  0.28    -81712.77    -1.24
  0.4313   0.7784     0.2164      
Dummy Mercer  148485.63  1.90 169628.01*** 4.17    132401.31    1.46
  0.0585   0.0000     0.1464       
Dummy NBS  30847.29  0.51 73604.19**  2.73    206765.13    1.93
  0.6133   0.0063     0.0548      
Dummy Kepler  -64075.27  -0.30 -67205.18  -1.32   -339045.78    -1.47294 
 
Variable  Actual STI value gap   TC gap     TDC gap 
 Coefficient  t-stat  Coefficient  t-stat    Coefficient  t-stat 
  0.7645   0.1882     0.1417      
Dummy Monks Partnership  167742.27  1.89 152931.53*  2.17    157453.37    1.10
  0.0593   0.0300     0.2724      
Industry effects               
Diversification level (conglomerate)  30167.01  1.63 35842.74*** 5.04    36598.01    1.40
  0.1047   0.0000      0.1629      
Industry dummies (SIC two-digit)  yes     yes       yes    
               
Country effects               
Country dummy (Austria)  166482.87  1.55 166847.47**  2.63    205601.09    1.30
  0.1230   0.0085     0.1957      
Country dummy (Belgium)  1621.32  0.02 28053.68  0.94    -43049.30    -0.46
  0.9821   0.3456     0.6449      
Country dummy (Spain)  261535.93*  2.22 249104.26*** 6.88    311570.04 **  2.78
  0.0267   0.0000     0.0057      
Country dummy (France)  87128.58  1.25 84983.07*** 3.43    91604.71    1.16
  0.2117   0.0006     0.2470      
Country dummy (Germany)  45590.43  0.54 92097.34*  2.02    129824.43    1.16
  0.5923   0.0438     0.2487      
Country dummy (Italy)  190128.98*  2.28 205716.28*** 4.13    148333.52    0.64
  0.0230   0.0000     0.5221      
Country dummy (Sweden)  174222.61*  2.42 182331.78*** 5.56    64341.18    0.65
  0.0160   0.0000     0.5148      
Country dummy (Switzerland)  43759.57  0.43 30434.28  0.94   -666933.76 **  -3.12
  0.6682   0.3462     0.0019      
Country dummy (UK)  101416.83  1.76 97657.44*** 3.91    67343.06    0.88
  0.0793   0.0001      0.3779      
               
Time effects               
Time dummies (2001-2008)  yes      yes        yes     
               
_cons -407857.37  -2.90 -344107.33  -5.69    -91967.96      -0.52
  0.0040        0.6043      
                             
Observations 5822    5919      6634       
Adjusted R²  0.763262
200       0.890178
201        0.936200
202      
                                                      
200 Without taking into account the ex ante remuneration level, this figure would equal 0.4607. 295 
 
Table 4.18: CEO-PCH remuneration gap – actual levels (sample selection) 
This table shows the results of the regression for the ex post or realised compensation levels, following 
equation 4.2. In terms of the regression methodology, we have used the Heckit full information maximum 
likelihood model to correct sample selection bias resulting from CEO turnover. The selection equation (1 
if the company stays with the company in the research year) is reflected in appendix 4.4. For this part of 
the model, a superset is used. For this superset we have added CEO specific characteristics (CEO age, 
CEO position tenure, CEO company tenure, and CEO international scope). In case of a selection bias 
(significant ‘athro’), we follow this procedure and show the results, i.e. for ‘TDC’. For ‘Actual STI value’ 
and ‘TC’ we did not get a significant result. As a robustness check we censor the years in which a CEO 
change occurs and show the remaining selection of observations, based on pooled OLS. For both models 
we estimate standard errors that are robust to disturbances being heteroskedastic and autocorrelated. 
Observations are clustered per company. We have used three dependent variables: i) ‘Actual STI value 
gap’ which equals the paid out bonus; ii) ‘TC gap’ is total cash which equals base salary plus actual 
bonus; iii) ‘TDC gap’ is total direct compensation which equals base salary plus actual cash bonus plus 
the annualised value of long-term incentives. Remuneration gap figures are expressed in EUR. The 
coefficient, p-value (italic) and t-statistic are reflected. Stars stand for significance: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; 
*** p<0.001. Variables are reflected in the following groups: individual, company, industry, and country 
effects. Time dummies have been included in the model. The variable ‘Company assets’ is natural log 
transformed. The ex ante remuneration levels are incorporated as right-hand-side variables: i) ‘STI target 
value gap’ equals the expected or target bonus amount paid out if targets are met (instead of 
underperformed or exceeded);  ii) ‘Base salary gap’ equals all fixed components including elements such 
as vacation allowance; iii) ‘LTI value gap’ equals the annualised value of all long-term incentive 
components (including e.g. stock options with and without condition, restricted shares and performance 
shares). These three elements are expressed in EUR. 
Variable 
Sample OLS 
Actual STI value   
Sample OLS 
TC    
Heckit  
TDC 
 Coefficient  t-stat Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient t-stat
              
Individual effects (contract, job & personal characteristics) 
STI target value gap  1.04***23.20            
  0.0000            
TTC gap      1.05***33.01       
     0.0000         
TTDC gap             0.95 ***48.03
           0.0000   
Reporting level difference  -15969.23  -1.15 -17170.37   -1.16   4307.95    0.19
  0.2511   0.2471     0.8520    
                                                                                                                                                            
201 Without taking into account the ex ante remuneration level, this figure would equal 0.5243. 




Actual STI value   
Sample OLS 
TC    
Heckit  
TDC 
 Coefficient  t-stat Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient t-stat
Age difference  1363.42  1.35 554.90   0.54    1317.26    0.76
  0.1771   0.5870     0.4476    
Externally hired recently difference  5221.92 0.22 -7447.03    -0.32    78713.46  *  2.35
  0.8271   0.7495     0.0186    
Position tenure difference  871.23  0.36 1065.04   0.47    -3099.79    -0.99
  0.7208   0.6372     0.3219    
Company tenure difference  536.97  0.70 272.66   0.36    -1596.71    -1.27
  0.4863   0.7199     0.2024    
International scope difference  13048.57  1.52 7621.95   0.93    11362.78    1.07
  0.1291   0.3506     0.2854    
Previous CEO  22912.64  0.70 3364.15   0.10    17776.94    0.31
  0.4874   0.9191     0.7530    
Dummy CEO = Chair  75890.21  1.49 60719.07   1.24    6898.08    0.10
  0.1360   0.2171     0.9218    
CEO share value owned  0.00  -1.49 0.00   -1.62   0.00    -1.45
  0.1370   0.1053     0.1460    
CEO share percentage owned  -720.43  -0.72 -837.28   -0.73   -554.59    -0.45
  0.4707   0.4662     0.6561    
Dummy female CEO  -71888.29  -1.37 11277.76   0.14   -130995.26    -0.90
  0.1708   0.8866     0.3665    
Dummy education (PhD, Prof)  107761.02  1.05 96943.27   0.99   -357506.07    -1.41
  0.2932   0.3233     0.1589    
Financial paper (control)  756.29  1.55 309.86   0.64    623.53    0.80
  0.1222   0.5232     0.4233    
Large paper (control)  -806.67  -1.53 -315.89   -0.62   451.70    0.53
  0.1264   0.5370     0.5944    
Media CEO  470.97  0.71 402.69   0.59    -258.41    -0.25
  0.4810   0.5552     0.8015    
Span of control difference  -0.06  -0.20 -0.09  -0.34   -0.75    -1.90
  0.8413   0.7319     0.0570    
Sales difference  -1.53**  -2.83 -1.70*** -3.56   -0.15    -0.21
  0.0050   0.0004     0.8342    
              
Company effects (size, age, capital, performance, risk, governance, block holders, remuneration advisor) 
Company assets (ln)  20505.67  1.82 19565.45   1.84    17751.54    1.13
  0.0698   0.0665     0.2599    




Actual STI value   
Sample OLS 
TC    
Heckit  
TDC 
 Coefficient  t-stat Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient t-stat
  0.4906   0.4292     0.2409    
IPO age (categories)  13143.70*  2.27 14343.62**  2.87    5924.61    0.69
  0.0238   0.0043     0.4904    
Governance (dummy two-tier board)  18827.62  0.24 46531.56   0.55    132596.70    1.13
  0.8090   0.5817     0.2571    
Size of the main board  103.82  0.02 -1038.48   -0.23   -1210.85    -0.19
  0.9823   0.8190     0.8525    
NED percentage on main board  -520.12  -0.90 -544.30   -1.02   135.27    0.15
  0.3692   0.3074     0.8791    
Size of the Supervisory Board  -6774.85  -0.97 -12841.85  -1.91   -19448.64 *  -2.13
  0.3314   0.0571     0.0333    
Tobin’s Q (market-to-book)  -1023.67*  -2.04 -1067.92*  -2.14   -647.58    -1.02
  0.0416   0.0333     0.3061    
Liquidity ratio  49852.60**  2.75 41698.80*  2.37    19207.93    1.10
  0.0063   0.0181     0.2697    
Solvency ratio  -1269.48  -1.61 -837.04  -1.08   -1545.08    -1.73
  0.1088   0.2823     0.0839    
ROCE 1230.07  1.12 1647.68*  2.54    743.36      0.63
  0.2632   0.0113     0.5261    
Profit margin  -405.27  -0.54 -901.94   -1.57   -480.38    -0.52
  0.5874   0.1178     0.6036    
Gearing  7.92  0.23 5.44   0.16    -46.40    -1.26
  0.8216   0.8730     0.2068    
Interest coverage  7.07  0.75 7.48   0.76    -16.12    -0.73
  0.4560   0.4476     0.4681    
Capital expenditure % of sales  248.80  1.64 187.87   1.27    -55.26    -0.38
  0.1013   0.2052     0.7069    
Volatility  86.34  0.87 93.68   0.80    3.27    0.03
  0.3857   0.4246     0.9747    
Block holders total %  -727.89  -0.92 -837.71   -1.04   -777.03    -0.69
  0.3588   0.2980     0.4916    
Block holder % (insurance company)  -977.39  -0.69 -291.83   -0.31   -1335.32    -0.92
  0.4918   0.7530     0.3588    
Block holder % (bank)  1035.41  1.50 1145.23   1.51    2318.62    1.88
  0.1343   0.1328     0.0595    
Block holder % (industrial company)  220.28  0.31 384.78   0.56    636.70    0.66




Actual STI value   
Sample OLS 
TC    
Heckit  
TDC 
 Coefficient  t-stat Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient t-stat
Block holder % (nominee/trust)  2038.10  1.08 1467.80   0.78    2490.00    1.11
  0.2787   0.4366     0.2685    
Block holder % (financial company)  835.79  1.03 855.66   1.04    1419.49    1.25
  0.3047   0.3000     0.2117    
Block holder % (individual / family)  279.03  0.14 187.60  0.09    2034.60    0.65
  0.8899   0.9286     0.5133    
Block holder % (foundation)  2645.08*  2.40 2882.58*  2.37    2116.54    1.02
  0.0168   0.0182     0.3063    
Block holder % (emp./ man./directors)  -1024.84  -0.07 1894.97   0.13    71209.52 **  2.97
  0.9430   0.8997     0.0029    
Block holder % (private equity)  -4196.06*** -3.41 -3880.73**  -2.92   -3938.36    -1.85
  0.0007   0.0037     0.0646    
Block holder % (state)  4554.24  1.81 4450.96   1.74    7300.48 *  2.16
  0.0705   0.0829     0.0306    
Dummy presence rem. comm.  -17829.74  -0.38 -7322.64   -0.17   76863.85    1.03
  0.7009   0.8658     0.3015    
Dummy presence rem. advisor  114314.72**  2.97 92445.23*  2.46    36287.89    0.66
  0.0032   0.0142     0.5118    
Dummy Towers Perrin   24515.76  0.57 -1457.07   -0.03   -93790.48    -1.29
  0.5707   0.9735     0.1969    
Dummy Mercer  142444.59  1.79 159597.76   1.93    139302.35    1.25
  0.0738   0.0543     0.2125    
Dummy NBS  40849.15  0.61 82289.64   1.15    260116.49 *  2.15
  0.5410   0.2525     0.0319    
Dummy Kepler  -126904.69  -0.63 -144779.59   -0.70   -81945.44    -0.49
  0.5320   0.4821     0.6225    
Dummy Monks Partnership  -13204.31  -0.20 -23551.04   -0.32   197913.36    0.96
  0.8405   0.7514     0.3378    
              
Industry effects  
Diversification level (conglomerate)  27637.03  1.53 33550.32   1.95    44397.21    1.64
  0.1278   0.0521     0.1015    
Industry dummies (SIC two-digit)  yes   yes     yes    
              
Country effects                
Country dummy (Austria)  -26576.11  -0.24 -40833.92   -0.33   225470.37    1.21




Actual STI value   
Sample OLS 
TC    
Heckit  
TDC 
 Coefficient  t-stat Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient t-stat
Country dummy (Belgium)  29435.12  0.34 20863.62   0.24    8043.70    0.07
  0.7308   0.8069     0.9448    
Country dummy (Spain)  247470.12  1.86 221999.51   1.84    300080.99 *  2.40
  0.0641   0.0668     0.0166    
Country dummy (France)  59893.35  0.84 57364.85   0.80    83141.03    0.95
  0.4024   0.4230     0.3422    
Country dummy (Germany)  19474.55  0.22 71372.68   0.80    112358.70    0.89
  0.8275   0.4242     0.3730    
Country dummy (Italy)  128565.53  1.51 145733.97   1.64    252211.96    0.87
  0.1315   0.1019     0.3858    
Country dummy (Sweden)  178883.75*  2.21 175248.90*  2.12    134032.04    1.16
  0.0279   0.0349     0.2475    
Country dummy (Switzerland)  41338.84  0.40 32609.76   0.31   -778599.56 *** -3.39
  0.6923   0.7595     0.0007    
Country dummy (UK)  67749.69  1.06 66750.59   0.99    106655.03    1.13
  0.2913   0.3247     0.2601    
              
Time effects              
Time dummies (2001-20008)  yes    yes      yes    
              
_cons -358519.42*  -2.53 -286569.81*  -2.14    -119390.17      -0.60
  0.0100   0.0300     0.5500   
                             
Observations  5185   5250         
Adjusted  R²  0.776338   0.895053         
athrho           -0.874605  **   
lnsigma                     13.087866 *** 
 
Observations related to table 4.17 and 4.18 are presented below.  
 
Individual effects 
The dummy new CEO year is associated with a smaller actual remuneration gap (table 4.17). 
This could be explained by the fact that the CEO is only paid for part of the year, instead of the 
full year.  
 300 
 
The media CEO variable is not significant, although it was significant in the ex ante model. This 
could imply that media stardom helps in convincing the board of directors to take into account a 
higher human capital reference point (i.e. an increased ex ante remuneration level). However, 
other factors explain whether the CEO actually earns more or less in relation to this level. In 
other words, if stardom is not ‘paid back’ in the form of performance, there is no additional 
premium.    
 
Company effects 
The longer the company is listed, the higher is the actual remuneration gap (for actual STI and 
TC). An explanation could be that companies that are longer listed gradually move towards a 
stronger CEO model. 
 
The variable ‘sales difference’ is negatively associated with the actual pay gap at the STI and 
TC level. In the previous section (ex ante perspective) we observed no significant correlation. A 
possible explanation could be that units that show low relative sales are often in a ‘start-up’ 
phase. The effort that it takes to build a strategy, increase market share, etc. is rewarded beyond 
the current level of sales only, resulting in a higher ratio between actual and target 
compensation. A possible variable pay program could be directed towards achieving certain 
milestones in the short run (without progression in the short term there is no long-term). This 
could also explain why we do not find significant differences related to sales for the total direct 
compensation gap. 
 
Some other conclusions: i) Tobin’s Q is negatively related to the actual CEO-PCH gap in terms 
of STI and TC. A possible explanation could be that such firms are better governed and are 
better able to distinguish between performers (i.e. greater appreciation for PCH performance); 
ii) A higher liquidity ratio is positively related to the CEO-PCH gap; iii) Private equity investors 
form a disciplinary mechanism on the gap (negative correlation). 
 
Industry effects 
Also in this model we have run general industry dummies based on the two-digit SIC code. 
Positive and significant effects (at the 99.9% confidence level) are observed for rubber and 
plastic products as well as glass products. A negative correlation is observed for retail (building 
materials as well as retail-home equipment). 
 
Country effects 
In terms of total direct compensation levels we observe a significant and positive effect for the 
country Spain and negative correlation for Switzerland. 301 
 
Time effects 
As expected, time effects are small to non-existent. As a result of taking into account target 
compensation levels within the regression of the actual compensation levels, time effects are 
already (partly) controlled for. 
 
A note on the relevance of performance II 
The analysis in this section further emphasises the results of the previous section 4.3. Even 
without specific details on performance at the individual profit centre level we were (again) able 
to explain between 76% (difference in STI actual pay-out) and 89% (difference in total cash 
pay-out) of the variation in the dataset. This implies that companies set targets that result in 
payments close to the target level of pay. If the lion share of realised pay is explained by the 
target pay level, this raises the question which role performance plays in its explanation.  
 
Before answering this question, it is important to establish that the above result is rooted in 
human capital theory, connected to the general economic issue of scarcity. Therefore, 
controlling actual remuneration levels (including variable pay) for the level of human capital is 
the first stage in attempting to say something about the pay-for-performance hypothesis. The 
second stage is controlling for individual performance.  
 
We believe that the validity of pay-for-performance theory eventually boils down to answering 
the question: is there evidence to believe that after controlling for individual human capital 
differences, performance would not play the most important part in explaining the variation in 
pay? In the next section we will turn to the CEO position in our attempt to answer the question. 302 
 
4.5 Pay with and without performance  
This section explores the pay-for-performance adage that has been put forth in academic 
literature, grounded in agency theory. There is quite a lot of research on this topic executed for 
the CEO position. In this section, we will take a different angle by confronting CEO cash 
bonuses with PCH bonuses.
203 We will first describe the existing theory and develop our 
hypotheses. Subsequently, we will discuss the data & methodology. Finally, the results of the 
analyses are presented.  
 
4.5.1 Theory and hypothesis development 
Agency theory, which was discussed in the introduction, states that the interests of managers 
and shareholders differ. Together with the difference in risk preferences and the imperfect 
ability of the shareholder to monitor the actions of the manager, agency costs arise. Agency 
theory suggests that compensation contracts should make pay contingent on observable 
measures of performance, with the purpose of reducing the agency costs. Section 4.3 has shown 
the determinants of the PCH contract in terms of level and structure. 
 
Combining agency theory with tournament theory renders the view that the size of explicit 
incentives differ, depending on the position in the organisation. In section 4.4 we have 
researched the pay gap between the CEO and PCH. Typically, the CEO receives higher pay and 
higher explicit incentives. This puts forward the belief that besides explicit incentives, there are 
also implicit incentives (such as career concerns, Fama, 1980; Gibbons and Murphy, 1992; 
Holmström, 1999) that need to be optimised in combination. For CEOs these implicit incentives 
are typically less than for PCHs. Gibbons and Murphy (1992) for example find that career 
perspectives have decreased when one reaches the CEO position, as well as the present value of 
future compensation from promotion (Ortín-Ángel and Salas-Fumás, 1998). Our findings are 
therefore in line with the theory that explicit inducements in the optimal compensation contract 
should be the strongest for CEOs.  
 
In comparing CEO and PCH actual remuneration outcomes, we thus need to control for the size 
of these incentives for each position as a first step. In terms of bonuses, this can be achieved by 
                                                      
203 Short-term incentive programs are especially interesting given the fact that it has been proven 
insufficient to research cash incentives, only from a pay-performance perspective. An example for the 
Dutch market is Duffhues and Kabir (2008). The area of short-term incentive pay-outs is surrounded by 
different performance definitions per company, company culture, power, retention concerns, etc. As a 
contrast, long-term incentives are typically constructed in the form of shares and or stock options, with a 
direct link to the company share price (performance management is outsourced to the market in most 
listed firms). 303 
 
taking the bonus as a percentage of base salary. As a second step we need to control for 
performance. Let us first look at how pay and performance are related in a bonus program. In 
most companies, there is an expected STI value, which is called the target STI level. If one 
performs better than target this results in a higher pay-out. If one performs below the set targets, 
this would result in a below target pay-out. A typical pay-out curve is shown in figure 4.2.
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Controlling for target performance in the pay-out thus equals dividing the pay-out by the target 
bonus. Based on these two steps (actual bonus as a percentage of base salary and as a percentage 
of target), we have a basis to compare CEO and PCH pay-outs. It is based on bonus multipliers.  
 
From a pay-for-performance perspective we would expect that the sum of PCH multipliers 
divided by the number of PCHs, i.e. the mean PCH multiplier, would provide an indication of 
the CEO multiplier, given the fact that the sum of business unit performance equals the total 
performance of the company. Figure 4.3 provides an illustration: 
 
Figure 4.3: Actual versus target ratio (bonus multiplier) 
This figure shows the bonus ratio or multiplier for the CEO and PCHs. The ratio is obtained by dividing 
the actual bonus by the target bonus. A PCH is responsible for his business unit. The CEO is responsible 
for the sum of the business units, i.e. the overall company. The average of the bonus multipliers of the 
                                                      
204 If such mathematical calculation of the pay-out indeed is executed or that a less formulaic approach is 
used, depends among others on the company culture. These are company fixed effects that affect both the 
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PCH positions, reflect a proxy for the overall business performance. From the perspective of pay-for-






H0: CEO bonus multiplier = average PCH bonus multiplier  
H1: CEO bonus multiplier ≠ average PCH bonus multiplier 
 
If the null hypothesis is rejected, it implies that other factors than performance play the most 
influential role in explaining the actual pay-out levels of variable compensation of the CEO. 
Managerial power could provide such explanation. In terms of the power of the CEO versus a 
PCH, Pfeffer (1994) argues that power and social structures become more important the higher 
one goes up the hierarchical level. For this reason, the CEO may be better able to positively 
influence his own level of actual variable compensation pay-out. Bebchuk and Fried (2005) and 
Grinstein and Hribar (2003) among others, indicate that managerial power can be of substantial 
influence. Managerial power theory suggests that the CEO may have substantial influence over 
the board which is used to increase his pay. Bebchuk and Fried talk about excess pay defined by 
the difference between what a CEO would get under arm’s-length bargaining and what his 
influence over the board enables them to obtain. A proxy for excess pay is obtained by taking 
our CEO bonus multiplier minus the average PCH bonus multiplier. 
 
Especially if the null hypothesis is rejected, we would like to further research this proxy of 
excess pay by running a regression analysis. If the null hypothesis is not rejected, there is less 















4.5.2 Data & methodology 
The data is a selection of the sample of 2,513 CEO-years as reflected in section 4.2. The 
selection is equal to all CEOs for which policy target bonus as a percentage of base salary is 
given, as well as the actual bonus as a % of base salary. Furthermore, both figures need to be 
available for the PCHs in the company. Given the fact that policy levels are not often 
communicated to the outside world, we rely primarily on data from the survey. The sample 
equals a total of 1,309 CEO years. The corresponding number of PCHs equals 5,559.   
 
To test the hypothesis 4.2, we will apply a two-sided signed-rank test (Wilcoxon, 1945). It will 
test the equality of matched pairs of observations by using the Wilcoxon matched-pairs. The 
null hypothesis is that both distributions are the same. In addition we will apply an alternative 
signtest (two-sided as well as one-sided) which tests the equality of matched pairs of 
observations (Snedecor and Cochran, 1989) by calculating the difference between the CEO 
bonus multiplier and the PCH bonus multiplier. The null hypothesis for the two-sided test is that 
the median of the differences is zero; no further assumptions are made about the distributions in 
this test. 
 
4.5.3 Results of the analyses 
The results of the analyses are reflected in table 4.19. 
 
Table 4.19: Hypothesis testing, CEO multiplier versus mean PCH multiplier – panel A 
Null hypothesis (H0)   Observations Test  statistics  H0 rejected 
(yes/no) 
     Type  Prob.   
Wilcoxon (1945) signed-rank test          
CEO ratio = mean PCH ratio    1,309  Two-sided  0.6403  No 
          
Snedecor and Cochran (1989) sign test          
Median of (CEO ratio – mean PCH ratio) = 0   1,309  One-sided 
(Ha: > 0)  0.3134 No 
Median of (CEO ratio – mean PCH ratio) = 0   1,309  One-sided 
(Ha: < 0)  0.7066 No 
Median of (CEO ratio – mean PCH ratio) = 0   1,309  Two-sided 
(Ha: ≠ 0)  0.6268 No 
 
The null hypothesis is not rejected, which results in the belief that the CEO and PCH ratio for a 




To further test the validity of the results of table 4.19 panel A, we test two other hypotheses. 
The first hypothesis is that the CEO multiplier equals the multiplier of the most successful PCH 
(as measured by the highest bonus multiplier). This would imply that the CEO is rewarded in 
line with the best performing PCH. The second hypothesis is the opposite; the CEO is rewarded 
in line with the weakest performing PCH. Panel B and C, show the results.  
 
Table 4.19: Hypothesis testing, CEO multiplier versus mean PCH multiplier – panel B 
Null hypothesis (H0)   Observations Test  statistics  H0 rejected 
(yes/no) 
     Type  Prob.   
Wilcoxon (1945) signed-rank test          
CEO ratio = high PCH ratio    1,309  Two-sided  0.0000  Yes 
          
Snedecor and Cochran (1989) sign test          
Median of (CEO ratio – high PCH ratio) = 0   1,309  One-sided 
(Ha: > 0) 
0.0000  Yes 
Median of (CEO ratio – high PCH ratio) = 0   1,309  One-sided 
(Ha: < 0) 
1.0000  No 
Median of (CEO ratio – high PCH ratio) = 0   1,309  Two-sided 
(Ha: ≠ 0) 
0.0000  Yes 
 
Table 4.19: Hypothesis testing, CEO multiplier versus mean PCH multiplier – panel C 
Null hypothesis (H0)   Observations Test  statistics  H0 rejected 
(yes/no) 
     Type  Prob.   
Wilcoxon (1945) signed-rank test          
CEO ratio = low PCH ratio    1,309  Two-sided  0.0000  Yes 
          
Snedecor and Cochran (1989) sign test          
Median of (CEO ratio – low PCH ratio) = 0   1,309  One-sided 
(Ha: > 0) 
1.0000  No 
Median of (CEO ratio – low PCH ratio) = 0   1,309  One-sided 
(Ha: < 0) 
0.0000  Yes 
Median of (CEO ratio – low PCH ratio) = 0   1,309  Two-sided 
(Ha: ≠ 0) 
0.0000  Yes 
 
Panel B and C support the conclusion from panel A. Equality is rejected in panel B and C, 
where it was not rejected in panel A. From the one-sided tests, we can conclude that the most 
successful PCH has a higher bonus multiplier than the CEO, and the least successful PCH a 
lower multiplier.     
 
In summary, because the average PCH multiplier equals the CEO multiplier (as expected) there 
is no direct indication that the CEO bonus multiplier would be primarily related to other factors 
(e.g. position power) than performance as defined by the company. And if there would be other 307 
 
factors playing a role, they play an equal role for the CEO as well as the PCH. We believe this 
finding adds to the interpretation of empirical work and could be an indication of a 
misalignment between theory and practice where often no indication of the relations between 
pay and performance is found for cash incentives (e.g. Duffhues and Kabir, 2008). In practice, 
companies set performance standards and typically try to live up to these standards. The fact 
that in empirical research the relationship between pay-and-performance is not always shown 
could indicate that performance standards used in practice are not perfectly mimicked in 
empirical work. Empirical work needs to further entangle the difference between two research 
questions: 1) which measures are optimal versus which are used in practice?; 2) does pay 
respond to the measures used in practice? The latter is a difficult research question given the 
fact that companies typically use multiple measures and sometimes define measures differently 
(EVA with or without investment relief, EPS diluted or non-diluted, taking into account 
extraordinary items or not, etc.). We therefore promote the idea of controlling for performance 
in CEO compensation research and then establish the weight of other factors in explaining the 
remaining variation in outcomes. As shown in section 4.3 (PCH research) and 4.4 (CEO-PCH 
research), this can be done directly through controlling for human capital based on the target 
bonus. For CEO research there is an additional possibility based on controlling for performance 
relative to the PCHs.  
 
Explaining the difference  
Now that the null hypothesis still stands, researching the difference between CEO and PCH will 
be less successful, simply because we expect no large differences between the CEO and PCH 
multiplier. Noise can further hinder us from reaching any robust conclusions. In order to be able 
to say something about the difference, we subtract the PCH multiplier from the CEO multiplier 
(a proxy for Bebchuk’s “excess compensation”), and run the regression model from the 
previous section, relating to the differences between PCHs and CEOs. We have taken the 
average differences of age, position tenure and company tenure. Differences in international 
scope, reporting level and being externally hired became less intuitive in a multi-PCH setting 
versus a single CEO, and are not added to the model. To prevent collinearity in this smaller 
sample, we have taken out the variables “size of the board”, “size of the supervisory board 
“dummy two-tier companies”, “sales difference”, “span of control difference” (see equation 
4.3). The resulting mean VIF equals 1.85 (with all individual factors below 7). 
CEO-PCH Remuneration Gapit = α + β1Var.Coeff.PCH-Ratioit + β2Stand.Dev.PCH-Ratioit + 
β3NumberPCHsit+  β4AgeDifferenceit + + β5PositionTenureDifferenceit + 
β6CompanyTenureDifferenceit +  β7DummyPreviousCEOit + β8DummyNewCEOYearit + 
β9DummyCEO=Chairit + β10CEOShareValueOwnedit+ β11CEOSharePercentageOwnedit + 308 
 
β12DummyFemaleCEOit + β13DummyEducationit + β14FinancialPaperit +  β15LargePaperit + 
β16MediaCEOit  + β17FirmSizeit + β18CompanyAgeit  + β19IPOAgeit +  β20NED%MainBoardit  + 
β21FirmPerformanceit + β22CapitalExpenditures%ofSalesit + β23FirmRiskit + 
β24BlockHolderTotal%i  + β25BlockHolderType%i + 
β26DummyPresenceRemunerationCommitteeit + β27DummyPresenceRemunerationAdvisorit + 
β28DummyTowersPerrinit + β29DummyMercerit + β30DummyNBSit + β31DummyKeplerit + 
β32DummyMonksPartnershipit + β33DiversificationLevel(Conglomerate)it + β34DummyIndustryit 
+ β35DummyCountryit + β36DummyTimei + εit                [4.3] 
 
As reflected in the previous section, the total number of observations equals 1,309. We have 
taken out 4 outliers (residuals greater than 4 times SD). We have run the model on this sample 
(including a dummy variable for CEO change) as well as a selection where the CEO remains in 
position. The latter does not likely suffer from selection bias as the Heckit regression returns a 
non-significant athrho. Therefore we present the outcome without the Heckit regression, in table 
4.20. 
 
Table 4.20: CEO-PCH ratio (CEO excess compensation) 
This table shows the results of the regression for the ex ante or policy compensation levels, following 
equation 4.3. The full sample of observations is used for the regression in the left column (1,305 data 
combinations), and the sample of years with no CEO change for the right column (1,162). In terms of the 
regression methodology, we have used pooled OLS, based on estimation of standard errors that are robust 
to disturbances being heteroskedastic and autocorrelated. Observations are clustered per company. We 
have used one dependent variable: ‘CEO-PCH’ which equals the CEO bonus multiplier (actual divided by 
target STI) minus the mean PCH bonus multiplier (actual divided by target STI). This is a proxy for CEO 
excess compensation. It is multiplied by 100 to simplify the interpretation. The coefficient, p-value (italic) 
and t-statistic are reflected. Stars stand for significance: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Variables are 
reflected in the following groups: individual, company, industry, and country effects. Time dummies have 
been included in the model. The variable ‘Company assets’ is natural log transformed.  
Variable  CEO-PCH (full sample)     CEO-PCH (sample) 
 Coefficient    t-stat   Coefficient    t-stat 
             
Individual effects (contract, job & personal characteristics) 
Variation Coefficient (PCH ratio)  0.344791***  4.27    0.375259 ***  4.08 
  0.0000     0.0001    
Standard Deviation (PCH ratio)  -0.521517***  -8.00    -0.539491 ***  -7.72 
  0.0000     0.0000    
Age difference  0.102990  1.01    0.152451    1.06 
  0.3153     0.2882    309 
 
Variable  CEO-PCH (full sample)     CEO-PCH (sample) 
 Coefficient    t-stat   Coefficient    t-stat 
Position tenure difference  1.394206*  2.50    1.009700*    1.98 
  0.0128     0.0479    
Company tenure difference  -0.050483  -0.31    -0.045865    -0.28 
  0.7586     0.7786    
New CEO year  -20.742652***  -4.02         
  0.0001         
CEO externally hired recently  3.437756  0.75    8.088518    1.70 
  0.4525     0.0897    
Number of PCHs  0.148328  0.36    0.282185    0.65 
  0.7192     0.5149    
Previous CEO  6.133647  1.51    3.852394    0.88 
  0.1320     0.3798    
Dummy CEO = Chair  -7.496000  -1.20    -7.398158    -1.10 
  0.2326     0.2709    
CEO share value owned  0.000000  -0.32    0.000000    -0.14 
  0.7501     0.8877    
CEO share percentage owned  -2.167653**  -2.91    -1.924673 *  -2.26 
  0.0038     0.0244    
Dummy female CEO  -24.125582***  -3.87    -24.489363 ***  -3.58 
  0.0001     0.0004    
Dummy education (PhD, Prof)  11.225112  0.88    11.852579   0.90 
  0.3793     0.3665    
Financial paper (control)  0.051500  0.66    0.061987    0.75 
  0.5106     0.4553    
Large paper (control)  -0.094521  -1.62    -0.125452 *  -1.98 
  0.1063     0.0484    
Media CEO  0.020198  0.22    0.039891    0.40 
  0.8283     0.6867    
           
Company effects (size, age, capital, performance, risk, governance, block holders, remuneration advisor) 
Company assets (ln)  0.411491  0.37    0.343438    0.32 
  0.7139     0.7461    
Company age (years)  -0.012933  -0.42    -0.017617    -0.50 
  0.6778     0.6199    
IPO age (categories)  0.458116  0.68    0.595426    0.84 
  0.4983     0.3994    
NED percentage on main board  0.035368  0.31    0.015049    0.12 
  0.7534     0.9071    310 
 
Variable  CEO-PCH (full sample)     CEO-PCH (sample) 
 Coefficient    t-stat   Coefficient    t-stat 
Tobin’s Q (market-to-book)  -0.047676  -1.55    -0.042927    -1.10 
  0.1230     0.2735    
Liquidity ratio  -0.284054  -0.55    -0.399647    -0.79 
  0.5801     0.4305    
Solvency ratio  0.072130  0.79    0.105060    1.13 
  0.4311     0.2587    
ROCE 0.088906  1.26    0.115231      1.58 
  0.2100     0.1150    
Profit margin  0.007514  0.14    -0.020493    -0.38 
  0.8867     0.7023    
Gearing -0.001056  -0.30    0.001538      0.45 
  0.7673     0.6512    
Interest coverage  0.000180  0.21    -0.000195    -0.22 
  0.8320     0.8245    
Capital expenditure % of sales  -0.003260  -1.48    -0.002869    -1.25 
  0.1401     0.2126    
Volatility -0.007988  -0.62    -0.005458      -0.44 
  0.5326     0.6604    
Block holders total %  0.044492  0.53    0.028627    0.31 
  0.5987     0.7560    
Block holder % (insurance company)  0.036134  0.26    -0.012160    -0.08 
  0.7914     0.9328    
Block holder % (bank)  -0.103193  -0.95    -0.011720    -0.11 
  0.3418     0.9164    
Block holder % (industrial company)  -0.030048  -0.39    0.015923    0.19 
  0.6977     0.8455    
Block holder % (nominee/trust)  0.092402  0.53    -0.061815    -0.34 
  0.5976     0.7334    
Block holder % (financial company)  0.002791  0.02    -0.001644    -0.01 
  0.9801     0.9896    
Block holder % (individual / family)  -0.415743  -1.36    -0.275737    -0.85 
  0.1737     0.3951    
Block holder % (foundation)  0.210493  1.75    0.217998    1.73 
  0.0810     0.0850    
Block holder % (emp./ man./directors)    .        . 
 .      .     
Block holder % (private equity)  -0.617536***  -4.00    -0.656953 ***  -3.58 
  0.0001     0.0004    311 
 
Variable  CEO-PCH (full sample)     CEO-PCH (sample) 
 Coefficient    t-stat   Coefficient    t-stat 
Block holder % (state)  -0.059741  -0.70    0.039320    0.43 
  0.4860     0.6692    
Dummy presence rem. comm.  -0.198201  -0.04    -3.593751    -0.63 
  0.9707     0.5280    
Dummy presence rem. advisor  8.913216  1.80    11.352372 *  2.41 
  0.0730     0.0164    
Dummy Towers Perrin  1.340957  0.28    2.407764    0.47 
  0.7783     0.6390    
Dummy Mercer  51.311673**  3.24    50.428093 **  3.30 
  0.0013     0.0011    
Dummy NBS  6.586786  0.72    10.495827    0.97 
  0.4734     0.3341    
Dummy Kepler  -20.013037  -1.36    -25.358605    -1.76 
  0.1732     0.0796    
Dummy Monks Partnership  -3.504332  -0.15    -23.079893    -0.87 
  0.8810     0.3837    
           
Industry effects           
Diversification level (conglomerate)  -0.804482  -0.37    0.216633    0.10 
  0.7087     0.9207    
Industry dummies (SIC two-digit)  yes        yes     
           
Country effects            
Country dummy (Austria)  -3.301640  -0.17    -2.287343    -0.12 
  0.8685     0.9066    
Country dummy (Belgium)  5.593823  0.42    9.673561    0.63 
  0.6721     0.5321    
Country dummy (Spain)  37.004573*  2.45    42.603857 *  2.42 
  0.0148     0.0159    
Country dummy (France)  16.566086  1.75    18.564072    1.76 
  0.0809     0.0800    
Country dummy (Germany)  65.563309  1.49    72.336355    1.16 
  0.1367     0.2457    
Country dummy (Italy)  17.548015  1.43    21.773794    1.51 
  0.1531     0.1307    
Country dummy (Sweden)  -1.696394  -0.13    2.913730    0.20 
  0.8940     0.8393    
Country dummy (Switzerland)  3.012386  0.25    7.415368    0.55 312 
 
Variable  CEO-PCH (full sample)     CEO-PCH (sample) 
 Coefficient    t-stat   Coefficient    t-stat 
  0.8018     0.5844    
Country dummy (UK)  -1.220451  -0.15    1.222888    0.13 
  0.8823     0.8946    
           
Time effects           
Time dummies (2001-2008)  yes       yes    
           
_cons -18.896826  -1.09    -19.182618      -1.17 
  0.2769     0.2430      
                    
Observations 1305      1162       
Adjusted R²  0.217914         0.228357      
      
As expected, the adjusted R
2 is relatively low (around the 20%). The observations related to 
table 4.20 are described below: 
 
Individual effects 
Female CEOs are correlated with significantly lower actual bonus pay-outs in relation to the 
PCH standard. Given the fact that top executives (including PCHs) are more often male than 
female, this could be an indicator of inequality.  
 
CEOs with longer relative position tenure are able to negotiate higher actual bonus pay-outs, 
judging from a significant correlation between excess remuneration and position tenure.  
 
The percentage of share ownership is negatively correlated with excess compensation. CEOs 
with large share ownership seem to be less inclined to use this power in order to receive a bonus 
pay-out that cannot be justified by performance. Wealth changes as a result of share price 
movements will be of greater concern. 
 
The variables ‘variation coefficient’ and ‘standard deviation’ are both indicators of the 
distribution of the PCH ratio. In conjunction, the effect is negative. In other words, the CEO is 
less able to negotiate a higher actual bonus multiplier if the variation in performance of the 
various business units, is more diverse. Volatility is thus not rewarded. If the CEO succeeds in 




The presence of private equity investors results in a disciplining effect on the CEO bonus 
(negative correlation). 
 
In the sample of years with no CEO change, we observe a positive and significant correlation (at 
the 95% confidence level) between the disclosure of the presence of a remuneration advisor.
205 
This could imply that remuneration advisors are associated with higher actual compensation for 
CEOs beyond the average performance of the PCHs. An alternative explanation could be that 
companies that pay a higher actual bonus multiplier to the CEO are more likely to disclose the 
fact that there was a remuneration advisor in place, to justify this practice.  
 
Industry effects 
Because the dummy for financial companies is not significant, we have included general 
industry dummies based on the two-digit SIC codes. Specific industry practices are observed. 
Positive correlation at 99.9% confidence level: mining, rubber & plastic products, services 
(motion pictures); Negative correlation at 99.9% confidence level: retail (building materials). 
 
Country effects 
In Spain, CEOs seem to have more power (than in the Netherlands and the other companies) to 
obtain “excess compensation”. This could indicate a relative weakness in the corporate 
governance system and may be a concern for investors. 
                                                      
205 In addition, the human resources advisory company Mercer is significantly associated with higher 
actual bonus multipliers for the CEO. 314 
 
4.6 Summary & conclusion 
In the quest for survival, businesses try to obtain a strategic advantage. This is achieved by 
means of optimally financing the business, developing a superior strategy and executing this 
strategy. It goes without saying that human capital is indispensable in this equation; attracting 
the best people to the organisation, retaining them and motivating them to deploy their abilities 
at the benefit of the company. It can be safely assumed that the success of the business is a 
positive function of the amount of talent in the organisation. Human capital becomes 
additionally important when one moves up the corporate ladder. This is because decisions 
geometrically affect the organisation; positively or negatively. The CEO has final decisive 
power. However, an important part of his power is cascaded to managers, so called profit centre 
heads (PCH), that report directly or indirectly to him. These individuals have profit & loss 
responsibility for a part of the business and / or are jointly responsible for the total company. In 
light of the aforementioned topics of attraction, retention and motivation, as well as the general 
topic of optimally financing the business, the following questions arise: 
 
1) What are the determinants of profit centre head remuneration? 
2) What are the determinants of the CEO-PCH remuneration gap? 
3) Do CEOs have more power to influence their actual bonus than PCHs? 
 
Answers to these questions are not abundant given the relative absence of empirical research, 
especially for the European context. Based on a proprietary dataset, made available by Towers 
Perrin, we were able to research these questions. 
 
4.6.1. Summary  
In the tables 4.21 to 4.25 we provide overviews of our statistically significant findings from the 
most relevant models of section 4.3 to 4.5 and the associated economic effects. The 58 industry 
dummies are not reflected. We have used these dummies to control for (industry) fixed effects. 
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Table 4.21: PCH policy pay levels: economic effects of statistically significant findings 
This table shows an overview of the statistically significant findings, of equation 4.1, for ex ante (or 
policy) remuneration levels, as well as the economic effects (see table 4.10). ‘Sig’ stands for significance 
level. ‘Ec. Effect’ stands for economic effect. The economic effect is calculated, based on an event size of 
1 standard deviation ((coefficient * (mean + 1SD)) – (coefficient * mean)). For dummy variables, the 
economic effect is equal to the b-coefficient.  
Variable  Base salary (ln)    TTC (ln)     TTDC (ln) 
  Sig. Ec.  Effect  Sig. Ec. Effect    Sig.  Ec. Effect 
Age  *** 0.06   *** 0.06   *** 0.05 
Block holder % (emp./ man./directors)  **  -0.07    ***  -0.09    *  -0.09 
Block holder % (industrial company)  *  0.04    *  0.05    n.s.s.   
Block holder % (insurance company)  *  0.01    **  0.03    **  0.05 
Block holders total %  n.s.s.     **  -0.06    ***  -0.09 
Company  assets  (ln)  *** 0.16   *** 0.18   *** 0.23 
Company  employees  *** 0.05   **  0.05   *  0.06 
Company  tenure  *** -0.03   *** -0.03   *** -0.04 
Country  dummy  (Austria)  ** -0.35    ** -0.34    ** -0.50 
Country  dummy  (Belgium)  * -0.10    * -0.15    **  -0.26 
Country  dummy  (France)  *** -0.19   *** -0.26   **  -0.20 
Country  dummy  (Germany)  *** -0.26   **  -0.15   *  -0.16 
Country dummy (Spain)  **  -0.17    n.s.s.     *  -0.18 
Country  dummy  (Sweden)  *** -0.51   *** -0.66   *** -0.83 
Country  dummy  (Switzerland) *** -0.49   *** -0.52   *** -0.43 
Country  dummy  (UK)  *** 0.37   *** 0.35   *** 0.38 
Dummy externally hired recently  *  0.04    n.s.s.     n.s.s.   
Governance (dummy two-tier board)  **  -0.08    *  -0.09    n.s.s.   
Interest  coverage  *** 0.02   *** 0.03   *** 0.03 
International  scope  *** 0.08   *** 0.11   *** 0.14 
IPO age   **  0.03    **  0.04    *  0.05 
PC  relative  size  *** 0.07   *** 0.07   *** 0.09 
Reporting  level  *** -0.20   *** -0.23   *** -0.25 
Span  of  control  *** 0.04   *** 0.04   *** 0.04 
Time  dummy  (2001)  *** 0.09   *** 0.11   n.s.s.   
Time dummy (2002)  **  0.09    ***  0.14    n.s.s.   
Time  dummy  (2003)  *** 0.12   *** 0.23   n.s.s.   
Time  dummy  (2004)  *** 0.14   *** 0.25   *  0.13 
Time  dummy  (2005)  *** 0.18   *** 0.31   *** 0.18 
Time  dummy  (2006)  *** 0.19   *** 0.33   **  0.17 
Time  dummy  (2007)  *** 0.18   *** 0.34   *** 0.23 
Time dummy (2008)  ***  0.16    ***  0.30     **  0.16 316 
 
Table 4.22: PCH actual pay levels: economic effects of statistically significant findings – 
panel A 
This table shows an overview of the statistically significant findings, of equation 4.1, for ex post (or 
actual) remuneration levels, as well as the economic effects (see table 4.12-A). ‘Sig’ stands for 
significance level. ‘Ec. Effect’ stands for economic effect. The economic effect is calculated, based on an 
event size of 1 standard deviation ((coefficient * (mean + 1SD)) – (coefficient * mean)). For dummy 
variables, the economic effect is equal to the b-coefficient. Panel A refers to the regression without 
incorporation of the ex ante remuneration levels as right-hand-side variables. 
Variable  Actual STI value (ln)    TC (ln)     TDC (ln) 
 Sig.  Ec.  Effect    Sig.  Ec. Effect    Sig.  Ec. Effect 
Age ***  0.05    ***  0.06    ***  0.06 
Block holder % (bank)  *  0.05    n.s.s.     n.s.s.   
Block holder % (emp./ man./directors) n.s.s.     *  -0.07    n.s.s.   
Block holder % (financial company)  ***  0.08    *  0.03    *  0.03 
Block holder % (individual / family)  n.s.s.     n.s.s.     n.s.s.   
Block holder % (industrial company)  n.s.s.     ***  0.07    *  0.07 
Block holder % (insurance company)  n.s.s.     **  0.03    **  0.04 
Block holder % (state)  n.s.s.    n.s.s.    n.s.s.   
Block holders total %  ***  -0.16    ***  -0.08    ***  -0.10 
Company assets (ln)  ***  0.36    ***  0.22    ***  0.25 
Company employees  n.s.s.     *  0.05    *  0.05 
Company  tenure  ***  -0.06    *** -0.04   *** -0.04 
Country dummy (Austria)  *  -0.48    *  -0.41    **  -0.55 
Country dummy (Belgium)  n.s.s.     *  -0.15    **  -0.24 
Country dummy (France)  ***  -0.39    ***  -0.22    **  -0.18 
Country  dummy  (Germany)  *  0.19   ** -0.22   ** -0.22 
Country dummy (Spain)  n.s.s.     n.s.s.     *  -0.19 
Country  dummy  (Sweden)  ***  -0.99    *** -0.62   *** -0.79 
Country  dummy  (Switzerland)  **  -0.46    *** -0.48   *** -0.43 
Country dummy (UK)  ***  0.42    ***  0.35    ***  0.38 
Governance (dummy two-tier board)  *  -0.23    **  -0.13    *  -0.14 
Interest coverage  ***  0.03    ***  0.03    ***  0.03 
International scope  ***  0.17    ***  0.11    ***  0.14 
IPO age   *  0.06    **  0.04    **  0.06 
PC relative size  ***  0.08    ***  0.07    ***  0.09 
Position tenure  ***  0.04    ***  0.02    **  0.03 
Reporting  level  ***  -0.31    *** -0.23   *** -0.25 
ROCE ***  0.10    ***  0.03    ***  0.04 
Span of control  **  0.04    ***  0.04    ***  0.04 
Time dummy (2001)  **  0.20    ***  0.12    n.s.s.   317 
 
Variable  Actual STI value (ln)    TC (ln)     TDC (ln) 
 Sig.  Ec.  Effect    Sig.  Ec. Effect    Sig.  Ec. Effect 
Time dummy (2002)  *  0.16    ***  0.14    n.s.s.   
Time dummy (2003)  ***  0.29    ***  0.18    n.s.s.   
Time dummy (2004)  ***  0.31    ***  0.18    n.s.s.   
Time dummy (2005)  ***  0.49    ***  0.24    *  0.13 
Time dummy (2006)  ***  0.48    ***  0.28    *  0.14 
Time dummy (2007)  ***  0.62    ***  0.33    ***  0.22 
Time dummy (2008)  ***  0.57     ***  0.29     **  0.16 
 
 
Table 4.22: PCH actual pay levels: economic effects of statistically significant findings – 
panel B 
This table shows an overview of the statistically significant findings, of equation 4.1, for ex post (or 
actual) remuneration levels, as well as the economic effects (see table 4.12-B). ‘Sig’ stands for 
significance level. ‘Ec. Effect’ stands for economic effect. The economic effect is calculated, based on an 
event size of 1 standard deviation ((coefficient * (mean + 1SD)) – (coefficient * mean)). For dummy 
variables, the economic effect is equal to the b-coefficient. Panel B refers to the regression with 
incorporation of the ex ante remuneration levels as right-hand-side variables. 
Variable  Actual STI value (ln)    TC (ln)     TDC (ln) 
 Sig.  Ec.  Effect    Sig.  Ec. Effect    Sig.  Ec. Effect 
                
Age n.s.s.     n.s.s.     **  -0.01 
Base salary (ln)        ***  0.45    ***  0.34 
Block holder % (bank)  *  0.03    n.s.s.     *  0.01 
Block holder % (emp./ man./directors) n.s.s.     *  0.01    ***  0.02 
Block holder % (financial company)  *  0.03    n.s.s.     n.s.s.   
Block holder % (individual / family)  n.s.s.     *  0.01    *  0.01 
Block holder % (industrial company)  *  0.06    ***  0.03    **  0.02 
Block holder % (insurance company)  *  -0.02    n.s.s.     n.s.s.   
Block holder % (state)  n.s.s.     ***  0.02    **  0.02 
Block holders total %  *  -0.07    ***  -0.03    ***  -0.03 
Company assets (ln)  ***  0.11    *  0.02    n.s.s.   
Country dummy (Germany)  n.s.s.     n.s.s.     *  -0.09 
Dummy externally hired recently  n.s.s.     ***  -0.05    n.s.s.   
Dummy financial company  n.s.s.     **  0.06    **  0.05 
Interest coverage  *  0.01    n.s.s.     n.s.s.   
International scope  **  0.03    **  0.01    **  0.01 
LTI value (ln)              ***  0.28 318 
 
Variable  Actual STI value (ln)    TC (ln)     TDC (ln) 
 Sig.  Ec.  Effect    Sig.  Ec. Effect    Sig.  Ec. Effect 
PC relative size  n.s.s.    *  -0.01    n.s.s.   
Position tenure  **  0.03    ***  0.02    ***  0.02 
Reporting level  ***  -0.04    n.s.s.     n.s.s.   
ROCE ***  0.08    **  0.02    *  0.01 
STI target value (ln)  ***  0.79    ***  0.20    ***  0.16 
Time dummy (2007)  n.s.s.       *  0.04     n.s.s.    
 
 
Table 4.23: CEO-PCH remuneration gap – policy levels: economic effects of statistically 
significant findings 
This table shows an overview of the statistically significant findings, of equation 4.2, for ex ante (or 
policy) remuneration levels, as well as the economic effects (see table 4.16). ‘Sig’ stands for significance 
level. ‘Ec. Effect’ stands for economic effect. The economic effect is calculated, based on an event size of 
1 standard deviation ((coefficient * (mean + 1SD)) – (coefficient * mean)). For dummy variables, the 
economic effect is equal to the b-coefficient.  
Variable 
Heckit 
Base salary gap (ln)    
Heckit 
TTC gap (ln)    
Sample OLS 
TTDC gap (ln)
  Sig.  Ec. Effect    Sig. Ec. Effect    Sig.  Ec. Effect
                
Age difference  ***  0.07    *** 0.06    *  0.05 
Block holder % (emp./ man./directors)  **  0.05    n.s.s.     n.s.s.   
Block holders total %  n.s.s.      n.s.s.     **  -0.14 
Company assets (ln)  ***  0.15    *** 0.14    ***  0.25 
Company tenure difference  *  -0.03    n.s.s.     n.s.s.   
Country dummy (Austria)  ***  0.50    *** 0.76    *  0.91 
Country dummy (Germany)  n.s.s.      *  0.30    **  0.58 
Country dummy (Italy)  ***  0.57    n.s.s.     n.s.s.   
Country dummy (Spain)  ***  0.61    n.s.s.     n.s.s.   
Country dummy (Sweden)  *  0.26    n.s.s.     n.s.s.   
Country dummy (UK)  ***  0.54    *** 0.47    **  0.46 
Dummy female CEO  **  -0.65    n.s.s.     n.s.s.   
Dummy Monks  ***  0.55    n.s.s.     **  0.59 
Dummy presence rem. advisor  n.s.s.      n.s.s.     *  0.16 
Dummy presence rem. comm.  *  0.14    n.s.s.     n.s.s.   
Externally hired recently difference n.s.s.      **  0.10    n.s.s.  
Financial paper (control)  *  -0.06    n.s.s.     n.s.s.   
International scope difference  n.s.s.      *  0.02    n.s.s.   319 
 
Media CEO  ***  0.13    *** 0.15    *  0.09 
NED percentage on main board  ***  -0.15    n.s.s.     n.s.s.   
Previous CEO  **  0.18    *** 0.25    ***  0.26 
Reporting level difference  ***  -0.16    *** -0.16    ***  -0.17 
ROCE *  0.03    n.s.s.     n.s.s.   
Size of the Supervisory Board  n.s.s.      n.s.s.     *  -0.20 
Span of control difference  **  0.07    **  0.12    ***  0.16 
Time dummy (2001)  *  0.15    **  0.24    n.s.s.   
Time dummy (2002)  *  0.15    *** 0.34    n.s.s.   
Time dummy (2003)  **  0.16    *** 0.26    n.s.s.   
Time dummy (2004)  *  0.13    **  0.25    **  0.33 
Time dummy (2005)  ***  0.22    *** 0.38    ***  0.51 
Time dummy (2006)  **  0.19    *** 0.40    ***  0.48 
Time dummy (2007)  **  0.20    *** 0.43    ***  0.53 
Time dummy (2008)  ***  0.28     *** 0.52     ***  0.65 
 
 
Table 4.24: CEO-PCH remuneration gap – actual levels: economic effects of statistically 
significant findings 
This table shows an overview of the statistically significant findings, of equation 4.2, for ex post (or 
actual) remuneration levels, as well as the economic effects (see table 4.18). ‘Sig’ stands for significance 
level. ‘Ec. Effect’ stands for economic effect. The economic effect is calculated, based on an event size of 
1 standard deviation ((coefficient * (mean + 1SD)) – (coefficient * mean)). For dummy variables, the 
economic effect is equal to the b-coefficient. The regression is run with incorporation of the ex ante 
remuneration levels as right-hand-side variables. 
Variable 
Sample OLS 
Actual STI value gap   
Sample OLS 
TC gap    
Heckit 
TDC gap  
  Sig.  Ec. Effect    Sig. Ec. Effect    Sig. Ec. Effect
                
Block holder % (emp./ man./directors)  n.s.s.     n.s.s.     **  79235 
Block holder % (foundation)  *  20207    *  22022    n.s.s.   
Block holder % (private equity)  ***  -26349    **  -24369    n.s.s.   
Block holder % (state)  n.s.s.     n.s.s.     *  98325 
Country dummy (Spain)  n.s.s.     n.s.s.     *  300081 
Country dummy (Sweden)  *  178884    *  175249    n.s.s.   
Country dummy (Switzerland)  n.s.s. 41339    n.s.s.     ***  -778600
STI target value gap  ***  533624             
TTC gap        *** 842737       
TTDC gap               ***  1901910320 
 
Dummy NBS  n.s.s.     n.s.s.     *  260116 
Dummy presence rem. advisor  **  114315    *  92445    n.s.s.   
Dummy presence rem. comm.  n.s.s.     n.s.s.     n.s.s.   
Externally hired recently difference n.s.s.     n.s.s.     *  78713 
IPO age (categories)  *  36080    **  39374    n.s.s.   
Liquidity  ratio  **  104170   * 87132   n.s.s.   
ROCE  n.s.s.    * 26419   n.s.s.   
Sales difference  **  -39723    *** -44021    n.s.s.   
Size of the Supervisory Board  n.s.s.     n.s.s.     *  -99059 
Solvency ratio  n.s.s.     *  -16299    n.s.s.   
Time dummy (2002)  n.s.s.     *  -109518    n.s.s.   
Tobin’s Q (market-to-book)  *  -16579     *  -17296     n.s.s.    
 
 
Table 4.25: Excess remuneration: economic effects of statistically significant findings 
This table shows an overview of the statistically significant findings, of equation 4.3, as well as the 
economic effects (see table 4.20). ‘Sig’ stands for significance level. ‘Ec. Effect’ stands for economic 
effect. The economic effect is calculated, based on an event size of 1 standard deviation ((coefficient * 
(mean + 1SD)) – (coefficient * mean)). For dummy variables, the economic effect is equal to the b-
coefficient.  
Variable  CEO-PCH (full sample)    CEO-PCH (sample selection)
  Sig.  Ec. Effect    Sig.  Ec. Effect 
          
Block holder % (private equity)  ***  -3.51    ***  -3.73 
CEO share percentage owned  **  -3.23    *  -2.87 
Country dummy (Spain)  *  37.00    *  42.60 
Large paper (control)  n.s.s.      *  -5.17 
Dummy female CEO  ***  -24.13    ***  -24.49 
Dummy Mercer  **  51.31    **  50.43 
Dummy presence rem. advisor  n.s.s.      *  11.35 
New CEO year  ***  -20.74       
Position tenure difference  *  5.09    *  3.69 
Standard Deviation (PCH ratio)  ***  -21.65    ***  -22.39 






This research chapter emphasises the importance of contingency studies in the area of 
remuneration research for top managers, based on multiple variables. As reflected in the 
summary (see section 4.6.1), there are individual, company, industry, country and time effects 
that can contribute to understanding the drivers of managerial compensation.  
 
In this conclusion we will explore 7 overarching themes that are based on the findings in this 
PCH research chapter. We will discuss the following subjects:  
 
1.  Managerial compensation theories – ex ante versus ex post perspective 
2.  Corporate governance & sources of CEO power 
3.  Career concerns – is company loyalty rewarded? 
4.  Does gender matter? 
5.  Industry effects – dynamics in the financial services sector 
6.  Country effects – the prince and the pauper revisited  
7.  Time effects – a decade of growing CEO power? 
 
1) Managerial compensation theories – ex ante versus ex post perspective  
In this chapter we have strictly differentiated between policy (ex ante) and actual (ex post) pay 
levels.
206 This two-step approach enables us to better evaluate the explanatory power of 
different theories of managerial remuneration as set forth below.  
 
Ex ante compensation  
The total direct (ex ante) remuneration level equals the sum of fixed compensation in 
combination with the bonus level under expected (target) performance and the annualised value 
of long-term incentives. It refers to the price that needs to be paid for attracting and retaining 
scarce human capital from the labour market. When the qualifications, expertise and skills 
required carrying out the job increase, the relative supply diminishes, resulting in higher pay. In 
our regression study of section 4.3 we observe that the complexity of the PCH job (e.g. defined 
in terms of international scope, span of control, relative size of the profit centre), is positively 
and significantly correlated to the ex ante remuneration level. The level of complexity and 
accountability increases when one moves up the corporate hierarchy. Human capital theory thus 
explains that there is a CEO-PCH pay gap, based on relative scarcity. It also explains why we 
observe a different PCH pay gap between managers that report directly to the CEO (level 2 in 
                                                      
206 Within the ex post remuneration levels, we were able to further distinguish between pay that is related 
to performance and pay related to other factors (‘excess remuneration’). 322 
 
the organisation) and PCHs that indirectly report to the CEO (level 3 in the organisation). The 
significance of pay gaps within the organisation is typically explained from a corporate 
tournament theory perspective; significant gaps can be an optimal strategy for a company from 
an overall incentive viewpoint.      
 
Ex post compensation 
When moving from ex ante to ex post compensation, we are moving from the start of the 
performance period to the end of this period. Deviations from the expected performance level in 
a variable pay system result in pay-out deviations from the expected or ex ante remuneration 
level; i.e. higher or lower pay than expected. This perspective results in a more realistic setting 
for empirical research, than assuming that the absolute value of variable pay is completely 
driven by performance.
207 Our research findings in section 4.3 and 4.4 emphasise this point. 
Even without specific details on performance at the individual profit centre level, we were able 
to explain between 75% (difference in STI actual pay-out) and 91% (difference in total cash 
pay-out) of the variation in the dataset. We observed that the lion share is explained by 
controlling for the underlying policy levels. It seems that we need to come up with different 
terminology in light of the explanation of bonus pay-outs by performance. The term ‘bonus’ as 
such may not be an effective term to help explain the executive remuneration landscape. A 
bonus would imply an additional pay-out on top of the fixed salary, based on good performance. 
In reality, the reference point is typically not basic salary but total target cash compensation, 
which includes fixed salary but also the ‘expected variable compensation’. Deviations from this 
amount in fact represent the ‘real bonus’ (positive or negative). We define ‘performance’ as the 
factor that explains the variation in this ‘real bonus’.  
 
We believe that the validity of pay-for-performance theory eventually boils down to testing this 
hypothesis. A direct test of the hypothesis is complicated and would need to be based on access 
to undisclosed legal plan rules for each company.
208 Even if such access would be gained, the 
                                                      
207 Theoretically, one might argue that if an individual would do nothing, this would result in a zero bonus 
pay-out. Therefore, performance would be the most important determinant of ex post compensation. 
However, this is a very unlikely situation (first and foremost because such person would be fired). 
208 The difficulty of directly testing this hypothesis relates to the question: how to define performance? 
Empirical work typically chooses a number of return measures (based on theoretical assumptions) and 
attempts to find a correlation between pay and these measures of performance. Failing to find a 
correlation could be the result of the fact that there is no correlation. However, it could also mean that the 
measures used in practice are not mimicked well enough in empirical research. Companies often use 
multiple measures for their pay programs and sometimes use company specific definitions (EVA with or 
without investment relief, EPS diluted or non-diluted, taking into account extraordinary items or not, 
etc.). This complicates the analysis and basically boils down to entangling the difference between two 
research questions: 1) which measures are theoretically optimal versus which measures are really used by 
companies; 2) does pay respond to the measures used in real life? As aforementioned, the latter question 323 
 
regression results could turn out insignificant given the variety of measures used in practice. In 
section 4.5 we proposed to follow the indirect route, by confronting CEO data with PCH data. 
We tested the null hypothesis that the ‘real bonus’ of the CEO equals the average ‘real bonus’ 
for the PCHs, defined in terms of the bonus multipliers. After all, the sum of performance of 
individual profit centres equals the total performance of the firm, for which the CEO is 
responsible. If the multiplier for the CEO would be higher, than this is based on factors that are 
beyond performance (more generally; beyond factors that are similar to the CEO and the full 
PCH population). This indirectly controls for performance as defined by the company. We were 
not able to reject the null hypothesis. This finding was supported in two robustness checks. We 
conclude that the ‘real bonus’ of the CEO primarily depends on performance. This would imply 
that other explanations such as managerial power play a subordinate role. However they are still 
valuable, as they can be used to explain the variation in ‘excess remuneration’ which we have 
defined as the difference between the real bonus (multiplier) of the CEO and the average real 
bonus (multiplier) of the PCHs. 
 
2) Corporate governance & sources of CEO power 
Corporate governance matters (Renneboog, 2005). Good governance can limit managerial 
power to extract excess remuneration. There are external and internal measures of governance. 
Some examples: 
  External: an example of an external measure is the total percentage of block holders. At the 
PCH level, indeed we observe lower total remuneration levels in the presence of larger 
block holders (see table 4.10). We also observe a smaller pay gap between CEOs and PCHs 
if a greater part of the shares are owned by block holders (see table 4.15). 
  Internal: an example of an internal measure is the percentage of non-executive directors on 
the main board (in a one-tier governed company). With regard to the CEO-PCH pay gap, we 
observe a lower base salary if more directors are non executives (see table 4.16). This could 
imply that the remuneration package of the CEO has a greater dependence on performance.  
 
In other words, checks and balances are needed to control the power of the CEO. We will now 
elaborate on the sources of CEO power. In line with Finkelstein (1992) and Grabke-Rundell and 
Gomez-Meija (2002) we distinguish between four sources of CEO power: structural (proxy: 
position tenure), expertise (proxy: education), status (proxy: media CEO and cultural 
differences per country) and ownership (proxy: CEO value and percentage of share ownership). 
The general view is that sources of power are associated with higher levels of compensation. 
                                                                                                                                                            
is difficult to answer given the fact that companies do not typically disclose a lot of detail on the measures 
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We further refine this view by splitting remuneration in an ex ante and ex post perspective. This 
can explain in which case we would expect these variables to be sources of managerial power 
(i.e. sources of remuneration beyond arm’s length bargaining). After all, the first mentioned 
three indicators, can also reveal information on productivity (position tenure and education) or 
increased risk (media CEO). In these cases we would expect a positively and significant relation 
between these variables and ex ante remuneration levels, based on human capital theory. A real 
managerial power variable, thus, should exhibit a positive relationship between ex post 
remuneration, controlled for the ex ante (human capital) level.  
 
Structural  
It seems that position tenure indeed is a managerial power variable. Especially, because it 
positively and significantly correlates to ex post remuneration levels. In the analysis on the 
determinants of PCH remuneration, we found a positive correlation between this variable and 
actual remuneration levels (see table 4.12-B). So called ‘excess compensation’ for the CEO is 
furthermore positively and significantly correlated with the positive difference between CEO 
and PCH tenure (see table 4.20). 
 
Expertise  
We find a positive correlation between higher academic titles of the CEO and the ex ante CEO-
PCH gap (see table 4.15). This is expected. A higher education typically implies a higher level 
of human capital. We do not observe a significant correlation with the actual (ex post) pay gap. 
Academics might be able to negotiate a higher ex ante pay level (from a human capital 
perspective), but if this is not repaid with performance, the level of education does not provide a 
source of power to obtain ‘excess compensation’. 
 
Status  
A similar conclusion can be drawn for the media CEO variable. We observe a significant 
correlation between media CEOs and policy remuneration levels (see table 4.15 and 4.16). 
There is no correlation with ex post outcomes. This is in line with the hypothesis that media 
CEOs demand a higher premium from the perspective of increased reputation risk. There is no 
evidence to assume that star qualities can be used beyond this, to obtain excess compensation. 
In contrast, cultural differences that promote power distance can provide the CEO with a 
position in which he is able to extract rents beyond the specific human capital level and 
performance. This is particularly observed in Spain. This country is positively correlated with a 
higher ex post CEO-PCH pay gap at the total target direct compensation level (see table 4.17 




When assessing the percentage of share capital owned by the CEO, this seems to be a power 
variable similar to position tenure. There is no correlation with policy pay levels but there is a 
link with realised excess pay (table 4.20). However, the coefficient is negative. The CEO with 
large ownership rights is inclined to give his subordinates a relatively higher bonus multiplier 
than he claims for himself, in a given year. In other words, he follows the pay-for-performance 
paradigm stricter for himself than for his direct and indirect reports. Two possible explanations 
are: i) This is a way to decrease overall bonus payments in the company. Tone at the top in the 
sense of strict measurement, results in overall lower costs. Through his ownership stake in the 
company this could be repaid multiple times in comparison to the value of his yearly bonus; ii) 
Self-dealing with regard to yearly remuneration has less impact than accumulated wealth 
changes stemming from his equity portfolio. It can even damage his reputation. Retaining and 
motivating the (right) top team by being ‘generous’ in relation to his own bonus, could 
eventually be positively tied to his wealth. 
 
Summary  
In summary, the only real ‘managerial power’ variable in the sense that it is significantly and 
positively correlated with excess compensation, is position tenure. From this perspective, it 
makes sense that corporate governance codes typically require limitations on the term in office 
and provide shareholders with voting rights. For example, the Dutch Corporate Governance 
Code (2008) in best practice provision II.1.1 states: “A management board member is appointed 
for a maximum period of four years. A member may be reappointed for a term of not more than 
four years at a time”. Cultures in which power distance is promoted, can also provide the CEO a 
position to extract rents beyond arm’s length bargaining. From the researched countries, this 
effect is the largest in Spain. This may be the result of a weaker corporate governance climate, 
and might be a concern for investors.  
  
3) Career concerns – is company loyalty rewarded? 
PCHs that are recently hired from outside the company (past 2 years), are correlated with lower 
base salary increases than insiders. However, from an absolute perspective they earn a higher 
base salary than insiders.
209 This may be consistent with outside candidates being able to 
immediately negotiate the higher base salary, whereas insiders grow towards such level over 
time. It seems that company loyalty is not rewarded, given the negative correlation between 
company tenure and all definitions of policy pay levels (see table 4.10). A possible explanation 
                                                      
209 This implies that a greater level of security is needed to persuade an individual to transfer from one 
company to the other.  326 
 
would follow the hypothesis that transferable skills are higher priced than company specific 
skills. 
 
4) Does gender matter? 
We observe a negative correlation between the CEO-PCH pay gap in terms of base salary, for 
female CEOs at the 95
th % confidence level and for total target cash compensation at the 90
th % 
confidence level (see table 4.16). Contingent pay is furthermore less likely to be earned by a 
female CEO. The dummy variable is associated with lower realisations on the actual STI (see 
table 4.17). Finally, there is support for the hypothesis that a female CEO is associated with 
negative excess remuneration (see table 4.20). This could imply that male CEOs use their power 
for the benefit of earning more money, and female CEOs do not. It can also indicate that female 
CEOs are assessed more strictly in terms of performance, resulting in lower relative pay-outs 
than her male colleagues in the top team. 
 
5) Industry effects – dynamics in the financial services sector 
From the start of the worldwide financial crisis (late 2008), the (remuneration) practices within 
the financial services sector were heavily scrutinised. Criticism was related to taking excessive 
risk and being myopic over the period before. Our dataset covers the 9 years preceding the crisis 
(2000-2008). We found that short-term variable pay as a % of base salary is significantly higher 
than in other industries (target as well as maximum pay-outs). Furthermore, the defined proxy 
for ‘short-term focus’ (STI target divided by LTI expected value) is positively correlated to the 
financial services sector dummy.
210 The observed practices may signal specific dynamics of the 
labour market competition in this sector.  
 
6) Country effects – the prince and the pauper revisited  
The general notion that ‘everything is relative’ is emphasised by this research chapter. In the 
paper of Conyon and Murphy (2000) the U.S. was labelled as ‘the prince’ and the UK as ‘the 
pauper’, given the large positive pay differences in favour of the U.S. In our research for the 
European market we have observed that the UK is the prince and continental Europe is the 
pauper. UK PCHs earn (significantly) more than their continental European counterparts in all 
definitions of policy remuneration.  
 
                                                      
210 The financial industry dummy was not significant in sections 4.4 and 4.5. This implies that there is no 
indication that the CEO-PCH gap is larger or smaller (4.4) nor that CEO power is larger in financial 
companies than in non-financial companies (4.5). Therefore, we have incorporated the non-financial 
industries for these studies based on the two-digit SIC code classification. We have observed some 
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7) Time effects – a decade of growing CEO power? 
A general tendency of remuneration is that it grows over time. In terms of PCH remuneration 
we observe a peak in 2007. Starting in the year 2008 we observe a significant decline (in 
relation to the years before). The start of the financial crisis could be a possible explanation for 
this. In terms of remuneration structure, we observe a strong increase in the amount of short-
term variable remuneration. Approximately 17%-points for 2008 in relation to the 2000 target 
STI, and 32%-points for maximum STI.  
 
The remuneration gap between the CEO and PCH has also grown over time. This may indicate 
that over the period 2000-2008, Europe has moved towards a stronger CEO-model in which a 
greater value is placed on the CEO position in relation to the other members of the top team. An 
alternative explanation is that the responsibility of CEOs has increased; e.g. due to an increase 
in the size of firms. This may impact PCHs to a lesser extent given the fact that greater 
responsibility can be more evenly distributed amongst multiple PCHs. 
 
The above two observations in conjunction, reveal a (time lag) difference between the CEO and 
PCH position. Where the PCH remuneration declined in 2008, the remuneration of the CEO 
remained stable or even increased, judging from the increased gap with the PCH. This could be 
in line with the hypothesis that the start of the financial crisis, has impacted the individuals that 
(in)directly report to the CEO, faster than it has affected the CEO himself.  
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Appendix 4.1: Overview research variables 
 
Below, explanations and sources of the research variables are presented in alphabetical order. 
Subsequently, a list of the meaning of abbreviations is shown.   
 
Variable name  Description and source  Section 
Age  Equals the age of the PCH in years. Source: Towers Perrin survey 
2000-2008, Annual Reports, corporate websites, financial websites 




Represents the difference in age between the CEO and a PCH of 




(LTI) %  
Reflects the value of long-term incentive awards (cash, shares and 
options), according to the valuation techniques used in the Top 
Executive Remuneration Survey, expressed as a percentage of base 
salary. For example: the annualised expected value of options is 
calculated with a binomial tree (lattice model). Source: Towers 




(LTI) Value  
Reflects the value of long-term incentive awards (cash, shares and 
options), according to the valuation techniques used in the Top 
Executive Remuneration Survey, expressed in EUR. For example: 
the annualised expected value of options is calculated with a 
binomial tree (lattice model). Source: Towers Perrin survey 2000-
2008, Annual Reports. 
4.2 
Base salary   Equals all fixed components including elements such as vacation 
allowance.  Source: Towers Perrin survey 2000-2008, Annual 
Reports. 
4.2-4.5 
Base salary increase   Equals the percentage increase in base salary between t and t-1. 
Source: Towers Perrin survey 2000-2008, Annual Reports. 
4.2, 4.3 
Block  holders total %   A block holder is defined as a shareholder that owns at least a 
certain minimum percentage of the total share capital of a company 
(typically 3% or 5%). This variable represents the total percentage 
of the share capital of company which is owned by block holders. 
It is measured per the end of the research period and used as a 
proxy for the preceding years as well. 
4.3-4.5 
Block holder % (type)   Represents the type of the largest block holder, and the percentage 
of the total share capital of the company owned by this party. We 
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Variable name  Description and source  Section 
distinguish the following types of block holders: 
- Block holder % (insurance company); 
- Block holder % (bank); 
- Block holder % (industrial company); 
- Block holder % (nominee/trust); 
- Block holder % (financial company); 
- Block holder % (individual/family); 
- Block holder % (foundation); 
- Block holder % (employees/managers/directors); 
- Block holder % (private equity); 
- Block holder % (state). 
For the sake of completeness, we have controlled the regression 
analyses for categories “public”, “unnamed private shareholders 
aggregated” and “other unnamed shareholders”. Amadeus/REACH 
argues that these categories of block holders are unable to exert 
control over a company. Therefore, they are not reflected in the 
overview tables. Source: Amadeus/REACH. 
Capital expenditure % of 
sales  
Equals the amount of capital expenditures as a percentage of sales 
((Capital Expenditures / Sales) * 100). Source: Capital IQ Database 
4.3-4.5 
CEO externally hired 
recently  
 
Dummy variable which equals 1 if CEO is externally hired 
between t and t-2, and 0 otherwise. Source: Towers Perrin survey 
2000-2008, Annual Reports, corporate websites, financial websites 
(e.g. Bloomberg Business Week, Yahoo Finance). 
4.5 
CEO share percentage 
owned 
 
Represents the number of shares owned by the CEO as a 
percentage of the total outstanding shares of the company. Source: 
Annual Reports, Worldscope. 
4.4, 4.5 
CEO share value owned  
 
Represents the value of the shares owned by the CEO (number of 
shares * share price). Source: Annual Reports, DataStream. 
4.4, 4.5 
Company age  
 
Equals the age of the company measured in terms of the number of 
years since the year of incorporation. Source: Amadeus/REACH, 
corporate websites, financial websites (e.g. Bloomberg Business 




Equals total sales/revenues of the company in year t in millions. 




Company tenure  
Equals the time the CEO or PCH has been employed within the 
company in years. Source: Towers Perrin survey 2000-2008, 
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Variable name  Description and source  Section 
Annual Reports, corporate websites, financial websites (e.g. 
Bloomberg Business Week, Yahoo Finance). 
Company tenure 
difference  
Equals the difference in number of years of company tenure 
between the CEO and a PCH of the same company. 
4.4, 4.5 
Country dummy  
 
Dummy variable where The Netherlands is taken as the basis. Nine 














Categories variable which represents the extent to which a firm has 
diversified operations: 
- 0 equals: the company has only one SIC code; 
- 1 equals: the company has more than one SIC code, but the SIC 
codes do not differ at the first digit; 
- 2 equals: the company has more than one SIC code, and the SIC 
codes do differ at the first digit. 
Source: Amadeus/REACH, Worldscope. 
4.3-4.5 
Dummy CEO = Chair  
 
Dummy variable which equals 1 if the CEO also holds the 
Chairman position, and 0 otherwise. Source: Annual Reports. 
4.4, 4.5 
Dummy education (PhD, 
Prof.)  
 
Dummy variable which equals 1 if the CEO is a PhD or Professor, 
and 0 otherwise. Source: Annual Reports, corporate websites, 
financial websites (e.g. Bloomberg Business Week, Yahoo 
Finance). 
4.4, 4.5 
Dummy externally hired 
recently  
 
Dummy variable which equals 1 if CEO or PCH is externally hired 
between t and t-2, and 0 otherwise. Source: Towers Perrin survey 
2000-2008, Annual Reports, corporate websites, financial websites 
(e.g. Bloomberg Business Week, Yahoo Finance). 
4.3 
 
Dummy female CEO  
 
Dummy variable which equals 1 in case of a female CEO, and 0 in 
case of a male CEO. Source: Annual Reports, corporate websites, 
financial websites (e.g. Bloomberg Business Week, Yahoo 
Finance). 
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Variable name  Description and source  Section 
Dummy financial 
company    
Represents a company with a primary SIC code of which the first 
digit is a 6. Source: Amadeus/REACH, Worldscope. 
4.3 
Dummy presence rem. 
advisor  
Dummy variable which equals 1 if the company makes use of an 
external remuneration advisor and has published this, and 0 
otherwise. Source: Annual Reports, corporate websites. 
4.4, 4.5 
Dummy presence rem. 
comm.  
Dummy variable which equals 1 if the company operates a 
remuneration committee and has published this, and 0 otherwise. 
Source: Annual Reports, corporate websites. 
4.4, 4.5 
Dummy remuneration 
advisor   
Represents the case when a company makes use of an external 
remuneration advisor and has published the name of the advisor. If 
multiple advisors are used, this results in multiple dummies being 
recorded as 1. The five largest advisors were used:  
-Towers Perrin; 
- Mercer; 
- NBS ( New Bridge Street); 
- Kepler; 
- Monks Partnership. 
Source: Annual Reports. 
4.4, 4.5 
Externally hired recently 
difference 
Categories variable which:  
- Equals 1 if the CEO is externally hired recently and the PCH of 
the same company is not; 
- Equals 0 if both the CEO and the PCH of the same company are 
externally hired recently, or if both the CEO and the PCH of the 
same company are not externally hired recently; 
- Equals -1 if the CEO is not externally hired recently, and the PCH 
of the same company is externally hired recently. 
4.4, 4.5 
Financial paper (control)   Equals the percentrank per year of the number times the name of a 
CEO appears in a country’s financial newspaper in combination 
with the name of the company. For an overview of financial 
newspapers used, please refer to table 4.14. Source: Lexis Nexis 
Database. 
4.4, 4.5 
Firm performance   Represents the performance of the firm, measured by: 
- Liquidity ratio:  (Current Assets – Inventory) / Current Liabilities. 
Source: Amadeus/REACH. 
- Gearing ratio: ((Non-Current Liabilities + Loans) / Equity) * 100. 
Source: Amadeus/REACH. 
- ROCE (Return on Capital Employed): (Profit before Taxation / 
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Variable name  Description and source  Section 
Equity) * 100. Source: Amadeus/REACH. 
- Profit margin: (Profit before Taxation / Operating Revenue). 
Source: Amadeus/REACH. 
- Interest coverage: Operating Profit / Interest Paid. Source: 
Amadeus/REACH. 
- Tobin’s Q (market-to-book): As a proxy for Tobin’s Q the 
Market-to-Book ratio is used: (Market Capitalisation / Book Value 
of Equity). Source: DataStream, Capital IQ Database. 
- Solvency ratio: (Shareholder funds / Total Assets) * 100. Source: 
Amadeus/REACH. 
Firm risk   Volatility: 1-year volatility of the company’s share price. Source: 
DataStream. 
 
Firm  size      Reflects the size of the firm in terms of company assets, and 
company employees: 
- Company assets: Equals total assets of the company in year t in 
millions (ln). Source: Towers Perrin survey 2000-2008, 
Amadeus/REACH, Annual Reports. 
- Company employees: Equals the total number of employees of 
the company. Source: Towers Perrin survey 2000-2008, 
Amadeus/REACH, Annual Reports. 
4.2-4.5 
Governance (dummy 
two-tier board)  
Dummy variable which equals 0 if the company operates a one-tier 
board structure, and equals 1 if the company operates a two-tier 




Dummy variable which represents the extent to which a CEO or 
PCH is operating internationally: 
- Equals 0 in case of single-country responsibility; 
- Equals 1 in case of multi-country responsibility; 
- Equals 2 in case of single-region responsibility; 
- Equals 3 in case of multi-region or worldwide responsibility. 
Source: Towers Perrin survey 2000-2008. 
4.3 
International scope 
difference    
Represents the difference in the international scope of operations 
between the CEO and a PCH of the same company. International 
scope per position is measured on a scale of 0 to 3. Source: Towers 
Perrin survey 2000-2008.  
4.4, 4.5 
 
IPO age   
Category variable which represents the number of year since the 
firm’s IPO: 0 equals: the firm is not listed; 1 equals: IPO in the 
current year; 2 equals: IPO 1 year ago; 3 equals: IPO 2 years ago; 4 
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Variable name  Description and source  Section 
equals: IPO 3 years ago; 5 equals: IPO 4 years ago; 6 equals: IPO 
5-10 years ago; 7 equals: IPO 10-20 years ago; 8 equals: IPO over 
20 years ago. Source: Amadeus/REACH, DataStream, financial 
websites (e.g. Bloomberg Business Week and Yahoo Finance), 
Annual Reports. 
Large paper (control)  
 
Equals the percentrank per year, per country of the number of times 
the name of a CEO appears in a country’s largest daily newspaper / 
weekly magazine in combination with the name of the company. 
For an overview of newspapers used, please refer to table 4.14. 
Source: Lexis Nexis Database. 
4.4, 4.5 
Media CEO   Equals  the  percentrank  per year of the total number of hits the 
name of a CEO in combination with the name of the company are 
generated by the Lexis Nexis Database. Source: Lexis Nexis 
Database. 
4.4, 4.5 
NED percentage on main 
board  
Equals the number of non-executive directors as a percentage of 
the total number of positions on the main board (For this variable a 
0 is recorded in case of a two-tier board structured company.). 
Source: Annual Reports, corporate websites. 
4.4, 4.5 
New CEO year   Dummy variable which equals 1 if there is a change of CEO in the 
respective year, and 0 otherwise. Source: Towers Perrin survey 
2000-2008, Annual Reports, corporate websites, financial websites 
(e.g. Bloomberg Business Week, Yahoo Finance). 
4.4, 4.5 
Number of PCHs     Equals the number of profit centre heads in the database in year t. 
Source: Towers Perrin survey 2000-2008. 
4.5 
PC relative size  
  
Reflects the relative responsibility for the total company. 
- The CEO is responsible for the entire company: responsibility is 
always 100%; 
- A PCH is typically responsible for part of the company. This 
responsibility is measured by: PCH span of control divided by 
company total employees; if not available; Profit centre sales 
divided by company total sales. 
Source: Towers Perrin survey 2000-2008. 
4.2, 4.3 
Position tenure     Equals the time the CEO or PCH has been in the current position 
measured in years. Source: Towers Perrin survey 2000-2008, 
Annual Reports, corporate websites, financial websites (e.g. 
Bloomberg Business Week, Yahoo Finance). 
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Variable name  Description and source  Section 
Position tenure difference Equals  the  difference in number of years of position tenure 
between the CEO and a PCH of the same company. 
4.4, 4.5 
Previous  CEO    Dummy variable which equals 1 if a CEO already employed a 
CEO-position previously in another company and 0 otherwise. 
Source: Annual Reports, corporate websites, financial websites 
(e.g. Bloomberg Business Week, Yahoo Finance). 
4.4, 4.5 
Reporting level  Equals 1 for a CEO; 2 for a PCH who is part of the executive board 
and reports directly to the CEO; 3 for a PCH who is not part of the 
executive board and does not report directly to the CEO. Source: 
Towers Perrin survey 2000-2008, Annual Reports. 
4.3 
Reporting level 
difference    
Equals the difference in reporting level between the CEO and a 
PCH of the same company. 
4.4, 4.5 
Sales difference   Equals the difference in corporate sales (for the CEO position) and 
profit centre sales (for a PCH position) of the same company. 
Source: Towers Perrin survey 2000-2008, Worldscope. 
4.4, 4.5 
Short-Term Incentive 
(STI) %  
Equals the actual amount of short-term incentive earned in the most 
recent bonus cycle as a percentage of base salary. Source: Towers 
Perrin survey 2000-2008. 
4.2 
Short-Term Incentive 
(STI) Target %  
  
 
Expressed as a percentage of base salary: is reflective of individual 
incentive and bonus awards in the most recent bonus cycle for 
normal, expected or on target performance. Source: Towers Perrin 
survey 2000-2008, Annual Reports. 
4.2 
Short-Term Incentive 
(STI) Target value 
Equals base salary * STI target %. Source: Towers Perrin survey 
2000-2008, Annual Reports. 
4.2 
Short-Term Incentive 
(STI) Value    
Equals the actual amount earned in the most recent bonus cycle. 
Source: Towers Perrin survey 2000-2008, Annual Reports. 
4.2-4.4 
Size  of  the  main  board  Equals the number of positions in the “main board” (one-tier 
Board, and two-tier Executive Board). Source: Annual Reports, 
corporate websites. 
4.4 
Size of the supervisory 
board (section 4.4): 
 
Equals the number of positions in the supervisory board (a 0 is 
recorded in case of a one-tier board structured companies). Source: 
Annual Reports, corporate websites. 
4.4 
Span of control     Equals the number of employees who are subordinate to the CEO 
or PCH. Source: Towers Perrin survey 2000-2008. 
4.3, 4.3 
Span of control  Equals the difference in the number of subordinates of the CEO  4.4, 4.5 339 
 
Variable name  Description and source  Section 
difference   and a PCH of the same company. 
Total  Cash    Equals the sum of base salary and STI value. Source: Towers 
Perrin survey 2000-2008, Annual Reports. 
4.2-4.4 
Time dummy    Dummy variable where the year 2000 is taken as basis. 8 dummies 
are created for the years 2001 – 2008. 
4.3-4.5 
Total Target Cash 
  
Equals the sum of base salary and STI target value. Source: 
Towers Perrin survey 2000-2008, Annual Reports. 
4.2-4.4 
Total Target Direct 
Compensation  
Equals the sum of base salary, STI target value and the annualised 
expected LTI. Source: Towers Perrin survey 2000-2008, Annual 
Reports. 
4.2-4.4 
Total Target Variable % 
  
Equals the sum of the target short-term incentive and the 
annualised expected long-term incentive as a percentage of base 
salary. Source: Towers Perrin survey 2000-2008, Annual Reports. 
4.2 
Total Variable %   Equals the sum of the short-term incentive value and the annualised 
expected long-term incentive as a percentage of base salary. 
Source: Towers Perrin survey 2000-2008, Annual Reports. 
4.2 
Variation coefficient and 
standard deviation  
 
Measure the variance in actual pay-out as a percentage of target 
pay-out for the PCH, and therefore a proxy of the variation in 




List of abbreviations 
CEO  Chief Executive Officer    OLS  Ordinary Least Squares 
CHF Swiss  Franc   PC  Profit  Centre 
EPS  Earnings Per Share    PCH  Profit Centre Head 
EUR Euro    SD  Standard  Deviation 
EVA  Economic Value Added    SEK  Swedish Krona 
GBP  British Pound    SIC  Standard Industrial Classification 
IPO  Initial Public Offering    STI(P)  Short-Term Incentive (Plan) 
JPY  Japanese yen    TC  Total Cash 
ln  Natural logarithm    TDC  Total Direct Compensation 
LN  Lexis Nexis database    TTC  Total Target Cash 
LTI(P) Long-Term  Incentive  (Plan)    TTDC  Total Target Direct Compensation 
NED  Non-Executive Director    USD  United States Dollar 
N.S.S. Not  Statistically  Significant   VIF  Variance  inflation  factor 
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Appendix 4.2: CEO position summary tables per year (2000-2008) 
Chief Executive Officer  year  N  p5  p25  p50  mean  p75  p95 
Base salary  2000  109  408402 669966 839284 870126  1037824 1407830
Base increase %  2000  81  0  4  8  11  15  32 
STI target value  2000  73  90756  208738 305029 389896  505060  1029701
STI target %  2000  73  15  25  35  43  50  75 
STI max %  2000  87  30  50  60  74  100  140 
STI value  2000  93  0  144393 333241 399663  557718  979475
STI  %  2000  93 0 21 37 47 60  129 
LTI value  2000  63  64247  169487 311099 523669  708357  1517632
LTI  %  2000  63 8 23 34 55 69  127 
Total target variable %  2000  46  33  54  83  87  107  172 
Total variable %  2000  57  27  55  74  96  110  240 
Total Target Cash  2000  109  476469 767088 1030964 1131250  1372635 2260651
Total Cash  2000  109  538863 836251 1156138 1222528  1490857 2310287
Total Target Direct Compensation  2000  63  726317 1121014 1482072 1790043  2104302 3602378
Total Direct Compensation  2000  63  662073 1189958 1634936 1850618  2295603 3602378
Age of individual  2000  136  44  51  53  53  57  61 
Tenure position (years)  2000  138  0  1  3  4  5  13 
Tenure company (years)  2000  139  1  4  13  14  22  36 
Span of control (# of employees)  2000  138  4915  13561  31134  52595  75200  166114
Company total employees  2000  138  4915  13561  31134  52595  75200  166114
Company total assets (* 1 mln)  2000  129  491  3309  9631  60529  35556  435599
Company total sales (* 1mln)  2000  128  790  2906  6702  16428  19002  56751 
Responsibility (relative size PC)  2000  140  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Base salary  2001  146  396683 627236 884406 886013  1082948 1480027
Base increase %  2001  100  0  5  8  11  14  27 
STI target value  2001  99  64435  210146 328493 433762  595619  1110019
STI target %  2001  99  7  30  40  4875758  60  100 
STI max %  2001  111  40  50  60  8342342  100  200 
STI value  2001  127  0  195000 343729 488905  708877  1263439
STI  %  2001  127  0 28 42 57 73  132 
LTI value  2001  135  0  0  271597 554765  727289  1855333
LTI  %  2001  135  0  0 29 61 80  179 
Total target variable %  2001  98  20  42  78  102  115  227 
Total variable %  2001  118  6  44  89  1170424  159  294 
Total Target Cash  2001  146  447144 762350 1035118 1180140  1443930 2225070
Total Cash  2001  146  530922 870895 1129874 1318080  1658263 2590049
Total Target Direct Compensation  2001  135  447144 1036070 1516125 1752966  2171218 3608364
Total Direct Compensation  2001  135  510271 1007994 1469441 1868189  2285787 4095720
Age of individual  2001  164  45  50  54  54  58  61 
Tenure position (years)  2001  170  0  1  3  4  6  15 
Tenure company (years)  2001  171  1  5  13  15  26  36 
Span of control (# of employees)  2001  177  2332  12100  29606  53512  76630  188050
Company total employees  2001  177  2332  12100  29606  53512  76630  188050341 
 
Chief Executive Officer  year  N  p5  p25  p50  mean  p75  p95 
Company total assets (* 1 mln)  2001  172  473  2844  9712  56244  32406  465486
Company total sales (* 1mln)  2001  171  695  2475  6766  16592  20683  54213 
Responsibility (relative size PC)  2001  180  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Base salary  2002  184  347000 604653 885056 898003  1105509 1500000
Base increase %  2002  126  0  2  5  8  10  21 
STI target value  2002  127  130239 264550 426653 530514  649767  1511116
STI target %  2002  127  23  32  50  57  70  120 
STI max %  2002  135  45  50  80  90  100  200 
STI value  2002  162  0  122734 327689 526075  727380  1834246
STI  %  2002  162  0 17 42 65 82  144 
LTI value  2002  164  0  66800  342000 733670  818207  2400843
LTI  %  2002  164  0 14 47 72 96  235 
Total target variable %  2002  126  25  61  101  123  153  275 
Total variable %  2002  144  14  49  96  125  158  333 
Total Target Cash  2002  184  448344 748500 1100742 1264173  1587870 2517182
Total Cash  2002  184  450000 812726 1112734 1382493  1710736 3042446
Total Target Direct Compensation  2002  164  514362 1017688 1643210 2026143  2365910 4635177
Total Direct Compensation  2002  164  542669 999407 1656146 2071224  2553468 4393822
Age of individual  2002  208  42  51  55  54  58  62 
Tenure position (years)  2002  207  0  1  3  4  6  11 
Tenure company (years)  2002  204  1  5  13  16  27  36 
Span of control (# of employees)  2002  225  1805  10013  25554  49978.12  69400  177000
Company total employees  2002  225  1805  10013  25554  49978.12  69400  177000
Company total assets (* 1 mln)  2002  217  463  2621  8544  56605.75  30148  376747
Company total sales (* 1mln)  2002  215  487  2183  6154  15410.35  18280  53689 
Responsibility (relative size PC)  2002  232  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Base salary  2003  236  408000 626508 902842 918271  1143059 1534175
Base increase %  2003  152  0  0  6  8  12  25 
STI target value  2003  198  138978 252686 401592 540962  667057  1425879
STI target %  2003  198  22  30  50  5641919  67  100 
STI max %  2003  179  50  60  80  97  100  200 
STI value  2003  198  0  225000 408053 587394  736404  1950000
STI  %  2003  198  0 30 51 61 81  150 
LTI value  2003  213  0  0  283522 793767  789449  2863800
LTI  %  2003  213  0  0 36 77 83  249 
Total target variable %  2003  194  25  50  86  122  132  300 
Total variable %  2003  176  11  51  89  124  143  343 
Total Target Cash  2003  236  475111 843596 1225986 1372130  1738650 2637044
Total Cash  2003  236  487085 870798 1188029 1427913  1814839 3113500
Total Target Direct Compensation  2003  213  625000 1079810 1718275 2202325  2616151 4675148
Total Direct Compensation  2003  213  603082 1048169 1630015 2224011  2704107 5179827
Age of individual  2003  243  43  50  55  54  58  63 
Tenure position (years)  2003  251  0  1  3  4  5  11 
Tenure company (years)  2003  247  0  4  10  14  23  35 
Span of control (# of employees)  2003  291  1545  9000  25567  47674  66400  163694342 
 
Chief Executive Officer  year  N  p5  p25  p50  mean  p75  p95 
Company total employees  2003  291  1545  9000  25567  47674  66400  163694
Company total assets (* 1 mln)  2003  283  582  2417  8240  55258  37968  300548
Company total sales (* 1mln)  2003  283  495  2116  5970  15419  17553  50025 
Responsibility (relative size PC)  2003  296  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Base salary  2004  243  365000 599115 902457 944470  1227454 1606372
Base increase %  2004  165  0  0  4  5  8  15 
STI target value  2004  202  117468 257180 475007 620816  717452  1710333
STI target %  2004  202  25  37  50  63  75  148 
STI max %  2004  187  50  63  100  103  120  200 
STI value  2004  222  0  194834 453033 684897.3  920505  2195856
STI  %  2004  222  0 29 52 69 91  187 
LTI value  2004  207  0  246117 604554 1117495  1183425 3909305
LTI %  2004  207  0  33  61  101  116  433 
Total target variable %  2004  185  43  82  120  155  180  457 
Total variable %  2004  188  36  75  121  172  202  582 
Total Target Cash  2004  243  483869 847528 1295024 1460540  1845934 3197581
Total Cash  2004  243  467602 827428 1350530 1587465  1992072 3510173
Total Target Direct Compensation  2004  207  647157 1254060 2091386 2671134  3232178 7205390
Total Direct Compensation  2004  207  643500 1221292 2204842 2746624  3220052 7046365
Age of individual  2004  272  44  51  55  54  58  63 
Tenure position (years)  2004  271  0  1  3  4  5  12 
Tenure company (years)  2004  272  1  3  10  13  21  35 
Span of control (# of employees)  2004  306  1031  8741  24264  43890  61732  161310
Company total employees  2004  306  1031  8741  24264  43890  61732  161310
Company total assets (* 1 mln)  2004  299  503  2362  8043  60523  36835  417148
Company total sales (* 1mln)  2004  297  262  2173  5685  15311  16262  59773 
Responsibility (relative size PC)  2004  314  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Base salary  2005  284  347484 588251 873386 948465  1260521 1876285
Base increase %  2005  190  0  0  4  6  7  16 
STI target value  2005  241  70200  265000 468000 677981  844992  1880344
STI target %  2005  241  20  40  50  66  90  131 
STI max %  2005  220  40  75  100  115  150  233 
STI value  2005  241  0  284273 639841 827202  1171270 2517184
STI %  2005  241  0  41  70  88  112  208 
LTI value  2005  242  0  196930 574571 1187958  1303866 4527327
LTI %  2005  242  0  27  63  111  117  342 
Total target variable %  2005  221  35  83  130  172  197  412 
Total variable %  2005  206  27  78  134  197  226  496 
Total Target Cash  2005  284  481504 810886 1257280 1523794  1966748 3514162
Total Cash  2005  284  491722 896652 1354640 1671720  2141123 3913486
Total Target Direct Compensation  2005  242  579190 1220588 2081606 2766229  3311848 7047409
Total Direct Compensation  2005  242  546911 1195161 2127217 2851072  3603582 7552700
Age of individual  2005  310  44  49  54  54  58  63 
Tenure position (years)  2005  305  0  1  3  4  6  11 
Tenure company (years)  2005  310  1  3  10  13  22  36 343 
 
Chief Executive Officer  year  N  p5  p25  p50  mean  p75  p95 
Span of control (# of employees)  2005  344  881  7044  21843  45087  64102  167801
Company total employees  2005  344  881  7044  21843  45087  64102  167801
Company total assets (* 1 mln)  2005  340  311  2240  7165  70939  30106  383392
Company total sales (* 1mln)  2005  339  257  1924  5595  16056  16528  61303 
Responsibility (relative size PC)  2005  356  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Base salary  2006  276  353460 631056 901853 985101  1263439 1850035
Base increase %  2006  186  0  0  4  5  8  23 
STI target value  2006  228  123711 336900 623415 801341  1000321 2165892
STI target %  2006  228  30  50  62  75  100  140 
STI max %  2006  221  50  75  100  122  150  250 
STI value  2006  252  75000  252682 691128 968535  1256085 3282683
STI %  2006  252  11  40  75  89  120  206 
LTI value  2006  234  0  200092 540868 1000127  1057498 3647779
LTI %  2006  234  0  27  60  90  101  243 
Total target variable %  2006  211  40  91  126  160  196  427 
Total variable %  2006  212  34  81  135  179  224  439 
Total Target Cash  2006  276  464100 836450 1416154 1647079  2078948 4000000
Total Cash  2006  276  492561 911481 1478517 1888391  2313148 5049051
Total Target Direct Compensation  2006  234  570000 1214367 2045000 2697890  3253711 7081771
Total Direct Compensation  2006  234  560148 1202307 2116152 2844282  3337881 7612030
Age of individual  2006  310  42  49  54  53  58  63 
Tenure position (years)  2006  306  0  2  3  4  6  12 
Tenure company (years)  2006  311  1  3  9  13  21  36 
Span of control (# of employees)  2006  330  692  6689  19627  45426  61900  164078
Company total employees  2006  330  692  6689  19627  45426  61900  164078
Company total assets (* 1 mln)  2006  325  381  2461  8021  78088  32190  512185
Company total sales (* 1mln)  2006  325  288  1867  5802  16202  14509  66152 
Responsibility (relative size PC)  2006  338  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Base salary  2007  281  350000 600000 825000 939386  1186378 1850000
Base increase %  2007  171  0  0  5  7  9  20 
STI target value  2007  231  119800 333933 627251 795893  1028230 2058769
STI target %  2007  231  25  50  75  80  100  150 
STI max %  2007  218  50  90  120  135  170  250 
STI value  2007  256  0  378146 689833 986559  1375000 3240000
STI %  2007  256  0  54  86  99  122  240 
LTI value  2007  233  0  215129 663408 1231638  1388625 3716882
LTI %  2007  233  0  36  74  112  128  311 
Total target variable %  2007  215  39  98  153  191  225  452 
Total variable %  2007  214  40  100  169  210  257  490 
Total Target Cash  2007  281  448000 817311 1345078 1593662  2050303 3825000
Total Cash  2007  281  500000 938644 1496937 1852906  2322467 4533143
Total Target Direct Compensation  2007  233  570000 1189395 2254201 2871813  3508001 6827439
Total Direct Compensation  2007  233  540000 1292799 2252450 3021545  3601210 6983718
Age of individual  2007  302  41  48  53  53  58  63 
Tenure position (years)  2007  294  0  1  3  4  6  11 344 
 
Chief Executive Officer  year  N  p5  p25  p50  mean  p75  p95 
Tenure company (years)  2007  302  1  4  9  13  20  36 
Span of control (# of employees)  2007  330  700  7097  20738  47270  62009  175000
Company total employees  2007  330  700  7097  20738  47270  62009  175000
Company total assets (* 1 mln)  2007  324  349  2690  9354  94953  34646  497679
Company total sales (* 1mln)  2007  324  217  2171  6016  19768  16282  72448 
Responsibility (relative size PC)  2007  336  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Base salary  2008  259  362000 650000 906210 1015211  1250000 1980000
Base increase %  2008  153  0  2  5  8  8  18 
STI target value  2008  204  148750 450000 751497 948446  1129461 2349266
STI target %  2008  204  35  58  80  87  100  150 
STI max %  2008  193  50  100  142  147  180  250 
STI value  2008  235  0  393988 800000 1122652  1598554 3229350
STI %  2008  235  0  57  93  104  137  216 
LTI value  2008  219  0  204532 698553 1224934  1479742 3394007
LTI %  2008  219  0  33  78  103  128  257 
Total target variable %  2008  192  54  115  156  198  243  422 
Total variable %  2008  200  52  109  179  213  273  474 
Total Target Cash  2008  259  450000 920000 1545000 1762250  2125920 3925130
Total Cash  2008  259  484507 1030000 1637696 2046375  2678940 4617801
Total Target Direct Compensation  2008  219  583071 1295531 2372332 3040856  3846582 7084584
Total Direct Compensation  2008  219  580781 1434676 2453182 3215268  3954903 7175448
Age of individual  2008  197  42  49  54  54  60  65 
Tenure position (years)  2008  274  0  2  4  5  6  14 
Tenure company (years)  2008  275  1  4  8  13  20  35 
Span of control (# of employees)  2008  308  750  6253  20839  51236  67554  186049
Company total employees  2008  308  750  6253  20839  51236  67554  186049
Company total assets (* 1 mln)  2008  302  367  2947  9612  109227  42893  647027
Company total sales (* 1mln)  2008  298  306  2128  6088  22958  19019  81334 
Responsibility (relative size PC)  2008  321  100  100  100  100  100  100 
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Appendix 4.3: PCH position summary tables per year (2000-2008) 
Profit Centre Head  year  N  p5  p25  p50  mean  p75  p95 
              
Base  salary  2000 477 156099  231325  324884 352798 451228 631719 
Base increase %  2000  288  0  4  7  9  13  25 
STI target value  2000  375  25223  56853  100616  124377  164246  300065 
STI target %  2000  375  13  25  30  34  40  65 
STI max %  2000  399  30  40  50  58  70  100 
STI value  2000  406  0  45510  99930  135707  176974  377558 
STI  %  2000  406  0 19  32 36 46 91 
LTI  value  2000 330 18037 75874 159726 278171 301800 917794 
LTI  %  2000  330  6 25  47 78 89  236 
Total target variable %  2000  260  27  56  84  114  129  250 
Total variable %  2000  284  33  55  89  120  139  293 
Total Target Cash  2000  477  176429  283741  411612  450579  569450  856430 
Total  Cash  2000 477 163885  292828  417164 474126 599030 914999 
Total Target Direct Compensation  2000  330  230255  386222  614699  739606  894661  1735031 
Total Direct Compensation  2000  330  219534  409251  626082  767448  937623  1869870 
Age of individual  2000  358  38  45  50  49  53  58 
Tenure position (years)  2000  366  0  1  2  3  3  8 
Tenure company (years)  2000  370  1  4  11  14  22  32 
Span of control (# of employees)  2000  404  200  1586  4366  10742  11774  44246 
Company total employees  2000  138  4915  13561  31134  52595  75200  166114 
Company total assets (* 1 mln)  2000  129  491  3309  9631  60529  35556  435599 
Company total sales (* 1mln)  2000  128  790  2906  6702  16428  19002  56751 
Responsibility (relative size PC)  2000  382  1  7  16  25  32  95 
Base  salary  2001 820 114859  185003  268615 313372 397081 649884 
Base increase %  2001  413  2  4  6  9  10  25 
STI target value  2001  612  17885  50630  89929  123880  167407  335712 
STI target %  2001  612  12  25  30  36  50  67 
STI max %  2001  656  30  40  50  61  75  100 
STI  value  2001  738 3607 40941  79302 126769  163818  394570 
STI  %  2001  738  2 21  32 37 48 83 
LTI  value  2001  820 0  0 88844  206797  271600  725600 
LTI  %  2001  820  0 0 33 61 76  193 
Total target variable %  2001  612  15  37  72  100  121  232 
Total variable %  2001  738  10  38  73  100  125  253 
Total Target Cash  2001  820  130131  228291  328309  405829  523863  870000 
Total  Cash  2001 820 136622  237128  360457 433947 534852 935602 
Total Target Direct Compensation  2001  820  132462  283749  458536  612627  786269  1494175 
Total Direct Compensation  2001  820  140250  291521  493844  640744  811056  1561173 
Age of individual  2001  474  38  45  49  49  54  59 
Tenure position (years)  2001  515  0  1  2  3  3  9 
Tenure company (years)  2001  521  1  4  12  14  23  32 
Span of control (# of employees)  2001  625  65  740  2600  7710  6900  30000 346 
 
Profit Centre Head  year  N  p5  p25  p50  mean  p75  p95 
Company total employees  2001  177  2332  12100  29606  53512  76630  188050 
Company total assets (* 1 mln)  2001  172  473  2844  9712  56244  32406  465486 
Company total sales (* 1mln)  2001  171  695  2475  6766  16592  20683  54213 
Responsibility (relative size PC)  2001  556  0  2  8  14  19  50 
Base  salary  2002  1291 117365 173278 243918  297219  368900  635292 
Base increase %  2002  831  0  3  5  7  9  19 
STI target value  2002  1007  25835  51891  91599  132067  169661  374130 
STI target %  2002  1007  15  25  37  40  50  83 
STI max %  2002  1081  27  45  60  67  80  150 
STI value  2002  1177  0  34294  75005  130450  152856  459537 
STI  %  2002  1177  0 17  32 40 50  110 
LTI value  2002  1291  0  0  67228  153705  184700  602200 
LTI  %  2002  1291  0 0 28 45 61  150 
Total target variable %  2002  1007  20  40  64  84  109  197 
Total variable %  2002  1177  12  36  65  86  115  214 
Total Target Cash  2002  1291  139034  216364  315859  400233  495000  914367 
Total  Cash  2002  1291 140162 223500 323104  424478  536171 1036020 
Total Target Direct Compensation  2002  1291  154813  259194  410741  553939  688907  1403675 
Total Direct Compensation  2002  1291  160991  266196  428596  578184  714991  1470677 
Age of individual  2002  769  38  45  50  49  55  59 
Tenure position (years)  2002  693  1  1  2  3  3  9 
Tenure company (years)  2002  680  1  5  14  16  26  37 
Span of control (# of employees)  2002  684  7  103  1029  5076  4260  16983 
Company total employees  2002  225  1805  10013  25554  49978.12  69400  177000 
Company total assets (* 1 mln)  2002  217  463  2621  8544  56605.75  30148  376747 
Company total sales (* 1mln)  2002  215  487  2183  6154  15410.35  18280  53689 
Responsibility (relative size PC)  2002  1087  0  1  6  17  22  84 
Base  salary  2003  1606 110004 165000 240000  292573  370006  645920 
Base increase %  2003  1196  0  2  5  6  8  17 
STI target value  2003  1534  21247  47993  85957  128572  161000  382800 
STI target %  2003  1534  15  25  35  40  50  81 
STI max %  2003  1348  26  45  60  68  80  144 
STI value  2003  1458  0  38054  74832  128814  155223  432000 
STI  %  2003  1458  0 21  34 41 50 99 
LTI value  2003  1606  0  0  54100  124989  133200  439593 
LTI  %  2003  1606  0 0 23 46 52  123 
Total target variable %  2003  1534  20  39  60  75  102  167 
Total variable %  2003  1458  12  35  62  88  105  187 
Total Target Cash  2003  1606  135008  216589  330507  415381  521167  999018 
Total  Cash  2003  1606 135369 214276 324884  416771  507179 1037824 
Total Target Direct Compensation  2003  1606  158016  262503  394917  540371  662019  1408797 
Total Direct Compensation  2003  1606  152119  257070  392308  541760  651212  1424797 
Age of individual  2003  863  38  44  49  49  55  60 
Tenure position (years)  2003  830  0  1  2  3  4  8 
Tenure company (years)  2003  847  1  5  14  15  24  35 347 
 
Profit Centre Head  year  N  p5  p25  p50  mean  p75  p95 
Span of control (# of employees)  2003  787  6  160  1250  5155  4500  21130 
Company total employees  2003  291  1545  9000  25567  47674  66400  163694 
Company total assets (* 1 mln)  2003  283  582  2417  8240  55258  37968  300548 
Company total sales (* 1mln)  2003  283  495  2116  5970  15419  17553  50025 
Responsibility (relative size PC)  2003  1322  0  2  8  19  23  92 
Base  salary  2004  1870 114452 167812 243032  299068  380000  658795 
Base increase %  2004  1339  0  2  4  6  7  17 
STI target value  2004  1752  19800  49429  93900  143281  177801  424153 
STI target %  2004  1752  15  25  36  44  50  100 
STI max %  2004  1411  28  45  60  71  90  150 
STI value  2004  1610  0  40000  83914  155843  197003  524688 
STI  %  2004  1610  0 21  34 45 56  115 
LTI value  2004  1714  0  5241  85266  169731  205813  683220 
LTI  %  2004  1714  0 4 33 49 67  152 
Total target variable %  2004  1600  23  41  75  91  120  208 
Total variable %  2004  1491  15  38  75  96  125  232 
Total Target Cash  2004  1870  136347  220379  333167  433308  556234  1055873 
Total  Cash  2004  1870 131793 209820 326771  441672  563132 1112910 
Total Target Direct Compensation  2004  1714  160004  265939  443153  615929  793100  1634254 
Total Direct Compensation  2004  1714  151525  253733  440691  625200  800028  1794556 
Age of individual  2004  1465  39  45  50  50  55  60 
Tenure position (years)  2004  1113  0  1  2  3  4  8 
Tenure company (years)  2004  908  1  5  13  15  23  34 
Span of control (# of employees)  2004  733  7  304  1579  5930  5500  26000 
Company total employees  2004  306  1031  8741  24264  43890  61732  161310 
Company total assets (* 1 mln)  2004  299  503  2362  8043  60523  36835  417148 
Company total sales (* 1mln)  2004  297  262  2173  5685  15311  16262  59773 
Responsibility (relative size PC)  2004  1490  0  3  8  21  26  95 
Base  salary  2005  2002 113273 180000 252583  305763  377578  650000 
Base increase %  2005  1311  0  2  4  6  7  17 
STI target value  2005  1928  20000  51820  98755  153666  183640  475687 
STI target %  2005  1928  15  27  40  44  50  94 
STI max %  2005  1616  26  45  60  73  100  150 
STI value  2005  1586  13025  49875  99885  176395  214500  536961 
STI  %  2005  1586  8 26  41 51 61  113 
LTI value  2005  1904  0  19113  72810  189634  180951  636376 
LTI  %  2005  1904  0 10  30 48 56  140 
Total target variable %  2005  1832  22  44  70  89  108  198 
Total variable %  2005  1514  18  45  74  101  120  247 
Total Target Cash  2005  2002  140000  235383  352386  453750  556906  1097836 
Total  Cash  2005  2002 135003 226724 337642  453644  546889 1100000 
Total Target Direct Compensation  2005  1904  161130  281115  454517  652539  772053  1730547 
Total Direct Compensation  2005  1904  152846  273156  443457  653141  767740  1726391 
Age of individual  2005  1663  39  44  49  49  54  59 
Tenure position (years)  2005  1269  0  1  2  3  4  8 348 
 
Profit Centre Head  year  N  p5  p25  p50  mean  p75  p95 
Tenure company (years)  2005  1492  1  5  12  15  24  34 
Span of control (# of employees)  2005  1139  10  250  1304  5547  5234  25000 
Company total employees  2005  344  881  7044  21843  45087  64102  167801 
Company total assets (* 1 mln)  2005  340  311  2240  7165  70939  30106  383392 
Company total sales (* 1mln)  2005  339  257  1924  5595  16056  16528  61303 
Responsibility (relative size PC)  2005  1663  0  2  8  21  27  100 
Base  salary  2006  1951 109776 175351 257250  317171  400000  721964 
Base increase %  2006  1268  0  3  4  6  7  17 
STI target value  2006  1878  22460  52520  95711  170649  202149  541473 
STI target %  2006  1878  15  28  40  46  50  100 
STI max %  2006  1677  25  42  60  75  90  165 
STI value  2006  1744  11200  46248  87744  205773  199457  697392 
STI  %  2006  1744  7 25  37 54 59  125 
LTI value  2006  1891  0  10293  62100  186851  170875  696182 
LTI  %  2006  1891  0 6 25 44 50  129 
Total target variable %  2006  1820  20  40  67  87  106  215 
Total variable %  2006  1707  18  40  67  99  116  250 
Total Target Cash  2006  1951  136256  231840  357500  481436  592500  1210000 
Total  Cash  2006  1951 138264 234536 350127  508664  574683 1277516 
Total Target Direct Compensation  2006  1891  147550  266780  431842  661936  766143  1863864 
Total Direct Compensation  2006  1891  146899  267100  433763  693284  766131  1933737 
Age of individual  2006  1685  39  45  49  50  55  60 
Tenure position (years)  2006  1314  0  1  3  3  5  9 
Tenure company (years)  2006  1626  1  5  13  15  24  34 
Span of control (# of employees)  2006  980  12  198  975  4289  4000  19951 
Company total employees  2006  330  692  6689  19627  45426  61900  164078 
Company total assets (* 1 mln)  2006  325  381  2461  8021  78088  32190  512185 
Company total sales (* 1mln)  2006  325  288  1867  5802  16202  14509  66152 
Responsibility (relative size PC)  2006  1594  0  3  10  22  30  100 
Base  salary  2007  1810 109600 174100 253536  309974  386004  692670 
Base increase %  2007  1034  0  3  5  7  8  20 
STI target value  2007  1711  26551  54817  107941  186934  210000  600000 
STI target %  2007  1711  17  30  41  52  60  110 
STI max %  2007  1437  30  44  67  86  100  200 
STI  value  2007 1657 20157 52940 107514 253706 246282 825146 
STI  %  2007  1657  12  28  44 68 75  168 
LTI value  2007  1715  0  16117  79603  197952  205166  753032 
LTI  %  2007  1715  0 9 32 50 64  151 
Total target variable %  2007  1619  25  48  79  98  124  233 
Total variable %  2007  1581  23  48  82  120  139  298 
Total Target Cash  2007  1810  135705  235419  361823  486684  593741  1268500 
Total  Cash  2007  1810 145062 234739 359890  548965  609000 1479380 
Total Target Direct Compensation  2007  1715  163645  277200  448329  690297  821188  2000844 
Total Direct Compensation  2007  1715  163495  275893  460000  756647  851282  2255049 
Age of individual  2007  1455  40  45  49  50  55  61 349 
 
Profit Centre Head  year  N  p5  p25  p50  mean  p75  p95 
Tenure  position  (years) 2007  1159  0 1 3  4  5 10 
Tenure company (years)  2007  1428  1  5  13  15  23  34 
Span of control (# of employees)  2007  893  11  170  902  4796  3800  21117 
Company total employees  2007  330  700  7097  20738  47270  62009  175000 
Company total assets (* 1 mln)  2007  324  349  2690  9354  94953  34646  497679 
Company total sales (* 1mln)  2007  324  217  2171  6016  19768  16282  72448 
Responsibility (relative size PC)  2007  1442  0  2  9  19  25  84 
Base  salary  2008  2075 111800 166800 238586  302218  369802  700000 
Base increase %  2008  828  0  3  5  6  8  19 
STI target value  2008  1881  27626  53900  95010  181684  191500  606085 
STI target %  2008  1881  17  30  40  51  60  102 
STI max %  2008  1547  30  42  60  82  100  200 
STI  value  2008  1904 5500  47485 96981 239439 214177  816143 
STI  %  2008  1904  3 27  42 63 69  142 
LTI value  2008  1921  0  21864  63600  171361  179974  641689 
LTI  %  2008  1921  0 11  30 43 53  123 
Total target variable %  2008  1757  25  50  77  92  112  213 
Total variable %  2008  1785  17  47  80  107  123  251 
Total Target Cash  2008  2075  141507  221130  324000  466917  538744  1237652 
Total  Cash  2008  2075 138000 223066 335000  525964  569195 1421914 
Total Target Direct Compensation  2008  1921  159572  260260  393490  642157  750000  1834066 
Total Direct Compensation  2008  1921  155820  260000  410865  704878  767775  2054672 
Age of individual  2008  1130  39  45  50  50  55  61 
Tenure  position  (years) 2008  1233  0 1 3  4  5 10 
Tenure company (years)  2008  1645  1  6  14  15  24  35 
Span of control (# of employees)  2008  914  18  265  1101  5468  4163  24767 
Company total employees  2008  308  750  6253  20839  51236  67554  186049 
Company total assets (* 1 mln)  2008  302  367  2947  9612  109227  42893  647027 
Company total sales (* 1mln)  2008  298  306  2128  6088  22958  19019  81334 













Appendix 4.4: Heckit table sample selection equations 
This table shows the sample selection equation (CEO remains in position) as part of the Heckit 
model relating to table 4.16 and 4.18. 
Variable      Base salary gap (ln)  TTC gap (ln)     TDC gap  
          
TTDC         3.629e-07*** 
Reporting level difference    .1895486***  .20467706***   .19640988** 
Age difference    0.00329115  0.0052646    -0.00008652 
Externally hired recently difference   -0.01172243  0.00248488   0.06184714 
Position tenure difference    -0.00100655  -0.00536286    0.01931083 
Company tenure difference    0.00015227  0.0006949    0.00389838 
International scope difference    -0.00515073  -0.03186174    -0.01012449 
Previous CEO    0.01071967  -0.0674308    -0.12406185 
CEO age  Superset  0.00420802  -0.00693439    0.01209669 
CEO exthired. rec.  Superset  0.10974132  -0.05728351    -0.07423294 
CEO position tenure  Superset  .37466895***  .37815404***   .31141496*** 
CEO tenure  Superset  .01126921*  0.0090911    0.00749915 
CEO international scope  Superset  0.05603821  0.11813024    0.00529689 
Dummy CEO = Chair    .65580926**  .87526075***   1.0454613** 
CEO share value owned    0.000000001972  1.820e-09*   0.000000001049
CEO share percentage owned    -.04305281***  -0.05157526    0.05107305 
Dummy female CEO    .73806186*  1.0812954*    -0.03253992 
Dummy education (PhD, Prof)    0.00938308  0.16598001    0.89651244 
Financial paper (control)    -0.00163326  -0.00111626    -0.00167883 
Large paper (control)    0.00039459  -0.0011162    -0.00035558 
Media CEO    -0.00120336  0.00162867    -0.00268105 
Company assets (ln)    -0.00134401  0.00088613    0.03807978 
Span of control difference    -2.484e-06**  -2.754e-06**    -2.932e-06* 
Sales difference    0.000001021  0.000001249    0.0000007523 
Company age (years)    0.00137844  0.00040242    .00242912** 
IPO age (categories)    0.01720575  0.01110329    0.02803434 
Diversification level (conglomerate)    0.11030201  0.0665853    -0.0675978 
Governance (dummy two-tier board)    0.06923833  0.11599046    -0.15403096 
Size of the main board    0.0285001  0.01591203    -0.00216434 
NED percentage on main board    0.001889  -0.00084282    -0.00045626 
Size of the Supervisory Board    0.03213544  0.03454721    0.05196252 
Tobin’s Q (market-to-book)    0.00166787  0.00183166    0.00227621 
Liquidity ratio    0.01217558  -0.03682133    -0.09058953 
Solvency ratio    0.00161528  0.00076063    -0.00040349 
ROCE   -0.00032372  -0.00153752    0.00300166 
Profit margin    0.00085953  -0.00073067    -0.00200712 
Gearing   0.00020941  0.0002009    0.00033698 
Interest coverage    0.00002972  0.00007238    0.00014507 
Capital expenditure % of sales    0.00006038  0.00057122    0.0004579 
Volatility   -.00134313**  -0.00125066    0.00489169 351 
 
Variable      Base salary gap (ln)  TTC gap (ln)     TDC gap  
Block holders total %    0.00018392  -0.00012004    -0.00021653 
Block holder % (insurance company)    .00965025*  .00772002*    .0119486** 
Block holder % (bank)    -.00619412*  -.00642808*    -.00742378* 
Block holder % (industrial company)    0.0029778  0.00212002    0.00388002 
Block holder % (nominee/trust)    -0.00604804  -0.00605051    -0.00676374 
Block holder % (financial company)    0.00126172  0.00049663    -0.00181258 
Block holder % (individual / family)    0.00825173  0.01660228    .02912138* 
Block holder % (foundation)    -0.0004  0.00936703    0.00136367 
Block holder % (emp./ man./directors)    0.02922383  .18084736**    -0.04548846 
Block holder % (private equity)    0.00576811  0.00493605    -0.00176106 
Block holder % (state)    -.00695158*  -0.00471549    -0.00402243 
Dummy presence rem. comm.    0.01013558  0.02182818    -0.11585094 
Dummy presence rem. advisor    0.05476644  0.13041596    0.05730451 
Dummy Towers     0.1721242  0.04457852    0.29750582 
Dummy Mercer    -0.32497456  -0.33274841    0.28585134 
Dummy NBS    -0.13797197  0.06222563    0.48872667 
Dummy Kepler    -.83100831**  -.84431812*    -0.89451271 
Dummy Monks    -1.0693001**  -14247569    -13483351 
Country dummy (Austria)    -1.3789485***  -1.9645401***   0.03676933 
Country dummy (Belgium)    0.11597644  0.30039588    .65013453* 
Country dummy (Spain)    -0.44861111  -.73515393*    -0.3729831 
Country dummy (France)    -.58314707**  -.60589588*    -0.28997051 
Country dummy (Germany)    -0.20799447  -1.0711085**    0.2522474 
Country dummy (Italy)    -0.41846429  0.09606664    0.60905219 
Country dummy (Sweden)    -0.34275663  -0.15406001    0.18508213 
Country dummy (Switzerland)    -.7211577*  -.69510217*    0.54807564 
Country dummy (UK)    -0.30041113  -0.04661263    -0.08209246 
Time dummy (2008)    -0.14791396  -0.1949759    -.65115177* 
Time dummy (2007)    -0.38841913  -0.28143684    -0.29645792 
Time dummy (2006)    -0.23266181  -0.17851996    -0.12494982 
Time dummy (2005)    -0.24968578  -0.0670487    -0.06304851 
Time dummy (2004)    0.0757182  -0.03441118    0.03207074 
Time dummy (2003)    -.47636746*  -.49377454*    -0.34613675 
Time dummy (2002)    -.66454777**  -.89203218***   -0.58734416 
Time dummy (2001)    -.5655981*  -.71482561**    -0.475208 
_cons   -0.17653564  0.36161292    -0.83547481 
          
athro   -1.7157819***  -1.3282952***   -.87460526** 
lnsigma      -.62305902***   -.64373331***   13.087866*** 352 
 
Appendix 4.5: Overview of literature on the determinants of CEO remuneration 
Variable   Positive / negative effect  Reference 
    Bebchuk et al. (2007) 
    Core et al. (1999) 
Job/firm tenure  +  Cyert et al. (1997) 
    Finkelstein & Hambrick (1989) 
      Hill & Phan (1991) 
    Bebchuk et al. (2007) 
Age  +  Conyon & Murphy (2000) 
      Lewellen et al. (1985) 
    Bebchuk et al. (2002) 
    Bebchuk et al. (2007) 
Externally hired  +  Deckop (1988) 
   Murphy  (2002) 
      Murphy & Zabojnik (2003) 
   Leonard  (1990) 
Education  +  Ortín-Ángel & Salas-Fumás (1998) 
    Bebchuk et al. (2007) 
Ownership stake  +  Finkelstein & Hambrick (1989) 
      Tosi & Gómez-Mejia (1989) 
    Balkin & Gómez-Mejia (1987) 
    Baker et al. (1988) 
   Baumol  (1959) 
   Becker  (1964) 
   Boyd  (1994) 
   Ciscel  (1974) 
    Ciscel & Carroll (1980) 
    Conyon & Murphy (2000) 
Firm size  +  Conyon & Schwalbach (2000) 
   Deckop  (1988) 
    Finkelstein & Hambrick (1989) 
    Kraft & Niederprum (1999) 
    Lambert et al. (1991) 
   Murphy  (1998) 
    O'reilly et al. (1988) 
   Rosen  (1982;1992) 
      Simon (1957) 
   Agarwal  (1981) 
   Ciscel  (1974) 
    Ciscel & Carroll (1980) 
    Conyon & Schwalbach (2000) 
    Core et al. (1999) 
   Deckop  (1988) 
Firm performance  +  Finkelstein & Hambrick (1989) 
    Hall & Lieberman (1998) 
    Jensen & Murphy (1990a;1990b) 
    Kraft & Niederprum (1999) 
    Lewellen & Huntsman (1970) 
    McGuire et al. (1962) 
   Murphy  (1985) 
      O'Reilly et al. (1988) 
Capital structure  +  Bebchuk et al. (2007) 
Shareholder rights/anti-
takeover mechanisms  + 
Bebchuk et al. (2007) 
Borokovich et al. (1997) 
      Fahlenbrach (2004) 353 
 
Presence of 
institutional investors  -  Hartzell & Starks (2002) 
    Bebchuk et al. (2002) 
    Cyert et al. (1997) 
Presence of 
large shareholder  - 
Dyl (1988) 
Kraft & Niederprum (1999) 
    Gómez-Mejia et al. (1987) 
      Tosi & Gómez-Mejia (1989) 
   Boyd  (1994) 
    Bebchuk et al. (2007) 
CEO = chair  +  Conyon & Murphy (2000) 
    Core et al. (1999) 
      Cyert et al. (1997) 
    Bebchuk et al. (2007 
Board size  +  Core et al. (1999) 
      Yermack (1996) 
Busy board  +  Core et al. (1999) 
Industry factors:     
* Financial services  +  Murphy (1998) 
* Conglomerates  +  O'Reilly et al. (1988) 
    Abowd & Bognanno (1999) 
Country factors (Anglo- 
American firms: 
dispersed ownership)   + 
Conyon & Schwalbach (2000) 
Murphy (1998) 
LaPorta et al. (1999) 
      Oxelheim & Randøy (2005) 
 
 
 